Karnataka High Court
Sri G K Praveen Kumar vs State Of Karnataka By on 19 June, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 KAR 2525
Author: B. Veerappa
Bench: B. Veerappa
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF JUNE, 2020
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B. VEERAPPA
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. I. ARUN
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.314/2015
BETWEEN:
1. SRI G. K. PRAVEEN KUMAR,
S/O LATE G. KANNAN NAIDU,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS
2. SMT. KASTHURI,
W/O LATE KANNAN NAIDU,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
BOTH WERE RESIDENT OF
GOVINDA NILAYA, R. P. BOWRYLALPET,
ROBERTSONPET, K. G. F.-563122.
(NOW ARE IN J.C.)
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI M. NARAYANA REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
OORGAUM POLICE STATION,
K. G. F., BANGARPET TALUK-563120.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI S. RACHAIAH, HCGP)
2
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, PRAYING TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION AND
SENTENCE DATED 06.03.2015, PASSED BY THE PRESIDING
OFFICER, FAST TRACK COURT, K.G.F., IN S.C.NO.45/2012
CONVICTING APPELLANTS/ACCUSED NO.1 & 3 FOR THE
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 498-A, 304-B READ
WITH SECTION 34 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE AND SENTENCING
THEM TO UNDERGO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY FINE OF
RS.2,00,000/- EACH AS THE COMPENSATION TO THE FAMILY
OF THE VICTIM AND IN DEFAULT OF PAYMENT OF FINE TO
UNDERGO SIMPLE IMPRISONMENT FOR A PERIOD OF 6
MONTHS, AND TO ACQUIT THE APPELLANTS/ACCUSED OF ALL
THE CHARGES ETC.,
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL COMING ON FOR HEARING THIS
DAY, B.VEERAPPA, J, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The present Criminal Appeal filed by the appellants - Accused No.1 (husband of the deceased ) and Accused No.3 (mother-in-law of the deceased) against the Judgment & Order of conviction and sentence dated 6.3.2015 made in S.C. No.45/2012 on the file of the Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, KGF convicting for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry 3 Prohibition Act ('D.P. Act' for short) and sentencing them to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment of six months.
2. Brief facts of the prosecution case are as under:
The Accused Nos.1 and 2 are brothers and Accused No.3 is mother of Accused Nos.1 and 2. Prior to the marriage of the deceased Hemalatha with Accused No.1, negotiations held and it was agreed that PWs.1 and 2 (parents of the deceased) have to give 240 grams jewellery and two wheeler or cash of Rs.70,000/- and on 16.9.2010, the marriage of the Accused No.1 and the deceased was performed at Reddy Kalyana Mantapa, KGF.
At the time of the marriage, jewelry and other expenses were met by the parents of the deceased. After marriage, deceased and Accused No.1 lived cordially in matrimonial home at R.P. Bowrilapet, Robertsonpet. Subsequently, 4 accused demanded for eight sovereign jewelry and cash of Rs.70,000/- or two wheeler vehicle and subjected the deceased to mental and physical cruelty. The accused posed condition that if the dowry is not given, they will conduct panchayath and will not take the deceased- Hemalatha to the matrimonial home. All the accused abetted and instigated the deceased to commit suicide stating that "Go and die somewhere". On 22.2.2012 afternoon at 12.30 p.m. unable to bear the physical and mental torture, the deceased-Hemalatha hanged herself in pooja room at her parents' house and died.
3. Based on the aforesaid complaint by PW.1, the jurisdictional Police registered Crime No.11/2012 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Investigating Officer - PW.18 - Deputy Superintendent of Police after investigation filed the charge sheet against Accused Nos.1 to 3. After committal of the case, the charge has been 5 framed against Accused Nos.1 to 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. Accused pleaded guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 18 and got marked Ex.P1 to Ex.P16(a) and MOs.1 to 6. The defence has not examined any witness on its behalf and got marked Ex.D1 to Ex.D8.
5. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, were recorded. In the said statement, at paragraphs 8 and 9, the Accused No.1 has stated that his wife (deceased) was not at all residing in his house and she had left his house on 1.8.2011 by taking all her belongings including cash of Rs.35,000/- and failed to turn up to lead a matrimonial life and he had persuaded the deceased on number of times to come and 6 join, but she failed to join him in order to conceal the disease which she was suffering. Accused No.1 further stated that subsequent to desertion by his wife, he got a reliable information through the Discharge Summary of R.L. Jalappa Hospital & Research Centre, Tamaka, Kolar, that his deceased wife was admitted to said hospital on 2.8.2011 and discharged on 7.8.2011 as she was suffering from conversion disorder and the said aspect was not brought to his knowledge at the time of marriage and the same has been concealed by the deceased and her parents.
6. The trial Court considering both oral and documentary evidence on record, has recorded a finding that the prosecution proved beyond all reasonable doubt that Accused No.1 - G.K. Praveen Kumar, Accused No.2 - Sathish are brothers and Accused No.3 is mother of Accused Nos.1 and 2 and negotiations were held between the accused and PWs.1 and 2 and it was agreed that PW.2 has to give 240 grams of jewelry and two wheeler or cash 7 of Rs.70,000/- in the form of dowry and the accused have received the same in the marriage and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 3 of the D.P. Act.
7. The Trial Court further recorded a finding that the prosecution proved beyond all reasonable doubt that on 16.9.2010 the accused No.1 married the deceased Hemalatha at Reddy Kalyana Mantapa, KGF and after the marriage, they lived cordially in matrimonial home at R.P. Bowrilapet, Robertsonpet and during that period, the accused demanded for 8 sovereign jewelry and cash of Rs.70,000/- or two wheeler vehicle and further subjected the deceased to mental and physical cruelty and harassment for dowry, thereby committed offences punishable under Section 4 of the D.P. Act and Section 498A of IPC.
8. The Trial Court further recorded a finding that the prosecution proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the 8 accused being the husband, brother-in-law and mother-in- law of the deceased Hemalatha, while she was residing in the matrimonial home, with their common intention, demanded the deceased to bring remaining 8 sovereign jewelry and cash of Rs.70,000/- or two wheeler vehicle as agreed in negotiations, thereby they subjected the deceased to mental and physical cruelty. The prosecution also proved that the accused have abetted and instigated the deceased to commit suicide stating that "go and die somewhere' and the legal notice for divorce was also given to the victim and on 22.2.2012 unable to bear physical and mental torture, the deceased hanged herself in her parents' house at pooja room and died committing suicide, thereby accused committed an offence of dowry death punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code.
9. Accordingly, the Trial Court by the impugned Judgment and order, convicted Accused Nos.1 and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 304B r/w Section 9 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/- each and in case of default of payment fine to undergo further imprisonment for six months and acquitted Accused No.2 for the said offences conferring benefit of doubt.
10. The Convicted Accused Nos.1 and 3 have filed the present Criminal Appeal questioning the Judgment & Order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court.
11. The respondent - State has not preferred any appeal questioning the order of acquittal of the Accused No.2 for the offences with which he has been charged.
12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis.
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13. Sri M. Narayana Reddy, learned counsel for appellants/Accused Nos.1 and 3 contended with vehemence that the impugned Judgment & Order of conviction against Accused Nos.1 and 3 is without any basis and the Trial Court convicted Accused Nos.1 and 3 based on the assumptions and presumptions and therefore, the same cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. He would contend that the deceased had suicidal tendency as per the statement of PW.2 - father, thereby she has committed suicide in the house of her parents and the same would not attract the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. He further contended that the deceased has taken treatment for conversion disorder from 2.8.2011 to 7.8.2011 as spoken to by PWs.1 and 2 (parents of the deceased) in their evidence and the said fact has been concealed by the parents and because of the mental disorder of the 11 deceased, the Accused No.1 - husband filed M.C. No.5/2012 as per Ex.D4 for divorce.
14. He further contended that admittedly in the very impugned Judgment, the Accused No.2 (brother-in-law of the deceased) was acquitted for the aforesaid offences holding that the prosecution failed to prove beyond all reasonable doubt the involvement of Accused No.2 and the said order of acquittal has reached finality and the respondent - State has not filed any appeal challenging the order of acquittal. He would contend that absolutely there is no material against Accused No.1 (husband of the deceased) and Accused No.3 (mother-in-law of the deceased) for their involvement in the commission of the alleged offences and pressurizing the deceased to commit suicide. He would further contend that soon before death, the deceased was not subjected to any cruelty or harassment as there was no complaint either by the deceased or parents of the deceased and the same was 12 supported by the statements of PWs.9 and 17. In the alternative, he contended that the deceased wife died by natural death i.e., strangulation by herself and therefore, extreme punishment of life imprisonment imposed by the Trial Court is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by Accused Nos.1 and 3, in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, he sought to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned Judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against Accused Nos.1 and 3.
15. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the following judgments:
1. Hem Chand -vs- State of Haryana (AIR 1995 SC 120 .. paragraph-7)
2. State of Karnataka -vs- Dr. H.A. Ramaswamy and others (1996 Crl.LJ 2628 .. paragraphs 26, 28 and 30) 13
3. State of H.P. -vs- Jagroop Singh and others (1993 Crl.LJ 2766 .. paragraphs 17, 18 and 19)
4. State of Karnataka -vs- Dattaraj and others [(2016)12 SCC 331 .. paragraph18]
5. Sharad Biridhichand Sanda -vs- State of Maharashtra (AIR 1984 SC 1622 .. paragraph 95)
16. Per contra, Sri S. Rachaiah, learned HCGP sought to justify the impugned Judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed against Accused Nos.1 and
3. He would contend that PW.1 - mother (complainant) ; PW.2- father, PW.5 - grand-mother; PW.9 - neighbour of the deceased; PW-10 - aunt of the deceased; and PW.17 - grand-father of the deceased, have categorically stated on oath that there was a demand for dowry at the time of the marriage and as the demand was not fulfilled, there was constant harassment to the deceased by the accused and therefore unable to bear the torture, the deceased has 14 taken the extreme step to commit suicide in her parents' house, thereby the prosecution proved the mental torture, harassment and demand of dowry beyond all reasonable doubt attracting the provisions of Section 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. He would further contend that admittedly the marriage between the accused No.1 and the deceased was performed on 16.9.2010 and the death took place on 22.2.2012 within seven years and therefore, the presumption has to be drawn under the provisions of Section 113B of the Evidence Act, thereby the death of the deceased attracts the provisions of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code.
17. He further contended that though the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the deceased has taken treatment from 2.8.2011 to 7.8.2011 for mental disorder in R.L. Jalappa Hospital, no document produced by the appellants - accused and no suggestion was made to 15 any of the prosecution witnesses and therefore, the said contention cannot be accepted. He would further contend that offence committed by Accused Nos.1 and 3 is not only against the deceased, but also against the society at large. Therefore, the Court has to take cognizance of seriousness of the offence and dismiss the appeal.
18. In support of his contentions, learned HCGP relied upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tummala Venkateswara Rao -vs- State of A.P. reported in (2014)2 SCC 240, wherein it is held as under:
"Section 304B of IPC - Expression 'soon before her death' under - how to be construed - Held, said term has been consistently held by Supreme Court not to mean immediately before death - Term 'soon before her death' has been employed by Parliament to refer to cruelty or harassment which was meted out in proximity and has to be considered as cause of death - The provision does not employ the term "at any 16 time before" nor "immediately before" and must be construed according to its true import - Section 113-B of the Evidence Act."
19. In view of the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration in the present appeal are:
(i) Whether the Trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) for the offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act ?
(ii) Whether the Trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) for the offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act ?
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(iii) Whether the quantum of sentence imposed by the Trial Court calls for any modification by this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the present case ?
20. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material including the Original Records carefully.
21. The substance of the prosecution case is that the marriage of the deceased and Accused No.1 was performed on 16.9.2010 and it was arranged marriage and according to PWs.1 and 2, they have to give 240 grams of gold and two wheeler or cash of Rs.70,000/- as per the marriage negotiations. The agreement was not fulfilled by the parents of the deceased as agreed and therefore there was constant mental and physical cruelty to the deceased by 18 Accused Nos.1 and 3 and thereby she was forced to take extreme step of committing suicide on 22.2.2012. Therefore, Accused Nos.1 and 3 are punishable under the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act.
22. Though no witness was examined on behalf of the defence, the statement of Accused No.1 was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accused No.1 has taken the specific defence in the 313 statement that his wife deceased not at all residing in his house and left the house on 1.8.2011 by taking all her belongings including cash of Rs.35,000/- and failed to turn up to lead matrimonial life inspite of his best persuasion. It is further stated that after her desertion on 1.8.2011, Accused No.1 got the information that the deceased had taken the treatment at R.L. Jalappa Hospital and Research Centre, Tamaka, Kolar from 2.8.2011 to 7.8.2011 as she was suffering from conversion disorder. The deceased 19 committed suicide in her parents' house on 22.2.2012 and Accused Nos.1 and 3 have no role at all and question of implication of Accused Nos.1 and 3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act would not arise.
23. In order to re-appreciate the material on record including the oral and documentary evidence, it is relevant to consider the sum and substance of evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
24. PW.1 - Jayanthi who is mother of the deceased deposed that she has given the complaint as per Ex.P2. She deposed that the marriage of the deceased and Accused No.1 was performed on 16.9.2010 at Reddy Kalyana Mantapa, KGF and the marriage expenses were incurred by them (PWs.1 and 2) and they have agreed to give 10 sovereign gold ornaments to the bridegroom and 20 sovereign gold to the bride, but the accused have also 20 demanded two wheeler. She further deposed that at the time of marriage, they have given 40 grams gold bracelet, 40 grams chain and one sovereign ring to the bridegroom and 6 sovereign chain, 6 sovereign mangalya chain and 1 sovereign ear stud and 1 sovereign ear hangings (jumki), ½ sovereign ring and 2 sovereign bangles to the bride (deceased). She also deposed that when her daughter (deceased) came to their house for Deepavali festival, she told that the accused are forcing, coercing, pressurizing and insisting her to bring more jewelry. PW.1 further deposed that when they went to the house of the accused and invited the couple for Sankranti festival, Accused demanded sari and gold and the accused have not allowed the deceased to come to their house for the festival. PW.1 further deposed that accused persons have given mental and physical torture and instigated and driven the deceased to commit suicide. PW.1 further deposed that ultimately on 22.2.2012 at 12 p.m., the deceased committed suicide 21 by hanging herself in pooja room at the parents' house with the aid of sari.
25. In the cross-examination, PW.1 has stated that one Janardhana Naidu (PW.17) and Raghupathi Naidu (PW.11) negotiated the marriage and informed about the bridegroom. She further admitted that the particulars of jewels and its weight and giving of 240 grams jewels is not evidenced through any document and she has not signed any such document. She further stated that the jewels given to the accused No.1 and the deceased were purchased from Mangal Chand Jain. She further admitted that there is no document for payment of Rs.70,000/- for the purpose of purchase of two wheeler and some of the jewels were purchased at Vellore, but the receipts not produced before the Court. She further admitted that the accused have sent the legal notice to the deceased. 22
26. PW.2 - Sridhar who is the father of the deceased has stated on par with his wife (PW.1) with regard to the place of the marriage, payment of gold agreed. He also deposed that he was informed that the accused assaulted on the head of the deceased with iron rod and further husband and mother-in-law of the deceased were not giving proper food to the deceased and she was being ill-treated. In his cross-examination, on the suggestion made that the mental condition of the deceased was not stable and she used to behave abnormally and go around Geetha Circle striping her clothes and that has been informed to the accused, are all denied. He further admitted in the cross- examination that after return back from Africa and while he working at Hyderabad, the deceased got married and they have incurred marriage expenses and given 176 grams gold and assured that again he will go to Africa and after his return, he will fulfill the demand of remaining 8 sovereign gold and cost of motor cycle. He further deposed that in 23 view of constant harassment by the accused, his daughter committed suicide.
27. PW.3 - Subramani who is the inquest witness to mahazar - Ex.P5 conducted on the dead body of the deceased, has deposed that he went alongwith CW.4 - Sathya to the hospital on receiving message that the deceased committed suicide and stated that it is revealed that cause for committing suicide is balance of gold and cost of two wheeler, which is not given as per negotiations of the marriage. He denied the statement- EX.D1. He has stated before the Tahasildar that there was demand for gold jewelry as per Ex.D2 marked by defence.
28. PW.4 - Sathya who is the witness to the spot mahazar - Ex.P1 and seizure of MO.1 - sari of the deceased, has deposed that the parents of the deceased (PWs.1 and 2) had informed him that the deceased had committed suicide due to not fulfilling the demand of 24 balance of jewelry and cost of the two wheeler. He further deposed that the place of suicide has been inspected by the Police and in presence of PW.1, the sari used in suicide has been seized and Ex.P1 - mahazar has been drawn and his signature has been obtained as per Ex.P1(a). He has denied the suggestion that the deceased was suffering from mental disorder and taking treatment even prior to the marriage.
29. PW.5 - Prema who is the grand-mother of the deceased has also deposed about marriage of the deceased and demand of dowry and stated that the deceased has received divorce notice from the accused and that is the cause for intolerable mental stress, which has driven her to commit suicide and the persistent and perpetrated harassment is also the cause for sacrifice of life by the deceased. In the cross-examination, PW.5 admitted that Accused No.1 has filed petition for divorce before the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, KGF and denied that the deceased 25 was admitted to hospital from 2.8.2011 to 7.8.2011 for psychological problem/convulsive state of mind and she further stated that she is not aware of the contents of Ex.P1.
30. PW.6 - Babu who is the witness to the inquest mahazar drawn as per Ex.P5 by the Tahasildar, has deposed that the deceased belonged to his village and he supported the case of the prosecution.
31. PW.7 - Kumar who is the Panchayathdar and whose statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as per Ex.P8, has stated that he knows the marriage of the deceased with accused No.1 and the quarrel between them after the marriage. He further deposed that he went and pacified the quarrel between the accused No.1 and the deceased. However, he denied the statement - Ex.P8. The prosecution treated this witness as hostile.
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32. PW.8 - Ravi who is also Panchayathdar and whose statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded as per Ex.P9, has denied the said statement - Ex.P9. He denied convening of panchayath and the Panchayathdars advising the Accused No.1 not to demand dowry and to lead cordial life. The prosecution treated this witness as hostile.
33. PW.9 - Ravi who is the relative and neighbour of PW.1 deposed that the deceased was in her husband's house at Bowrilapet and she came to her parents' house all of a sudden. He further deposed that when he enquired the deceased as to why she came to her parents house frequently, he learnt that there was due of gold ornaments and cost of two wheeler demanded by the accused. He supported the case of the prosecution.
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34. PW.10 - Ammu who is the younger sister of PW.1 supported the case of the prosecution and portions of her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were marked by the defence as per Ex.D5 and Ex.D6 and she denied the Ex.D5 and Ex.D6.
35. PWs.11 and 14 were Mediators of the marriage between the deceased and Accused No.1 along with PW.17. They have denied their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as per Ex.P11 and Ex.P12. They have turned hostile to the case of the prosecution.
36. PWs.12 and 13 are witnesses to the seizure of articles as per Ex.P11. They have turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution.
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37. PW.15 is the doctor who conducted post mortem examination and the post-mortem report is marked as per Ex.P12. He has deposed that the cause of death of the deceased was due to asphyxia as a result of hanging.
38. PW.16 is the Taluka Executive Magistrate who conducted the inquest proceedings as per Ex.P5.
39. PW.17 who is the grand-father of the deceased was mediating the marriage between the accused No.1 and the deceased along with PW.11.
40. PW.18 who is the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Investigating Officer has deposed that after perusing the records in Crime No.11/2012, he went to the spot, drawn mahazar as per Ex.P1, seized clothes used for committing suicide. He sent the material objects in P.F. No.6/2012 and recorded the statement of Prema and obtained the report as per Ex.P12 and ultimately filed the charge sheet.
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41. Based on the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, Accused Nos.1 and 3 are convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act and acquitted Accused No.2 for the aforesaid offences.
42. In order to attract the provisions of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, a presumption can be raised only on the proof of the following five essentials:
a) Death of a woman took place within seven years of her marriage;
b) Such death took place not under normal circumstances;
c) The woman was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband or his relatives;
d) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry; and
e) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.30
43. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that soon before death, the deceased was not subjected to cruelty or harassment and there is no complaint either from the deceased or from her parents (PWs.1 and 2).
44. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Sections 304B IPC and 113B of the Evidence Act was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hira Lal -vs- State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2003)8 SCC 80, wherein at paragraph-8 it is held as under:
8. Section 304B IPC which deals with dowry death, reads as follows:
"304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to 31 cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:32
(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance.
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.
(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry.
(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:
"113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.--When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death 33 of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Penal Code, 1860."
The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10-8-1988 on "Dowry Deaths and Law Reform". Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has 34 been inserted. As per the definition of "dowry death"
in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death.
45. The provisions of Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant in the present case. Both Section 304B of IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths.
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46. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions stated supra has been amply analyzed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10.8.1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform'. Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the Legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It in this background the presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted.
47. Learned HCGP vehemently contended that the Accused Nos.1 and 3 were constantly demanding dowry from PWs.1 and 2 and harassing the deceased as per the consistent statements of PWs.1,2,5,9, 10 and 17. Therefore, he would contend that the prosecution proved the demand of dowry and presumption of death so as to attract the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. The 36 fact remains that on the same set of evidence of PWs.1,2,5,9, 10 and 17 relied upon by the prosecution, the trial Court by the very impugned Judgment acquitted Accused No.2 (brother-in-law of the deceased) for the aforesaid offences conferring benefit of doubt. The respondent - State has not filed any appeal against acquittal of Accused NO.2 and the same has reached finality.
48. On proper evaluation of both oral and documentary evidence i.e., evidence of PWs.1 to 18 ; material documents - Ex.P1 to Ex.P16(a) and Ex.D1 to Ex.D8 and Material objects Mos.1 to 6, absolutely there is no material against Accused No.3 (mother-in-law of the deceased). The prosecution has not proved the case against Accused No.3 (mother-in-law of the deceased) and her involvement so as to attract the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. In the absence of oral and documentary 37 evidence against Accused No.3 to prove her involvement beyond all reasonable doubt, convicting Accused NO.3 who is aged about 62 years as on the date of the incident and now aged about 67 years, is not justified.
49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 498A and 304B of IPC, has time and again held that in the absence of oral and documentary evidence to implicate, the in-laws including mother-in-law should not be inducted unnecessarily. Our view is fortified by the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sher Singh @ Partapa -vs- State of Haryana reported in (2015)3 SCC 724, wherein at paragraph -20 it is held as under:
20. Now, to the case in hand. It has been contended before us, as was also unsuccessfully argued before both the courts below that there was a "delay" in lodging the FIR. There is no perversity in the concurrent views that its lodgement after ten hours on the day next after the tragedy i.e. 8-2-1998 did 38 not constitute inordinate delay such as would justifiably categorising the FIR as an afterthought or as contrived. The complainant along with family and friends had to travel to another village; he would have had to first come to terms with the tragedy, make enquiries and consider the circumstances, before recording the FIR. Equally preposterous is the argument that once the High Court had seen fit to acquit the other accused, namely, Davinder Singh (brother-in-law) and Jarnail Singh (father-in-law) the appellant/husband should have been similarly acquitted. It cannot be ignored that the accused was not living with his parents and brother, and it is justified nay necessary to require stronger proof to implicate the family members of the husband. It has been essayed by the learned counsel for the appellant to impress upon us that the cruelty postulated in this provision has not been shown to have occurred "soon before her death". This argument, assumes on a demurrer, that statutory cruelty had, in fact, been committed. The deceased and the appellant were married in February 1997 and the former committed suicide within one year;
to even conjecture that it was not soon before death, has only to be stated to be stoutly shot down. 39
50. On proper evaluation of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, the impugned Judgment and order convicting Accused NO.3 for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B r/w 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act and sentencing her to undergo life imprisonment, cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside.
51. The material on record clearly depicts that according to the prosecution as per the evidence of PWs.1,2,5,9, 10 and 17, the Accused No.1 has harassed the deceased for dowry and the deceased died within two years of her marriage. To be specific, the marriage of the deceased and Accused NO.1 was performed on 16.9.2010 and the deceased committed suicide in her parents' house on 22.2.2012 i.e., the death occurred within 7 years of their marriage. Therefore, the provisions of Section 498A and 304B and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act attract in respect of Accused No.1.
40
52. The evidence on record clearly depicts that the deceased was not happy in her matrimonial home. But the cause for this unhappiness was the failure of the first accused in understanding her feelings and not showing love and affection for which she was yearning as well as incompatibility of their likes and dislikes. It is said that there is no greater disparity in marriage than unsuitability of mind and purpose. The marriage appears to have broken down and the deceased did not see any possibility of retrieving it. The husband admittedly issued legal notice four months prior to the deceased taking drastic step of hanging herself. It appears the deceased mentally depressed during that period and she has felt that the only way left to her was to die by committing suicide.
53. Though the learned counsel for the Accused No.1 contended that the deceased was suffering from conversion disorder and the same was concealed by PWs.1 and 2 at 41 the time of marriage, the said contention cannot be accepted as the accused has not made out any efforts to produce any document to prove the conversion disorder of the deceased prior to the marriage.
54. By careful reading of the entire material on record, according to the prosecution witnesses there was harassment and demand of dowry by the accused. It is not in dispute that the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself in the pooja room at her parents' house within seven years of her marriage. Therefore, the provisions of Section 304B of IPC attract presumption against Accused No.1. It is also not in dispute that the Accused No.1 filed M.C. No.5/2012 as per Ex.D4 before the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), KGF under the provisions of Section 13(1)(i-a) and 13(iii)(a)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce and there might be some mistake on the part of the accused and the deceased being educated should not have taken the drastic step of hanging herself and ought to have 42 faced the problem suitably. Unfortunately the circumstances surrounding her compelled her to commit suicide. The deceased received Court summons in respect of petition filed by the Accused No.1 - husband for divorce on 22.2.2012, she seems to have sensitive and committed suicide on the same day at 12.30 p.m. In the present case, no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died un natural death namely hanging herself, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused No.1 and there is no charge under the provisions of Section 302 of IPC, but the fact remains that the deceased died within two years of marriage and in the circumstances, the presumption has to be drawn under the provisions of Section 304B of IPC.
55. At this stage, it is relevant to state that principles for sentencing and proportionality/Balancing of Aggravating and Mitigating circumstances, have to be taken into consideration while imposing the imprisonment for life. The 43 Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the said principles in the case of Hem Chand -vs- State of Haryana reported in AIR 1995 SC 120 (Three Judges' Bench) held at paragraphs 6,7 and 8 held as under:
6. In this appeal, the same contentions have been put forward. We find only from the second set of medical evidence that it is a case of strangulation.
However, for the purpose of this case, it should be accepted that it was an unnatural death. The plea set up by the accused that he found the dead body hanging thereby suggesting that it could be a case of suicide committed by the deceased for unknown reasons is, under the circumstances, wholly unacceptable. Though the case rests on circumstantial evidence, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has rightly been drawn and the appellant is convicted under Section 304-B IPC. Having given our careful consideration we agree with the findings of the courts below.
7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that: 44
"Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B IPC would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman what all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under 45 Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 IPC. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr Usha Rani PW 6 and Dr Indu Lalit PW 7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr Dalbir Singh PW 13 who also examined the 46 dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post-mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 IPC have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused- appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to 47 imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.
8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' RI. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are, however, confirmed. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the above modification of sentence.
56. On the same proposition, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. -vs- Suresh reported in (2019)14 SCC 151, held at paragraphs 13 and 14 as under:
13. Therefore, awarding of just and adequate punishment to the wrongdoer in case of proven crime remains a part of duty of the court. The punishment to be awarded in a case has to be commensurate with the gravity of crime as also with the relevant facts and attending circumstances. Of course, the task is of striking a delicate balance between the mitigating and aggravating 48 circumstances. At the same time, the avowed objects of law, of protection of society and responding to the society's call for justice, need to be kept in mind while taking up the question of sentencing in any given case. In the ultimate analysis, the proportion between the crime and punishment has to be maintained while further balancing the rights of the wrongdoer as also of the victim of the crime and the society at large. No straitjacket formula for sentencing is available but the requirement of taking a holistic view of the matter cannot be forgotten.
14. In the process of sentencing, any one factor, whether of extenuating circumstance or aggravating, cannot, by itself, be decisive of the matter. In the same sequence, we may observe that mere passage of time, by itself, cannot be a clinching factor though, in an appropriate case, it may be of some bearing, along with other relevant factors. Moreover, when certain extenuating or mitigating circumstances are suggested on behalf of the convict, the other factors relating to the nature of crime and its impact on the social order and public interest cannot be lost sight of.49
57. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC in the case of Kashmira Devi -vs- State of Uttarakhand reported in AIR 2020 SC 652 held at paragraph-24 as under:
24. Having arrived at the above conclusion the quantum of sentence requires consideration. The High Court has awarded life imprisonment to the appellant on being convicted under Section 304B IPC. The minimum sentence provided is seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. In fact, this Court in the case of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 727 has held that while imposing the sentence, awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304B IPC should be in rare cases and not in every case. Though the mitigating factor noticed in the said case was different, in the instant case keeping in view the age of the appellant and also the contribution that would be required by her to the family, while husband is also aged and further taking into consideration all other circumstances, the 50 sentence as awarded by the High Court to the appellant herein is liable to be modified.
58. It is not in dispute that PWs.7,8, 11, 12, 13 and 14 have turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution.
59. The doctor - PW.15 who conducted post-mortem examination clearly stated in the post-mortem report - Ex.P12 that the cause of death of the deceased is asphyxia as a result of hanging. The report also depicts that a ligature mark is seen in front of neck above the thyroid cartilage, oblique in direction and the report does not depict any external injuries on the deceased. Admittedly the deceased committed suicide in her native place and not in in-laws house. In the circumstances, the imposition of life imprisonment to Accused No.1 is disproportionate to the crime made out.
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60. In so far as the judgment in the case of Sunil Dutt Sharma -vs- State (Government of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2014)4 SCC 375 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the State, it is a case wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC, modified life imprisonment imposed by the High Court and reduced to 10 years. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph-15 specifically observed that there may not be any direct involvement of the accused - husband with the death and the deceased died within seven years of her marriage and the Hon'ble Supreme Court while modifying the order of life sentence, imposed sentence of ten years to the accused - husband for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC. We have no quarrel with the law laid down in the said judgment. Therefore, the principles laid down in the said judgment are also made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
52
61. Learned counsel for the appellants though relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of H.P -vs- Jagroop Singh and others reported in 1993 Crl.LJ 2766, it was a case where the cordial relations between accused and deceased established and in those circumstances, the accused was liable to be acquitted as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC considered. Admittedly in the present case, there is no material produced by the defence that there was cordial relationship between the deceased and accused No.1 from the date of marriage till her death. Admittedly Accused No.1 - husband filed M.C. No.5/2012 for divorce, which clearly indicates that there is no cordial relationship. Therefore, the said judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
53
62. In yet another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in the case of State of Karnataka -vs- Dr. H.A. Ramaswamy and others reported in 1996 Crl.LJ 2628, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "the material showing exaggerations in oral evidence of witnesses who were close relatives of deceased - offence under Section 304B of IPC not made out and conviction for the offence punishable under Section 498A was not proper." Admittedly in the present case though a contention was taken that some of the witnesses viz., PWs.1,2,5,9,10 and 17 are close relatives, the fact remains even assuming their evidence is not considered, the death took place within two years of marriage of the deceased and the presumption arises under Section 304B. Though in the said judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated that it is the duty of the husband to look after the wife with love and affection, the same has not been made out in the present case. The said 54 judgment has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
63. In so far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in the case of State of Karnataka -vs- Dattaraj and others reported in (2016)12 SCC 331, it was a case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Sections 3,4 and 6 of the D.P. Act and Section 304B IPC held that the customary gifts exchanged in accordance with the prevailing practice and customs not amount to dowry. In the present case, it is not the case of the prosecution or the defence that the alleged dowry demand made by the accused persons and alleged to have been given by PWs.1 and 2 was customary. Therefore, the said judgment is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 55
64. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that soon before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by Accused No.1 (husband). The accused No.1 was not successful in rebutting the presumption raised under the provisions of Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court in respect of Accused No.1 is based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and convincing reasons.
65. On re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, we find that the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) for the offences with which he is charged. The reasons assigned by the trial Court for convicting appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) are just and proper. Accordingly, we answer point No.1 in the affirmative holding that the Trial Court is justified in convicting appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) for the offences punishable under the 56 provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act.
66. Looking to the totality of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and on re-appreciation of the entire material on record, we find that the trial Court is not justified in convicting appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) for the offences with which she is charged. We find that the reasons assigned by the trial Court for convicting appellant No.2 - Accused No.3 (mother-in-law of the deceased) are without any basis. Accordingly, we answer point No.2 in the negative holding that the Trial Court is not justified in convicting appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) for the offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act. In view of the above, the impugned Judgment and order of conviction and sentence in so far as convicting Appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) for the offences with which she is 57 charged and sentencing her to undergo life imprisonment, is liable to be set aside.
67. Having arrived the above conclusion, the quantum of sentence requires consideration. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned HCGP for the respondent - State on the point of imposition of sentence. The Learned counsel for the appellants submits that there are several mitigating circumstances in the present case and there is no direct involvement of Accused NO.1 in the commission of the offence and therefore he pleads for leniency while imposing sentence. However, the said submission is opposed by the learned HCGP. He submits that the sentence imposed by the trial Court is just and proper.
68. The trial Court has imposed life imprisonment to Accused No.1 on being convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. For the said 58 offence, the punishment is imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life. Section 304B IPC thus prescribes statutory minimum sentence of seven years. While imposing the sentence, awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304B of the IPC should be in rare cases and not in every case.
69. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having considered the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has not made out a case that this should be treated as a rare case, where extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be imposed against Accused No.1 for the offence punishable under the provisions of Section 304B of IPC. In view of the mitigating circumstances noticed in the present case stated supra and keeping in view age of the Accused No.1 and the surrounding circumstances, the sentence awarded by the 59 trial Court to Accused No.1 is liable to be modified. Accordingly, we answer point No.3 in the affirmative holding that the quantum of sentence imposed by the Trial Court calls for modification and interest of justice will be met if appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for EIGHT years, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
70. For the reasons stated above, we pass the following:
ORDER
1. The Criminal Appeal is allowed in part.
2. The impugned Judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court in so far as convicting appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) for the offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 60 and 4 of the D.P. Act and sentencing her to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment of six months, is hereby set aside.
3. The appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) shall be released, in case if she is not required in any other case.
4. The bail bonds of appellant No.2 (Accused No.3), who is on bail, shall stand cancelled.
5. In view of acquittal of appellant No.2 (Accused No.3), the fine amount, if any deposited in respect of appellant No.2 (Accused No.3) as per the impugned Judgment, shall be released/disbursed in her favour in accordance with law, in case the fine amount is not already disbursed to the family of the victim.
6. The impugned Judgment of the trial Court in so far as convicting appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) for the offences punishable under 61 Sections 498A and 304B r/w Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act, stands confirmed.
7. The impugned order of sentence passed by the trial Court imposing life imprisonment to the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) for the offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 498A and 304B r/w 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P. Act, is modified and the sentence of imprisonment for life is altered by ordering the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of eight years, which shall include the period of sentence already undergone by the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) as contemplated under the provisions of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8. The fine imposed by the trial Court in respect appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) by the impugned order of sentence, is also modified and reduced from Rs.2,00,000/- to 62 Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only). Out of Rs.1,00,000/-, Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) shall be paid to PW.1 - Smt. Jayanthi and PW.2 - Sridhar (parents of the deceased) in equal proportion after proper identification as compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and remaining Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) shall be remitted to Government account. In case of default of payment of fine, the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) shall undergo further imprisonment of six months.
9. If the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) has already deposited fine amount of Rs.2,00,000/- as per the impugned order of sentence and the same is not disbursed to the family of the victim, the balance amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) shall be refunded to the appellant No.1 (Accused No.1) at the time of his release after serving out the remaining part of the sentence in terms of the present order.
63
10. The parties to bear their own cost.
Accordingly, the impugned Judgment and order passed by the trial Court is modified.
In crafting this judgment, the erudition of Sri M. Narayana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri S. Rachaiah, learned HCGP for the respondent - State, is commendable and the same is placed on record.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE Gss/-