Allahabad High Court
Shri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha ... vs State Of U.P. And Others. on 25 July, 2025
Author: Irshad Ali
Bench: Irshad Ali
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:42692 Reserved on: 06.05.2025 Delivered on: 25.07.2025 Court No. - 4 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 1002468 of 1997 Petitioner :- Shri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha Sandwa Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others. Counsel for Petitioner :- G.P.Tripathi,Hairdaya Narain Tiwari,L.P.Misra,S.B.Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Aseem Chandra,Mohd. Afzal,Sudeep Kumar,Sudeep Seth Hon'ble Irshad Ali,J.
1. Heard Sri L.P. Misra, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri H.N. Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sudeep Kumar, learned counsel assisted by Ms. Radhika Verma, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 & 3.
2. The present writ petition has been preferred for issuance of writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 02.03.1996 passed by the Registrar and order dated 09.03.1997 passed by the Commissioner contained as annexure Nos.1 & 2 to the writ petition with a prayer to quash the resolution dated 13.02.1972 contained as annexure 6 to the writ petition.
3. Factual matrix of the case is that petitioner No.1 is a society registered on 12.01.1952 under Societies Registration Act, 1860, which has been renewed upto 10.10.1995 on 30.10.1995 and fee for further renewal has been deposited.
4. Since 1952, the elections of the office bearers in the society have been held every year in accordance with rule and bye laws. Last election was held on 15.12.1994 and Rama Shankar Tiwari was elected as President and Ram Prasad Singh was elected as Secretary. Other office bearers and 12 members of the executive were also elected. The total number of members of General House was 97 in 1970-73.
5. The first petitioner was registered with a view to start and run a junior high school. It was started and in due course of time, it was elevated to the High School on 18.08.1967 and Intermediate College on 06.10.1979 and recognition has been given by U.P. Board and is aided by the Government and Scheme of administration of college is approved by Deputy Director of Education, U.P. Allahabad.
6. There was no problem in working of Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha till 1972-73 Satya Narain Singh was the manager of managing committee of the school on behalf of Sri Vidya Pracharini Sabha. On 25.02.1973, Satya Narain Singh was removed by the society under Rule 9 of the bye laws / memorandum of association from the post of Manager. However, this expulsion was not approved by the DIOS, Pratapgarh. Satya Narain Singh was expelled from primary membership of the society. The expulsion was confirmed in meeting dated 18.03.1973.
7. At the time resolution dated 25.02.1973 was passed, it was not within the knowledge of Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha - petitioner No.1 that Satya Narain Singh has fabricated false resolution dated 15.02.1972 providing for constitution of a new committee in the name of Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya.
8. Satya Narain Singh kept the documents of the society with him and succeeded in manipulating the documents at his will. The papers of the society were not returned by him to his successor elected at his place by the society despite demand of the society. He fabricated the resolution dated 13.02.1972 and forcibly captured the society illegally and against bye laws Sri Vidya Pracharinin Sabha was kept hostage by Satya Narain Singh.
9. The resolution dated 13.02.1972 no where states that as to what was the strength of the total membership of the alleged prabandh samiti. In this resolution, petitioner No.1 is referred to as Ex Samiti. Petitioner No.1 came to know about fabricated resolution ated 13.02.1972 on 21.01.1973. By this time, Satya Narain Singh got respondent No.3 registered on 04.04.1972 on the basis of alleged resolution dated 13.02.1979. The Sabha expelled Satya Narain Singh on 25.02.1973 from executive committee and on 06.05.1673 from the membership of society.
10. Litigation about office bearers of the committee of management started. Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha held election on 23.12.1973 and sent the resolution to DIOS for counter signature and approval of signature of Rama Shanker elected by the Sabha. Respondent No.3 sent different list. The DIOS did not counter sign either and imposed single operation and referred the matter to Deputy Director of Education, Allahabad.
11. The Deputy Director of Education decided the matter on 12.08.1976. Satya Narain Singh challenged the order dated 12.08.1976 in Writ Petition No.485 of 1977 before this Hon'ble Court. The single operation order of DIOS was also challenged by Satya Narain Singh before this Court.
12. The DIOS decided the matter on 18.02.1992. Satya Narain Singh filed Writ Petition No.875 of 1992 and during its pendency, Satya Narain Singh died. His son Virendra Pratap Singh - respondent No.2 moved an application for substitution. He also filed new writ petition No.2153 of 1995 challenging the order dated 18.02.1992 passed by DIOS. Writ Petition No.1682 of 1993 (M/S) was also filed by Gokul Singh claiming to be Manager. All writ petitions were dismissed by this Court vide order dated 31.03.1994, against which Special Appeal No.16 of 1994 and 17 of 1994 have been filed.
13. When Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha, who knew about registration of respondent No.3, sent representations dated 15.08.1977 and 13.07.1978 to the Registrar, Societies Registration, Faizabad challenging the farzi registration of respondent No.3 and for renewal of registration of petitioner No.1, the Registrar renewed the registration of petitioner No.1 up to 1995. He, however, referred the matter to prescribed authority vide letter dated 2/5-4-1984 providing that respondent No.3 was registered afterwards under resolution of Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha and the Sabha got its registration renewed, therefore, registration of respondent No.3 shall have to be cancelled.
14. The prescribed authority decided the matter on 21.08.1995 and expressed the view that the matter falls under Section 12 (D) of Societies Registration Act and sent the matter back to the Registrar. Against the order dated 21.08.1995, respondent Nos.2 & 3 preferred a writ petition No.1909 (M/S) of 1995 and challenged the order dated 21.08.1995 and also the jurisdiction of Registrar.
15. Petitioner No.1 was registered on 12.01.1952, respondent No.3 was registered on 04.04.1972. The application was moved on behalf of the petitioner No.1 that the registration of respondent No.3 be cancelled as it has been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. Respondent No.3 never moved any application for cancellation of registration of petitioner No.1.
16. In Societies Registration Act, 1860 there is no provision for cancellation of registration of a society registered under the Act. By Section 6 of U.P. Act No.52 of 1975 new Sections 12A, 12B, 12C and 12D have been inserted. Section 12-D now gives power to the Registrar to cancel the registration of a society on any of three grounds; namely firstly when society's registration or registration of its name is contrary to the provisions of Societies Registration Act or against the provisions of any other law in force. Only when its activities or proposed activities are destructive of the objects of the society or are contrary to public policy or when the certificate of registration has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud.
17. Acting further on order dated 21.08.1995, respondent No.5 passed the impugned order dated 02.03.1996 on the basis of Section 12-D(b) and has cancelled the registration of petitioner dated 12.01.1952 and upheld the registration of respondent No.3 dated 04.04.1972 on the ground that respondent No.3 has came in existence.
18. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the resolution dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 are farzi, fabricated and have been forged for preparing a case in favour of and for preparing a blue print for giving birth to respondent No.3. These are brain children of Late Satya Narain Singh - respondent No.2.
19. He submitted that petitioner No.1 was registered on 12.01.1952 and certificate of registration was issued and it has been renewed from time to time in 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1990 and is valid upto 1995. However, respondent No.3 was registered on 04.04.1972 and it was never renewed thereafter.
20. He further submitted that elections in Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha have been held on scheduled dates and the last election was held in year 1994 and the election has been approved by the DIOS, Pratapgarh.
21. He next submitted that there is no provision in bye laws of the petitioner society authorizing passing of resolutions dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972, which amount self - effacement and as such these resolutions ever if genuine, are not binding on Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha. The genuineness has been denied by the petitioner society, signatures of many were forged.
22. He submitted that Writ Petition No.485 of 1977 filed by respondent No.2 challenging the order of DIOS and D.D.R. dated 12.08.1976 was allowed with direction to open the membership and DIOS was directed to decide the matter by order of this Court dated 29.11.1973 passed in Writ Petition No.485 (M/S) of 1977. The DIOS vide order dated 18.02.1992 decided the matter against respondent No.2. He filed Writ Petition No.875 of 1992, wherein no stay was granted and the writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 31.03.1994 along with six other writ petitions of same matter.
23. He submitted that the Registrar wrote a letter dated 05.04.1984 stating that two societies cannot exist claiming control of same school and registration of society registered afterwards requires to be cancelled but later on he cancelled the registration of petitioner No.1.
24. He submitted that registration of petitioner No.1 has been cancelled on the ground of public policy as given in Section 12(D)(b) and these provisions were inserted on 10.10.1975. These provisions cannot be given retrospective effect to cancel registration dated 12.01.1952.
25. He further submitted that registration certificate of the petitioner was not cancelled on 04.04.1972 when respondent No.3 was registered and it was against Rule 12(5) of U.P. Registration of Societies Rules, 1976. Rather registration of petitioner society was renewed from time to time, thereafter.
26. An application for amendment was made seeking addition of some detail in the description of the petitioner No.1 against the name of petitioner No.2 Rama Shankar Tripathi as Dead and the addition of Tej Bahadur Singh as petitioner No.3 claiming himself to be the Manager of petitioner No.1. The amendment was objected to and after exchange of reply affidavits, the amendment application was allowed by this Court vide order dated 19.12.2024.
27. He further submitted that no second society in the name of Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Chandika District Pratapgarh could have legally been registered on 04.04.1972 without dissolution of original society namely Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha, Sandwa, Chandika, District Pratapgarh registered on 12.01.1952 that during currency of the society establishing an educational institution, if any second society is registered, the later is nothing but an usurper and trespasser.
28. He further submitted that the registration of second society amounts to denuding the original society from the objects for which the original society was established and the resolution dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 are illegal and dehors the statutory prescriptions as mentioned under Section 12 of 1860 Act. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon following judgments:
A) Church of North India Vs. Lavaji Ratanji Bhai and others; 2005 (10) SCC 760:
60. We are not oblivious of the fact that the resolution adopted in the meeting held on 17.02.1970 allegedly fulfilled all the requirements for such resolution as provided in the Societies Registration Act but it is now beyond any controversy that the society having not owned any property, their transfer / in favour of a new society was impermissible in law. In term of Section 5 of Societies Registration Act, all properties would vest in the trustees and only in case in the absence of vesting of such properties in the trustees would the same be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such property. In this case, it is clear that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in the governing body of the society.
61. There is nothing on record to show that the churches concerned were being managed by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act. In any event, it stands accepted that the dispute as regards dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs should have been referred to the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction.
64. Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the Act, the society is not dissolved. Even assuming that the society stands dissolved in terms of its memorandum of association and articles of association, the same would not ipso facto mean that the properties could be adjusted amongst the members of the society in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Concededly, the properties of the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested in such trust. Such a provision, we have noticed hereinbefore, also exists in the BPT Act. Thus, only because the society has been dissolved, ipso facto the properties belonging to the trust cannot be said to have been adjusted. The appellants, thus, we noticed hereinbefore, have averred in the plaint that the suit relates to the property of the trust and their administration. If the properties of the churches did not belong to the society, the appellant herein cannot claim the same as their successor. The plaint has to be read meaningfully. So done, it leads to the only conclusion that the dispute was in relation to the management of the churches as religious trust and not as a society. Even if it is contended that the administration of the property would mean the properties of the Brethren Church both as a trust and as a society, a still then having regard to the legal position, as discussed supra, the property belonging exclusively to the trust, the suit will not be maintainable."
B) Vinod Kumar Mathur Sewa Malavia Vs. Magnilal Maganlal Das Gameti and others; 2006 (9) SCC 282 and in the case of Vinod Kumar M. Malavia etc. Vs. Maganlal Mangal Das Gameti and others; 2013 (15) SCC 394:
7. The claim of the Church of North India is that the First District Church of Brethren has lost its entity and has been amalgamated therewith and, thus, it has only the authority to recommend names of the trustees to the parent body of USA. The Church of North India with whom the other trusts were said to have been merged also filed a change notice purported to be on the strength of the authority given by the parent body at USA, wherein five names: (i) Rt. Rev. Paul Chauhan, (ii) Francis G. Gameti, (iii) N.R. Rajawadi, (iv) Jesing S. Bhagat and (v) Rt. Rev. Malvia were proposed to be included as trustees. The said change notice was disputed by the then trustees of the CBGB Trust before the Joint Charity Commissioner, Baroda and by order 9 dated 20-9-1997 the matter was remitted to the Assistant Charity Commissioner with a direction to frame issues as to whether the First District Church of Brethren was amalgamated with CNI and whether the Church of North India was the successor of the First District Church of Brethren. The said decision of the Joint Charity Commissioner was impugned before the District Court.
8. In the meanwhile, a civil suit was filed by one Ambalal Onkarlal against the trustees. The said suit was decreed holding that all the six uniting churches including the First District Church of Brethren were dissolved and a united in one church i.e. the Church of North India. A first appeal was preferred there against being regular Civil Appeal No.72 of 1984 and the Assistant Judge, Surat, by a judgment and decree dated 11-8-1986 allowed the said appeal holding that the First District Church of Brethren was not dissolved and had not ceased to exist. It was further held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. The judgment and decree to the Assistant Judge came to be questioned in second appeal before the High Court being Second Appeal No.303 of 1986, which was dismissed. The matter ultimately came up before this Court in Church of North India. VS. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai wherein it was held that the civil court has no jurisdiction in such matters. While arriving at the said finding the court invariably had to deal with various contentions raised by the parties.
it was stated : (SCC p.788, para 83).
83. With a view to determine the question as regards exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the court comes to the conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated. Section 26 of the Act must be read in that context as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedly barred. Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to the nature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that the civil court has no jurisdiction, Section 26 preforce will have no application whatsoever."
9. The High Court relying on or on the basis of the said decision, inter alia, opined that the First District Chuch of Brethren did not cease to exist. It further came to the conclusion that this Court had held that the property of the society vested in the trust and not in the governing body of the society. On the aforementioned premise it was directed:
"............... It is seen that the Joint Charity Commissioner remanded the matter to Assistant Charity Commissioner only on the assumption that CNI was an interested party and was required to be heard, but as per the decision and conclusion of the Apex Court, the reasons for the remand would not stand any further and it would not be necessary at all to remand the matter to the Assistant Charity Commissioner issued which is already decided by the Apex Court. It may be true and on merits at the relevant juncture when the Joint Charity Commissioner passed the orders in Appeal No.7 of 1999. The decision of the Apex Court was not pronounced and the Joint Charity Commissioner might have found that CNI was an interested party. The cause at this juncture to remand the matter back for decision to the Assistant Charity Commissioner, according to my humble view, would not be surviving after the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Church of North India. Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanbhai.
10. As regards the change notice filed by the Church of North India, it was opined:
"Now the question of postponement of appointing trustees as proposed by Change Report No.329 on 1999 is concerned, true it is that, as decided by the Apex Court, the issue of merger between churches is required to be decided by the Charity Commissioner, and such issued is sub judice. In fact, as aforesaid, the decision of the Joint Charity Commissioner to decide the same after framing of the issue that whether the churches are merged, is challenged before the District Court and is pending. The scheme of the Bombay Public Trusts Act undoubtedly reveals only the objective of betterment and proper administration of public as well as religious trusts. It is on record that the only surviving trustee of CBGB trust is opponent I herein, who is aged about 90 years. There are no other trustees except proposals are made for appointment of trustees, highly contested and are pending at various hierarchical levels. In these circumstances as well as in view of what is decided by the Apex Court in the matter of Church of North India. Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai it is considered that the postponement of the decision of present Change Report No.329 of 1999 woujd not serve the object of the Bombay Public Trusts Act,1950 would be served more if the proposed (sic) by Change Report No.329 of 1999 and administration of public religious trusts is well taken care of. So when these appointments sought by Change Report No.329 of 1999, prima facie, appear to be in consonance with the scheme of CBGB Trust particularly clause 9. It would not serve the interest of justice, if the issue of appointment of trustees as per clause 9 is postponed till the issue of merger of churches is decided finally at various levels which will ultimately affect the administration of public religious trusts."
17. In view of aforementioned findings, we are of the opinion that the High Court arrived at a wrong conclusion that the First District Church of Brethren did not cease to exist. Such a question indisputably, in view of the decision of this Court, is required to be determined by the statutory authorities under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and not by the civil court. This Court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction, a fortiori no finding could have been arrived at that the First District Church of Brethren did or did not cease to exist.
C) Committee of Management, Hari Shyam Khadi Gram Udyog Sewa Sabha, Allahabad and others Vs. State of U.P. and others; (2006) 3 UPLBEC 2774 :
"9. Now, on the touchstone of these provisions effect of renewal of registration of Society is being looked into. In the present case delayed renewal was applied for finding the cause sufficient, renewal was accorded on 18.5.1979. Effect of according renewal is that such renewal shall operate from the date of expiration of period for which certificate was operative, meaning thereby that at no point of time society in question was unregistered. Once this is the effect of renewal, can the Society with new registration owing its existence on account of non registration of old society be permitted to stand. Resolution dated 3.12.1978 is again being looked into. Said resolution speaks that old Society Hari Shyam Khadi Gramodyog Sewa Sangh, Malak Harhar, District Allahabad has become unregistered and is not in existence and as no steps have been undertaken for getting its registration renewed and as it is not possible to get its registration done th old Memorandum and Rules be can cancelled and new registration be done. Crux of the said resolution is that old Society had become unregistered and it was not feasible to get its registration done and for this reason and for some other reasons fresh registration be obtained. Once renewal is accorded to old Society with changed name on 18.5.1979, then same relates back to the date when Society had become unregistered and the net effect of the same is that resolution dated 3.12.1978 and subsequent registration stands obliterated, as it owes its existence on account of Society being unregistered. In these circumstances and in this background necessary consequence of renewal as already mentioned is that Society with the name of Hari Shyam Khadi Gramodyog Sewa Sabha being in existence is only entitled to run and manage the affairs of the Junior High School, the second Society with the name of Hari Shyam Khadi Gramodyog Sewa Samiti cannot be permitted to operate. Once the registration of original Society has been renewed with the same registration number and this being undisputed position that said Society has established Junior High School, then it is only Hari Shyam Khadi Gramodyog Sewa Sabha, which is competent to run and manage the affairs of the institution and not any other Society and the Second Society for all practical purposes has to be treated as rank trespasser and usurper until and unless order of renewal of registration certificate is got cancelled or set aside in proceedings under Section 3-B or Section 12-D of Societies Registration Act, 1860 or by way of declaration in civil suit, the same will hold the field and will have to be given its due weightage."
D) Chairman -Cum- Managing Director, Coal India Limited and others Vs. Ananta Saha and others; (2011) 5 SCC 142:
"32. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls.
33. In Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle of consequential order which is applicable to judicial and quasi - judicial proceedings is equally applicable to administrative orders."
E) Committee of Management, Brig. Hoshiar Singh Memorial Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Samli, Muzaffarnagar. Vs. Dy. Director of Education, I - Region Meerut; 1994 All. LJ 968 :: (1994) 24 All LR 23:
"9. (1993) 1 UPLBEC 344 : (1994 All LJ 268); Ram Kripal Singh Vs. Committee of Management, Uchhatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Neoharia. The above view was reiterated by the Division Bench again. Thus, there is no dispute or doubt about the legal position that the petitioners were not competent to hold the election of the committee of management alter expiry of three years and one month from the last approved election of committee of management i.e. 27-7-1986. Any other election held thereafter by the petitioners' committee of management shall be of no consequence. A body illegally constituted cannot constitute and elect legal body claiming it functioned and continued to hold the management for number of years that even after the lapse of three years one month period. After considering the facts and legal submissions, I have no hesitation in holding that petitioners have no case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution. They are usurpers of office illegally. Their writ petition is liable to be dismissed with heavy cost, recoverable from the petitioner No.2, which I assess Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand) would be a reasonable amount of cost which may include the cost of the writ petition for the opposite party Sri Anil Kumar Sharma."
F) Committee of Management, Sri Raghubar Dayal Pathak Inter College, Etawah, Through its Manager Krishna Murari Pathak Vs. Committee of Management, Sri Raghubar Dayal Pathak Inter College, Etawah through its Alleged Manager RRIJ Bihari Lal Pathak and others; 2006 (4) ESC 2819 (All) (DB):
"4. We are of the view that in the facts of the case and also in view of the fact that the elections held in the year 1999 and 2002 were found to be invalid, the Hon'ble Single Judge is right in directing to hold fresh election by an independent agency. Even during the course of submission in spite of repeated request, learned counsel for the appellant could not show any evidence or material nor has brought anything on record to show that the elections held in the year 1999 and 2002 are validly held.
5. The contention that since the orders dated 21.6.2005 and 22.6.2005 were not set aside, the judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge is wrong, has also no substance for the reason that the elections of the year 1999 and 2002 having been found to be invalid, all subsequent actions or orders are also illegal and nonest in the eyes of law. Thus, we do not find any fault in the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge."
G) Raghubar dayal VS. Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur; 2004 SCC Online All 1267 :: (2005) 58 ALR (All) : (2004) 3 SAC 641:
"14. At this stage it would be appropriate to refer to the contention raised by the petitioner with regard to the inherent power of the Assistant Registrar to refuse the registration to a society by the same name coupled with the incidental power to cancel the registration of a society, if granted, by him in the same name. In the opinion of the Court, no such incidental power can be culled out from the provisions of Section 3 as were applicable in the year 1973, nor any such inherent power can be read from any other provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Power to refuse the registration of the society cannot be enlarged to the extent so as to confer a power upon the Registrar to cancel the registration of the society with the same name. The contention of the respondents runs contrary to the law laid down by the Calcutta High Court in the case of U. Srinivas Malliah and another (supra). In the aforesaid judgment after referring to the various judgments of the Court of Appeal, Calcutta High Court and to the Halsbury laws, it was held as follows :
"It is true that apart from certain special statutes which entitle companies or persons to the exclusive use of a name or a mark, such as the Companies Act or the Trade Marks Act, a man has no exclusive proprietary rights in a fancy name or title, and normally and principally, it is in relation to the user of a name associated with a certain businesses or trading concern or some profession that the Court affords protection and grants an injunction restraining the adoption and use of such a name by another when the Court is satisfied that damage has been caused or there is tangible risk or possibility of a damage resulting from confusion caused in the public mind or in other words by reason of the public being deceived by the use of such name."
15. It is, thus, clear that only Courts of law have been conferred a power to grant an injunction restraining the adoption and use of the same name when the Court is satisfied that damage has been caused or there is tangible risk or, possibility of a damage resulting from confusion caused in public mind, or the public being deceived by the use of the identical name and style. This power to grant injunction against the use of same name and style as recognised by the Courts of law is based upon a cause established by the plaintiff of likelihood damage/confusion to be caused in the mind of the public. Thus, it is established beyond doubt that it is for the respondents to have initiated suitable Civil Injunction Proceedings, if they had any apprehension of misuse of the name of the respondent by the subsequent society being registered. The claim, if any, so pleaded would be adjudged by the Civil Court, on the basis of evidence led and the extent of damage/loss, which may be caused. However, they cannot be permitted to invoke the authority of the Registrar himself to cancel the registration.
29. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3 submitted that initially the instant writ petition was filed arraying the society as petitioner No.1 without specifying the person through whom it is being represented and Sri Rama Shankar Tripathi as petitioner No.2 without specifying the designation and authorization to him for filing of writ petition. He submitted that Section 6 of Societies Registration Act provides through whom the society can be represented and since there was no particular to that effect, the same was not competent to be intertained.
30. He placed reliance upon ratio of law propounded in the case of Umesh Chandra and another Vs. Mahila Vidhyalaya Society, Aminabad, Lucknow and others reported in 2006 (24) LCD 1373, wherein it has been held that an individual member of office bearer, unless authorized by the rules or regulation or by the governing body, has no right to represent the society.
31. He submitted that in the case of Fahim Ahmad and others Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2008 (26) LCD 1109, Hon'ble Allahabad High Court has relied upon in the case of Bahadur Singh Lakhu Bhai Gohil Vs. Jagdish Bhai, reported in (2004) 2 SCC 65 and has held that if any decision taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on the suggestion of a person who has statutory role to play, the same would be ultra vires.
32. In the affidavit clause also the particulars of petitioner No.2 were made, however, subsequently it is argued by the petitioners that Sri Tej Bahadur Singh has filed the writ petition, therefore, the affidavit filed in support of writ petition was inherently so much defective that cannot be cured and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed being not in accordance with Chapter IV Rule 18 of Allahabad High Court Rules.
33. He further submitted that by means of aforesaid resolutions dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972, which were passed in accordance with law and bye laws of the society, the old society itself has resolved to create new society namely Prabandh Samiti Shri Chandika Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalay Samiti, Sandawa, Chandika, Pratapgarh for particular purpose to run the institution namely Shri Chandika Uchchattar Madhyanik Vidyalaya, Sandawa, Pratapgarh assigning reason that the old society is unable to run the institution, therefore, it is resolved that a new society be created so that the institution may be run properly.
34. At the relevant point of time, there was no provision providing any rider for registration of new society in the original Act in the year 1972. However, it is submitted that the same was added only on 10.10.1975 in the Act. Thus, the registration of society was legally valid and is not questionable on the ground of any subsequent amendment.
35. He submitted that admittedly the resolutions of society dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 have not been assailed by the petitioners in any court of law. The Assistant Registrar while passing the impugned order has categorically observed that once all the members of the petitioner No.1 society took a decision to form a new society and all the members have become members of subsequent society, therefore, existence of previous society has rightly been cancelled by the Assistant Registrar while exercising the power conferred under Section 12D(b) of Societies Registration Act.
36. He submitted that as far as the reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the provisions contained under Section 12-A, 12-B, 12-C and 12-D are concerned, it is relevant to point out here that the proceedings / resolutions / decisions are relating to the year 1972 and all the aforesaid provisions have been inducted with prospective effect in the statute book in the year 1975 which are not applicable in the facts and circumstances, thus the said argument is not acceptable.
37. He submitted that the reliance placed by the petitioners upon provision under Section 12 of Societies Registration Act, by arguing that in case the existing society was desirous to alter, extend or abridge the purpose, the decision must have been taken by 2/3rd of members of the erstwhile society. Such an argument does not have any substance, inasmuch as firstly, the aforesaid argument was never advanced before the Assistant Registrar nor nay list of 97 members was brought on record before the Assistant Registrar and secondly, the case of respondent No.2 and respondent No.3 is for creation / forming of new society, therefore, provisions of Section 12 of Societies Registration Act does not have any play in the controversy involved in present writ petition. Similarly, unamended Section 12 of Societies Registration Act does not bar formation of new society in view of pre-amendment era of the Societies Registration Act.
38. He submitted that at this juncture, the respondents seeks leave to place reliance upon the ratio of law propounded in the case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. Vs. Generic Electric Co.; reported in 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 644 re-iterating the limited scope of application of doctrine of public policy in field of conflict laws.
39. He further submitted that the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to the provisions contained under Section 14 of the Act are misleading for the reason that the provision contained under Section 14 of the Act talks about the dissolution of the society and its quorum, whereas, in the present case, the old society was not dissolved, rather, it has taken the decision by itself resolving that the new society shall be formed to achieve the object of running the institution properly and the said decision was taken by the old society in accordance with law.
40. Apart from aforesaid, the petitioners have taken plea regarding 2/3 members present while passing the resolution at the first time in the writ petition and said plea was never taken before the authorities in the proceeding which resulted into the orders dated 09.03.1997 and 02.03.1996, therefore, there shall be an estoppel against them to raising such plea at this stage.
41. He submitted that as far as the reasons assigned while passing the impugned orders dated 09.03.1997 and 02.03.1996 regarding public policy is concerned, it is submitted that the authorities have rightly cancelled the registration of the old society under Section 12-D of the society holding same to be opposed to the public policy. The new society having been registered w.e.f. 04.04.1972 for the particular purpose to run and manage the institution have been renewed from time to time and periodic elections have also been held are running the institution efficiently from 1972 and thus, unsettling the situation settled from long time is against the public policy.
42. He submitted that as far as the status of Sri Tej Bahadur Singh is concerned, it is submitted that Sri Tej Bahadur Singh by filing the supplementary rejoinder affidavit dated 02.04.2025 have specifically stated that he was elected as manager of the society on 23.12.1969, whereas according to his date of birth mentioned in the Aadhar Card, he has not attained the age of majority to be eligible for induction of member of society, therefore, he could not have been member of the society in view of Rule 4 of the Society.
43. He submitted that the resolutions submitted by the petitioner are not authenticated and self-claimed documents, which have never been filed or made available before the authorities genuinety of which cannot be verified. It is submitted by the respondents Nos.2 & 3 that all the documents related to the authorization and elections claimed by the petitioners are fabricated documents and genuinety of which need to be verified and without its verification, it cannot be accepted.
44. He next submitted that the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of 2008 (70) ALR 104 is subsequent to the amendment to the Societies Registration Act and further in view of provisions contained under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Societies Registration Act, as inserted subsequent to the year 1975, the bar exists only for forming identical society. Here, in the present case, respondent No.3 is not identical society rather its name is also changed, therefore, even assuming without admitting that the position subsequent to the 1975 amendment applies to respondent No.3 even then the name of society is neither identical nor similar.
45. He submitted that respondent society is functioning for last 53 years and running an educational institution namely, Shri Chandrika Intermediate College, Sandwa, Chandrika, as such at such a belated stage, any interference will hamper the functioning of the Society as well as the institution.
46. He lastly submitted that in view of facts and reasons stated above, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability and merits too with cost for filing fabricated documents. In support of his arguments, he placed reliance upon following judgments:
A) Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. Vs. General Electric Co.; 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 644:
"45. We are, therefore, of the view that the words "public policy" used in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act refer to the public policy of India and the recognition and enforcement of the award of the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to the public policy of the State of New York.
IV. Meaning of public policy in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act.
46. While observing that "from the very nature of things, the expressions 'public policy' opposed to public policy or 'contrary to public policy' are incapable of precise definition" this Court has laid down: (SCC p. 217, para 92) "Public policy ... connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from time to time." (See : Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly.)
47. The need for applying the touchstone of public policy has been thus explained by Sir William Holdsworth:
"In fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to supress practices which, under ever new disguise, seek to weaken or negative them." (History of English Law, Vol. III, p.55)
48. Since the doctrine of public policy is somewhat open-textured and flexible, Judges in England have shown certain degree of reluctance to invoke it in domestic law. There are two conflicting positions which are referred as the "narrow view" and the "broad view". According to the narrow view courts cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the broad view countenances judicial law making in this areas. (See : Chitty on Contracts, 26th Edn., Vol. I, Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya this Court favoured the narrow view when it said:
"... though the heads are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve a new head under exceptional circumstances of a changing world, it is admissible in the interest of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads in these days"v(.440)
49. In later decisions this Court has, however, leaned towards the broad view. [See : Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P.; Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly at p. 373; Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung.]
50. In the field of private international law, courts refuse to apply a rule of foreign law or recognise a foreign judgment or a foreign arbitral award if it is found that the same is contrary to the public policy of the country in which it is sought to be invoked or enforced. The English courts follow the following principles:
"Exceptionally, the English court will not enforce or recognise a right conferred or a duty imposed by a foreign law where, on the facts of the particular case, enforcement or, as the case may be, recognition, would be contrary to a fundamental policy of English Law. The court has, therefore, refused in certain cases to apply foreign law where to do so would in the particular circumstances be contrary to the interests of the United Kingdom or contrary to justice or morality." (See : Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 8, para 418.)
51. A distinction is drawn while applying the said rule of public policy between a matter governed by domestic law and a matter involving conflict of laws. The application of the doctrine of public policy in the field of conflict of laws is more limited than that in the domestic law and the courts are slower to invoke public policy in cases involving a foreign element than when a purely municipal legal issue is involved. (See. Vervaeka v. Smith, Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 11th Edn. Vol. 1 p. 92, Cheshire & North, Private International Law, 12th Edn. pp. 128-129). The reason for this approach is thus explained by Professor Graveson:
"This concern of law in the protection of social institutions is reflected in its rules of both municipal and conflict of laws. Although the concept of public policy is the same in nature in these two spheres of law, its application differs in degree and occasion, corresponding to the fact that transactions containing a foreign element may constitute a less serious threat to municipal institutions than would purely local transactions." (R.H. Graveson : Conflict of Laws, 7th Edn. p. 165).
47. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perused the law reports submitted by learned counsel for the parties.
48. Petitioner No.1 is a society registered on 12.01.1952 under Societies Registration Act, 1860, which has been renewed upto 10.10.1995 on 30.10.1995 and fee for further renewal has been deposited. Since 1952, the elections of the office bearers in the society have been held every year in accordance with rule and bye laws. Last election was held on 15.12.1994 and Rama Shankar Tiwari was elected as President and Ram Prasad Singh was elected as Secretary. Other office bearers and 12 members of the executive were also elected.
49. The total number of members of General House was 97 in 1970-73. The first petitioner was registered with a view to start and run a junior high school. It was started and in due course of time, it was elevated to the High School on 18.08.1967 and Intermediate College on 06.10.1979 and recognition has been given by U.P. Board and is aided by the Government and Scheme of administration of college is approved by Deputy Director of Education, U.P. Allahabad.
50. The working of Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha till 1972-73 Satya Narain Singh was the manager of managing committee of the school on behalf of Sri Vidya Pracharini Sabha. On 25.02.1973, Satya Narain Singh was removed by the society under Rule 9 of the bye laws / memorandum of association from the post of Manager. However, this expulsion was not approved by the DIOS, Pratapgarh. Satya Narain Singh was expelled from primary membership of the society. The expulsion was confirmed in meeting dated 18.03.1973.
51. At the time resolution dated 25.02.1973 was passed, it was not within the knowledge of Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha - petitioner No.1 that Satya Narain Singh has fabricated false resolution dated 15.02.1972 providing for constitution of a new committee in the name of Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya. Satya Narain Singh kept the documents of the society with him and succeeded in manipulating the documents at his will. The papers of the society were not returned by him to his successor elected at his place by the society despite demand of the society. He fabricated the resolution dated 13.02.1972 and forcibly captured the society illegally and against bye laws Sri Vidya Pracharinin Sabha was kept hostage by Satya Narain Singh. The resolution dated 13.02.1972 no where states that as to what was the strength of the total membership of the alleged prabandh samiti. In this resolution, petitioner No.1 is referred to as Ex Samiti. Petitioner No.1 came to know about fabricated resolution ated 13.02.1972 on 21.01.1973. By this time, Satya Narain Singh got respondent No.3 registered on 04.04.1972 on the basis of alleged resolution dated 13.02.1979. The Sabha expelled Satya Narain Singh on 25.02.1973 from executive committee and on 06.05.1673 from the membership of society.
52. Litigation about office bearers of the committee of management started. Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha held election on 23.12.1973 and sent the resolution to DIOS for counter signature and approval of signature of Rama Shanker elected by the Sabha. Respondent No.3 sent different list. The DIOS did not counter sign either and imposed single operation and referred the matter to Deputy Director of Education, Allahabad. The Deputy Director of Education decided the matter on 12.08.1976. Satya Narain Singh challenged the order dated 12.08.1976 in Writ Petition No.485 of 1977 before this Hon'ble Court. The single operation order of DIOS was also challenged by Satya Narain Singh before this Court.
53. The DIOS decided the matter on 18.02.1992. Satya Narain Singh filed Writ Petition No.875 of 1992 and during its pendency, Satya Narain Singh died. His son Virendra Pratap Singh - respondent No.2 moved an application for substitution. He also filed new writ petition No.2153 of 1995 challenging the order dated 18.02.1992 passed by DIOS. Writ Petition No.1682 of 1993 (M/S) was also filed by Gokul Singh claiming to be Manager. All writ petitions were dismissed by this Court vide order dated 31.03.1994, against which Special Appeal No.16 of 1994 and 17 of 1994 have been filed.
54. The prescribed authority decided the matter on 21.08.1995 and expressed the view that the matter falls under Section 12 (D) of Societies Registration Act and sent the matter back to the Registrar. Petitioner No.1 was registered on 12.01.1952, respondent No.3 was registered on 04.04.1972. The application was moved on behalf of the petitioner No.1 that the registration of respondent No.3 be cancelled as it has been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. Respondent No.3 never moved any application for cancellation of registration of petitioner No.1.
55. Societies Registration Act, 1860 there is no provision for cancellation of registration of a society registered under the Act. By Section 6 of U.P. Act No.52 of 1975 new Sections 12A, 12B, 12C and 12D have been inserted. Section 12-D now gives power to the Registrar to cancel the registration of a society on any of three grounds; namely firstly when society's registration or registration of its name is contrary to the provisions of Societies Registration Act or against the provisions of any other law in force.
56. Only when its activities or proposed activities are destructive of the objects of the society or are contrary to public policy or when the certificate of registration has been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. Respondent No.5 passed the impugned order dated 02.03.1996 on the basis of Section 12-D(b) and has cancelled the registration of petitioner dated 12.01.1952 and upheld the registration of respondent No.3 dated 04.04.1972 on the ground that respondent No.3 has came in existence.
57. That resolution dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 are farzi, fabricated and have been forged for preparing a case in favour of and for preparing a blue print for giving birth to respondent No.3. These are brain children of Late Satya Narain Singh - respondent No.2. The petitioner No.1 was registered on 12.01.1952 and certificate of registration was issued and it has been renewed from time to time in 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1990 and is valid upto 1995. However, respondent No.3 was registered on 04.04.1972 and it was never renewed thereafter.
58. Elections in Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha have been held on scheduled dates and the last election was held in year 1994 and the election has been approved by the DIOS, Pratapgarh. There is no provision in bye laws of the petitioner society authorizing passing of resolutions dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972, which amount self - effacement and as such these resolutions ever if genuine, are not binding on Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha. The genuineness has been denied by the petitioner society, signatures of many were forged. Writ Petition No.485 of 1977 filed by respondent No.2 challenging the order of DIOS and D.D.R. dated 12.08.1976 was allowed with direction to open the membership and DIOS was directed to decide the matter by order of this Court dated 29.11.1973 passed in Writ Petition No.485 (M/S) of 1977.
59. The DIOS vide order dated 18.02.1992 decided the matter against respondent No.2. He filed Writ Petition No.875 of 1992, wherein no stay was granted and the writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 31.03.1994 along with six other writ petitions of same matter.
60. The Registrar wrote a letter dated 05.04.1984 stating that two societies cannot exist claiming control of same school and registration of society registered afterwards requires to be cancelled but later on he cancelled the registration of petitioner No.1 on the ground of public policy as given in Section 12(D)(b) and these provisions were inserted on 10.10.1975. These provisions cannot be given retrospective effect to cancel registration dated 12.01.1952. Registration certificate of the petitioner was not cancelled on 04.04.1972 when respondent No.3 was registered and it was against Rule 12(5) of U.P. Registration of Societies Rules, 1976. Rather registration of petitioner society was renewed from time to time, thereafter.
61. An amendment was made seeking addition of some detail in the description of the petitioner No.1 against the name of petitioner No.2 Rama Shankar Tripathi as Dead and the addition of Tej Bahadur Singh as petitioner No.3 claiming himself to be the Manager of petitioner No.1. The amendment was objected to and after exchange of reply affidavits, the amendment application was allowed by this Court vide order dated 19.12.2024. The second society in the name of Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Chandika District Pratapgarh could have legally been registered on 04.04.1972 without dissolution of original society namely Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha, Sandwa, Chandika, District Pratapgarh registered on 12.01.1952 that during currency of the society establishing an educational institution, if any second society is registered, the later is nothing but an usurper and trespasser. The registration of second society amounts to denuding the original society from the objects for which the original society was established and the resolution dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 are illegal and dehors the statutory prescriptions as mentioned under Section 12 of 1860 Act.
62. Allegedly fulfilled all the requirements for such resolution as provided in the Societies Registration Act but it is now beyond any controversy that the society having not owned any property, their transfer / in favour of a new society was impermissible in law. In term of Section 5 of Societies Registration Act, all properties would vest in the society and only in case in the absence of vesting of such properties in the society would the same be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such property. In this case, it is clear that the properties have vested in the society and not in the governing body of the society. There is nothing on record to show that the society concerned were being managed by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act.
63. In any event, it stands accepted that the dispute as regards dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs should have been referred to the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction. Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the Act, the society is not dissolved. Even assuming that the society stands dissolved in terms of its memorandum of association and articles of association, the same would not ipso facto mean that the properties could be adjusted in terms of the provisions of the said Act. The properties of the society being properties of the society had vested in society.
64. Such a provision, we have noticed till 1995. Thus, only because the society has been dissolved, ipso facto the properties belonging to the society cannot be said to have been adjusted. If the properties of the society did not belong to the society registered, subsequently it cannot claim the same as their successor. Even if it is contended that the administration of the property would mean the properties of the society both as a society, a still then having regard to the legal position, as discussed above, the property belonging exclusively to the society, the proceeding will not be maintainable in these proceedings.
65. The claim of the society is that Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha has lost its entity and has been amalgamated therewith and, thus, it has only the authority to recommend names of the office bearers to the parent body of the society registered subsequently. The society Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha with whom the other office bearers were said to have been merged also filed a change notice given by the parent body. Now, on the touchstone of these provisions effect of renewal of registration of Society is being looked into. In the present case renewal was applied for finding the cause sufficient, renewal was accorded from time to time upto year 1995. The renewal was accorded in 1977, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1990 and is valid upto 1995.
66. The effect of according renewal is that such renewal shall operate from the date of expiration of period for which certificate was operative, meaning thereby that at no point of time society in question was unregistered. Once this is the effect of renewal, can the Society with new registration owing its existence on account of non registration of old society be permitted to stand. The society which was registered in year 1952 has become unregistered and is not in existence and as no steps have been taken for getting its registration renewed and it is not possible to get its registration done, the old memorandum and rules be can cancelled and new registration be done. Crux of the said resolution is that old Society had become unregistered and it was not feasible to get its registration done and for this reason and for some other reasons fresh registration be obtained. Once renewal is accorded to old society with changed name, then same relates back to the date when society had become unregistered.
67. The resolution dated 13.02.1972and 29.02.1972 and subsequent registration stands obliterated, as it owes its existence on account of society being renewed from time to time. In these circumstances and in this background necessary consequence of renewal as already mentioned is that society Sri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha being in existence is only entitled to run and manage the affairs of the college. The second Society with the name of Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya cannot be permitted to operate.
68. Once the registration of original Society has been renewed with the same registration number and this being undisputed position that said society has established Junior High School, then it is only competent to run and manage the affairs of the institution and not any other society and the second society for all practical purposes has to be treated as trespasser and usurper until and unless order of renewal of registration certificate is got cancelled or set aside in proceedings under Section 3-B, therefore, misuse of power under Section 12-D of Societies Registration Act, 1860 is wholly illegal and arbitrary in law.
69. It is a well settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact situation, the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls. Once the old society registered in year 1952 is existence, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle of consequential order which is applicable to judicial and quasi - judicial proceedings is equally applicable to administrative orders.
70. I am of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of the fact that elections held in the year 1972 were found to be invalid, the respondent could not show any material evidence that with the change of society, property and assets of the earlier society came with the new society.
71. Learned counsel for the respondent Sri Sudeep Kumar placed reliance that there is no resolution authorizing the petitioner No.2 to file writ petition before this Court. In the amendment, it has been brought on record that the resolution was passed authorizing the petitioner No.2 to file writ petition, therefore, the objection of respondent Nos.2 and 3 has no merit and is rejected. The reliance placed in the case of Fahim Ahmad and others (Supra) has no applicability in the present case. The objection in regard to filing of petition by Tej Bahadur, the reasons assigned has no merit and is hereby rejected.
72. Once the case of the petitioner is that resolution dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 are prepared with forged signature of the office bearers and members of the society, the society namely, Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Chandika District Pratapgarh cannot supersede the earlier society registered under the Societies Registration Act.
73. In regard to rider for registration of new society, in the original act in the year 1972 it is submitted that once a society in the name of Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha is registered along with property of the institution, subsequent society registered in the resemblance name cannot be permitted for its registration taking over the properties of the earlier society.
74. Once, case of the petitioner is that the resolution of the society dated 13.02.1972 and 29.02.1972 is based on forged and fabricated signature of the office bearers and members of the general body, therefore, there is no question that all the members of the petitioner No.1 society took a decision to form a new society as well as all the members of the society become members of the subsequent society. Therefore, the orders passed cancelling the registration under Section 12D (b) of Societies Registration Act are wholly misplaced, illegal and arbitrary in nature, therefore, are liable to be set aside.
75. While deciding the dispute, relevant provision of Section 12 A, B, C & D are concerned, the same would be taken into consideration, whether it has been taken under the statute book in the year 1975, therefore, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is acceptable.
76. In regard to objection raised by respondent Nos.2 and 3 that provisions of Section 12 of Societies Registration Act in regard to old society was desirous and resolution would have been passed by 2/3 members erstwhile society, the members of the general body of the society never merges into new society.
77. The Registrar, while passing the impugned orders has committed gross illegality in applying the public policy as there was no conflict in the field of law. The society of the petitioner has wrongly been cancelled by the Registrar under the impugned order dated 09.03.1997 and 02.03.1996. The old society establishes the junior high school and thereafter, the high school and inter mediate college, which cannot be taken over by the newly registered society. Due to non consideration of this aspect of the matter, the impugned orders suffer from apparent illegality and are liable to be set aside.
78. The submission advanced by learned counsel for the respondent that the documents submitted by the petitioner is not authenticated and self claimed documents, which is never filed or made available before the authorities genuinity of which cannot be verified, in fact the documents were filed before the society registered as well as before the Registrar claiming election and renewal of registration of the society till year 1994-95, therefore, the submission advanced by learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 are not acceptable.
79. It is relevant that name of the society is in resemblance. In fact name of petitioners' society is Shri Chandika Vidya Pracharini Sabha Sandwa, Pratapgarh and the name of petitioner Nos.2 and 3 society is Prabandh Samiti Sri Chandika Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Sandwa, Pratapgarh. Moreover, by registration of a new society, the property and assets of old society cannot be taken over, therefore, cancellation of registration of old society is wholly illegal and arbitrary in nature, therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside by this Court.
80. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3 are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and are distinguishable in nature.
81. On over all consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent on the face of it that the impugned order dated 02.03.1996 passed by the Registrar and order passed by the Commissioner dated 09.03.1997 contained as annexure 1&2 to the writ petition are wholly illegal, arbitrary in nature and are hereby quashed.
82. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
83. However, the matter is remanded back to the Registrar to pass a fresh order after affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties in accordance with observations made above within a period of 6 months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.
84. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 25.07.2025 Adarsh K Singh