Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Shri Uttam Agarwal on 23 September, 2024
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
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2024:CGHC:37248-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
FAM No. 10 of 2024
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, District : Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
2. Land Acquisition Officer And Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Bilha,
District-Bilaspur (C.G.).
3. Executive Engineer, Water Resource Department, Kota, District Bilaspur
(C.G.).
... Appellants
versus
1. Shri Uttam Agarwal S/o Sitaram Agrawal, R/o Pendridih Bilha, Tehsil-
Bilha, District-Bilaspur (C.G.).
2. Smt. Smirti Agarwal, W/o Uttam Agarwal, R/o Pendridih Bilha, Tehsil-
Bilha, District-Bilaspur (C.G.).
... Respondents
For Appellants : Mr. Sanjeev Pandey, Dy.A.G.
For Respondent : Mr. Rishabh Gupta, Advocate.
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey,
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal
Judgment on Board
(23.09.2024)
Per Rajani Dubey, J.
Heard.
1. The appellant filed application (I.A. No. 01/2024), application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
2 / 162. Mr. Sanjeev Pandey, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant/plaintiff has preferred the First Appeal under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 against the judgment & decree dated 17/04/2023 passed by the learned Tribunal. After passing the impugned award dated 17/04/2023, the Under Secretary, Department of Water Resources, Mantralya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar [CG] vide its letter 01/12/2023, sought permission / sanction to file the instant appeal from the Secretary, Department of Law & Legislative Affairs, Raipur & Secretary, Department of Revenue, Raipur and thereafter sanction was given to file the instant appeal and Officer Incharge of the case was appointed on 01/03/2024. Thereafter, the concerned Officer In-charge of the case made all possible efforts to collect the requisite documents which were required for filing the instant appeal which took some time. Therefore, there is no willful intention to cause delay in the matter but due to requirement of permission which involves various departmental formalities and, therefore, the appeal could not be filed within time.
Though sincere efforts were made by the revenue authorities to avoid delay but in spite of that, the delay could not be avoided and the same is bonafide. There is no deliberate lapse on the part of authorities but due to procedures involved, the delay has caused. He further submits that the State is a multi- functioning body and it has to follow the rules of obtaining sanction etc. for filing an appeal, therefore, it took some time for the State to obtain sanction etc. from the highest authorities of the State for preferring this appeal. The delay caused in filing the instant appeal may kindly be condoned on the basis of principles as laid down in case of "State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao and others" reported in (2005) 3 SCC
752. 3 / 16
3. Learned counsel for the respondent strongly opposes the prayer made by learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the appellant has filed the instant appeal under Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 challenging the judgment and decree dated 17.04.2023. The appeal has been filed on 12.03.2024 and there is a delay of near about 9 months in filing the appeal. No proper and satisfactory explanation has been given for the delay caused in filing the appeal. The State Government took almost 9 months' time to decide whether this appeal has to be filed or not? The only reason assigned for delay in filing the appeal has been narrated in para 3 of the application.
He further submits that from bare perusal of the averments made in para 3 of the application, it appears that the secretary of the department sought permission to file the appeal, after 8 months. The first letter dated 01.12.2023 itself shows that the steps were taken after near about 8 months and no explanation was given for the delay between 17.04.2023 and 01.12.2023. The award was passed on 07.06.2017 thereafter the claim of the respondent was allowed on 17.04.2023 and near about 7 years have already been lapsed in between. The reasons assigned in the application appear to be vague. Therefore, in absence of any sufficient cause, the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal deserves to be rejected.
4. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others; (2010) 5 SCC 23, Central Electricity Regulatory Commission Vs. M/s Techno Electric and Engineering Company Ltd & Ors.; 2023 LawSuit (SC) 265, order passed by High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in the matter of State of Kerala Vs. Kool Foam Pvt.
4 / 16Ltd. & other connected matters; 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 863 & this Court's judgment dated 10.06.2024 passed in ARBA No. 51 of 2023 in the matter of The Superintendent Engineer, National Highway Circle Vs. ECI-Keystone (JV) through its Managing Director.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.
6. It is an admitted position in this case that the award was passed in favour of the respondent on 07.06.2017. Against this award, reference was filed by the respondent before the learned Tribunal. On 17.04.2023, the Tribunal passed award and against which, the instant appeal has been filed by the appellant on 12.03.2024.
7. Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 provides as under:-
"74. Appeal to High Court- (1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under Section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award:
Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court."
8. It is clear from this provision that maximum time, within which an appeal can be entertained by the High Court. Proviso states that the High Court may entertain the appeal if there is sufficient cause is 5 / 16 shown beyond 60 days. Provided, the appeal is filed within a further period of 60 days.
9. Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in the matter of State of Kerala Vs. Kool Foam Pvt. Ltd.; 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 863 observed in para 2 as under:-
"2. Proviso to Section 74(1) of the Act is clear as to the maximum time, within which an appeal can be entertained by the High Court. Section 74(1) of the Act states that an appeal has to be filed within 60 days from the date of the award. Proviso states that the High Court may entertain the appeal if there is sufficient cause is shown beyond 60 days, provided, the appeal is filed within a further period of 60 days. That means, the maximum period, within which the appeal can be entertained by the High Court, is 120 days. Any appeal filed beyond. 120 days from the date of award cannot be entertained by the High Court as the High Court has no power to condone the delay beyond 60 days after the expiry of 60 days reckoned from the date of award."
10. Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others reported in (2010) 5 SCC 23 held in paras 24, 25, 26, 29 and 32 as under:-
"24. Sections 111(1) and (2) lay down that any person aggrieved by an order made by an adjudicating officer or an appropriate Commission under this Act may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of 45 days from the date on which a copy of the order made by an adjudicating officer or the appropriate Commission is received by him. Section 111(5) mandates that the Tribunal shall deal with the appeal as expeditiously as possible and b endeavour to dispose of the 6 / 16 same finally within 180 days from the date of receipt thereof. If the appeal is not disposed of within 180 days, the Tribunal is required to record reasons in writing for not doing so.
25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the expression "within a further period of not exceeding 60 days" in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days.
26. The object underlying establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e. the Tribunal to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate Commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from the operation and implementation of different provisions of the Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the decision or order of the Tribunal. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the 7 / 16 civil courts (Section 145) qua an order made by an adjudicating officer is also a pointer in that direction.
29. Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is substantially similar to Section 125 of the Electricity Act came to be interpreted in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co; (2001) 8 SCC 470. The precise question considered in that case was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The two-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions in Mangu Ram v. MCD; (1976) 1 SCC 392, Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel; AIR 1964 SC 1099, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra; (1974) 2 SCC 133, Patel Naranbhai Marghabhai v. Dhulabhai Galbabhai; (1992) 4 SCC 264 and held: (Popular Construction Co. case2, SCC pp. 474-76, paras 12 & 16) "12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
* * *
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award 'in accordance 8 / 16 with' sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application 'in accordance with' that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that:
'36. Enforcement- Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court."
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to 'proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow' (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."
(emphasis supplied)
32. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the 9 / 16 period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory."
11. This Court in the matter of The Superintendent Engineer Vs. ECI-Keystone passed in ARBA No. 51 of 2023 dated 10.06.2024 observed in paras 11 to 14 as under:-
11. For the sake of brevity the relevant part of Sections 31 (5) and 34(3) of the Act, 1996 are reproduced hereinunder:-
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.-
XXX XXX XXX (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party
34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-
XXX XXX XXX (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
12. When specific limitation period is prescribed under statute is maximum for four months in the relevant case no further extention 10 / 16 of time can be provided by the Court to challenge an award under the Act, 1996.
13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India v Varindera Constructions Limited; (2020) 2 SCC 111 held thus at para 4:
4. Given the fact that an appellate proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding, as has been held in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and repeatedly followed by our judgments, we feel that any delay beyond 120 days in the filing of an appeal under Section 37 from an application being either dismissed or allowed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 should not be allowed as it will defeat the overall statutory purpose of arbitration proceedings being decided with utmost despatch.
14 It is the trite law that merely because Government authorities is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. In this context, the Supreme Court in the matter of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer v Borse Brothers Engineers And Contractors Private Limited; (2021) 6 SCC 460 held thus at paras 58 & 59:
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression "sufficient cause" is not is not period provided by the appeal provision itself.. the expression "sufficient cause" itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, has held (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15) "9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word 11 / 16 "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause"
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive"
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, Parimal v. Veena and Maniben Devraj Shah v Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai.)
10. In Arjun Singh v Mohindra Kumar this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but 12 / 16 only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao.)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. 'A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266:
'605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in 13 / 16 them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.' An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.)
14 In P. Ramachandra Rao v State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing 14 / 16 an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. ["Postmaster General"], as follows: (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29) "27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
15 / 1629. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
15. In light of above, it is clear that merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. Section 74 (1) of the Act provides maximum time period therefore, any appeal beyond 60 days from the date of award without reasonable cause for such delay cannot be entertained by the High Court as High Court has no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 60 days from the date of passing of the impugned award in absence of reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay.
16. In present case also, it is clear that the impugned award was passed on 17.04.2023 by learned Tribunal and it is clear from the application filed by the appellant that first letter for seeking permission/sanction was written on 01.12.2023 to file the instant appeal and no satisfactory explanation was offered by the appellant for such delay caused in filing the appeal. The instant appeal has been filed on 12.03.2024 which is beyond 120 days of award dated 17.04.2023. Therefore, looking to the proviso and the fact that this appeal has been filed beyond 120 days without any just and reasonable explanation therefor, no appeal is 16 / 16 entertainable by the High Court and High Court has no power to condone such delay.
17. In the light of above, the application (I.A. No. 01/2024) to condone the delay in filing the appeal is dismissed. Consequently, the land acquisition appeal is also dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Judge Judge
Sourabh P.