Delhi District Court
Acj-Cum-Ccj-Cum-Arc vs Sh. Chhangaram on 14 January, 2022
IN THE COURT OF MS. SNIGDHA SARVARIA,
ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC, SHAHDARA DISTRICT,
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI.
M No : 07/2021
1 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain
S/o Sh. N.C. Jain
R/o 4/1436-D, Gali No. 3,
Shalimar Park,
Delhi-110032
2 Sh. Sunil Kumar Jain
S/o Sh. N.C. Jain
R/o 25/97-98, Pandav Road,
Gali No. 14, Vishwas Nagar,
Shahdara, Delhi-110032 ......... Petitioners
Versus.
Sh. Chhangaram
S/o Sh. Inder Jeet
Having his shop at
25/97-98, Pandav Road,
Gali No. 14, Vishwas Nagar,
Shahdara, Delhi-110032 ......... Respondent
Order on application under Section 340 r/w Section 195 CrPC
1. Vide this order I shall dispose of an application under section 340 read with section 195 Cr.PC. filed by the Applicant.
2. By way of this application the applicant/respondent seeks indulgence of this court in taking suo-moto action under the provision of section 340 Cr.PC. against the petitioners M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 1 of 8 for the offence committed by the petitioner for giving wrong information as the petitioner filed an eviction petition against respondent and stated in para no. 18(a)(7) in the petition the petitioners are running the partnership business in the name and style M/s Eagle Rubber Company in tenanted premises bearing its municipal no. 4/1463, Shalimar Park, Shahdara, Delhi, however, the petitioner earlier filed a eviction petition against respondent in which petitioner claimed eviction on the ground that the petitioner was doing business under partnership, now the said partnership firm is dissolved and now petitioner required the said shop for doing his own business there and on this aspect Hon'ble Court of Sh. N.K. Laka also taken a ground for grant of leave by stating that it is clear that the "petitioner did not clearly depicted the entire picture of his claim of bonafide requirement in as much as he did not disclose as to where he was doing the business in partnership, who were the partners when the said partnership firm was constituted and as to how and when it was dissolved" and the petitioner herein has given wrong informed to this Court. It is further stated that the petitioner has given wrong information in the present petition in para no. 3A that petitioners are the owner of the tenanted premises, however, in earlier petition petitioner Parveen Jain claimed that he is the owner of the premises and thus the petitioner did not give clear picture on this aspect.
3. On the other hand, Ld. counsel for the non-applicant/petitioner submitted that present application is nothing but a gross abuse of the process of law. The non-applicant basically denied all the averments and submitted that the present application is liable to be dismissed.
4. I have heard Ld. counsel for both the parties and perused the record & gone through the relevant provision of law.
M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 2 of 85. Section 190, Cr.P.C. provides that a Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts, and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Section 195, Cr.P.C. is a sort of exception to this general provision and creates an embargo upon the power of the court to take cognizance of certain types of offences enumerated therein. The procedure for filing a complaint by the court as contemplated by Section 195(1), Cr.P.C. is given in Section 340, Cr.P.C. and sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof are being reproduced below : -
"340. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195.- (1) When, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 195, which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary,-
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the First -4-
Class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance of the accused before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable and the court thinks it necessary so to do, send the accused in custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.
2. The power conferred on a court by sub-section (1) in respect of an offence may, in any case where that court has neither made a M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 3 of 8 complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be exercised by the court to which such former court is subordinate within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195.
7. The power under S. 340 Cr. P.C. read with S. 195, I.P.C. can be exercised only where someone fabricates false evidence or gives false evidence.
8. In view of the language used in Section 340, Cr.P.C. the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint.
9. From the aforesaid it is clear that for the purpose of S. 340 CrPC firstly Section 195(1)
(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. contemplates a situation where offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any Court and secondly, the said commission of offence has an effect M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 4 of 8 on the administration of justice meaning thereby that it adversely effects a party to the lis.
10. Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C. would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.
11. As per decision in Iqbal Singh Narang & Ors vs Veeran Narang- (2012) 2 SCC 60, Rent Controller although discharges quasi judicial functions, is not a 'court' and cannot therefore, make a complaint under S. 340 CrPC. The relevant paragraphs in this regard are as under:
7. Having held that the Rent Controller is not a Court within the meaning of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C., the learned Single Judge also held that private complaints would be maintainable in case of allegations of false evidence before the Rent Controller. The learned Judge observed that the concept of the Rent Controller being a Court was erroneous and hence the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Ram Krishan Vs. Santra Devi [1986 (1) P&H (DB) PLR 567] was per incuriam.
8. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the High Court chose not to interfere with the order passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed by the Appellants under Section 193/120-B IPC and dismissed the Misc.
Case No.32515-M of 2006 filed by the Appellants herein.
9. On behalf of the Respondent it was urged that the order of the learned Single Judge, impugned in this appeal, was based on a judgment of this Court and hence it did not suffer from any irregularity or illegality. It was also urged that since the Rent Controller was not a Court, a complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. in respect of false statements made before it, would be maintainable at the instance of a private party, notwithstanding the bar to filing of such complaint, except on a complaint in writing of that Court, by such officer of the Court, as that Court may authorize in writing in M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 5 of 8 such regard. Learned counsel submitted that no interference was called for with the order of the High Court and the appeal was liable to be dismissed.
10. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration in this appeal is that even if the Rent Controller is held not to be a "Court", whether any private complaint would be maintainable in respect of statements alleged to have been falsely made before it. While disposing of the Revisional Application filed by the Appellants, the learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court took note of a judgment of the said Court in Ishwar Chand Gupta Vs. Chander Shekhar & Anr.[(2001) 1 RCR Criminal 171], in which it had been held that the Rent Controller was not a Court and that a complaint would lie under Section 195 Cr.P.C. in respect of statement made before the Rent Controller at the instance of a private party.
11. The aforesaid question has fallen for consideration in several cases before this Court and the consistent view which has been taken is that the Rent Controller, being a creature of Statute, has to act within the four corners of the Statute and could exercise only such powers as had been vested in him by the Statute.
12. In the decision rendered by this Court in Prakash H. Jain Vs. Marie Fernandes [(2003) 8 SCC 431], this Court held that the Competent Authority under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, is at best a statutory authority created for a definite purpose and to exercise powers in a quasi-judicial manner, but its powers were strictly circumscribed by the very statutory provisions which conferred upon it those powers and the same could be exercised in the manner provided therefor and subject to such conditions and limitations stipulated by the very provisions of law under which the Competent Authority itself was created.
The aforesaid observations were made by this Court in the context of the powers conferred on the Competent Authority appointed under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, which included powers to condone the delay in the filing of the proceedings.
It is in such circumstances that it was observed by this Court that the High Court had rejected the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant therein that since it had all the trappings of a Court, the Competent Authority was a Court in the eye of law and M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 6 of 8 consequently possessed inherent powers to condone the delay. The High Court also rejected the said prayer upon observing that statutory authorities have to act within the powers conferred on them by Statute.
13. The same views were also expressed by this Court in Om Prakash Vs. Ashwani Kumar Bassi [(2010) 9 SCC 183], wherein it was held that in the absence of a specific power being vested in the Rent Controller, it being a creature of statute, it could only act in terms of the powers vested in it by the Statute and could not, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, since the Statute did not vest him with such power.
14. The aforesaid decisions of this Court establish that though the Rent Controller discharges quasi-judicial functions, he is not a Court, as understood in the conventional sense and he cannot, therefore, make a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Consequently, as held by the High Court, a complaint could be made by a private party in the proceedings.
12. In the present case, the applicant has stated that in earlier petition for eviction under S. 14 (1) ( e) DRC Act filed by Praveen Kumar Jain he had stated that the partnership had dissolved but in present case he has stated that the partnership is still in existence. But since the applicant Chhangaram has not disputed the partnership and there is nothing to show on record that Praveen Kumar Jain had stated about the same partnership in earlier petition as in the present case as there is no document to that effect, therefore, mere averments in this regard is of no help to the applicant. Further, as regards ownership of Praveen Jain qua the premises in question as pleaded by him in the earlier petition and this petition, the documents show that Praveen Jain and Sunil Jain are the owners of the premises in question. But that does not mean that in previous proceedings he had made false averment. Even otherwise averments in previous proceedings before Ld. SCJ even M No : 07/2021 Sh. Praveen Kumar Jain @ Praveen Jain & anr. Vs. Sh. Chhangaram Page 7 of 8 if false cannot be considered herein as no false evidence or declaration is made in the present case.
13. Thus, clearly, the present application does not disclose any grounds warranting indulgence by exercising powers under S. 340 CrPC, therefore, the present application is dismissed. The file be consigned to the record room after due compliance.
Digitally signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA
SARVARIA Date: 2022.01.04
12:55:25 +0530
Announced through VC (SNIGDHA SARVARIA)
on 14th Day of January, 2022. ACJ/ARC/CCJ
(SHAHDARA) KKD, DELHI.
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