Punjab-Haryana High Court
Nar Singh And Ors vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 7 August, 2024
Bench: G.S. Sandhawalia, Meenakshi I. Mehta
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
1. CWP-13459-2021 (O&M) Date of Decision: 07.08.2024
Nar Singh & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
2. CWP-17137-2020 (O&M)
Vidya & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
3. CWP-18823-2020 (O&M)
Ram Chander & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
4. CWP-13728-2022 (O&M)
Shri Bhagwan & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
5. CWP-14609-2022 (O&M)
Jhamman & another --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
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CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases
6. CWP-14780-2022 (O&M)
Bhagwat Dayal & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
7. CWP-17511-2022 (O&M)
Mitru @ Mittar Singh(deceased) through LRs. --Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
8. CWP-16945-2022 (O&M)
Rekha Devi & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
9. CWP-16948-2022 (O&M)
Satpal & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
10. CWP-6037-2023 (O&M)
Raj Singh & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
11. CWP-8633-2021 (O&M)
Nar Singh & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
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CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases
12. CWP-9940-2022 (O&M)
Inder Prasad --Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
13. CWP-9943-2022 (O&M)
Kavita & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
14. CWP-9947-2022 (O&M)
Mukesh & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
15. CWP-11242-2022 (O&M)
Satish Kumar & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
16. CWP-26633-2021 (O&M)
Pardeep Yadav & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
17. CWP-587-2022 (O&M)
Desh Raj & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
18. CWP-850-2021 (O&M)
Ishwar & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
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CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases
19. CWP-9962-2020 (O&M)
Hukum Singh & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
20. CWP-1426-2021 (O&M)
Hira Lal& others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
21. CWP-15586-2021 (O&M)
Lalita & others --Petitioners
Versus
State of Haryana & others --Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA
Present:- Mr. Sanjiv Ghai, Advocate and
Mr. Parminder S. Kaul, Advocate for the petitioners
(inCWP-13459-2021&CWP-13728-2022).
Mr. Shailendra Jain, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Nitin Jain, Advocate,
Mr. Mukesh Yadav, Advocate,
Mr. Vikram Singh, Advocate,
Mr. Aditya Jain, Advocate & Mr. Rajat Singla, Advocate
for the petitioners (in CWP-850-2021, CWP-16945 & 16948-2022
and CWP-6037-2023).
Mr. S.K. Yadav, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate and
Ms. Kushaldeep K. Manchanda, Advocate and
Mr. Siddharth Arora, Advocate for respondent-HSIIDC.
*****
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4 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases G.S. SANDHAWALIA.J (Oral) The present judgment shall dispose of above referred 21 writ petitions, wherein challenge has been made to the notification dated 10.01.2011 (Annexure P-10) issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the 1894 Act) and the subsequent notification dated 17.08.2020 (Annexure P-20) issued under Section 6 of the Act. The challenge is on account of the gap of 9½ years of the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act being impermissible after the repeal of the Act on the basis of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court dated 31.08.2017 in case of Deepak Aggarwal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others, 2008(1) RCR (Civil) 161. When the petitions were filed in the year 2021 the award had not been passed which came subsequently to be passed on 16.08.2022.
2. The facts are being taken from CWP-13459-2021 'Nar Singh and others Vs. State of Haryana and others', wherein seven petitioners belonging to the family of Jorawar Singh pleaded that they are owners in possession of the land, which was possessed by way of inheritance by petitioner Nos.1& 3 and their brother (now deceased) through his legal heirs being petitioner Nos.4 to 6. Total share of the petitioners is stated to be 8 kanals 5 marals with the petitioners No.1&3 having additional share of 4 kanals 3 marlas, on the basis of the subsequent sale deeds and, thus, having a total area of 19 kanals. It is admitted that land was sought to be acquired of 1810 acres 11 marlas, as per notification dated 10.01.2011 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short '1894 Act') for the purpose of extension of Industrial Model Township falling in village Kasan, Kukrola, Sehrawan, Tehsil Manesar, District Gurgaon. Objections under Page 5 of 16 5 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases Section 5A of the 1894 Act having been filed for exemption on account of having constructed residential house, which have been appended as Annexure P-11, it was pleaded that it was incumbent upon respondent No.1 to consider the report under Section 5A and then only if deemed appropriate a declaration under Section 6 of 1894 Act had to be made. It was their own case that on account of the 2013 Act coming into force from 01.01.2014 and Section 6 notification having not been issued, proceedings could not be carried out under 1894 Act. While placing reliance upon the provisions of Sections 24 and 114 of theRight to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, it has been pleaded that the award having not been passed, the land could not be acquired under the provisions of 1894 Act and, therefore, reference was made to the Full Bench judgment of this Court passed in Deepak Aggarwal (supra). It was, accordingly, pleaded that the intention to acquire the land would, thus, be only on publication, once there was a declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. It was further pleaded that SLPs were still pending before the Apex Court when the petition was filed. Challenge was thus, made that now objections were being heard under Section 5A in June, 2020.
3. The respondentNo.3 in its reply took the plea that the petitioners had also earlier filed CWP-8633-2021 and factum of concealing was pleaded. It was also mentioned that operation of the judgment passed in Deepak Aggarwal's case (supra) had been stayed by the Apex Court in SLP (C) Diary No.18374 of 2018 on 03.07.2018 and, therefore, reliance upon the same was misplaced and, accordingly, reliance was placed upon the observations made by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Indore Development Page 6 of 16 6 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases Authority Vs. Manoharlal & others, AIR 2020SC 1496.Further perusal of the reply of the State would go on to show that the reason for the delay in issuing the notification under Section 6 of the Act was on account of the fact that a writ petition CWP-113-2011 titled as Fertile Land Protection Movement Vs. Union of India and others had been filed before the Apex Court which had also challenged two earlier notifications/acquisition proceedings dated 25.04.2008 and 22.04.2009 apart from the present notification dated 10.01.2011. The Apex Court, at that point of time, while issuing notice on 25.04.2011, had granted ad interim relief as prayed for in paragraph 12(a) of the Special Leave to Appeal. Paragraph 12(a) reads as under:-
"12(a) Grant ex-parte ad-interim stay of the further proceeding pertaining to taking possession of the land notified by the respondent authority for acquisition of vide notification dated 25.04.2008 and 22.04.2009 and 10.01.2011 and/or to maintain status quo pertaining to the said lands."
4. Apparently because of the said interim order, Section 5-A proceedings of the Act were also not completed. The Apex Court transferred the matter on 06.08.2014 to this Court and it was re-numbered as CWP-18940- 2014-Fertile Land Protection Movement and others Vs. Union of India and others. Resultantly, the necessary declarations were made detailed as under:-
Sr. Date Event Remarks No. (i) 10.01.2011 Section 4 notification A period of 105 days lapsed issued on 25.04.2011 (ii) 16.01.2011 "Aaj Samaj" (Delhi Edition (Hindi) Page 7 of 16 7 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases (iii) 17.01.2011 "Hindustan Times" (English) (iv) 25.04.2011 Hon'ble Supreme Court This period is to be excluded ordered status quo from Section 6 declaration. (v) 02.12.2019 Matter was finally disposed of (vi) 17.08.2020 Section 6 declaration was Within the period prescribed issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
5. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 02.12.2019 that the Government would consider the case for release. After the disposal, the State considered the objections filed and the Land Acquisition Collector recommended to release the constructed portion prior to issuance of Section 4 notification and, accordingly, has recommended that the Government may take a view on the construction raised after issuance of Section 4 notification also as there was cluster of residential houses on part notified land comprising in Khasra No.126//24/2(3-19), 131//4 min north (4-0) and the same was adjoining the village abadi. The recommendations were considered but the HSIIDC had decided to acquire the entire land and it was included in the declaration dated 17.08.2020. It has been mentioned that petitioner No.7 did not file objections and the writ petition is not maintainable at her hands. It was, accordingly, pleaded that declaration was issued for the entire land notified under Section 4, which at the time of actual measurement was found to be 1808 acres, 6 kanals and 1 marla for the three villages in question.
6. It is a matter of record now that an award has been passed on 16.08.2022 as per the plea taken by the State. The Apex Court in the case of Faizabad-Ayodhya Development Authority Vs. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Pandey and others, AIR 2022 SC 2558, has decided the issue whether the Page 8 of 16 8 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases Award passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act could be passed by the authority, once there was an interim stay granted by the High Court in the writ petitions filed by the landowners and whether the original landowners would be entitled to compensation determined under sub-Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act.Resultantly, it has been held that the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act would be applicable and once there is stay of dispossession or status-quo, the authority would be restrained from proceeding further and no award can be made. However, the Apex Court further went on to hold that the acquiring authority cannot be burdened with the determination of compensation under the provisions of 2013 Act, while placing reliance upon the observations made by the Constitutional Bench in Indore Development Authority (supra), wherein it was held that the intention of the law was not to grant advantage to the relentless litigants. Resultantly, the following principles were laid down:-
"46. The sum and substance of the aforesaid observations could be summarized as under:-
(i) The time of five years is provided to the authorities to take action, not to sleep over the matter;
(ii) Only in cases of lethargy or inaction and default on the part of the authorities and for no other reason lapse of acquisition can occur;
(iii) Lapse of acquisition takes place only in case of default by the authorities acquiring the land, not caused by any other reason or order of the court;
(iv) The additional compensation @ 12% provided under Section 69 of the Act, 2013 has been excluded from the period acquisition proceedings have been held up on account of the interim injunction order of any court;
(v) If it was not possible for the acquiring authorities, for any reason not attributable to them or the Government, to take requisite steps, the period has to be excluded;
(vi) In case the authorities are prevented by the court's order, obviously, as per the interpretation of the provisions such period has to be excluded;
(vii) The intent of the Act, 2013 is not to benefit landowners only. The provisions of Section 24 by itself do not intend to confer benefits on litigating Page 9 of 16
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(viii) It is not the intendment of the Act, 2013 that those who have assailed the acquisition process should get benefits of higher compensation as contemplated under Section 24;
(ix) It is not intended by the provisions that in case, the persons, who have litigated and have obtained interim orders from the Civil Courts by filing suits or from the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should have the benefits of the provisions of the Act, 2013 except to the extent specifically provided under the Act, 2013;
(x) In cases where some landowners have chosen to take recourse to litigation and have obtained interim orders restraining taking of possession or orders of status quo, as a matter of practical reality it is not possible for the authorities or the Government to take possession or to make payment of compensation to the landowners. In several instances, such interim orders also have impeded the making of an award;
(xi) However, so far as awards are concerned, the period provided for making of awards under the Act, 2013 (sic 1894 Act) could be excluded by virtue of Explanation to Section 11-A, which provided that in computing the period of two years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded;
(xii) The litigation initiated by the landowners has to be decided on its own merits and the benefits of Section 24(2) should not be available to the litigants in a straightjacket manner. In case there is no interim order, they can get the benefits they are entitled to, not otherwise. Delays and dilatory tactics and sometimes wholly frivolous pleas cannot result in benefitting the landowners under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013;
(xiii) Any type of order passed by this Court would inhibit action on the part of the authorities to proceed further, when a challenge to acquisition is pending;
(xiv) Interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would cause a complete restraint on the authorities to proceed further to issue declaration;
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(xv) When the authorities are disabled from performing duties due to impossibility, it would be a sufficient excuse for them to save them from rigour of provisions of Section 24. A litigant may have a good or a bad cause, be right or wrong. But he cannot be permitted to take advantage of a situation created by him by way of an interim order passed in his favour by the Court at his instance. Although provision of Section 24 does not discriminate between landowners, who are litigants or non-litigants and treat them differently with respect to the same acquisition, it is necessary to view all of them from the stand point of the intention of the Parliament. Otherwise, anomalous results may occur and provisions may become discriminatory in itself; (xvi) The law does not expect the performance of the impossible; (xvii) An act of the court shall prejudice no man;
(xviii) A party prevented from doing an act by certain circumstances beyond his control can do so at the first subsequent opportunity; (xix) When there is a disability to perform a part of the law, such a charge has to be excused. When performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute is rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons concerned have no control, it has to be taken as a valid excuse;
(xx) The Court can under its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae has a duty to mitigate the damage suffered by the defendants by the act of the Court;
(xxi) No person can suffer from the act of Court and an unfair advantage of the interim order must be neutralised;
(xxii) No party can be permitted to take shelter under the cover of Court's order to put the other party in a disadvantageous position; (xxiii) If one has enjoyed under the Court's cover, that period cannot be included towards inaction of the authorities to take requisite steps underSection 24 as the State authorities would have acted and passed an award determining compensation but for the Court's order."
7. The judgment of the Full Bench passed in Deepak Aggarwal's case (supra) was subsequently overruled on 28.07.2022 by a three Judge Bench in 'HSIIDC and others Vs. Deepak Aggarwal and others', 2022 SCC Online SC 932 whereby the specific issue was dealt with regarding the word used 'initiation' under Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. Resultantly, it was Page 11 of 16 11 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases held that 24(1)(a) provided the determination of compensation as per 2013 Act, in case an award had not been passed under Section 11 of the 1894 Act and under Section 24(1) (b) wherein an award had been passed and proceedings were to be continued under the 1894 Act. It was, thus, clarified that the initial notification under Section 4 as such would authorize the officers and empower them and it was a foundation for the proceedings under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. Similarly, the issue that the proceedings initiated would continue or survive after 01.01.2014 were decided by holding that the argument raised that the proceedings would not survive after 01.01.2014 and the Section 6 notification could not be issued, was unsustainable and would make working of the 2013 Act unworkable. The relevant portion, thus, read as under:-
"33.In the light of the above discussion and taking note of the legislative intention we have no hesitation to hold that the point of initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, is issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification in the official gazette of the appropriate Government.
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30. In the decision in Shiv Kumar and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. [(2019)] 10 SCC 229] a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that a purchaser of land in respect of which notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act issued and published (after the issuance of Section 4 notification under the L.A. Act) did not acquire any right in the land concerned and such sale is ab initio void and such a person would have no right to claim that land under the policy of law. Section 23 of the L.A. Act deals with matters to be considered in determining compensation. Going by the said provision, the market value of the land in question was to be decided taking the market value at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4. Going by the settled position, a vital defect in the Section 4(1) notification under the Page 12 of 16 12 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases L.A. Act cannot be cured by issuing and publishing a declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act and in such circumstances, it would entail annulment of both the notifications and also the acquisition proceedings. All the aforesaid aspects would reveal that issuance and publication of a valid Section 4(1)notification, was the foundation for acquisition of land in any locality under the L.A. Act. All the above reasons will fortify our conclusion and justify the rejection of the contention that Section 4(1) notification is nothing but a mere formality and got no real relevance or importance in the process of land acquisition under the L.A. Act.
37. Now, we will consider the other common questions involved in the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4 notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to 01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whether Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued after 01.01.2014.
38. We think that while considering those questions we will have to bear in mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Act and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in which it now exists. We have already dealt with those aspects. One crucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act was initiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of non-passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition proceedings should continue, but all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would Page 13 of 16 13 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases come into play only at that stage. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that between the initiation of land acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. The question is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period till the proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribed under the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the 2013 Act. It is in this context that the decision in Ambica Quarry Works' case (supra) assumes relevance. Any construction of the said provision without taking into the legislative intention, referred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention as also the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in public interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities to follow the procedures during such period according to their sweet will. A uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at the same time, the persons affected Page 14 of 16 14 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases shall have definite idea about the manner in which procedures would be conducted. The Party 'B' would not be justified in describing such situations of necessity and the consequential application of provisions which are actually saved on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt to bring the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the contentions of Party 'B' that Section 4(1) notification issued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and formalities shall be continued till the determination of compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contra-construction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable.
39. Having decided the common questions as above we are of the view that all the other issues involved in the individual appeals have to be considered on their own merits and subject to this judgment in respect of all the stated common questions.
40. To conclude, we hold that for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be treated as initiated on publication of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act. We further hold that when Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable, the proceedings shall continue as per the L.A. Act. However, only for the determination of compensation amount, the provisions of the 2013 Act shall be applied.
41. We have already observed that other issues are also involved in the captioned appeals besides the common questions and issues which we have answered in this judgment. Hence taking note of involvement of other legal and factual issues in these appeals shall be listed before appropriate Bench for disposal on their own merits."
8. Resultantly, keeping in view the above once the case of the petitioners was solely based on the fact that the Full Bench was in their favour Page 15 of 16 15 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:104248-DB CWP-13459-2021 and other connected cases and proceedings were deemed to have been lapsed under Section 24 of the 2013 Act, need not to be gone into any more, in view of the express declaration of law by the Apex Court.
9. Accordingly, once the State has taken a categorical decision to acquire all the land as notified and not released any land in spite of Section 5A objections and there has been no exception, which would be clear from Section 6 notification, we do not find any plausible reason to interfere in the acquisition proceedings. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. All pending civil miscellaneous applications are also disposed off, accordingly.
G.S. SANDHAWALIA) JUDGE (MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA) 07.08.2024 JUDGE Lucky/Naveen Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes Whether Reportable : Yes Page 16 of 16 16 of 16 ::: Downloaded on - 24-08-2024 04:45:00 :::