Madras High Court
New India Assurance Company vs Minor Krishnan on 25 March, 2004
Equivalent citations: AIR 2004 (NOC) 433 (MAD), 2004 A I H C 2523, (2005) 3 ACC 154, (2005) 3 TAC 937, (2004) 3 MAD LJ 141, (2005) 2 ACJ 926
Bench: P. Sathasivam, S.R. Singharavelu
In the High Court of Judicature at Madras Dated: 25/03/2004 Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. SATHASIVAM and The Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.R. SINGHARAVELU C.M.A. No.2069 of 2003 and C.M.A.Nos. to 2073, 2178 to 2180, 2312 to 2316, 2326 to 2328 of 2003, 119 and 120 of 2003 and CMP.Nos.15294 to 15298, 15938 to 15940, 16711 to 16715, 16765 to 16767 of 2002, 735 and 736 of 2003.
C.M.A.No.2069 of 2002:
New India Assurance Company Ltd., Theni. .. Appellant
-Vs-
1. Minor Krishnan rep. by his brother and natural guardian Rajendran.
2. N. Gunasekaran (given up)
3. Dhanalakshmi ..Respondents Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the common Judgment and decree dated 27.04.2001 made in MCOP.Nos.539 of 199 etc., batch on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (I Additional Subordinate Judge), Tirunelveli.
!Ms. N.B. Surekha for M/s. R. Vedantham for appellants in all the appeals.
^Mr. G. Masilamani, Senior Counsel for Mr. G. Thalamutharasu for R.1 in CMA.2069/02, for R.1 to 4 in CMA.2070 to 2073, 2327/02, for R.1 to 8 in CMA.2178, 2179/02, for R.1 to 5 in CMA.2180/02, for R.1 in CMA.2312, 2316/02, R.1 to 6 in CMA.2313/02, 2326/02, 119/03, R.1 to 5 in CMA.2314/02, R.1 and 2 in CMA.2315/02, 120/03, R.1 to 3 in CMA.2328/02.
:COMMON JUDGEMENT (Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. SATHASIVAM,J.,) Aggrieved by the common award dated 27.04.2001 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tirunelveli, New India Assurance Company Ltd., Theni has preferred the above appeals. Since all the appeals arise from a common award of the Tribunal, they are being disposed of by the following common judgment.
2. The facts which are required for the disposal of the appeals are briefly stated hereunder:
According to the claimants, on 21.02.1999, when the lorry bearing Registration No.TN 60 - 4705 belonging to one Dhanalakshmi and insured with New India Assurance Company Limited (appellant herein) driven by its driver by name Gunasekaran in a rash and negligent manner without observing the traffic rules and regulations in Sivakalai - Srivaikundam Road from East to West and going near the Betmanagaram - Srivaikundam Road, the lorry driver lost his control, due to which the lorry capsized into the paddy field on the South side of the said Road, as a result several persons who were travelling as loadmen and child labourers sustained fatal and multiple injuries. It is their further case that the persons travelling in the said lorry were engaged as workers and all of them have paid travelling fare to the driver of the said lorry. The persons travelled in the lorry were noway responsible for the accident, which occurred solely and exclusively due to the rash and negligent act of the driver of the lorry. The Srivaikundam Police have registered a case against the lorry driver in Crime No.9 5 of 1999 under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC, who in turn admitted the offence in C.C.No.157 of 1999 before the Judicial Magistrate, Srivaikundam and paid fine amount. The driver, owner and insurer of the vehicle are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation amount.
3. Before the Tribunal, the claimants have examined Pws.1 to 21 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.45 in support of their claim. The driver and owner of the lorry were set ex party and the New India Assurance Company alone filed counter and contested the claim petitions. They examined three witnesses as Rws.1 to 3 and marked documents as Exs.R.1 to R.3. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the Tribunal, after holding that the accident was caused due to the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry, the persons involved were travelled along with the goods, passed an award and directed the third respondent therein - Insurance Company to pay entire award amount in favour of the claimants. Questioning its liability, the New India Assurance Company has filed the above appeals.
4. Heard Ms. N.B. Surekha, learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company and G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the respondents - claimants. On direction by the Court, Mr. K.S. Narasimhan, appeared and highlighted the statutory and judicial pronouncements.
5. Since the appeals are by the Insurance Company questioning their liability, in the absence of appeal by the claimants, owner or driver, there is no need to refer the factual details either relating to the negligence aspect or the quantum of compensation arrived at by the Tribunal. It is the stand of the Insurance Company that inasmuch as the vehicle involved is a goods carriage (lorry), not permitted to take passengers along with the goods, in the light of the limited liability, as per copy of the policy Ex.R.2, they are not liable to pay compensation and indemnify the insured as ordered by the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the appellant also contends that as per policy Ex.R.2, their liability is restricted to six persons (6 coolies), apart from the driver, cleaner and third parties, the direction to pay compensation in respect of all persons cannot be sustained.
6. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents - claimants would contend that in the light of Section 147 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and in the absence of any provision to limit their liability only to six persons, the policy (Ex.R.2) itself is contrary to the said provision and the Tribunal is justified in fastening entire liability in favour of the Insurance Company. He also contended that inasmuch as the persons involved in the accident are coolies, illiterate schedule caste community people, even if there is any violation of statutory provisions or policy conditions, the Insurance Company may be directed to pay the compensation amount at the first instance and permission may be granted to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.
7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions.
8. Since the accident occurred on 21.02.1999, the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and the Rules made thereunder alone are applicable. Though the driver and the owner of the vehicle were set ex parte, the Insurance Company in their counter affidavit disputed the claim on the ground that the claimants were neither owner of the goods nor representing the owner, they travelled in a goods carriage - lorry, which is prohibited, they cannot be treated as a loadmen, knowing that it is dangerous to travel on the top of the lorry that too on the plantain bunches, travelled in the same and met with an accident, for which the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any amount. Those persons were not permitted to travel in the cabin, since the policy conditions have been violated, there is no need for the Insurance Company to pay compensation. On the above plea, the Insurance Company has examined one Subramani, Clerk working in the Office of the Regional Transport Office and also marked the Insurance Policy and Inspection Report as Exs.R.2 and R.3. There is no dispute that on the date of accident, namely on 21.02.1999, the lorry bearing registration No.TN60 4705 has valid policy of Insurance (policy valid from 18.05.1998 to 17.05.1999). However, a perusal of policy Ex.R.2, particularly schedule of premium apart from the payment of premium for persons employed in connection with the operation of the vehicle, the owner has paid premium of Rs.90/- for six coolies. By pointing out the same the learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company would submit that though their liability is unlimited in so far as third parties, in view of payment of premium of Rs.90/- for six coolies, the Insurance Company is liable to pay only to the extent of 6 persons either for bodily injury or fatal and according to the counsel, for others it is for the owner to pay the same.
9. Though several decisions have been cited on either side, in view of the fact that the accident had occurred on 21.02.1999, i.e., after the amendment Act 1994, it is unnecessary to refer the same except recent pronouncements of the Supreme court, which are directly on the point.
10. Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents - claimants would contend that in the light of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short "the M.V. Act"), the contract, namely the policy of Insurance Ex.R.2 between the owner and the insurer is first of all oppose to public policy, secondly contrary to the said provision, i.e., Section 147 of the M.V. Act. We are unable to appreciate the said contention. Even as per Section 147 of the M.V. Act, the policy is not required to cover all liability. Subsection (1) of Section 147 is subject to certain restrictions as per the proviso appended therein. In order to understand the above aspect, it is relevant to refer the said provision.
"147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.- (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which -
(a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and
(b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-
(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily (injury to any person including, owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle) or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;
(ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place:
Provided that a policy shall not be required -
(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1 923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee -
(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or
(b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or ( c ) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or
(ii) to cover any contractual liability.
Explanation.- for the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place.
(2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, upto the following limits, namely:-
(a) save as provide in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred;
(b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand:
......
(3).........
(4)......
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an insurer issuing a policy of insurance under this section shall be liable to indemnify the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability which the policy purports to cover in the case of that person or those classes of persons."
11. The above provisions make it clear that in so far as third parties are concerned, there is unlimited liability on the part of the Insurance Company if there is valid insurance on the date of accident. However, in respect of damage to third party liability is restricted to Rs.6,000/-. It is clear that the parties are free to agree for terms to cover any contractual liability. In such a circumstance, it cannot be contended that the Insurance Policy Ex.R.2 in our case is contrary to Section 147 of the M.V. Act, as claimed by the learned senior counsel for respondents.
12. Mr. K.S. Narasimhan, appearing on direction of the Court has also brought to our notice the relevant provisions from Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989. They are Rule 236, 238, 239, 240, 241 and 243.
"Rule 236. Limit of persons in goods carriage.- No person shall be carried in the cabin of a goods carriage beyond the number for which there is a seating accommodation at the rate of thirty eight centimeters measured along the seat, excluding the space reserved for the driver, for each person, and not more than six persons in all in addition to the driver shall be carried in any goods carriage.
238. Prohibition of persons on the top of goods carriage.- No person shall be carried in goods carriage upon the goods or otherwise in such a manner that such person is in danger of falling from the vehicle, and in no case shall any person be carried in a goods carriage in such a manner that any part of his person when he is in a sitting position, is at a height exceeding 300 centimeters from the surface upon which the vehicle rests.
239. Permission to carry more persons in goods carriage.- Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 236, the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority may, subject to such conditions as it thinks fit, allow a large number of persons to be carried in a goods carriage.
240. No person to be carried for hire or reward.-
Nothing contained in rules 236, 238 and 239 shall be deemed to authorise the carriage of any person for hire or reward on any goods carriage.
241. Travel subject to rule 240.- No person shall travel in a goods carriage save in accordance with rule 240.
243. Restriction of persons and goods near drivers seat.- No person may sit nor may any goods be placed on the right of the driver of a transport vehicle fitted with right hand steering control and on the left of the driver of a transport vehicle fitted with left hand steering control."
13. The above provisions make it clear that in any goods carriage, apart from the driver not more than six persons can be carried in the cabin. Rule 238 completely prohibits carrying persons on the top of goods carriage. For certain reasons irrespective of Rule 236 with the permission of Regional Transport Authority or State Transport Authority more number of persons can be carried in a goods carriage. In our case, admittedly, the vehicle in question is a goods carriage - lorry and not intended to carry passengers, except the persons as provided under the above mentioned provisions. Admittedly, more than six persons travelled in the lorry on the fateful day, that too on the top of the lorry, i.e., above the plantain bunches and met with an accident. A perusal of the impugned common award shows that the learned Tribunal relying on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Satpal Singh 2000 (1) S.C.C. 237, directed the Insurance Company to pay entire compensation amount. As rightly pointed out by the counsel appearing for the Insurance Company there is no dispute that decision rendered in Satpal Singh (cited supra) has been overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co., Ltd., vs. Asha Rani reported in 2003 (2) S.C.C. 223. In this regard, it is useful to refer the discussion and the ultimate conclusion of the Three Judges Bench in Asha Rani's case.
"9. In Satpal's case (supra), the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with Section 147 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred.
If the Motor Vehicles Amended Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46 of Act 6 of 1991 by which expression 'injury to any person' in the original Act stood substituted by the expression 'injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid amendment Act of 1994, even if widest interpretation is given to the expression 'to any person' it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of Clause 46 also states that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the Insurance Policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the Legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression 'including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existed expression 'injury to any person' is either clarification or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the Legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal's case, therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgments of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury."
14. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co., Ltd., vs. Devireddy Konda Reddy reported in 2003 (2) S.C.C. 339, is an appeal filed by the Oriental Insurance Company before the Supreme Court. Those appeals were directed against the common judgment rendered by a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in and by which the Division Bench upheld the view of the learned Single Judge for compensation is payable by the insurer even if the deceased persons in respect of whom the claims are made were gratuitous passengers. It is further seen that both the single Judge as well as Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Satpal Singh's case (cited supra) for coming to the said conclusion. After referring various provisions as well as three Judges Bench decision in Asha Rani's case ( cited supra), the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and the High Court, holding that the insurer had the liability to satisfy the award and ultimately allowed the appeal filed by the Insurance Company. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decision rendered in the case of National Insurance Co., Ltd., vs. Ajit Kumar reported in 2003 A.C.C. 277 (SC). It is also relevant to refer the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co., Ltd., vs. Baljit Kaur reported in 2004 (1) C.T.C. 210. The question considered in that case was whether the insurance policy in respect of goods vehicle would also cover gratuitous passengers in view of the legislative amendment in 1994 to Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The objection of the Insurance Company before the Tribunal was that the vehicle being a goods vehicle, it would not have to incur any liability with respect to passengers transported in the vehicle. The Tribunal relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Satpal Singh's case (cited supra) accepted the claim petition and rejected the contention of the Insurance Company. The High court upheld the verdict of the claims Tribunal on appeal with further direction that in the event the owner, the third respondent therein had committed any breach, the appellant insurer would be entitled to recover the amount of compensation from him.
15. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the driver and owner of the vehicle that the decision in Asha Rani's case (cited supra) and Devireddy Konda Reddy's case (cited supra) were delivered with respect to the position prevailing prior to the amendment of Section 147 by the Motor Vehicles ( Amendment) Act, 1994. As such, the effect of the legislative amendment was not in question in the above cases and therefore, the law laid down by these decisions would not be considered as binding law in view of coming into force of the said Amendment. It is also contended that since the accident in the present instance occurred in 1999, the Supreme Court would now have to consider afresh the impact of the 1994 Amendment, and could not consider itself circumscribed by the aforementioned decisions in the Asha Rani's case (cited supra) and Devireddy Konda Reddy's case (cited supra), which both involved motor accidents predating the said amendment. While considering the said contentions, after referring Section 147 of the M.V. Act, particularly the effect of 1994 amendment on Section 147, their Lordships have held, "12. We find ourselves unable, furthermore, to countenance the contention of the respondents that the words 'any person' as used in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, would be rendered otiose by an interpretation that removed gratuitous passengers from the ambit of the same. It was observed by this Court in the case concerning New India Assurance Co., Ltd., vs. Asha Rani (supra) that the true purport of the words 'any person' is to be found in the liability of the insurer for third party risk, which was sought to be provided for by the enactment.
13. It is pertinent to note that a statutory liability enjoined upon an owner of the vehicle to compulsorily insure it so as to cover the liability in respect of a person who was travelling in a vehicle pursuant to a contract of employment in terms of proviso (ii) appended to Section 95 of the 1939 Act does not occur in Section 147 of the 1988 Act. The changes effected in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act as regard definitions of 'goods vehicle', 'public service vehicle' and 'stage carriage' have also a bearing on the subject inasmuch as the concept of any goods carriage carrying any passenger or any other person was not contemplated.
14. In a situation of this nature, the doctrine of suppression of mischief rule as adumbrated in Heydon's case (3 Co Rep 7a, 76 ER 637) shall apply. Such an amendment was made by the Parliament consciously. Having regard to the definition of 'goods carriage' vis-a-vis ' public service vehicle', it is clear that whereas the goods carriage carrying any passenger is not contemplated under the 1988 Act as the same must be used solely for carrying the goods.
17. By reason of the 1994 Amendment what was added as 'including the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in this vehicle'. The liability of the owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by reason of the aforementioned amendment included only the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle besides of the third parties. The intention of the Parliament, therefore, could not have been that the words 'any person' occurring in Section 147 would cover all persons who were travelling in a goods carriage in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention there was no necessity of the Parliament to carry out an amendment inasmuch as expression 'any person' contained in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section(1) of Section 147 would have included the owner of the goods or his authorised representative besides the passengers who are gratuitous or otherwise.
18. The observations made in this connection by the Court in Asha Rani case (supra) to which one of us, Sinha,J, was a party, however, bear repetition:
"26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in the 1988 Act vis-a-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words 'any person' must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used i.e. 'a third party'. Keeping in view the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor."
19. In Asha Rani (supra), it has been noticed that sub-clause (i) of clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the 1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risk of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium in view of the 1994 Amendment would only cover a third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorised representative and not any passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.
20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorised representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorised representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people."
Similar view has been expressed by us in the case of Kalavathy vs. Annammal reported in 2004 (1) M.L.J. 589.
16. In the light of the above discussion, particularly the legal position as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to Section 147 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 and in view of the materials placed by the Insurance Company before the Tribunal, particularly Ex.R.2 - policy, we hold that in spite of the Amendment Act, 1994, there is no compulsion on the part of the Insurance Company to cover persons other than the owner of goods or his authorised representative. To this extent we clarify the legal position.
17. Coming to the grievance expressed by the claimants, namely that the persons travelled on the lorry are mostly illiterate ladies and child labourers belonging to Schedule caste, the claimants being parents and dependents of the deceased and also taking note of the fact that the amount awarded is reasonable and acceptable (no challenge with regard to quantum), again we intend to refer the observation made in the penultimate paragraph in Baljit Kaur case (supra), which reads as under.
"21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Sing (supra). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani (supra). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 19088 in terms whereof it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the tribunal in such a proceeding."
We are of the view that the said observation / direction of the Hon' ble Supreme Court is also applicable to cases on hand, since here also the Tribunal following the decision in Satpal Singh's case (supra), directed the appellant Insurance Company to pay the compensation amount. In view of the reasons given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above (para 21), we are of the view that interest of justice would be met by directing the appellant Insurance Company to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimants if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the said purpose, we permit the Insurance company to initiate proceeding before the Tribunal as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before it and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. The above direction of us is in consonance with similar directions issued in Baljit Kaur's case (supra).
Under these circumstances, the appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected CMPs., are closed.
Index:Yes Internet:Yes kh To
1. The Additional Subordinate Judge (MACT) Tirunelveli.
2. The Sub-Asst. Registrar V.R. Section, High Court, Chennai.