Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Pothuri Ananda Venkata Subba Rao Gupta vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 20 June, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ1115
ORDER
1. This is a revision filed by the petitioner against the conviction under Section 16(1A)(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and sentence of R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000/- in default to undergo R.I. for a period of three months and conviction under S. 16(1-C) to suffer R.I. for a period of two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer R.I. for one.
2. The facts of the case are that the Food Inspector (P.W. 1) of Krishna District is empowered to take sample of Food Articles (vide G.O. Ms. No. 467 M&H dated 18-7-1979 published at page 697 part-I of A.P. Gazette dated 9-8-1979). P.W. 1 is also authorised to institute prosecution under the Act vide G.O. Ms. No. 62 M&H (L1) Department dated 30-1-1985. The accused is the proprietor of Messrs. Sri Dhanalkshmi General Stores, Door No. 2-1, Main Road, Pedana, Bandar Taluk, Krishna District, and is prosecuting his business. P.W. 1 along with panch witness and another P.W. 3 visited the shop of the accused on 21-2-1986. On suspicion that the turmeric powder kept in the shop of the accused was adultered P.W. 1 had purchased 600 gms. of the turmeric powder paying Rs. 3/- to the accused under cash receipt. After purchasing the same he divided the sample into three parts and secured the same in three bottles as per the procedure laid down under the Food Adulteration Act, 1974 and the Rules made thereunder. P.W. 1 sent of the sample bottles to the Public Analyst for analysis and the other two bottles to the Local Health Authority, Hyderabad. P.W. 1 then questioned the accused about the source of supply of the said food article. The accused failed to disclose the name and address of the person from whom he had purchased. The Public Analyst analysed the sample bottle and opined that the sample contains rice flour, rice husk and added colour mentanil yellow, a non-permitted coal tar due which is injurious to health and is, therefore, adulterated and sent the analyst report Ex. P-10 to the Public Health Authority. Thereafter the Health Authority granted sanction for the prosecution of the accused. Thereafter P.W. 1 filed a complaint on 20-5-1986. P.W. 1 issued notice under S. 13(2) of the Act sending a copy of the analyst report stating therein that it is open to the accused to file a petition to send the bottle to the Central Food Laboratory. The complaint was taken on file on 28-5-1986. The prosecution in all examined P.Ws. 1 to 6 and marked Exs. P-1 to P-24. P.W. 1 is the Food Inspector. P.W. 2 is a mediator. P.W. 3 is another mediator who was working as an attender. P.W. 4 was the Assistant Food Controller, Kakinda, who followed P.W. 1 when he visited the shop of the accused. P.W. 5 is the Public Analyst examined in the trial Court. P.W. 6 is also a Food Inspector who succeeded P.W. 1. The accused examined D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 and marked Exs. D-1 and D-2. When the accused was examined under S. 313, Cr.P.C. he denied the offence and produced the phtostat copy of the cash memo alleged to have been issued to him by the vendor of the Food item i.e. turmeric powder. The trial court after considering the entire evidence on record believed the prosecution story and held that the food article was found adulterated and the same was taken from the shop of the petitioner. So, the petitioner was liable for the offence with which he was charged and held that the petitioner is liable for conviction. Against that judgment the petitioner filed an appeal. The appellate Court elaborately considered the rival contentions raised by the parties and confirmed the conviction on both the counts. But, however, modified the sentence of imprisonment from 18 months to one year. Against that judgment the present revision is filed.
3. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that P.W. 1 Food Inspector did not depose or produce any evidence to show that he gave intimation to Local Health Authority stating that he has sent one sample bottle to the Public Analyst as per S. 11(1)(c) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Therefore, non-compliance of the said provision causes prejudice to the accused as the same being mandatory. So he is entitled for acquittal. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that the duty cast on P.W. 1 under S. 11(1)(c) of the Act is only directory and not mandatory and in the present case though P.W. 1 had not deposed that he has sent the intimation to the Local Health Authority stating that he has sent one sample bottle to the Analyst he has sent the remaining two bottles to the Local Health Authority under registered post with acknowledgment due and the acknowledgment was filed into the Court. Therefore, no prejudice is caused to the accused. He further submitted that it is only directory and unless some prejudice is caused to the accused the case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out.
To appreciate the above contention it is relevant to extract S. 11(1) "11. Procedure to be followed by Food Inspectors :-
(1) When a Food Inspector takes a sample of Food for analysis, he shall -
(a) give notice in writing then and there of his intention to have it so analysed to the person from whom he has taken the sample and to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under S. 14-A;
(b) except in special cases provided by rules under this Act, divide the sample then and there into three parts and mark and seal or fasten up each part in such a manner as its nature permits and take the signature or thumb impression of the person from whom the sample has been taken in such place and in such manner as may be prescribed;
Provided that where such person refuses to sign or put his thumb impression the Food Inspector shall call upon one or more witnesses and take his or their signatures or thumb impression as the case may be, in lieu of the signature or thumb-impression of such person;
(c)(i) send one of the parts for analysis to the Public Analyst under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority; and
(ii) send the remaining two parts to the Local (Health) Authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of this section and sub-sections (2-A) and (2-E) of S. 13.
As per the above section the Food Inspector has give notice in writing of his intention of taking the sample for analysis. After purchasing the sample by paying the cash he has to divide the sample into three parts and put them into separate containers by putting seals thereon. He also has to take the signature or thumb impression from whom the sample is taken as prescribed. If such person refuses to sign or put his thumb impression then he has to take the signature of the mediator in lieu of the signature or thumb impression of the person from whom the article is purchased. Then he has to send one part for analysis to the Public Analyst under intimation to Local (Health) Authority. He has to send the remaining two Parts to the Local (Health) Authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of this Section and sub-sections (2-A) and (2-E) of S. 13 to enable the accused to have them sent if he so desires to the Local (Health) Authority for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory. By a reading of S. 11, prima facie, it is clear that a duty is imposed on the Food Inspector. Thus while taking the sample he has to observe the procedure laid down under S. 11(1)(a) and S. 11(1)(b). Coming to S. 11(1)(c) it is mandatory to send one of the parts to the Analyst. While sending one of the samples to analysis he has to give intimation to Local (Health) Authority. The question is whether the sending of intimation to Local (Health) Authority is mandatory or directory. By a reading of S. 11 (1)(c) it is manifestly evident that the sending of one of the parts of sample to the Public Analyst the opinion cannot be sought from the Analyst and no further proceeding can be taken under the Act. But not giving intimation to the Local (Health) Authority about sending one of the sample to the Analyst cannot be said to be mandatory. Though in this case there is no evidence that the intimation was sent to the Local (Health) Authority, P.W. 1 has deposed that he has sent the two remaining bottles to the Public Health Authority by registered post under acknowledgment due and received the acknowledgment. Thus the Local (Health) Authority has got the information that the sample of turmeric powder is taken from the petitioner. The intimation to Local Health Authority as contemplated under S. 11(1)(c) is only to have information. That information they have already received as they have received the two remaining bottles sent by P.W. 1. Therefore no prejudice is caused to the petitioner in this case.
4. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Raghunath, 1984 Cri LJ 1981 wherein a learned single Judge considered the question whether S. 11(1)(c) is mandatory or directory while discussing in the judgment in paras 6 to 9. The learned Judge mainly took the fact that the conviction under the Act is very grave and serious and stiff character. The learned Judge has not referred any other judgment which has taken that view. The entire discussion only based on the fact that the sentence is grave and serious. He further held that the Act provides before invoking the penal provision certain requirements have got to be complied with and after complying with the said requirement the citizen can be sent to jail. Therefore it was not the intention of the legislature and without complying those provisions the citizen can be sent to jail. There are number of provisions and Rules and not all of them are mandatory. Some of them are mandatory and some of them are directory. If the view taken by the single Judge is accepted then all the provisions in the Act have to be viewed as mandatory. With great respect I am not agreeing with his view.
In re : T. V. Hameed, 1986 Cri LJ 1001, a single Judge of the Kerala High Court has Considered the question whether S. 11(1)(c)(i) is mandatory or directory and elaborately discussed. In para 8 of the judgment he discussed elaborately referring to the different Provisions under the Act and also the Supreme Court judgment regarding the question whether a particular provision or rule is mandatory or directory and held that the provision of S. 11(1)(c)(i) is evidently directory one. The learned Judge also referred to S. 10(7) and held that non-observance of provisions is not fatal. The learned Judge also considered the above judgment of the Bombay High Court in para 7 of his judgment and dissented from that judgment giving cogent and convincing reasons. It is to be relevant to extract paras 7 and 8 of the judgment.
"7. S. 11(1)(c)(i) only says that when the Food Inspector takes sample of food for analysis, he shall send one of the parts of the sample for analysis to the Public Analyst under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority. In order to accept this contention the Sessions Judge seems to have strained himself too much to consider various provisions of the Act and Rules in an attempt to make out that this is a vital mandatory provision, the absence of proof of compliance of which must necessarily end in acquittal. For that purpose he utilised a lot of judicial time and energy and covered more than five pages of typed matter. To fortify his conclusions on the basis of such a report he was able to find support from a Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in State of Maharashtra v. Raghunath, 1984 Cri LJ 198. In that decision the Judge who decided the case himself regretted his inability to find out any precedent supporting his view. The only reason mentioned in support of the view that S. 11(1)(c)(i) is mandatory and its non-compliance is fatal to the prosecution is that a conviction in a food adulteration case must necessarily result in at least a serious minimum sentence of imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. Referring to the gravity of the sentence the judgment says "If this is the position of law, then it will be reasonable to assume that the legislature expected the officer concerned to comply with each of the formalities prescribed by the statute very strictly. This necessarily (means) that the provision is mandatory in character. Then the decision went on to say :-
"It cannot be lightly assumed that the legislature wanted the citizen to be sentenced to stiff penalty in a light-hearted manner. If such stiff penalty is the ultimate result the manner in which the stiff penalty should be imposed has to be prescribed and once the legislature prescribes such manner the same has got to be observed strictly by the person who has been entrusted with the duty of implementation of the law by paying attention to each of the mandatory requirements prescribed by the law. I do not think that the Court would be justified in taking the view that the legislature has made the provisions for intimation to Local Authority of certain facts as an empty formality. The Act provides that before invoking the penal provisions, certain requirements have got to be complied with. After compliance with those requirements the citizen may be sent to jail; but it cannot have been intended by the legislature that similar result would not follow even if the requirement was not complied with by the authorities concerned."
8. If that view is accepted each and every provision in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rules will have to be treated as mandatory and absence of proof of observance must be found fatal. But unfortunately that view is not favoured by this Court and the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. It is true that there is no other available decision concerning S. 11(1)(c)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act presumably for the reason that nobody must have thought it fit to raise such a hyper-technical contention. Decided cases show that various provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Rules are only directory in nature and their non-observance of strict or timely compliance will not be fatal. Guidelines to decide whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory were also given by various decisions. The appellate decision in this case referred to by me earlier has also given such guidelines. It is not necessary for me to extract all those decisions here. In my opinion, the provision of Section 11(1)(c)(i) is evidently only a directory one. There are a host of decisions which say that the provisions of S. 10(7) are only directory and that the non-observance of those provisions will not be fatal. Rule 9-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules made on the basis of S. 13(2) directing the Local (Health) Authority to send copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the accused was considered in the decision in Tulsiram v. State of M.P., , and it was found to be not a mandatory provision. It was held therein;
"The expression "immediately" in R. 9-A is intended to convey a sense of continuity rather than urgency. What must be done is to forward the report to the person from whom the sample was taken at the earliest opportunity, so as to facilitate the exercise of the statutory right under S. 13(2) in good and sufficient time before the prosecution commences leading evidence. Non-compliance with R. 9-A is not fatal. It is a question of prejudice."
Compliance of the rule is having some bearing on the right of the accused to have a second opinion from the Central Food Laboratory. Even in such a case it was held that proof of prejudice is required to make absence of strict compliance fatal. Compliance of S. 13(2-B) came up for consideration before a Single Bench of this Court in the decision in Mani v. Food Inspector, 1984 Ker LJ 752 what was observed therein is :
"When the accused exercises his right under S. 13(2) for a fresh analysis by the Central Food Laboratory, he has himself a duty to alert the Court of its responsibilities to satisfy whether there was any tampering of the packet and seal of the sample and to insist the Court to make record of its verification. The accused cannot at a later stage of the trial, or in appeal or revision contend that there is no record by the Court for the purpose. A technical lapse of Court, even if there is any, of a formal record of verification of the sample by the Court, cannot be taken advantage of by a party who never objected to the defect of the packet of the sample before it was despatched and who waited till the receipt of the report by the Central Laboratory. If the Central Food Laboratory obtained sample with seals intact and unbroken and the letter which was sent by the Court also referred to the details on the sample packet, regarding the seal etc. it can safely be concluded that the endorsement made on the application by the accused was by the Court and that the Court had applied its mind as contemplated under S. 13(2-B) of the Act. There is thus no violation of S. 13(2B) of the Act either. "It is unnecessary to quote further instances"."
Thus the Kerala High Court has elaborately considered and held that S. 11(1)(c)(i) is only directory.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner next relied on the judgment of Armugham v. Food Inspector, 1986 Food Adulteration Cases 39. In that case the Food Inspector has not sent the remaining two parts to the Local (Health) Authority apart from not giving the intimation to the Local (Health) Authority. In those circumstances the Madras High Court held in para 6 of the judgment as follows :
"6. Section 11 of the Act requires that when the Food Inspector takes a sample of food for analysis, he should send one of the parts for analysis to the Public Analyst under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority and send the remaining two parts to the Local (Health) Authority for the purposes of sub-section (2) of S. 11 and sub-sections (2-A) and (2-E) of S. 13. It does not appear from the evidence of P.W. 1 that he gave intimation to the Local (Health) Authority about the despatch of one of the parts for analysis by the Public Analyst or that he sent the remaining two parts to the Local Authority for the purposes aforesaid.
Thus the Food Inspector has violated the provisions of the Act and the Rules referred to above in every possible and conceivable manner. It is high time that the Local (Health) Authority concerned issues instructions to the Food Inspector is implied within its jurisdiction to strictly observe the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder."
Therefore in view of the abovestated circumstances I hold that the intimation to be sent to the Local (Health) Authority while the Food Inspector forwards one of the parts to the Public Analyst is only directory and not mandatory. Particularly in this case it is not shown that any prejudice is caused to the petitioner-accused.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner secondly contended that the notice contemplated under section 13(2) of the Act along with the Analyst Report was sent to the accused even before the complaint was taken on file. Therefore, the same has caused prejudice to the accused. So on that ground itself the petitioner is entitled for acquittal. The learned Public Prosecutor contended that no prejudice is caused to the accused as he has not filed any petition in the lower Court to send the sample for analysis.
7. To appreciate this contention it is relevant to mention some of the dates. The sample was taken on 22-1-1986 and thereafter it was sent for analysis. Analyst report was received by the Local (Health) Authority. Thereafter sanction was granted on 24-4-1986. The Food Inspector filed the complaint on 20-5-1986. Section 13(2) notice was served on the petitioner by the Food Inspector on 22-5-1986 and the complaint was taken on file on 28-5-1986. The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that notice under S. 13(2) is served on the petitioner on 22-5-1986 and the complaint is taken on file on 28-5-1986. Therefore there is no opportunity to the petitioner to file a petition to send the sample to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. First of all the petitioner has not filed any petition to send another sample bottle for the opinion of the Central Food Laboratory. Therefore he cannot say that any prejudice is caused to him. Apart from that the complaint was filed on 20-5-1986 and notice under S. 13(2) was served on 22-5-1986. Even on the complaint filed on 20-5-1986 the trial Court endorsed 'check and put up' and thereafter the complaint was taken on file on 28-5-1986. Therefore, there is no lacuna or negligence on the part of the Food Inspector and no prejudice is caused to the accused. It is contended that S. 13(2) of the Act says that on receipt of the report with the result of the Analyst stating that the article of food is adulterated, Local (Health) Authority shall after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under S. 14-A forward in such manner as may be prescribed attaching a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons informing him that if it is so desired he may make an application to the Court within ten days to send the another sample to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. In sub-section (2) of S. 13 the words used are - "after institution of the prosecution against the person". The meaning of word 'institution' though not defined in Food Adulteration Act or Criminal Procedure Code it means only after taking cognizance of the offence or after the case is taken on file. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in "Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shan, , for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of 'institution'. There is no, doubt that the Supreme Court in the judgment held that a case can be said to be instituted in a Court only when a Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein under S. 191 of Code of Criminal Procedure for cognizance of offences by the Magistrate. Even taking that 'institution' means taking cognizance of the offence, still no prejudice is caused to the petitioner in this case. Further the word 'institution' has to be interpreted according to its use in a particular place. The meaning of the word 'institution' also can be said to be filing of the case. But, however, the Supreme Court has held that a case is said to be instituted only when cognizance of the offence is taken. Therefore even following the view of the Supreme Court it can only be said that the case is instituted on 28-5-1986. Thus, it is six days before the case was taken on file, notice was served on the petitioner. The petitioner however, has not filed any petition earlier to 28-5-1986 requesting the Court to send another sample to the Central Food Laboratory nor his petition was rejected on the ground that no case is instituted. Therefore, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner and I see no force in the contention.
8. The learned Counsel also relied on the Judgment of the Orissa High Court reported in Bhagirathi Das v. State of Orissa, 1988 Cri LJ 260. No doubt the Orissa High Court held that non-compliance of S. 113(2) of the Act which is mandatory vitiates the prosecution. In that case 20 days earlier to the institution of the complaint, report of the Analyst was sent to the petitioner i.e. on 29-1-1979 whereas the institution of the prosecution is on 21-2-1979. In those circumstances the Orissa High Court held that the prosecution is vitiated. In the notice sent under S. 13(2) it was specifically stated by the Chief District Medical Officer (Local Health Authority) that if the petitioners desired they should make applications in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the intimation for examination of the food sample by the Central Food Laboratory as required under S. 13(2) of the, Act. Notice was received by the petitioners on 31-1-1979 in that case and ten days' time to file a petition to send the sample to Central Food Laboratory expired by 10-2-1979, whereas the prosecution was instituted on 21-2-1979. In the circumstances of that case the Orissa High Court held that the prosecution is vitiated as the petitioners have lost opportunity to send the sample to the Central Food Laboratory. In the present case notice was received by the petitioner on 22-5-1986 and the complaint was filed on 20-5-1986. The same was taken on file on 28-5-1986. Thus, even after taking of the case on file still there is time for the petitioner to request the Court for sending the bottle to the Central Food Laboratory. But the petitioner has not filed any petition nor his petition was rejected and thus no prejudice is caused to him. Therefore, the proposition laid down in the judgment of Orissa High Court does not apply to the facts of the present case. Therefore I see no force in this contention.
9. Thirdly, the learned Counsel contended that the petitioner has sent Ex. P-13 photostat copy of the cash memo issued by the vendor to him for the purchase of turmeric powder. The Food Inspector has not verified about such vendor and not taken any action to implead him. If the Food Inspector could have verified about the said vendor and implead him, the petitioner would have been exonerated as per S. 19(2) of the Act. Because the said vendor is not impleaded the petitioner is convicted. So his conviction is to be set aside.
10. Food Inspector P.W. 1 in his deposition clearly deposed that when he has taken the sample of turmeric powder from the shop of the petitioner he enquired the petitioner to disclose the source of supply but the petitioner did not disclose the same. Thereafter P.W. 1 has sent a letter Ex. P-11 to disclose the source of supply to the petitioner. To that letter the petitioner has sent a reply Ex. P-12 wherein he has attached the photostat copy of the alleged warranty Ex. P-13. Except this he has not taken any further action. He has not sent the original of Ex. P-13 to the Food Inspector nor he filed the said original in the Court. Even during his examination under S. 313, Cr.P.C. he filed another photostat copy of the cash memo and has not filed the original. Apart from it, the petitioner has not disclosed the source of supply at the time the sample was lifted by the Food Inspector and only after P.W. 1 had sent a letter he replied to that with a phtostat. Thus as observed by both the Courts below the said source was informed after considerable delay and further original is not filed. So, both the Courts below rightly rejected the contention that the petitioner is not entitled for the benefit of warranty as provided under S. 19(2) of the Act.
11. The learned Counsel Sri Padmanabha Reddy contended that when once the petitioner has given the intimation of source of supply it is the mandatory duty of the Food Inspector under S. 14-A of the Act to find out who is the vendor and to take further action by impleading him. To appreciate this contention it must be noted that S. 14 of the Act prescribes -
"No manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in of any article of food shall sell such article to any vendor unless he also gives a warranty in writing in the prescribed form about the nature and quality of such article to the vendor."
In the proviso to the said section it is further stated "a bill, cash memorandum or invoice in respect of the sale of any article of food given by manufacturer or distributor of, or dealer in, such article to the vendor thereof shall be deemed to be a warranty given by such manufacturer, distributor or dealer".
S. 14-A reads as follows :-
"Every vendor of an article of food shall if so required, disclose to the Food Inspector the name, address and other particulars of the person from whom he purchased the article of food."
By a reading of the above Section it is clear that a duty is cast on the person from whom the article of food is purchased by the Food Inspector to disclose the source of supply if the Food Inspector so requires. But there is nothing in the abovesaid section suggesting that a duty is cast on the Food Inspector to find out the vendor mentioned in the cash memo and implead him. However, it is open to the Food Inspector to find out who was the supplier to the person from whom the sample is taken and if he is satisfied that the said person supplied the food article he can take action under the provisions of the Act against the said supplier also. But by that itself it cannot be said that there is a mandatory duty cast on the Food Inspector to find out the said supplier to take action against him, particularly when the information is not given immediately even though enquired by P.W. 1 at the time of taking sample.
12. It is also relevant to extract S. 19 of the Act.
"19. Defences which may or may not be allowed in prosecution under this Act :
(1) It shall be no defence in a prosecution for an offence pertaining to the sale of an, adulterated or misbranded article of food to allege merely that the vendor was ignorant of the nature, substance or quality of the food sold by him or that the purchaser having purchased any article for analysis was not prejudiced by the sale.
(2) Vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded, article of food if he proves -
(a) that he purchased the article of food
(i) in a case where a licence is prescribed for the sale thereof, from a duly licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer
(ii) in any other case, from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer, with a written warranty in the prescribed form; and
(b) that the article of food while in his possession was properly stored and that he sold it in the same state as he purchased it.
(3) Any person by whom a warranty, as is referred to in (S. 14) is alleged to have been given shall be entitled to appear at the hearing and give evidence."
13. By a reading of Sections 14 and 19 together it is evident that whenever the person, from whom sample of food is taken by the Food Inspector pleads a warranty he can prove the same by filing the said warranty in the court and even the person who supplied the food article can come and give the evidence and if it is proved that the said person supplied food article under warranty, the person from whom the food article is taken is deemed to have not committed any offence as per S. 19(2) of the Act. It is also open to the person from whom food sample is taken to implead the said person under section 20-A of the Act as ample power is given to the court to implead such person. Therefore from a reading of Sections 19 and 20-A of the Act it is evident that the burden is on the accused to produce the warranty and prove that he purchased the food article under warranty from a particular person. In this case except sending photostat copy and filing another photostat copy of the cash memo into court at the time of examination under section 313 Cr.P.C. the original is not filed in the court nor any proceeding is taken even in the appellate court to file the original. Thus the accused has not discharged the burden cast upon him. Therefore this contention also fails. No other point is raised except the above points. Therefore I see no merits in the revision. The revision is dismissed.
14. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the sentence of imprisonment under count No. 1 is reduced to six months and the fine confirmed.
15. Revision dismissed.