Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs C.K. Patel on 13 February, 1991
Equivalent citations: [1992(65)FLR755], (1991)2GLR995
JUDGMENT
1. This group of nine acquittal appeals by the State arise out of the judgment and order dated February 6, 1990, passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Deesa wherein the respondent-accused who came to be tried for the alleged contravention of certain provisions under the Gujarat Minimum Wages Rules, 1961 read with Secs. 18 and 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, was ordered to be acquitted on the short ground of the complainant being absent when the cases were called out.
2. Mr. D. K. Trivedi, the learned P. P., while challenging the impugned orders of acquittal, with due respect to the trial Court, submitted that these days a tendency appears to be increasingly growing taking offences under the labor legislation too lightly and accordingly are more disposed off perfunctorily rather than deciding them on merits. The learned P.P. further submitted that in the instant cases also, the trial Court has not evinced the desired care while arbitrarily terminating the trials into premature acquittals. The learned P.P. further submitted, that in the beginning of the proceedings, longrope was given to the accused as cases went on being adjourned from time to time and then all of a sudden, on the ground of the absence of the complainant, the accused came to be acquitted. Mr. Trivedi further submitted that on number of occasions, not only the accused had remained absent, but the first and foremost simple step like recording the plea of the accused could not be taken up for an year and ten months and thereafter also the trial dragged on for a considerable long period. Such protracted trials are heart-breaking enough to anybody, much less a complainant, who is a public servant and has to attend many other important public duties. On the basis of above submissions, Mr. Trivedi finally urged that the impugned orders of acquittal being patently illegal, arbitrary and unjust, the same deserve to be quashed and set aside with orders remanding the same to be the trial Court.
3. As against the above, Mr. K.S. Zaveri, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent accused submitted that since the trial Court has fairly exercised its discretion under Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code') in acquitting the accused, the same should not be lightly interfered with. He further submitted that if despite summons being issued on the complainant, he did not care either to remain personally present or make any arrangement to keep somebody from his office present before the Court seeking adjournment, then in that case, the trial Court certainly cannot be blamed for the acquittal. Mr. Zaveri, in reply to two affidavits filed by : (1) the learned A.P.P. in-charge of the cases before the trial Court; and (2) the complainant, has submitted affidavit-in-reply of the respondent-accused countering the allegations made in those two affidavits. Mr. Zaveri further submitted that in identical matter, since this Court (Coram : K. G. Shah, J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 238 of 1983 decided on November 1, 1990 (State of Gujarat v. M/s. Unipal Plastic Industries), has confirmed the order of acquittal dismissing the State appeal, these appeals also should meet with the same fate and must be dismissed. Mr. Zaveri finally in the alternative also urged that offences by now having become quite old, even if these appeals were to be allowed, the same should not be remanded.
4. Now on going through the record and taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of these cases, it appears that argument of the learned P.P. has considerable force and therefore deserves to be accepted in toto. No doubt, it is true there are very many other factors as well responsible for unduly delaying the trials, still, however, it is simply difficult to understand as to how and why the trial Court should consume as many as four long years in conducting a trial which hardly requires a witness or two to be examined. It is indeed a matter of sheer regret that a simple thinking like recording the plea of the accused could not take place for a year and then months and thereafter also for other two years, the proceedings went on drifting aimlessly. Such sort of situation simply reflects upon the lack of will and duty on the part of the trial Court to proceed expeditiously ahead with trials in utter disregard of the interests of the workers and object of the statute. This also incidentally sadly reflects upon the trial Court of its total unawareness of the provisions contained in Section 309 of the Code pertaining to the manner as how trial proceedings are to be conducted and controlled. No doubt, sometimes, the cases deserve to be adjourned from time to time in over all and larger interests of justice and therefore granting of reasonable adjournments are quite within the discretion of the trial Court, but at the same time, while exercising such discretion, the Court cannot be permitted to altogether ignore directions given in Section 309 of Coded, which aims at the expeditious trials by regulating and controlling the undue frequencies of adjournments. No cases should ordinarily be adjourned without the reasons for the same being recorded. Not only that but in appropriate cases, on justifiable grounds, the trial Courts are duty bounds to award costs so as to control the dilatory tactics of the recalcitrant parties. Accordingly, the cases where unjust absence of the complainant causes undue hardship and inconvenience to the other side, the trial Court can meet with the said situation by awarding costs, if need be, by frequently awarding such costs in order to control such recalcitrant complainant enforcing him to appear before the Court. In fact, cases involving beneficial social pieces of legislation, require special and adequate care to be taken by the trial Court and that ordinarily should not permit itself to resort to easy premature acquittals under Section 256 of the Code on the ground of the absence of the complainant throwing the grievances of the aggrieved labourers to the wind.
5. Now, turning to the grievance of the learned P.P. regarding the growing tendency amongst some of the trial Courts in taking too lightly cases under the labour legislation and disposing of the same in perfunctory manner, it cannot be denied that the same is without any substance. These days, we do come across number of such cases wherein Rojkam proceedings sadly reflect two types of modus operandi in conduct of trials. They are - (1) either immediately on appearance before the Court or sometimes thereafter, whenever accused appears, moments he pleads guilty, the same is accepted without any reservation and then is let off with some ridiculous sentence - many a time, in clear disregard of the minimum punishment prescribed under the Act, and (2) in the beginning by giving long-rope to parties by freely giving adjournments after adjournments and then conveniently terminating the cases on the ground of absence of the complainant or the witnesses, with added label of the old case. Rarely one comes across the cases under labour legislation wherein the same are decided on merits after full-dress trial. Thus, unfortunately, in the midst of such disquieting circumstances, where there exist vast and widening gap between the law in its letters and forms, the law in its spirit and action and ultimate deliverance of justice with the aid of the said laws through the instrumentality of the Court, the future prospects of both the labour legislation as well as the beneficiaries thereunder, to say the least, is not encouraging enough, unless something radical is done at the grassroot level. It appears that on this side of administration of justice, the learned Sessions Judges can certainly do well to check and control the above unfortunate situations if with surprise frequencies, they call for the Rojkam proceedings from subordinate Criminal Courts for inspection and after personally examining the same, find out as to in how may cases, proceedings were unnecessarily delayed or accused were acquitted prematurely without being tried on merits or despite the inflexible minimum punishment provided under the particular statute, the accused have been let off with light sentences as a result of plea - bargaining. If during the course of such inspections, any serious lapse is noticed impairing the image of the administration of justice which cannot be accepted as a simple ordinary judicial error, or some honest and bona fide inadvertent mistake or, to put it more broadly, which cannot be reasonably and satisfactorily explained, the same should form a part of the service record of the concerned Magistrate after calling upon him to furnish the explanation report in the said regard. Further in such cases of serious lapses on the part of the learned Magistrate, it is equally the duty of the complainant to resort the matter to the concerned Sessions Judge before filing appeals before the High Court. If the learned Sessions Judge also fail to entertain this sort of care and anxiety and thereby fail in their respective duties, then in that case, it will indeed be difficult to take exception against the allegation that the absence of vigilance on the part of the Courts over their subordinate Courts is one of the main hindrances between the promise of law and ultimate goal of justice.
6. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of these cases, even without entering into the merits of allegations and counter allegations in affidavit and replies thereto filed by the parties, it appears to this Court that the order of acquittal being arbitrary, illegal and unjust, deserves to be quashed and set aside.
7. Now coming next to the reliance placed on the judgment cited above by Mr. Zaveri, it has to be stated that the same having no bearing on facts and circumstances of these cases, it is of no assistance to the accused. Each case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of that particular case. The present cases are clearly distinguishable from the judgment cited above. It appears that in the said judgment, the orders of acquittal were passed long before in the year 1982 and that the matter came up for final hearing in the year 1990, i.e., to say after 8 prolonged years. Further, in the present cases, for no fault of the complainant, even the plea was not recorded for one year and ten months. Not only that, but on number of occasions, the accused remained absent. Thus, when the accused on the one hand was given free-hand and pampered by granting frequent adjournments on mere asking, thereby permitting him to delay the trials causing lot of inconveniences and hardships to the complainant, then in that case, he is certainly not entitled to be heard to find fault with the absence of the complainant in justification of acquittal. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the submissions of Mr. Zaveri.
8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeals deserve to be remanded to the trial Court. Both Mr. D. K. Trivedi, the learned P.P. and Mr. K. S. Zaveri, the learned Advocate for the respondent, are directed to intimate their respective parties to appear before the trial Court on or before March 4, 1991 and take future date for the trial to proceed. The trial Court while conducting the cases, henceforth, shall bear in mind the relevant provisions contained in Section 309 of the Code as well as observations made hereinabove with a view to see that the trial proceeds smoothly and terminates according to law.
9. In the result, these appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned judgment and orders of acquittal passed by the trial Court are quashed and set aside. The matters are remanded to the trial Court with a direction to dispose of the same on merits according to law as expeditiously as possible.