Telangana High Court
M/S.Jaladhija Educational Society And ... vs Poloju Lakshmi on 23 October, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
HYDERABAD
****
A.S. No.168 OF 2022
Between:
Jaladhija Educational Society and 4 others
Appellants
Vs.
Poloju Lakshmi and others
Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 23.10.2024
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE M.G. PRIYADARSINI
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? :
Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? :
Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : No
_______________________________
JUSTICE M.G. PRIYADARSINI
2
* THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE M.G. PRIYADARSINI
+ A.S.No.168 OF 2022
% 23.10.2023
# Between:
Jaladhija Educational Society and 4 others
Appellants
Vs.
Poloju Lakshmi and others
Respondents
! Counsel for Appellants : Mr. G. Ravichandra
Sekhar
^ Counsel for Respondents : Mr. Chavali Ramanand
(R1)
Mr. M.V. Venu (R2)
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred :
1. 2011 (123) DRJ 91
2. Second Appeal No.89 of 2005 decided on 16.03.2023
3. 2020 (5) ALT 1 (SC)
4. AIR 1991 Karnataka 273
5. 2004 AIR SCW 5704
6. Civil Appeal No. 4177 of 2024 decided on 10.09.2024
3
4
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE M.G. PRIYADARSINI
A.S.No.168 OF 2022
JUDGMENT:
The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.12.2021 in O.S.No.185 of 2013, on the file of learned VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Khammam, whereby the suit for partition was preliminarily decreed.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they were arrayed before the trial Court.
3. The brief facts of the case as can be seen from the plaint are that the sole plaintiff filed the O.S.No.185/2013 on the file of learned VIII Additional District and Sessions Judge, Khammam against defendant Nos.1 to 9 seeking partition and separate possession in respect of the suit schedule property i.e., land admeasuring Ac.3.24 guntas in Sy.No.377/AA, 377/E, 378/AA, 378/E at Tanikella Village, Konijerla Mandal, Khamam. Batchala Sambaiah, who expired intestate on 13.11.2008, is the original owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. Plaintiff and defendant Nos.3 and 4 are the daughters and defendant Nos.1 and 2 are the sons of Batchala Sambaiah. After the death of Batchala Sambaiah, the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 4 have succeeded to the suit schedule 5 property and also in constructive possession of the same. Though plaintiff demanded for partition of the suit schedule property, the defendant Nos.1 and 2 went on postponing the same on one pretext or the other. The plaintiff came to know that defendant Nos.1 and 2 in collusion with defendant Nos.5 to 9 have created some sham and nominal documents in respect of suit schedule property by forging the signature of the plaintiff. Despite receiving legal notice from plaintiff, defendants did not respond. Hence, the suit for partition seeking division of the suit schedule property into five equal shares and for allotment of one such share to the plaintiff.
4. In response to the above plaint averments, defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed their respective written statements. The sum and substance of their written statement is that Batchala Sambaiah has performed the marriages of plaintiff and defendant Nos.3 and 4 by giving dowry amount in cash, valuable properties etc., and in the year 1985 entire properties of Batchala Sambaiah were partitioned among defendant Nos.1 and 2 and a daughter Kamalamma. At the time of partition, Batchala Sambaiah paid the amounts by way of cash in favour of plaintiff and defendant No.3, as such plaintiff and defendant No.3 have no share or right over any of the properties. 6 Batchala Sambaiah passed away on 13.11.2008 and during his life time he and defendant No.2 have relinquished their share in favour of defendant No.1 in respect of land to an extent of Ac.1.18 guntas vide document dated 08.09.2007. Defendant No.2 never forged any document. Since, plaintiff has no right to claim any share over the suit schedule property, there is no joint and constructive property left behind and hence, prayed to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff with costs. On the other hand, defendant Nos.5 to 9 have filed their common written statement admitting the relationship but contended that the plaintiff in collusion with defendant Nos.1 to 4 has filed the suit to harass these defendants and thus, prayed to dismiss the suit with exemplary costs.
5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues:
1. Whether the partition pleaded by the defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the year 1985 is true, valid and binding?
2. Whether the relinquishment deed dated 08.09.2007 pleaded by the defendant No.1 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff?
3. Whether the plaintiff is in joint possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property?
4. Whether the suit is in time?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition and separate 7 possession of suit schedule property and for share as prayed for?
6. To what relief?
6. On behalf of plaintiffs, PWs 1 to 3 were examined and got marked Exs. A1 to A10. On behalf of defendants, DWs 1 to 4 were examined and got marked Exs.B1 and B2. The trial Court on appreciating the evidence on record, has preliminarily decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the same, the defendant Nos.5 to 9 filed the present appeal to set aside the judgment and decree.
7. Heard both sides and perused the record including the grounds of appeal.
8. The undisputed fact in this case is that plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 4 are the children of Batchala Sambaiah, who was the original owner and possessor of the suit schedule property. Though the impugned judgment and decree is against all the defendants, only defendant Nos.5 to 9, who have purchased the suit schedule property from defendant Nos.1 and 2, have preferred the present appeal.
9. The main contention of the defendant Nos.5 to 9 is that they are bonafide purchasers for valid sale consideration from ostensible owners under the bonafide believe that all the legal 8 heirs of B. Sambaiah have attested the document; they do not know about the alleged fraud committed by defendant Nos.1 and 2 in forging the signatures of plaintiff, as such, the interest of defendant Nos.5 to 9 is protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. In order to gain protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is crucial for the transferee to act with bona fide intent. The provision requires honesty and good faith. Merely being unaware of the actual owner's title is not enough for the transferee to claim protection under this clause.
10. The following are the requirements to be fulfilled to gain protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.
a) The individual must be the ostensible owner of the property.
b) The ostensible owner must hold the property with the express or implied consent of the real owner.
c) The transferee must acquire the property from the ostensible owner in exchange for consideration.
d) The transferee should exercise reasonable caution to ensure that the transferor has the authority to make the transfer, acting in good faith.
11. If any of the above requirements are not fulfilled, the transferee will not be entitled to protection as provided under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Only when all the 9 requirements are met, the real owner's claim to the property will be overridden.
12. It is further contention of defendant Nos.5 to 9 that though plaintiff has not sought any relief against sale deeds in favour of defendant Nos.5 to 9, the trial Court has declared the said sale deeds as null and void, which is against the principle laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in Sikinder's case. But a perusal of the entire judgment, there is no whisper with regard to trial Court declaring the sale deeds as null and void and there is not even any adverse remarks passed against the said alleged sale deeds.
13. The learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 9 contended that the trial Court failed to discard the evidence of PW1 in proper perspective particularly in view of her own admission that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have properties in Sy.Nos.172, 173, 414 and 415 of Tanikella Village and that properties are included in the schedule of property but in fact PW1 failed to include the said properties. It is to be seen that the plaintiff is seeking partition of the suit schedule property belonging to her father Batchala Sambaiah. However, the above admission is with regard to the properties held by defendant 10 Nos.1 and 2 but not the properties belonging to Batchala Sambaiah. Thus, there is no necessity for the plaintiff to include the above said properties standing in the name of defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the suit filed by the plaintiff for partition of the property held by father of the plaintiff. Hence, the above said contention is unsustainable.
14. The learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 9 further contended that the trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit as the suit schedule property is not the ancestral property and not in joint and constructive possession. As per Ex. B2, Batchala Ramachary was shown as pattadar. But as per the written statement of defendant Nos.1 and 2, the suit schedule property originally belongs to Batchala Sambaiah and after his demise, there was a oral partition of suit schedule property in the year 1985. Thus, even as per the version of defendant Nos.1 and 2, through whom the defendant Nos.5 to 9 are claiming rights over the suit schedule property, the suit schedule property is the ancestral property that belongs to Batchala Sambaiah. The High Court of Delhi in Sushma Tehlan Dalal v. Shivraj Singh Tehlan & Others 1 observed as under:
1 2011 (123) DRJ 91 11 "9. In Neelavathi and Ors. v. N. Natarajan and Others, AIR 1980 SC 691, which arose out of a suit for partition, the plaintiff averred in the plaint that they were in joint possession of the property along with the defendants. The plaintiffs had valued their share of the property and paid fixed court fee of Rs 200/-
under Section 37(2) of Tamil Nadu Court-Fee and Suits Valuation Act. It was contended by the defendants in that suit that the plaintiff were not in joint possession and, therefore, were required to pay ad valorem Court fee at the market rate. The suit was dismissed on the ground that ad valorem Court fee had not been paid. Allowing the appeals, filed by the plaintiff, Supreme Court held that the question of Court fee was to be considered in the light of allegations made in the plaint and decision of this issue cannot be influenced either by the plea taken in the written statement or by final decision of the suit on merits. In that case, the plaintiff had stated in the plaint that the defendants had failed to give their share of income and they could not remain in joint possession. It was held that this averment would not mean that the plaintiffs had been excluded from possession of the suit property. During the Course of judgment, Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as under:
"It will be seen that the Court-fee is payable under Section 37(1) if the plaintiff is 'excluded' from possession of the property. The plaintiffs who are sisters of the defendants, claimed to be members of the joint family, and prayed for partition alleging that they are in joint possession. Under the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956) the plaintiffs being the daughters of the male Hindu who died after the commencement of the Act having at the time of the death an interest in the mitakshara coparcenary property, acquired an interest by devolution under the Act. It is not in dispute that the plaintiffs are entitled to a share. The property to which the plaintiffs are entitled is undivided joint family property' though not in the strict sense of the term. The general principle of law is that in the case of co-owners, the possession of one is law possession of all unless ouster or exclusion is proved. To continue to be in joint possession in law, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should be in actual possession of the whole or part of the property. Equally it is not necessary that he should be getting a share or some income from the property. So long as his right to a share and the nature of the property as joint is not disputed the law presumes that he is in joint possession unless he is excluded from such possession. Before the plaintiffs could be called upon to pay Court-fee under Section 37(1) of the Act on the ground that they had been excluded from possession, it is necessary that on a reading of the plaint, there should be a clear and specific averment in the plaint 12 that they had been 'excluded' from joint possession to which they are entitled to in law."
15. Even in the present case, there is no ample evidence to show that the plaintiff was excluded from the possession of the suit schedule properties. In view of the above discussion, it is also clear that the plaintiff is entitled for a share in the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has clearly stated in the plaint that she is in joint possession of the suit schedule properties. Thus, in view of the principle laid down in the above said decision, it is clear that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to be in actual possession of the suit schedule properties, more particularly when there is no evidence to show that plaintiff was excluded from the joint possession of the suit schedule property in accordance with law. Thus, the above contention of the learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 9 cannot hold water.
16. It is the specific contention of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 that the marriages of the plaintiff, defendant Nos.3 and 4 were performed by giving dowry amount in cash, valuable properties. Their further contention is that in the year 1985, the entire properties were partitioned and allotted shares in favour of defendant Nos.1 and 2 and one daughter Kamalamma; in lieu of shares, late Batchala Sambaiah paid amounts by way of cash in 13 favour of plaintiff and defendant No.3, as such, plaintiff and defendant No.3 have no share or right over any of the properties. In Mrs.Tezinha Martins David v. Mr. Miguel Guarda Rosario Martins @ Michael Rosario Martins 2 the High Court of Bombay at Goa observed as under:
"86. The evidence on record shows that the joint family property was purported to be exclusively usurped by the brothers to exclude the sisters. Merely because one of the sisters deposed in favour of the brothers does not mean that the issue of family arrangement or oral partition was duly proved. There is no evidence about providing a sufficient dowry to the daughters of the house. However, even if it is assumed that some dowry was provided to the daughters, that does not mean that the daughters cease to have any right in the family property. The rights of the daughters could not have been extinguished in the manner in Page 39 of 41 16/03/23 207-SA-89-05.DOC which they have been attempted to be extinguished by the brothers, post the father's demise."
17. In the case on hand, the defendant No.1 failed to adduce any proof to establish that the plaintiff was given sufficient dowry at the time of marriage and that she was given amount in lieu of her share. There is also no proof to establish that in the year 1985 some oral partition took place among the family members. Thus, in view of the principle laid down in the above said decision, it is clear that merely because dowry was given to the daughter at the time of marriage, it cannot be said that the daughters cease to have any share in the joint family properties. In view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) 2 Second Appeal No.89 of 2005 decided on 16.03.2023 14 Act, 2005 and the recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma 3 an unregistered oral partition, without any contemporaneous public document, cannot be accepted as the statutory recognized mode of partition.
18. The learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 9 further argued that the plaintiff is not entitled to seek partition which was affected orally in the year 1985 and revenue records are evidencing the same, as such plaintiff is not entitled for any relief. It is settled law that revenue records neither creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any presumptive value on title and all it does is entitle the person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the land revenue in question. Though defendant No.1 as DW1 admitted that there was a written partition deed among them, he could not bring the same to the notice of this Court and he also failed to produce the said written partition deed or atleast could not even say as to in whose possession the said document was present. Thus, we cannot rely upon the version of defendant No.1 that a partition took place in the year 1985 and also with regard to relinquishment deeds.
3 2020 (5) ALT 1 (SC) 15
19. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendant Nos.5 to 9 relied upon a decision in Seshumull M. Shah v. Sayed Abdul Rashid and others 4 wherein the High Court of Karnataka observed as under:
"In every case, where a transferee for valuable consideration seeks protection u/S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, he must show that it was the real owner, who permitted or created the apparent ownership of the transferor either by express words or consent or by acts or conduct, which imply consent. Conversely, it must be held that if the real owner was not responsible for permitting or creating the apparent ownership, the protection u/S. 41 will not be available to a transferee from such person because such a person cannot be said to be an ostensible owner as his claim to ownership does not arise from the consent of the real owner. In substance, before one can be considered to be an ostensible owner, it must be shown that it was with the consent express or implied of the true owner that he was enabled to represent himself as the owner of the property to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. If it is found that the so-called ostensible owner by any fraudulent means created documents without the knowledge of the real owner and represented himself as the owner of the property. S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act will not protect the interest of a transferee from such a person and it must be held that the ostensible ownership of the property is not created by an act of the real owner or with his consent express or implied. Indeed such a person cannot claim himself to be an ostensible owner. S. 41, in my view, incorporates a rule akin to the rule of estoppel whereby the real owner, who by reason of his conduct or express or implied consent was responsible for the creation of an ostensible ownership cannot be permitted to set up his real ownership to defeat the rights of a bona fide purchaser acting in good-faith and who despite reasonable enquiries could not discover such real ownership. It is, therefore, the conduct of the real owner which gives rise to an enquiry in favour of a bona fide purchaser acting in good faith. S. 41 is a statutory recognition of this equitable rule.
20. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendant Nos.5 to 9 relied upon a decision in Crystal Developers v. Smt. Asha 4 AIR 1991 Karnataka 273 16 Lata Ghosh (dead) through legal representatives 5 wherein the Honourable Apex Court observed that the onus is on the transferee to show that the transferor was the ostensible owner of the property and that the transferee had after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to transfer, acted in good faith.
21. Now, the question before this Court is, whether a coparcener be considered as ostensible owner as alleged by the appellants herein. Generally a co-sharer in occupation in a jointly shared family property of residence cannot be considered as an ostensible owner. However, a coparcener can be considered as ostensible owner only when certain conditions are satisfied. If a coparcener is given a specific share or property for individual management or control, they may appear to third parties as the true or ostensible owner. If the other coparceners (true owners of the joint family property) knowingly allow one coparcener to represent themselves as the owner and the coparcener transfers the property to a third party, the third party may assume they are dealing with the true owner. The above said transaction can be upheld if the third party purchaser acted in good faith, and the transfer was for 5 2004 AIR SCW 5704 17 consideration. In certain cases, if the HUF (either through the Karta or other family members) allows or does not object to a coparcener holding themselves out as the owner of certain property, the coparcener may be considered the ostensible owner. If third parties enter into transactions with that coparcener based on this apparent ownership, such transactions may be binding under the principle of estoppel. At this juncture, Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 comes into play, which protects third parties who, acting in good faith, enter into transactions with the ostensible owner (coparcener) provided that the real owner (the HUF or the Karta) had consented to or allowed the appearance of ownership. Thus, a coparcener can be considered an ostensible owner under these limited circumstances, especially in situations where they appear to be the owner of the property due to possession, control, family consent, or representation, even though legal ownership lies with the HUF or another member. The rights of third parties dealing with the coparcener in good faith would be protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, as long as certain conditions (like consent and absence of fraud) are met.
22. The transfer of property to an ostensible owner as dealt 18 under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that when a person acts on the express or implied consent of a person, who is vested in a certain immovable property, that person is deemed the 'ostensible owner' of that property. Thus, the next question that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff's consent was obtained before the transaction between defendant Nos.1 to 4 and defendant Nos.5 to 9 in respect of suit schedule property. If at all the consent of the plaintiff was obtained for such transaction, the plaintiff would not have come forward in filing the suit for partition. At this juncture, it is appropriate to note some of the admissions made by defendant No.8, who is a crucial witness examined on behalf of defendant Nos.5 to 9 as DW4 i.e., one Buragadda Leela Venkata Kanaka Krishna Mohan. DW4 admitted that she is having knowledge about the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 7 since 2007. She pleaded ignorance about the law i.e., Hindu Succession Act which bars any sale transaction excluding any of the joint family members is voidable. It is to be noted that ignorance of law is not an excuse. DW4 further admitted that she has not paid any sale consideration to the plaintiff in respect of sale transaction done by defendant Nos.1 and 2 and late Sambaiah. DW4 admitted that he has seen the 19 plaintiff for the first time at Konijerla Police Station as she lodged a complaint against defendant No.1 attributing a forgery of her signature by defendant No.1. When defendant Nos.5 to 9 are aware about the relationship between plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 7 since 2007 and when they are also aware that Sambaiah is the owner of the property, they are supposed to know as to whether the property purchased by them is the self acquired property or ancestral property of Sambaiah. In this regard, DW4 admitted that they have not enquired or verified any of the documents to know how Sambaiah got the property; whether it is ancestral or self acquired; by way of gift deed or partition etc and only on believing the words of Sambaiah and his sons, they have purchased the property. As stated supra, the transferee should exercise reasonable caution to ensure that the transferor has the authority to make the transfer, acting in good faith. But on considering the above said admissions, it is amply clear that the defendant Nos.5 to 9 have not made any bonafide attempts to know as to how the transferor had obtained rights over the suit schedule property. Before purchasing a property, a prospective purchaser need to conduct a thorough due diligence process/enquiry to ensure that the property is legally clear, free from encumbrances and 20 has no hidden liabilities. But in the instant case, there is no convincing material to establish that the defendant Nos.5 to 9 have made diligent enquiry before purchasing the suit schedule properties to ascertain as to whether the vendor has clear and absolute title over such properties. Thus, the defendant Nos.1 to 4 are not entitled for protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.
23. It is the further contention of the defendant Nos.5 to 9 that the trial Court ought to have seen that there is no challenge to Exs.A5 to A7, as such, no relief would have been granted to plaintiff in respect of the property covered under Ex.A7 and consequently the judgment is vitiated. In a recent landmark decision Sk. Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal Shaw & others 6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that third parties affected by invalid sale deeds are not obligated to formally seek their cancellation. The argument has been noted only to be rejected for the simple reason that Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 uses the word 'may' for getting declared the instrument as void which is not imperative in every case, more particularly when the person is not a party to such an instrument. Even on perusal of the plaint, the plaintiff has 6 Civil Appeal No. 4177 of 2024 decided on 10.09.2024 21 neither sought for any such relief of cancellation of Exs.A5 to A7 nor has the trial Court passed any remarks adverse to the interest of defendants on validity of Exs.A5 to A7. Thus, the above said contention is untenable.
24. In one of the grounds, the defendant Nos.5 to 9 argued that the property acquired by them was sold in the form of plots much prior to filing of the suit by the plaintiff, which is admitted by the plaintiff. In this connection, it is appropriate to bring to the notice of the Court about the admission made by her in cross examination, wherein it was admitted that the property which they have purchased in the name of society i.e., defendant No.5 are utilized only for the purpose of education. Thus, the conduct of the defendant Nos.5 to 9 in converting the suit schedule property, which is meant for the welfare of the society, into plots also creates any amount of suspicion on the honesty and faith of the defendant Nos.5 to 9.
25. The learned counsel for the defendant Nos.5 to 9 argued that trial court ought to have seen that plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 and 2 in particular have intentionally withheld the partition document as stated by defendant Nos.1 and 2 and also intentionally did not file the relinquishment deed though copies 22 of the same are filed. Under Order XI of the Civil Procedure Code, a party can apply to the court for the discovery and inspection of documents in the possession or power of the other party. However, the opposing party has the right to object on the grounds of privilege or irrelevance. Thus, a party in a legal proceeding cannot compel the opposite party to produce documents that are incriminating or against their own interest.
26. Though defendant Nos.5 to 9 contended in the present appeal that the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 4 have colluded with each other and filed the suit, there is no material before this Court to establish the same. DW4 admitted that he has filed complaint against all the family members. However, DW4 pleaded ignorance about the date, month or year of lodging the case, which is still pending. But in the cross examination of DW4 done by the learned counsel for the defendant No.1, she admitted that the complaint given by them is not yet registered. It is very strange to note the denial of suggestion by DW4 in her cross examination that plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 4 in collusion with each other have filed the above suit against defendant Nos.5 to 9 to harass them.
27. Even otherwise, it is to be seen that the 23 appellants/defendant Nos.5 to 9 have never raised the plea of protection under Section of 41 of the Transfer of Property Act in their pleadings i.e., written statement but all of a sudden raised this plea in this appeal. It is settled law that courts cannot travel beyond the pleadings. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the appellants failed to raise the above even in the grounds of appeal but straight away put forth the said plea during the course of arguments. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the appellants cannot raise this new plea before this appellate court without raising the said plea before the trial court initially. It is a settled law that a new plea cannot be raised at the stage of appeal if it was not part of the original pleadings or trial proceedings. Courts emphasize the need for consistency and fairness in litigation by requiring that all relevant issues, claims, and defenses be raised at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings. Order XLI Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code specifically bars the raising of new grounds in appeal that were not part of the original pleadings or issues. It states that the appellate court cannot allow a party to raise a new plea that was not raised during the trial unless it involves a pure question of law that does not require additional evidence. Appellate courts generally do not entertain new 24 factual pleas or defenses unless they are purely legal in nature and their introduction will not prejudice the other party. Most of the grounds raised in the present appeal are new that were not raised before the trial Court. There is no explanation on the part of the appellants as to what prevented them in raising all these new pleas before the trial Court.
28. In view of the above discussion, this court is of the considered opinion that the appellants have failed to establish that the trial Court has committed irregularity or illegality while passing the impugned judgment so as to set aside it or interfere with the said findings of the trial Court. Hence, the appeal is devoid of merits and liable to be dismissed.
29. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
_______________________________ JUSTICE M.G. PRIYADARSINI Date: 23.10.2024 AS