Supreme Court of India
Bikas Chatterjee vs Union Of India & Ors on 12 August, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2004 SC 256, 2004 (7) SCC 634, (2004) CAL CRI LR 1124, (2004) 10 SCALE 109, (2005) 30 OCR 168, (2005) 51 ALL CRI C 698, (2005) 1 ANDH LT 46, 2004 SCC (CRI) 2018
Bench: R.C. Lahoti, Ruma Pal, Arun Kumar, G.P. Mathur, C.K. Thakker
CASE NO.: Writ Petition (crl.) 188 of 2004 PETITIONER: BIKAS CHATTERJEE RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/08/2004 BENCH: R.C. LAHOTI CJI & RUMA PAL & ARUN KUMAR & G.P. MATHUR & C.K. THAKKER JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT 2004(7)SCC 634 = 2004(10)SCALE 109 The Order of the Court was as follows :
This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India putting in issue the order of the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution rejecting the petitioner's prayer for pardon.
We have heard Shri. Colin Gonsalves, the learned counsel for the petitioner for about 1-1/2 hours as also Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel for the State of West Bengal present on caveat.
The convict in this case has been held guilty of offences punishable under Sections 376, 380 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death under Section 302 IPC. The capital sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Alipore was confirmed by the High Court, on the death reference having been dismissed. The matter came to this Court and the appeal filed by the convict was dismissed on 11-1-1994 by the decision of this Court in Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. ( 1994 (2) SCC 220 :
1994 SCC(Cri) 358) The learned Sessions Judge, the High Court and this Court have all recorded a finding that the case was "rarest of the rare cases" warranting the award of capital punishment.
In the decision of this Court in Dhananjoy Chatterjee ( 1994 (2) SCC 220 : 1994 SCC(Cri) 358) it is clear that anxious consideration was given to the question of sentence keeping in view the changed legislative policy, as also the observations made by this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab ( 1980 (2) SCC 684 : 1980 SCC(Cri) 580) laying down the principles on the application of which the award of capital punishment can be justified. This Court summed up its conclusions in the matter of awarding capital punishment to the accused-appellant in the following words :
"16. The sordid episode of the security guard, whose sacred duty was to ensure the protection and welfare of the inhabitants of the flats in the apartment, should have subjected the deceased, a resident of one of the flats, to gratify his lust and murder her in retaliation for his transfer on her complaint, makes the crime even more heinous. Keeping in view the medical evidence and the state in which the body of the deceased was found, it is obvious that a most heinous type of barbaric rape and murder was committed on a helpless and defenceless school-going girl of 18 years. If the security guards behave in this manner who will guard the guards ? The faith of the society by such a barbaric act of the guard, gets totally shaken and its cry for justice becomes loud and clear. The offence was not only inhuman and barbaric but it was a totally ruthless crime of rape followed by cold-blooded murder and an affront to the human dignity of the society. The savage nature of the crime has shocked our judicial conscience."
The Court also held that there were no extenuating or mitigating circumstances whatsoever in the case. The Court showed its concern and awareness that the consequence of the sentence of death would be depriving of a human life and then held that the facts of the case warranted no punishment other than the capital punishment being awarded to the accused. Accordingly, the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant was confirmed.
The sequence of events furnished on behalf of the petitioner makes it clear that successive petitions have been filed either by the petitioner or on his behalf under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution which have all been rejected at the end. Successive petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court and under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court have been filed, which have also been dismissed as devoid of merit.
What is impugned herein is the rejection of petition under Article 72 of the Constitution by the President of India in the first week of August 2004.
Although the decision of the President of India on a petition under Article 72 of the Constitution is open to judicial review but the grounds therefor are very very limited. In the Constitution Bench decision in Maru Ram v. Union of India ( 1981 (1) SCC 107 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 112) this Court has held that it is only a case of no consideration or consideration based on wholly irrelevant grounds or an irrational, discriminatory or mala fide decision of the President of India which can provide a ground for judicial review.
In a Division Bench decision of this Court in Satpal v. State of Haryana ( 2000 (5) SCC 170 : 2000 SCC(Cri) 920) these very grounds have been restated as : (i) the Governor exercising the power under Article 161 himself without being advised by the Government; or (ii) the Governor transgressing his jurisdiction; or (iii) the Governor passing the order without application of mind; or (iv) the Governor's decision is based on some extraneous consideration; or (v) mala fides. It is on these grounds that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review in relation to an order of the Governor under Article 161, or an order of the President under Article 72 of the Constitution, as the case may be.
In the case of Maru Ram v. Union of India ( 1981 (1) SCC 107 : 1981 SCC(Cri) 112) the Bench noted that the power conferred by Article 72 is a high prerogative power vested by the Constitution in the highest functionary of the Union. The Constitution Bench has also held that while exercising the power of judicial review the Court shall keep in mind that where a power is vested in a very high authority, it must be presumed that the said authority would act properly and carefully after an objective consideration of all the aspects of the matter and further, the higher the power the more cautious would be its exercise.
It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the President is an outcome of "non-application of mind". It was further submitted that the rejection of petition under Article 72 of the Constitution is arbitrary and suffers from the vice of inequality and unfairness.
On the averments made in the petition and what has been emphasised to us during the course of hearing, we are not at all, even prima facie, inclined to accept, much less to hold that there is any substance in the criticism laid on the order passed by the President of India.
We are clear in our minds that we are not deciding an appeal against an order of conviction and the sentence passed thereon. Nor are we sitting in review over an order passed by this Court. We are called upon to exercise our jurisdiction of judicial review against an order passed by the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution. Admittedly, the petition for pardon filed before the President of India remained pending receiving his consideration for about six weeks. We have no reason to assume that the President of India has not applied his mind to all the relevant facts and aspects of the case. Nor are we inclined to hold that there is any material which the President considered relevant and was inclined to look into but was not before him or was not called for by him when he took the decision to, reject the petition for grant of pardon.
We do not find that any case has been made out for making a departure from the presumption and assumption which attaches with the order of the President of India passed under Article 72 of the Constitution.
Having given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions made by the learned counsel and to all the relevant considerations, we find that this petition is wholly devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly.