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[Cites 18, Cited by 3]

Allahabad High Court

V. Kothari And Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 25 January, 1991

Equivalent citations: 1991CRILJ1606

ORDER
 

Palok Basu, J.
 

1. Both the aforesaid applications arise out of the complaint filed by the opposite party No. 2 Sudhir Chopra numbered as Complaint Case No. 2617/ 89 Under Section 420/ 406/120-B, IPC. of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad, against the 11 accused, the applicant V. Kothari and M/s. Sunds Defibrator AB, being accused No. 1 and 11 respectively. In both the cases State of U.P. and Sudhir Chopra are opposite parties No. 1 and 2 respectively. Since these two applications relate to the same complainant case, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.

2. Sudhir Chopra claimed himself to be the Vice President of a Company known as Best Boards Limited having its factory at Gajraula, Police Station Gajraula District Moradabad, U.P. The allegations in the complaint in short are that M/s Sunds Defibrator AB is a company with its registered office at Sweden. This company works in India through its representatives such as accused Nos. 4 to 10. There is another company arrayed as accused No. 3 while accused No. 1 and 2 are its executives and managers. An agreement was entered into between the complainant Company with the accused who are in league with each other for establishing a Dagasse Based Medium Density Particle Board Plant, Laminating Plant and Thermo-Oil Plant, the cost of which project runs into several crores of rupees. The accused were responsible for supply of equipment and materials according to specifications and for that purpose executed bank guarantees to gain confidence of the complainant company.

On the said assurance the complainant company made payments towards costs of the machinery, equipments and materials by letters of credit opened in the bank. According to the terms of the contract it was the responsibility of the accused persons to erect and fix all the machinery, equipment and materials according to the guaranteed performance parameters stipulated in the contract. Due to default of the accused persons, the plant could not commence in December, 1987 as per the contract because several defects were detected in the equipments and materials supplied by the accused, for which various letters were written. The plant could be completed with difficulty on 12-1-1989 but it could not function upto the guaranteed parameters and various defects and deficiencies were detected in the performance of the plant. In February 1989 one Mr. Boll of M/s. Panndorf of West Germany came to the Project site and informed that the Dryer which had been manufactured by their firm, was of a different specification and lessor efficiency than that contracted by the accused and it was not possible for the plant to achieve the guaranteed performance parameters since the equipments supplied by the accused persons was not of contracted quality, specification and efficiency. The complainant then got the other equipment also examined and found that they were substandard and not according to specifications. By letter dated 15-2-1989 the accused persons were asked to remove and replace the deficient equipments. Several meetings were held, letters and telexes were sent but the accused did not pay any heed. The accused knew that the equipment and materials were not of the stipulated specifications and efficiency and were substandard. They knew that they were not suplying the equipment and materials as promised by them. During the course of erection, fixation mechanical tests etc. the accused persons were entrusted with various spare-parts belonging to the complainant's company on the specific understanding that the accused persons would return them or pay costs to the complainant company but they have refused to do so. The accused have unilaterally refused to work any further vide their letter dated 28-3-1989. The intention of the accused persons was dishonest and was designed to cause wrongful loss to the complainant company and wrongful gain to themselves. This dishonest intention was comouflaged by them and the complainant company was beguiled by their statements and assurances considering them to be gentlemen. Had the complainant known their dishonest intention, he would not have paid them large sums of money at all. The accused had cheated the complainant company and have committed criminal breach of trust in respect of equipments and materials worth crores of rupees and have committed offences punishable Under Sections 420/406/120-B of the I.P.C.

3. In support of the complaint allegations the complainant examined himself Under Section 200, Cr. P.C. on 2-5-89 and examined wing-Commander Rajendra Kumar Chaudhury as his witness Under Section 202, Cr. P.C. on 4-5-89. The Chief Judicial Magistrate Moradabad has by his reasoned order dated 29-5-89 summoned all the eleven accused and later on bailable warrants by way of process was issued by him. Felt aggrieved by the summoning order accused No. 1 and accused No. 11 have filed the aforesaid two Criminal Misc. Applications, praying that the complaint, the summoning order and the further proceedings in the said complaint case, be quashed.

4. In Criminal Misc. Application No. 6549 of 1989 counter-affidavit has been filed by Sudhir Chopra seriously contesting the allegations made in the affidavit in support of the application and he has made an application praying that the interim order whereby the proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate were stayed, be vacated, the application be decided at the earliest and it should be dismissed. Rejoinder affidavit has also been filed on behalf of V. Kothari. It has been mentioned in the array of the parties that Mr. V. Kothari and others are petitioners but no details of any other accused petitioner has been given; it follows that the former application is, therefore, by V. Kothari alone and is treated as such.

5. Sri P. N. Duda, Senior Advocate, appeared on behalf of the applicant in both the cases. Sri Devendra Nath Dwivedi, Advocate, has appeared on behalf of complainant Sudhir Chopra. The State of U.P. has been represented by Sri Surendra Singh, learned Assistant Government Advocate who said that from the allegations made in the complaint no case for quashing thereof has been made out.

6. The primary point convassed by Sri Duda was that the complaint case should not proceed before a Magistrate as intricate question of Civil Law of accounting, of examining specifications of scientific and engineering datas/specifications are involved. It was argued by him that according to the tripartite agreement any dispute between the complainant and the accused had to be settled only by reference to arbitration. In this connection it was pointed out that the matter has in fact been taken to the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris. It was further argued that Civil Suit No. 402/1989 has been filed by the complainant in the court of the Civil Judge Moradabad, who has stayed the proceedings therein because of the pendency of the Arbitration proceedings in Paris. A true copy of the order has been filed along-with rejoinder affidavit. On the strength of these two proceedings and also relying upon the terms of the agreement Sri Duda argued that the Criminal complaint amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and should be quashed.

7. Sri Devendra Nath Dwivedi has while arguing the matter on behalf of the complainant stated that the two proceedings have been initiated one at Paris by way of Arbitration proceedings and the other at Moradabad through a Civil Suit. Sri Deivedi further stated that questions of Civil law, of accounting, of examining specifications of scientific and engineering datas/specifications are involved. He however, argued that in view of the allegations made in the complaint it can not be argued by the accused's counsel that no offence is made out or that there is any abuse of the process of the Court in the instant case and, therefore, these two clauses of Section 482, Cr. P.C. were not attracted. He further said that he was doubtful as to the applicability of the Clause 'interest of justice' for the accused to get the relief claimed by them. However, he very rightly drew the attention of the Court to the agreement which has a specific clause that the Indian Law would apply on contravention of any of its terms or any dispute arising therefrom.

8. From the facts stated in the complaint, in the body of the petitions Under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the statement of the complainant and his witnesses before the Magistrate one thing is apparent that several crores of rupees belonging to the nation have evaporated while one proceeding is thwarted by another and another proceeding is sought to be shut up by yet another. But on the production front nothing material is noticeable. By filing a counter affidavit in this Court and challenging each and every word of the accused as have been levelled in these petitions, the complainant has tried to stand by every allegation made in his complaint and is statement Under Section 200, Cr. P.C. In other words, the factual statements contained in the complaint have been reiterated by the complainant in his affidavit before this Court. Therefore, on record, the complainant would like to show that he is serious with his complaint. To repeat, the allegations in the complaint are indeed serious prima facie.

9. Sri Duda relied upon three decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1968 SC 700, AIR 1978 SC 326 and AIR 1979 SC 850.

10. In the first case it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a transaction of sale can not amount to an entrustment as cement was sold to its contractor solely for the purpose of being used in connection with construction work. After delivery of the cement the Government has neither any right nor dominion over it. With the aforesaid observations the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Government Appeal filed against the acquittal of the accused by State of Gujarat.

11. In the second case it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that to hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such dishonest intention cannot be inferred from a mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfil the promise. In this case also the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined to interfere with the acquittal of the accused and, therefore, dismissed the Government Appeal filed by the State of Kerala.

12. In the third case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that dispute raised by the respondents in that case was purely of a civil nature even assuming the facts stated by him to be substantially correct. Money must have been advanced to him and his partner by the financer on the basis of some terms settled between the parties. On the face of the complaint, highly exaggerated version was given by the complainant that the police went to his house with a mob armed with deadly weapons and committed an offence of dacoity in taking away the truck. This was held to be so un-natural and untrustworthy that it could not take the matter out of the realm of civil dispute. Thus, the Supreme Court quashed the complaint filed against the accused in that case Under Sections 395, 468, 465, 471, 412, 120-B/34, IPC. The said three cases are, therefore, clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant complaint case.

13. In this connection some other decisions of the Supreme Court on Sections 406 and 420, IPC and 482, Cr. P.C. appear to be no less relevant and may be usefully noted here.

14. In Pritbha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, reported in AIR 1985 SC page 628 : (1985 Cri LJ 817) the Supreme Court held that if the ingredients of the offences were made out from the allegations in the complaint, the High Court can and should not quash the complaint. It was further held that a criminal prosecution would not be completely barred merely because a civil remedy is or was available. Criminal Law and Civil Law can be taken recourse to even simultaneously because the two remedies are not mutually exclusive rather they are co-extensive. The two remedies essentially differ in their contents and consequences.

15. In Debabrata Gupta v. S.K. Ghosh reported in 1970 (1) SCC page-521 the Supreme Court refused to quash the process issued Under Section 406, IPC by the Magistrate even though it was a case where one partner was prosecuting the other and admittedly a proceeding for arbitration had been initiated in the Calcutta High Court and a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounting was also pending.

16. In Hari Har Prasad Dubey v. Tulsidas Mundhra reported in AIR 1981 SC page 81 : (1980 Cri LJ 1329) it was held by the Supreme Court that once Provident Fund amount was entrusted but was allegedly misappropriated the complaint could not be quashed only for want of some statutory Rules about its deposit.

17. In Jai Kishan Das v. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1960 SC page-889 : (1960 Cri LJ 1250) the Supreme Court has held that to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion of the property entrusted to him.

18. In Madhavrao J. R. Scindhia v. S. C. Angre, reported in AIR 1988 SC page 709 : (1988 Cri LJ 853), the Supreme Court has (speaking through Hon'ble Rangnath Misra, J. as his Lordship then was) laid down that when a prosecution of the initial stage is sought to be quashed the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie established the offences. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient to permit the prosecution to continue. It has further been held that a case of breach of trust can both be a civil wrong and a criminal offence and there may be situations where in may predominantly be a civil wrong and may or may not amount to a criminal offence.

19. To say the least, the allegations made in the complaint fully make out the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420, IPC. for which there was more than enough material on the record and, therefore, the Magistrate's order issuing process to the accused-applicants prima facie appears correct. Under such situation quashing of a complaint must depend upon the Rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court succinctly in the case of R. P. Kapoor v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC page 866: (1960 Cri LJ 1239). In view of the aforesaid discussion of nearly the entire case law relevant on the point involved in the present case it has to be held that taking the allegations as they are in the complaint and as they appear in the statement of the complainant and his witnesses none of the three clauses, i.e., passing of an order to give effect to an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice is available to the accused-applicants. Mere filing of a civil suit or pendency of the arbitration proceedings by themselves would not absolve and criminal court of its responsibility to punish a guilty if from evidence the offences are made out.

20. Keeping in view the argument advanced by the respective counsel it may be observed that if the complainant so chooses he has a remedy Under Section 320, Cr. P.C. to compound the offences of the accused with the permission of the Court. Similarly, if criminal proceedings are desired to be stayed for a longer period than ordinarily done than the parties may make an application Under Section 309, Cr. P.C. before the Magistrate.

21. In view of the aforesaid discussions these applications Under Section 482, Cr. P.C. fail and are hereby dismissed. If any application Under Section 309 or 320, Cr. P.C. is moved it may be decided in accordance with law.

22. It is further directed that if the accused applicants surrender voluntarily before the Magistrate and apply for bail, the said application may be disposed of in accordance with law on the day it is moved. If an application for personal exemption is moved that may also be decided accordingly.

23. The applications having thus failed the interim orders dated 18-7-1989 and 15-2-1990 passed in the aforesaid two cases are vacated.