Madhya Pradesh High Court
M/S New Balaji Chemist vs Indian Red Cross Society (Madhya ... on 2 February, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIR 2018 (NOC) 804 (M.P.)
(1)
W.P. No. 20757/2017
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : JABALPUR
(Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice J.K.Maheshwari)
**
Writ Petition No. 20757/2017
M/s New Balaji Chemist
-Vs-
Indian Red Cross Society (Madhya Pradesh State Branch)
& another
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Shri K.C.Ghildiyal, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri V.S.Shroti, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Vikram
Johri, Advocate for respondent No.1.
Shri Atulanand Awasthi and Shri Ankit Saxena, Advocates
for respondent No. 2.
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Arguments heard on : 24.1.2018
Order passed on :
ORDER
1. This petition has been filed by petitioner invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking direction to quash the agreement dated 16.11.2017 entered into by respondent No. 1 Society with respondent No. 2 allotting the shop in question in his favour and further direction to respondent No. 1 Society to execute an agreement in favour of petitioner being the third highest bidder and allow petitioner to commission the shop in question. Prayer has also been made to provide the (2) W.P. No. 20757/2017 petitioner all information/documents of clearance from the connected Departments.
2. The facts unfolded to file the present petition are, petitioner is a proprietorship Firm engaged in Pharmaceutical business. Respondent No. 1 is a Society registered under the provisions of Indian Red Cross Society Act, 1920 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1920") having its Branch office at Shivaji Nagar, Bhopal. An advertisement was published inviting tenders for the purpose of allotment of a Medical shop within the premises of the Society at Bhopal. Petitioner and respondent No. 2 both submitted their tenders. Petitioner was the third highest bidder and respondent No. 2 was the fourth highest bidder. The Tender Committee met on 16.10.2017 at 3:00 PM and opened all the tenders in presence of all twenty tenderers or their representatives. The description of four highest bids as given in the return in Paragraph 8 (a) indicates that first highest bidder was Sandeep Singh Parihar who offered to pay an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- per month as rent, second highest bidder was Mangleshwar Singh Parihar, who offered to pay an amount of Rs.21,52,000/- per month as rent, third highest bidder was petitioner, who offered to pay an amount of Rs.16,52,000/- per month as rent and fourth highest bidder was respondent No. 2, who offered to pay an amount of Rs.12,00,000/- per month as (3) W.P. No. 20757/2017 rent. The bids received by the Tender Committee were arranged chronologically in terms of the bid amount and it was decided that in case the highest bidder does not come forward to execute the agreement then in seriatim the next bidder would be called to execute the agreement. When the first two bidders did not come forward to execute the agreement, petitioner was called on 8.11.2017 to deposit the rent of six months in advance through Bankers cheque or Demand Draft on or before 10.11.2017. On 9.11.2017, petitioner requested for extension of time upto 13.11.2017 to deposit the amount and requested to Society to remain present on 13.11.2017 in the offfice of the Registrar to execute the agreement. The said request of petitioner was not accepted vide communication dated 9.11.2017 and said that if petitioner is willing to execute the agreement, he has to come in the office of Red Cross Society upto 10.11.2017 to deposit the amount and to execute the agreement. Petitioner again requested on 10.11.2017 specifying the fact that on 11.11.2017 and 12.11.2017 there are holidays, therefore, time to deposit the amount may be extended upto 13.11.2017 but no heed was paid to the said request of petitioner and on 10.11.2017 itself notice was issued to respondent No. 2, who was the fourth highest bidder, to deposit the amount upto 14.11.2017. Respondent No. 2 also requested for extension of time for two days i.e. upto 16.11.2017 to deposit the amount and to execute the agreement, (4) W.P. No. 20757/2017 which was allowed, as apparent from document Annexure R-10, however, similar demand of the petitioner was refused without any rhyme or reason discriminating him with respondent No. 2 though he offered to pay a sum of Rs.16,52,000/- per month, which is Rs.4,52,000/- more than the amount offered by respondent No.2 i.e. Rs.12,00,000/-. On deposit of the amount by respondent No. 2, the claim of petitioner is discriminated by the arbitrary act of the authorities, however, he has knocked the door of this Court asking the reliefs as described above.
3. Respondent No. 1 has filed the return raising preliminary objection that Indian Red Cross Society is neither State nor any instrumentality of State or authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is said, it is merely a voluntary organization. Its financial/administrative control is not under the Government and it is merely a society constituted under the Act of 1920, therefore, this petition is liable to be dismissed on the said ground. The reliance has been placed on the judgment of Delhi High Court in Sarmukh Singh Versus India Red Cross Society reported in (1985) LIC 1072. In the judgment of this Court in Dr. Mradula Sharma Versus State Chief Commissioner, M.P. Bharat Scouts and Guides reported in 1995 (1) MPJR 44 and the judgment of Supreme Court in K.K. Saksena Versus International Commission on Irrigation and (5) W.P. No. 20757/2017 Drainage and others reported in (2015) 4 SCC 670, maintainability of the writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been considered. It is further contended that there is no concluded contract in between petitioner and respondent No. 1, therefore, also the writ petition is not maintainable. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on the judgment of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Tamil Nadu, Tea Plantation Corporation Limited, Coonoor and another Versus M/s Srinivasa Timbers, Salem and another reported in AIR 1999 Madras 111. It is further urged that merely acceptance of the tender of the other person would not come within the scope of judicial review challenging the said contract by filing the writ petition, therefore, it is not maintainable. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Meerut Development Authority Versus Association of Management Studies and another reported in (2009) 6 SCC 171 and Bakshi Security and Personnel Services Private Limited Versus Devkishan Computed Private Limited and others reported in (2016) 8 SCC 446. In reply to the said contention, petitioner has placed reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Surjit Singh Gandhi Versus Indian Red Cross Society and others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 450 where the order of dismissal of the writ petition passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was set aside on the ground of maintainability and (6) W.P. No. 20757/2017 the case was remitted back for fresh consideration on the question of maintainability.
4. On merit it is submitted that the shop in question was required to be commissioned w.e.f. 1.1.2018 to which the tender was invited in the News Paper "Dainik Bhaskar". As per Clause 4 of the tender, the successful bidder was required to execute the agreement minimum for a period of six months depositing the amount of offer in advance and at the time of return of the said amount, the interest would not be leviable and payable. As the Red Cross Society do not come within the purview of definition of State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, therefore, not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It is said that having perused the tender, the Committee met on 16.10.2017 and decided that the first highest bidder be offered and intimated to appear in person in the office of the Society and execute the agreement. It was further decided that if the first highest bidder fails to appear and execute the agreement, the second highest bidder be offered and intimated to appear in the office of the Society and execute the agreement. If he too does not come forward to execute the agreement then third highest bidder be offered and intimated to appear in the office of the Society and execute the agreement. In this way, the bidders be offered and intimated in seriatim to execute the agreement. The said Scheme was placed before (7) W.P. No. 20757/2017 Hon'ble the Governor of the State, who is the Ex-Officio President of the Society, who approved it accordingly. Petitioner was the third highest bidder and respondent No. 2 was the fourth highest bidder. It is undisputed that the difference of the amount offered by petitioner and respondent No. 2 is of Rs.4,52,000/- per month. It is merely said that looking to the response given by petitioner, it do not appear that he was willing to execute the agreement and to run the shop, therefore, the contract was given to respondent No.2 on deposit of the amount by him and the agreement was executed with him on 16.11.2017 to run the shop. There is no malafide or arbitrariness, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in counter to the preliminary objection placed reliance on the judgment of Pradeep Kumar Biswas Versus Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111. It is said that the said judgment was considered in the case of Virendra Kumar Srivastava Versus U.P. Rajya Karmachari Kalyan Nigam and another reported in 2005 (1) SCC 149. The Apex Court in the case of Board Of Control For Cricket In India Versus Cricket Association of Bihar and others reported in (2015) 3 SCC 251 has laid down that the Cricket Association of Bihar may not fall within the purview of the State or other (8) W.P. No. 20757/2017 authority but because they are discharging the functions to develop the sports activities in the State and dealing with the Public, therefore, they are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the Court. However, it is urged that even the Red Cross Society do not come within the purview of the definition of the State or other authority or the instrumentality or Agency to discharge the public functions offering the medical facilities to the needy persons and in the said context the shop is being floated by way of tender to be opened in the premises, therefore, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction. Further placing reliance on the judgments of Supreme Court in United India Insurance Company Limited Versus Manubhai Dharmasinhbhai Gajera and others reported in (2008) 10 SCC 404 and Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India Versus Devi Ispat Limited and others reported in (2010) 11 SCC 186, it is submitted that the writ is maintainable in the contractual matter in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is further urged that respondent No. 1 has forfeited the amount of earnest money of Rs.50,000/- of the petitioner, which is permissible only in the case of concluded contract in view of the decision of this Court in S.R.S. Infra Project Private Limited, Gwalior Versus Gwalior Development Authority, Gwalior and another reported in 2010 (2) MPLJ 142. It is further said that the employees of Indian Red Cross Society are not amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High (9) W.P. No. 20757/2017 Court after establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal for the central employees. In this regard, notification under Section 14(2) has been issued, however, it cannot be ignored that the Indian Red Cross Society is discharging public functions, therefore, the action taken by the authority, which is arbitrary and discriminatory, cannot be sustained in law that too causing loss to the society. At last it is urged that in the facts of the present case wherein as per the direction of the Court petitioner has deposited the entire amount of rent of six months in advance, however, in case respondent No. 2 is permitted to run the shop, it would a financial loss of more than Rs.25 Lakhs to the Indian Red Cross Society. In such a situation when a public body is getting more amount, they cannot be permitted to oppose this petition particularly when they have acted in arbitrary and discriminatory manner with petitioner, therefore, allowing this petition agreement of respondent No. 2 be set aside and petitioner be permitted to execute the agreement and commission the shop in question.
6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has adopted the argument as advanced by the counsel for respondent No. 1 and submitted that they have deposited the entire amount and also entered into the agreement, therefore, at present the writ petition is not maintainable. Petitioner may avail the remedy before the (10) W.P. No. 20757/2017 Civil Court filing a suit for specific performance of the contract, therefore, also the writ do not lie and it is liable to be dismissed.
7. After having heard learned counsel for the parties, first of all the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding maintainability of the writ petition is taken into consideration. In this regard, judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) holds the field. In the said case, as per the majority view, certain observations are relevant, which are as under:-
Per majority
1. The Constitution has to an extent defined the word "State" in Article 12 itself as including "the Government...under the control of the Government of India". That an 'inclusive" definition is generally not exhaustive is a statement of the obvious and as far as Article 12 is concerned, has been so held by the Supreme Court. The words "State" and "authority" used in Article 12 therefore remain among "the great generalities of the Constitution"
the content of which has been and continues to be supplied by courts from time to time.
2. The decisions on this pint may be categorized broadly into those which express a narrow and those which express a more liberal view. In the ultimate analysis the difference may perhaps be attributable to different stages in the history of the development of the law by judicial decisions on the subject.
3. In this regard the statement of the law in Rajasthan SEB v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857 is affirmed, namely: "The State, as defined in (11) W.P. No. 20757/2017 Article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people."
4. The significance of Article 12 lies in the fact that it occurs in Part III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental rights. The various articles in Part III have placed responsibilities and obligations on the "State" vis-a-vis the individual to ensure constitutional protection of the individual's right against the State, including the right to equality under Article 14 and equality of opportunity in matter of public employment under Article 16 and most importantly, the right to enforce all or any of these fundamental rights against the "State" as defined in Article 12 either under Article 32 or under Article 226.
5. The range and scope of Article 14 and consequently Article 16 have been widened by a process of judicial interpretation so that the right to equality now not only means the right not to be discriminated against but also protection against any arbitrary or irrational act of the State.
6. Keeping pace with this broad approach to the concept of equality under Article 14 and 16, courts have whenever possible, sought to curb an arbitrary exercise of power against individuals by "centres of power", and thre was correspondingly an expansion in the judicial definition of "State" in Article 12.
7. Initially the definition of State was treated as exhaustive and confined to the authorities or those which could be read ejusdem generis with the authorities mentioned in the definition of Article 12 itself. The next stage was reached when the definition of "State" came to be understood with reference to the remedies available against it. Thus, a statutory corporation, with regulations framed by such corporation pursuant to statutory (12) W.P. No. 20757/2017 powers was considered a State, and the public duty was limited to those which were created by statute.
8. The picture that emerges from the case-
law is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia case, (1981) 1 SCC 722 for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be- whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.
8. Referring the same, it was found that the Indian Institute of Chemical Biology do not fall within the purview of definition of the State but looking to the observations made in Paragraphs 10 and 11, it is apparent that the Courts have whenever possible, sought to curb an arbitrary exercise of power against individuals by "centres of power", and there was correspondingly an expansion in the judicial definition of "State" in Article 12. The Court further observed that initially the definition of State was treated as exhaustive and confined to the authorities or those which could be read ejusdem generis with the authorities mentioned in the definition of Article 12 itself. The next stage was (13) W.P. No. 20757/2017 reached when the definition of "State" came to be understood with reference to the remedies available against it. Thus, a statutory corporation, with regulations framed by such corporation pursuant to statutory powers was considered a State, and the public duty was limited to those which were created by statute. In case it is found that the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government and such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive, then the body is a State within Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Court by minority view has also clarified that by the judicial interpretation the terms "instrumentality" or "agency" have been brought within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, therefore, it cannot be ignored. The Apex Court in the case of K.K. Saksena (supra) has reiterated the same principle but observed that even respondent International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage do not come within the purview of Article 12 but the Court may enforce any right conferred under Part III of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the case of Board of Control For Cricket in India (supra) has observed that the Board Of Control For Cricket In India is discharging the important public functions by holding monopoly over the game of Cricket in India but not being the State within the meaning of Article 12. On the question of amenability of the judicial review, the Court observed that there (14) W.P. No. 20757/2017 being prima facie material indicating sporting frauds like match fixing and betting arising out of/attributable to conflicts of interest between duties of administrators and their commercial interest in Indian Premier League (for short IPL) cricket matches conducted by the Board Of Control For Cricket In India, in such a case the Board Of Control For Cricket In India, who is having complete monopoly over the game of Cricket in India, the Central and the State Government being fully aware of the public functions and being supportive of said activities, the Government can by law take over the functions of Board Of Control For Cricket In India. Even if the duties and functions which the Board Of Control For Cricket In India discharges are administrative and not quasi- judicial, principles of judicial review will find their application with the same rigour as may be applicable to quasi-judicial functions. The Court further observed that Article 12 of the Constitution of India gives an inclusive definition to the expression "State" but the question whether or not Board Of Control For Cricket In India is "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution may not make any material difference to the case at hand in view of the admitted position that respondent Board Of Control For Cricket In India does discharge several important functions, which make it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (15) W.P. No. 20757/2017
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, in addition to the aforesaid has relied upon the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sarmukh Singh (supra) wherein it was held that the Red Cross Society do not fall within the definition of "State" or other authorities or instrumentality of the State, which is relied by this Court in the case of Dr. Mradula Sharma (supra). I do agree with the same proposition but in the light of the judgment of Board of Control For Cricket In India (supra) the amenability of the writ jurisdiction cannot be denied under the scope of judicial review in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court merely on this ground also and it is required to be tested with the action of the authority with a touch-stone whether it is arbitrary/discriminatory or not. The judgment of this Court in Dr. (Smt.) Mradula Sharma (supra) merely decides the issue that respondent M.P. Bharat Scouts and Guides would fall within the definition of State or not. It do not decide the amenability of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as apparent by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Board of Control For Cricket in India (supra).
10. In the present case, petitioner has challenged the action of respondents on the ground that it is arbitrary and discriminatory because respondent No.2 had offered lesser amount than (16) W.P. No. 20757/2017 petitioner causing loss to the society of Rs.4,52,000/- per month even then the time was extended to them for depositing the amount but when the same request was made by petitioner it was refused arbitrarily without any rhyme or reason. However, the discriminatory act of the Red Cross Society is amenable to writ jurisdiction even in the contract matter when the Society registered under the Central statute shall be put in a disadvantageous situation in case the amenability of the writ jurisdiction has been denied. In view of the aforesaid, referring the judgment of the Board Of Control For Cricket In India (supra), it can safely be concluded that the Indian Red Cross Society may not come within the purview of the definition of "State" or other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution of India but looking to the challenge made in this petition, their action, if discriminatory cause loss to the society, which functions for the needy persons, makes them amenable to writ jurisdiction in view of the language engrafted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India that said writ can be issued against the "State", "authority" or "person", therefore, it is held that in the facts, the writ petition is maintainable.
11. In the undisputed facts of the present case, it is apparent that petitioner and respondent No. 2 both were participants to the tender process invited by respondent No. 1 as per Annexure P-1. (17) W.P. No. 20757/2017 Petitioner offered a sum of Rs.16,52,000/- per month towards the rent of the shop while respondent No. 2 offered a sum of Rs.12,00,000/- per month and they were shown to be the third and fourth highest bidders respectively. The Tender Committee took a decision to call the highest bidders to execute the agreement and if he does not come forward then the second highest bidder would be called and thereafter in seriatim next highest bidders would be called. It is to be noted here that the Policy was approved by Hon'ble the Governor of the State, who is the ex-officio President of the Society. Accordingly, from the date of decision i.e. 16.10.2017, to call for the first highest bidder and the second highest bidder, the Society waited for about two weeks but they did not come forward to execute the agreement. Thereafter a communication was sent to petitioner on 8.11.2017, who was the third highest bidder, to deposit the amount of rent of six months in advance by 10.11.2017. On 9.11.2017, petitioner requested for extension of time till 13.11.2017 but the said request of the petitioner was not accepted on 9.11.2017 itself reducing the time to deposit the amount by 1:00 PM of 10.11.2017. Petitioner again requested that because on 11.11.2017 and 12.11.2017, there were holidays, therefore, he will deposit the entire amount of 13.11.2017 and he is ready to execute the agreement but again ignoring the said request of petitioner, the offer was given on 10.11.2017 itself to respondent (18) W.P. No. 20757/2017 No. 2, who was the fourth highest bidder, to deposit the amount by 14.11.2017. On making request by respondent No. 2 for extension of time to deposit the amount of rent in advance, the extension of two days was granted upto 16.11.2017. Thus, it is apparent that in case of petitioner, the time was granted only for one and half days to deposit the amount of rent and when the request was made by him for extension of time, it was refused and in case of respondent No. 2 initially four days time was granted and on making the request by him, two days further time was granted. No explanation is available in the return filed by respondent No. 1 why the said discrimination has been made except to say that looking to the tenor of the letter written by petitioner, they presumed that petitioner is not interested in depositing the amount of rent in advance. In this regard, it is to be noted here that after filing the writ petition before this Court on 1.12.2017 direction to maintain the status quo was issued. On 21.12.2017 when the matter came up for hearing, the Court found that if the offer of respondent No. 2 is accepted, it would cause a loss to the Indian Red Cross Society, however, directed to petitioner to deposit the entire amount through Bankers Cheque or Demand Draft on or before 27.12.2017 and produce receipt thereof in the Court on 28.12.2017. The order has been complied by petitioner and receipt of deposit of six months' rent in advance has been produced. The said fact has also not been (19) W.P. No. 20757/2017 disputed by the Indian Red Cross Society. In view of the aforesaid, it cannot be held that petitioner was not willing to deposit the amount as per the bid given by him. Clause 4 of the Tender document referred in the return by respondent No. 1 Society reads thus:-
"सफल नननवदाकार@अनबु धं करार को अनबु धं के ननषपादन के समय नयनू रम छः माह के नकराये के बराबर रानश अनगम सरु का रानश के रप मे जमा करनी होगीA वापसी के समय जमा रानश पर कोई बयाज देय नही होगा A"
12. On perusal of the aforesaid it is clear that at the time of execution of the agreement, the successful bidder must deposit the rent equal to six months in advance by way of security deposit which shall be returned to him after completion of the time of the contract without any interest, therefore, the term of tender do not specify that what should be the time to deposit the amount on issuance of notice by the Red Cross Society. However, the time as given in the notice was extendable upto the date on execution of the agreement if the bidder is ready to deposit the amount, therefore, it was a discretion vested with the Society to be exercised by them. As discussed above, for the said discretion, respondent No. 1 has spent about two weeks' time giving notice to first two highest bidders but remained unsuccessful. In case of petitioner, the time was given only for one and a half day while in the case of respondent No. 2, time (20) W.P. No. 20757/2017 was given for total period of six days, which apparently shows the discrimination with petitioner in the matter of extension of time to deposit the amount which was not specified in the tender document.
13. In the said sequel of facts, it is relevant to say that in case the time to deposit the amount would have been extended upto 13.11.2017 to petitioner, it would be beneficial to respondent No.1 because they would have been receiving the amount of Rs.4,52,000/- per month more than the amount offered by respondent No. 2, however, by not extending the time of two days to petitioner, respondent No. 1 have put themselves in a disadvantageous position and such an act on their part can only be termed as arbitrary.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, in my considered opinion, respondent No. 1 has acted arbitrarily in a discriminatory manner by not granting extension of time to petitioner to deposit the amount and has executed the agreement in favour of respondent No. 2, therefore, the agreement executed in favour of respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed with a direction that the amount deposited by respondent No. 2 be refunded back and respondent No. 1 is directed to execute the agreement in favour of petitioner within a week from the date of pronouncement of the (21) W.P. No. 20757/2017 order and allow petitioner to commission the shop fixing a date within a week's time.
15. At this stage the question raised regarding maintainability of the petition citing some judgments by the counsel appearing for both the parties in a contractual matter, is not required to be referred in detail except to observe that in view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparent that action of respondent No. 1 Society is arbitrary and discriminatory and such an action of the Society is always amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is held that though the Indian Red Cross Society do not fall within the definition of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India but it is amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India because such powers are wider enough and scope of judicial review is still open in case they have exercised the power arbitrarily and in discriminatory manner.
17. Consequently, the irresistible conclusion which can be arrived at in this petition is, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The agreement executed by respondent No. 1 Society in favour of respondent No. 2 is hereby quashed with a direction (22) W.P. No. 20757/2017 that the amount deposited by respondent No. 2 be refunded back immediately and in view of the amount deposited by petitioner, respondent No. 1 is directed to execute the agreement in favour of petitioner within a week from the date of pronouncement of the order and allow petitioner to commission the medical shop fixing a date within a week's time. In the facts and circumstances, parties to bear their own costs.
(J.K.Maheshwari)
Judge
PB Digitally signed by
PRADYUMNA BARVE
********** Date: 2018.02.02
18:46:59 +05'30'