Karnataka High Court
Sri G.S.Veeranagowdar S/O Shivana ... vs Shri. Dr. Alok Mohan Ips Dg And Igp Of ... on 18 December, 2023
Author: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
Bench: S.Sunil Dutt Yadav
®
-1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.SUNIL DUTT YADAV
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO.106667/2023 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
G.S.VEERANAGOWDAR,
S/O. SHIVANA GOWDA,
AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC: WORKING AS CIVIL
POLICE CONSTABLE
R/AT:DHANESWRI COLONY,
HOUSE NO: 51, GOPANAKOPPA,
HUBBALLI-580 032
.......PETITIONER
(BY SRI.GOURI SHANKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. DG & IGP OF POLICE,
KARNATAKA STATE,
NRUPATUNGA ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
HUBBALLI-DHARWAD-580 020
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.K.HIREGOUDAR, GOVT. ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETIITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 & 227 OF
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO SET - ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 16.06.2023 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE KARNATAKA
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, AT BELAGAVI BENCH IN CTA
NO.2061 OF 2022 IN APPLICATION NO.7667/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-
E AND DIRECT THE RESPONDENTS TO PAY THE ARREARS WITH
RESPECT TO CHARGE NO.1 AS STATED IN ORDER DATED
03.08.2020 IN APPLICATION NO.7667/2018 VIDE ANNEXURE-A1 TO
THE PETITIONER, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
-2-
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD, RESERVED ON
05.12.2023 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
VIJAYKUMAR A PATIL, J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER
This petition is filed assailing the order dated 16.06.2023 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Belagavi Bench (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') in CTA No.2061/2022 and sought further direction to the respondents to pay the arrears with respect to charge No.1 which is pertaining to withholding of arrears of pay for certain period for unauthorized absence as stated in the order dated 03.08.2020 in Application No.7667/2018.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of this petition are the petitioner was working as Civil Constable at Keshwapur Police Station, Hubballi. On certain misconduct, he was kept under suspension by the second respondent vide order dated 04.07.2013. The allegation of serious misconduct was that the petitioner threatened one Siddappa with intention to kill him by country made pistol by firing and assaulting him with deadly weapon. The jurisdictional police registered FIR against the petitioner, he was arrested and was in judicial custody. The suspension order was revoked on 17.03.2014 and the petitioner was posted in Excise Enforcement and Lottery -3- Prohibition Special Police Station, Hubballi. Second respondent vide order dated 17.07.2014, appointed Additional Commissioner of Police, Traffic Sub-Division, Hubballi as the enquiry officer. The petitioner was issued with charge memo dated 04.09.2014, charges levelled against the petitioner read as under:
1) On 21.06.2011 on the pretext of ill health has received MHS book and passport and went on medical leave and reported for duty on 06.03.2013 but he has not produced the medical documents in support of medical leave, thereby shown indifference and irresponsibility in duties.
2) On 16.04.2013 at 22.30 hours he along with others went to Kabbenur village in a Innova car bearing No.KA-47/M-206 with a view to kill Sri siddappa Sankappa Kardigudda, fired bullet from a country made pistol, tried to assault in a deadly weapons, abused in a filthy language, committed the criminal act and shown misbehavior and irresponsibility in duties.
3) By committing the criminal acts, he become responsible for registering Criminal case in Crime No.97/2013 u/s 143, 147, 148, 307, 114, 504 r/w 149 IPC and Sections 25 & 28 Indian Arms Act, in Dharwad Rural Police Station, he shown grave negligence and irresponsibility in duties.
4) He has shown grave negligence, irresponsibility in duties, for having arresting on 17.04.2013 at 11:55 hours by the Dharwad police taking him to judicial custody.
-4-
3. Petitioner submitted his explanation to the aforesaid charges, enquiry was conducted, enquiry report was accepted after considering the petitioner's reply. The second respondent passed an order dated 14.07.2017 for removal of the petitioner from services by treating the period from 04.07.2013 to 21.03.2014 as suspension period. The petitioner assailed the order of the second respondent before the first respondent appellate authority and the appellate authority vide order dated 07.07.2018 rejected the appeal of the petitioner.
4. Petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, approached the Tribunal in Application No.7667/2018. The Tribunal allowed the said application by quashing the impugned orders vide order dated 03.08.2020 by directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits within two months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. The respondent-State challenged the Tribunal's order dated 03.08.2020 in W.P. No.102599/2021 and the same came to be dismissed on 03.09.2021. The respondent-State filed Special Leave Petition No.16711/2021. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition vide order dated 08.11.2021.
-5-
5. The petitioner initiated contempt proceedings in CTA No.1037/2021 alleging willful disobedience of the order of the Tribunal dated 03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018. The Tribunal vide order dated 11.11.2021, dropped the contempt proceedings. Thereafter the petitioner submitted a representation to the respondent-State for revision of pay scale and payment of back wages. Failure of the respondents to consider the representation of the petitioner and non-compliance of the order of the Tribunal dated 03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018, the petitioner filed second contempt petition in CTA No.2061/2022. The said contempt proceedings were dropped by the Tribunal vide order dated 16.06.2023 which is challenged in the present petition.
6. Sri Gourishankar Mot, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal has committed a grave error in dropping the contempt proceedings. The respondent-State has failed to pay the arrears of salary as directed by the Tribunal in its order dated 03.08.2020. The finding of the Tribunal that the order dated 19.11.2021, 04.01.2022 and 07.10.2022 placed by the respondent along with a memo indicates that the arrears of pay pertaining to period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 is also paid to the -6- petitioner is incorrect. It is submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved as held by the Tribunal in Application No.7667/2018 which has been confirmed by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hence, dropping of contempt proceedings by the Tribunal was based on the compliance affidavit of the respondent is contrary to law and evidence on record as the petitioner has been reinstated pursuant to the orders of the Tribunal. However, the respondents have failed to pay the consequential benefits and failed to pay the arrears as directed by the Tribunal. He seeks to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned order dated 16.06.2023 passed by the Tribunal in CTA No.2061/2022. Further, prayed to issue direction to the respondents to pay arrears irrespective of charge No.1 as stated by the Tribunal.
7. Per contra, Sri Girish K. Hiregoudar, learned Government Advocate submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the challenge in the present petition is arising out of the contempt proceedings of the Tribunal. Hence, the petitioner has to file an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short '1971 Act') to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is submitted that the exercise of the -7- power by the Tribunal is under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (for short '1985 Act'). Hence, the writ petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable before this Court. It is further submitted that the exercise of power by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1971 Act is the same as of the High Court. Hence, judicial review of the orders of the Tribunal exercising its power under Section 17 is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It is also submitted that even on merits insofar as the claim of the petitioner for payment of arrears with respect of charge No.1, there is no adjudication of the allegation of charge No.1 before the Tribunal which was kept pending till the Medical Board Certificate is received with regard to the claim of the petitioner and until the said certificate is received from the Medical Board, the petitioner's claim cannot be considered. Hence, he seeks dismissal of the petition.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Advocate, perused the material available on record.
9. The respondent authorities have kept the petitioner under suspension on the basis of serious misconduct and -8- thereafter enquiry was conducted and punishment of removal from service was inflicted on the petitioner which was assailed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide order dated 03.08.2020 in an Application No.7667/2018 by a well reasoned order has set aside the order of punishment and directed the respondent- State to reinstate the petitioner with all the consequential benefits. The said order has attained finality as the writ petition in W.P.No.102599/2021 was rejected which was challenged SLP No.16711/2021 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the same came to be dismissed vide order dated 08.11.2021. Admittedly, the petitioner has filed a contempt petition before the Tribunal in CTA No.1037/2021 alleging willful disobedience of the order of the Tribunal dated 03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018. The Tribunal has passed the following order:
"Learned Additional Government Advocate has filed a memo along with Annexure-R1 dated 09.11.2021 by which complainant is issued with the order reinstating him into service. Learned counsel for the complainant also states that in view of the order dated 09.11.2021 passed by complying the order of this Tribunal which is confirmed by Hon'ble High Court and Apex Court, the Contempt Application may be dropped."
2. Accordingly, the Contempt Application is dropped."
-9-
10. On perusal of the aforesaid order of the Tribunal, it is evident that the Tribunal has recorded the compliance of its order based on the submissions of the learned AGA as well as of the complainant. Be that as it may, thereafter the petitioner has submitted representations to the respondent authorities seeking for payment of arrears of revision of pay scale and payment of back wages which was not considered by the respondents. Hence, he filed second contempt petition in CTA No.2061/2022 alleging the willful disobedience of the order dated 03.08.2020 passed in Application No.7667/2018 against which, the earlier contempt petition was filed and the Tribunal has dropped the contempt proceedings. The Tribunal in second contempt proceedings, considering the rival submissions of the parties and taking note of the compliance affidavit along with orders placed by the respondent-State has proceeded to pass the following order:
"7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsels and perused the compliance affidavit along with annexures produced by the learned AGA and the objection filed by the complainant to the compliance affidavit. The complainant has requested to issue a direction to the accused to pay arrears of the period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 and the consequential benefits. The complainant is admitting that the accused have partly complied the order by -10- reinstating the complainant into service, but the arrears of pay for the period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 is not paid. The orders passed by the accused on 19.11.2021, 04.01.2022 and 07.10.2022 along with the Memo filed by the learned AGA are perused. After the complainant was reinstated into service, even the arrears of pay pertaining to the period from 14.07.2017 to
11.11.2021 is also paid to the complainant. Hence the contention taken by the complainant that a direction be issued to the respondents to pay arrears for the period 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 cannot be sustained. Since the arrears for the period from 14.07.2017 to 11.11.2021 is also paid to the complainant, we are the opinion that the direction issued by this Tribunal in a.No.7667/2018 on 03.08.2020 is complied by the accused."
11. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal clearly indicates that the respondents have paid the arrears as claimed by the petitioner and dropped the second contempt proceedings. The petitioner has assailed the second order of the Tribunal wherein it has dropped the contempt proceedings against the respondent-accused. The respondent-State has not filed the objections to the present petition. However, it has raised the preliminary objection on maintainability of the writ petition and further submitted that the arrears what was required to be paid to the petitioner was paid and insofar as the charge No.1 which was not the subject matter before the Tribunal would be considered only on receipt of the medical certificate from the -11- Medical Board with regard to the petitioner's unauthorized absence.
12. To appreciate the rival contentions, more particularly, with regard to maintainability of the writ petition, it would be useful to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2001) 1 SCC 516. It would be useful to extract the relevant portion of the judgment:
"17. It is thus clear that the Constitution Bench has not declared the provisions of Article 323- A(2)(b) or Article 323-B(3)(d) or Section 17 of the Act ultra vires the Constitution. The High Court has, in its judgment under appeal, noted with emphasis the Tribunal having been compared to like "courts of first instance"
and then proceeded to hold that the status of Administrative Tribunals having been held to be equivalent to court or Tribunals subordinate to the High Court the jurisdiction to hear their own contempt was lost by the Administrative Tribunals and the only course available to them was either to make a reference to High Court or to file a complaint under Sections 193, 219 and 228 of IPC as provided by Section 30 of the Act. The High Court has proceeded on the reasoning that the Tribunal having been held to be subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and its decisions having been subjected to judicial review jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, the right to file an appeal to -12- the Supreme Court against an order passed by the Tribunal punishing for contempt under Section 17 of the Act was defeated and on these twin grounds Section 17 of the Act became unworkable and unconstitutional. We do not find any basis for such conclusion or inference being drawn from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Supreme Court Bar Assn. Vs. Union of India or L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India or any other decision of this Court. The Constitution Bench has in so many words said that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 could not be taken away by conferring the same on any court or Tribunal and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the High Court now legislatively conferred on Tribunals to the exclusion of High Court on specified matters, did not amount to assigning Tribunals a status of substitute for the High Court but such jurisdiction was capable of being conferred additionally or supplementally on any Court or Tribunal which is not a concept strange to the scheme of the Constitution more so in view of Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (2)(b) of Article 323-A specifically empowers the Parliament to enact a law specifying the jurisdiction and powers, including the power to punish for contempt, being conferred on the Administrative Tribunals constituted under Article 323-A. Section 17 of the Act derives its legislative sanctity therefrom. The power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself under Article 215 of the Constitution remains intact but the jurisdiction, power and authority to hear and decide the matters covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act having been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals the jurisdiction of the High Court to that extent has been taken away and hence the same jurisdiction which vested in the High -13- Court to punish for contempt of itself in the matters now falling within the jurisdiction of Tribunals if those matters would have continued to be heard by the High court has now been conferred on the Administrative Tribunals under Section 17 of the Act. The jurisdiction is the same as vesting in the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The need for enacting Section 17 arose, firstly, to avoid doubts, and secondly, because the Tribunals are not "courts of record". While holding the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act the Tribunal remains a Tribunal and so would be amenable to jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution subject to the well-established rules of self- restraint governing the discretion of the High Court to interfere with the pending proceedings and upset the interim or interlocutory orders of the Tribunals. However any order or decision of Tribunal punishing for contempt shall be appealable only to the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of the order appealed against in view of the specific provision contained in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act is a piece of legislation by reference. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act are not as if lifted and incorporated in the text of Administrative Tribunals Act (as is in the case of legislation by incorporation); they remain there where they are yet while reading the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act in the context of Tribunals, the same will be so read as to read the word "Tribunal" in place of the word "High Court" wherever it occurs, subject to the modifications set out in Section 17 of the Administrative -14- Tribunals Act. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for appeals. In its text also by virtue of Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the word "High Court" shall be read as "Tribunal". Here, by way of abundant caution, we make it clear that the concept of intra-Tribunal appeals i.e. appeal from an order or decision of a member of a Tribunal sitting singly to a Bench of not less than two Members of the Tribunal is alien to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The question of any order made under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Member of the Tribunal sitting singly, if the rules of business framed by the Tribunal or the appropriate Government permit such hearing, being subjected to an appeal before a Bench of two or more Members of Tribunal therefore does not arise. Any order or decision of the Tribunal punishing for contempt is appealable under Section 19 of the Act to the Supreme Court only. The Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar has nowhere said that orders of Tribunal holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided by Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The distinction between orders passed by Administrative Tribunal on matters covered by Section 14 (1) of Administrative Tribunals Act and orders punishing for contempt under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 17 of Administrative Tribunals Act, is this :
as against the former there is no remedy of appeal statutorily provided, but as against the later statutory remedy of appeal is provided by Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act itself.-15-
18. Subordination of Tribunals and courts functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court can be either judicial or administrative or both. The power of superintendence exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is judicial superintendence and not administrative superintendence, such as one which vests in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution over subordinate courts. Vide para 96 of L. Chandra Kumars case, the Constitution Bench did not agree with the suggestion that the Tribunals be made subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts within whose territorial jurisdiction they fall, as our constitutional scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of any High Court should be subject to its supervisory jurisdiction. Obviously, the supervisory jurisdiction referred to by the Constitution Bench in para 96 of the judgment is the supervision of the administrative functioning of the Tribunals as is spelt out by discussion made in paras 96 and 97 of the judgment.
19. Jurisdiction should not be confused with status and subordination. The Parliament was motivated to create new adjudicatory fora to provide new, cheap and fast-track adjudicatory systems and permitting them to function by tearing off the conventional shackles of the strict rule of pleadings, strict rule of evidence, tardy trials, three/four-tier appeals, endless revisions and reviews -
creating hurdles in fast flow of stream of justice. The administrative Tribunals as established under Article 323- A and the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 are an alternative institutional mechanism or authority, designed to be not less effective than the High Court, consistently -16- with the amended constitutional scheme but at the same time not to negate judicial review jurisdiction of constitutional courts. Transfer of jurisdiction in specified matters from the High Court to the administrative Tribunal equates the Tribunal with the High Court in so far as the exercise of judicial authority over the specified matters is concerned. That, however, does not assign the administrative Tribunals a status equivalent to that of the High Court nor does that mean that for the purpose of judicial review or judicial superintendence they cannot be subordinate to the High Court. It has to be remembered that what has been conferred on the Administrative Tribunal is not only jurisdiction of the High Court but also of the subordinate courts as to specified matters. The High Courts are creatures of the Constitution and their Judges hold constitutional office having been appointed under the Constitution. The Tribunals are creatures of statute and their Members are statutorily appointed and hold statutory office. In State of Orissa V. Bhagaban Sarangi, (1995) 1 SCC 399, it was held that administrative Tribunal is nonetheless a Tribunal and so it is bound by the decision of the High Court of the state and cannot side-track or bypass it. Certain observations made in the case of T.N. Seshan, Chief Election Commr. of India Vs. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 611, may usefully be referred to. It was held that merely because some of the service conditions of the Chief Election Commissioner are akin to those of the Supreme Court Judges, that does not confer the status of a Supreme Court Judge on the CEC. This court observed : (SCC Headnote) -17- "Of late it is found that even personnel belonging to other fora claim equation with High Court or Supreme Court Judges merely because certain jurisdictions earlier exercised by those Courts are transferred to them not realising the distinction between constitutional and statutory functionaries."
We are therefore clearly of the opinion that there is no anathema in the Tribunal exercising jurisdiction of High Court and in that sense being supplemental or additional to the High Court but at the same time not enjoying status equivalent to High Court and also being subject to judicial review and judicial superintendence of the High Court."
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in subsequent decisions i.e., in the case of R. Mohanjan and others vs. Shefali Sengupta and others, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 761 has reiterated the enunciation of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of T. Sudhakar Prasad referred supra.
14. The power to punish for contempt has been envisaged on the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act, bestowing same jurisdiction, powers and the authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has under the provisions of the 1971 Act. Section 19 of the 1971 Act provides -18- an appeal from any order or the decision of the Tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt an appeal lie to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. However, any order referred in Section 19 of the Act does not include the order of dropping of the contempt proceeding. The order or a decision of the Tribunal should be with regard to the imposition of punishment and not otherwise. Hence, the contention that the exercise of power or passing of any order by the Tribunal under Section 17 of the 1985 Act is appealable, does not merit consideration.
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharastra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another reported in (1996) 4 SCC 411 and Midnapore Peoples' Co-operative Bank Limited and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399 has held that, the appeal under Section 19 is maintainable before the Hon'ble Supreme Court when the Tribunal exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
16. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra kumar Vs. Union of India, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 in paragraph Nos.91 and 92 has held as under:
-19-
"91. It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a First Appellate Court. We have already emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K. Jain case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the afore-stated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.-20-
92. We may add here that under the existing system, direct appeals have been provided from the decisions of all Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In view of our above-mentioned observations, this situation will also stand modified. In the view that we have taken, no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution."
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Judgment has made it clear that, no appeal can be filed directly to the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the decision of the Tribunal passing an order under Section 14 of the 1985 Act, but the aggrieved party can file the writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India and such a petition shall lie before the Division Bench of the High Court. Applying the same analogy in the absence of any provision of statutory appeal to challenge the order of the Tribunal dropping of the contempt proceeding, the aggrieved party can maintain the writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, however, while exercising the power under Articles 226 & 227 by the High Courts, it cannot sit as an appellate forum. The High Court before examining the orders of the Tribunal of dropping of the contempt proceeding shall consider the entertainability of the -21- writ petition keeping in mind the settled principles of law that, the tribunal exercises power of contempt akin to that of High Court unless the order of tribunal is perverse, in violation of principles of natural justice or exceeds its jurisdiction, then only the High Courts shall entertain the writ petitions assailing the orders of the Tribunal in dropping of the contempt proceedings. The Tribunals have been conferred with the similar power of that of High Court when it comes to the exercise of power under Section 17 of the 1985 Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in L. Chandarkumar's case has nowhere said that, the order of the Tribunal holding the contemnor guilty and punishing for contempt shall also be subject to judicial scrutiny of the High Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India in spite of remedy of statutory appeal provided under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act being available. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Mohanraj and others, referred supra has made a distinction between the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal on the matters covered under Section 14(1) of the 1985 Act and the orders of the Tribunal for contempt under Section 19 of the Act read with Section 17 of the 1985 Act holding that, as against the orders under Section 14 (1) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, no statutory remedy of appeal is provided under the Act, hence -22- the aggrieved person can invoke the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, however, the order under Section 17 of the Act, the remedy of appeal is provided under Section 19 of the said Act, hence, the High Courts should refrain from entertaining the writ petitions under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, when there is a challenge to the order of the Tribunal under Section 17 punishing the party for contempt, however, if the Tribunal drops the contempt proceedings no statutory remedy of appeal is provided, hence, aggrieved party can maintain the writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, however, the High Court while considering such a petition shall keep in mind the well established rules of self restraint governing the discretion to interfere with the orders of the Tribunal.
18. The Administrative Tribunals are established under the provisions of the 1985 Act to adjudicate or try the administrative disputes and complaints with regard to the recruitment, conditions of service and the conditions of the service of the person appointed to the public services and the posts in connections with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other authority within the territory of India -23- under the control of Government of India or of any Corporation or Society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance to Article 323-A of the Constitution of India and matter connected therewith and incidental thereto. The 1985 Act is a complete Code by itself. Section 28 of the 1985 Act excludes the jurisdiction of all the Courts except the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Article 136 of the Constitution of India and the Labour Courts and the other Authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandarkumar has considered in detail the ambit of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
19. This Court after considering the enunciation of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra and the scheme of the 1985 Act and the 1971 Act is of the considered view that, the aggrieved person can maintain the writ petition under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Tribunal dropping of the contempt proceedings while exercising its power under Section 17 of the 1985 Act in the absence of any specific remedy of appeal under the aforesaid provisions of law. However, the writ courts cannot sit as an appellate authority over such orders. The writ court while -24- exercising its power shall keep in mind that the Tribunal exercises the contempt jurisdiction akin to the jurisdiction of the High Courts. No doubt, the Tribunal has no power as of the High Court under Articles 215 of the Constitution of India. The High Courts shall refrain itself from interfering with the Tribunal's order of dropping of the contempt proceedings unless the impugned order is without jurisdiction or exceeds the jurisdiction, or order is in violation of principles of natural justice or order is perverse and contrary to the settled principles of law. Contempt is between the Court and the contemnor or any one claiming under him, the complaint is only an informant of willful disobedience of the order of the Court. It is the Court which has to look into the facts and circumstances of the case as to the conduct of the accused and has to come to a conclusion as to whether such act of the accused is in willful disobedience of the order of the Court, which affect the majesty of law and the Courts. In light of the above, this Court is of the considered view that the High Court should be slow while executing its power of judicial review of dropping of the contempt proceedings by the Tribunals.
20. This Court on considering the material available on record holds that, the writ petition is maintainable by overruling -25- the objection of the State, however, this Court refrains from setting aside the impugned order of the Tribunal as the impugned order, is a well reasoned order passed after considering the compliance affidavit of the State. It is always open for the petitioner to avail other legal remedies available under the law, if the petitioner's grievance is still subsisting.
21. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed as devoid of merits. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE Naa/Svh