Allahabad High Court
Sharda Wife Of Sri Shahid Khan vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 29 November, 2006
Author: Vinod Prasad
Bench: Vinod Prasad
JUDGMENT Vinod Prasad, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the revisionist and the learned A.G.A.
2. Sri S.N.H. Zaidi, Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar without caring to look into the law has passed the impugned order of staying the arrest of the accused, illegally and without any jurisdiction. I am constrain to observe this because while passing the impugned order dated 8.11.2006 in Criminal Revision No. 122 of 2006, Ram Avtar and nine Ors. v. Smt. Sharda and Anr. he not only entertained the revision against an interlocutory pre cognizance order of an administrative nature under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. ignoring bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. but also directed the police not to arrest the opposite parties who were charged with commission of a cognizable offences of murdering Abid minor son of the applicant Sharda by sacrificing him and then burning by his body by electrocution.
3. The facts of the case in a thumbnail description are that an application at a pre-cognizance stage, under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by Smt. Sharda before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Gautam Budh Nagar, which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 72 of 2006. The Magistrate finding a cognizable offences being disclosed through the said application ordered for registration of F.I.R. and investigation of the offences by his order dated 3.10.2006 passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which has been appended as annexure No. 3 to the affidavit filed in support of this revision. A perusal of the said order dated 3.10.2006 indicate that A.C.J.M. concerned was of the view that cognizable offences were disclosed through the said application filed by the respondent No. 2. It was a case of human sacrifice and the allegations which were levelled in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. were that the accused malefactors had sacrificed Abid son of the respondent No. 2 Smt. Sharda and had burnt him by electrocuting him. In paragraph 8 and 9 of the application she clearly stated the aforesaid facts. The transcription of the aforesaid two paragraphs are as follows:
8-That all these persons have sacrificed Abid son of the applicant because of religious rights and have electrocuted him.
9-That for the purposes of performing religious rights these persons (accused) have murdered the son of the applicant by sacrificing him. The corpus is still buried in the mortuary of village Khairpur.
4. With such allegations the A.C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar directed the police to exercise their plenary power of investigation after registering the F.I.R. under Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. and investigate the offences. (Needless to say that the police had (sic) eschewed its responsibility of registering the F.I.R. of the respondent No. 2/revisionist Smt. Sharda when it was under the mandate of law and was required to register and investigate the same specially in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Chowdhary Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC (Cr.462); Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary 1993 SCC (Cr) 36).
5. The prospective accused in the said application challenged the said order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which has been decided by Sessions Judge Gautam Budh Nagar by passing the impugned order.
6. First of all the revision at the behest of the prospective accused before the Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar was not maintainable as it was an interlocutory order passed under Chapter XII at a pre-cognizance stage and secondly the said order was an order of an administrative nature passed under Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. relating to the power of police to conduct an investigation. The Apex Court has explained many times the scope of power of Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with exhaustively by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426; Devarpalli Lakshaminarayana Reddy and Ors. v. V. Narayana Reddy and Ors. 1976 ACC 230; Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. and Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh 2003 (2) JIC 126 (Para 20).
7. Sri S.N.H. Zaidi, Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar without caring to look into the law as to whether the revision was maintainable at the behest of the prospective accused or not who had no right to install the registration of F.I.R. of cognizable offences against them, not only, illegally, entertained the revision without jurisdiction but while dismissing it directed the police not to arrest the accused persons. Order passed by the Sessions Judge, (Lower Revisional Court) is a glaring example of flagrant misuse of power by the Sessions Judge. Sessions Judge does not seems to be oblivious of Section 41 Cr.P.C. which gives power to the police to arrest anybody without warrant who is involved in an offence of cognizable nature. Moreover, in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Naur Ahmad 1945 P.C 17 the Privy Council has categorically laid down the law that the power of Court and the police do not over lap each other. They are complementary not contradictory. The power of the Court starts when the investigation is over. How the investigation is to be conducted and against whom it is to be conducted all lies within the realm of the police. The Courts does not have any power to interfere, curtailed or restrict such a power if the allegations discloses commission of a cognizable offence. Moreover, this Court in the case of Rakesh Puri and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Anr. has laid down the law that against an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. no revision or 482 Cr.P.C. application is maintainable at the instance of proposed accused. Nobody against whom allegations of commission of cognizable offences has been levelled can install registration of F.I.R. and investigation, of the offences by resorting to the extra-ordinary power under Sections 482 on revisional power 397/401 Cr.P.C. No such person can appear and say that the F.I.R. of cognizable offences against him should not be registered and the offences should not be investigated. In case of Union of India v. W.N. Chaddha 1993 SCC (Cr.) 1171 the Apex Court has held as follows:
91. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal at p. 616, this Court to which both of us (Ratnavel Pandian and K. Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.) were parties after making reference to the decision of the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 and the decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha has pointed out that the field of investigation of any cognizable offence is exclusively within the domain of the investigating agencies over which the Courts cannot have control and have no power to stifle or impinge upon the proceedings in the investigation so long as the investigation proceeds in compliance with the provisions relating to investigation....
92. More so. the accused has no right to have any say as regards the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has no participation as a matter of right during the course of the investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section 173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding the said offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the accused has no right to have participation till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of being heard under certain specified circumstances.
93. It may be noted that under Section 227 of the Code dealing with discharge of an accused in a trial before a Court of Session under Chap. XVIII, the accused is to be heard and permitted to make his submissions before the stage of framing the charge. Under Section 228 of the Code, the trial Judge has to consider not only the records of the case and documents submitted therewith but also the submissions of the accused and the prosecution made under Section 227. Similarly, under Section 239 falling under Chapter XIX dealing with the trial of warrant cases, the Magistrate may give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard and discharge the accused for the reasons to be recorded in case the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the Code dealing with framing of charge also reaffirms the consideration of the examination of an accused under Section 239 before the charge is framed.
94. Under Section 235(2), in a trial before a Court of Sessions and under Section 248(2) of the trial of warrant cases, the accused as a matter of right, is to be given an opportunity of being heard. Unlike the above provisions which we have referred to above by way of illustration, the provisions relating to the investigation under Chapter XII do not confer any right of prior notice and hearing to the accused and on the other hand they are silent in this respect.
95. It is relevant and significant to note that a police officer, in charge of a police station, or a police officer making an investigation can make and search or cause search to be made for the reasons to be recorded without any warrant from the Court or without giving the prior notice to any one or any opportunity of being heard. The basic objective of such a course is to present secrecy in the mode of investigation lest the valuable evidence to be unearthed will be either destroyed or lost. We think it unnecessary to make a detailed examination on this aspect except saying that an accused cannot claim any right of prior notice or opportunity of being heard inclusive of his arrest or search of his residence or Seizure of any property in his possession connected with the crime unless otherwise provided under the law.
96. True, there are certain rights conferred on an accused to be enjoyed at certain stages under the Code of Criminal Procedure such as Section 50 whereunder the person arrested is to be informed of the grounds of his arrest and of his right of bail and under Section 57 dealing with person arrested not to be detained for more than 24 hours and under Section 167 dealing with the procedure if the investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours which are all in conformity with the 'Right to Life' and 'Personal Liberty' enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution and the valuable safeguards ingrained in Article 22 of the Constitution for the protection of an arrestee or detenu in certain cases. But so long as the investigating agency proceeds with his action or investigation in strict compliance with the statutory provisions relating to arrest or investigation of a crimnal case and according to the procedure established by law, no one can make any legitimate grievance to stifle or to impinge upon the proceedings of arrest or detention during investigation as the case may be. in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
98. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to be given to an accused in every criminal case before taking any action against him, such a procedure would frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice and make the provisions of law relating to the investigation as lifeless, absurd and self-defeating. Further, the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the procedure of investigation does not attract such a course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the contrary.
(Emphasis supplied and mine)
8. In the above view of the matter, the Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar transgressed flagrantly and blatantly the power conferred on him under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and passed a wholly illegal order by directing the police not to arrest the accused who were alleged to have committed offences of such a magnitude as the murder of a young boy and disappearance of evidence of his murder.
9. The impugned order of Lower Revisional Court is also illegal because the Sessions Judge entered into the realm of critically appreciating the facts of offences alleged which he could not have done at all under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the law as laid down by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), Janta Dal (supra). Recently in the case of Tanpa Kumar Singh (supra) the Apex Court has held:
20. It is well settled that a First Information Report is not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report about the commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first informant need not necessarily be an eye-witness so as to be able to disclose in great details all aspects of the offence committed. What is of significance is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basis of the information given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons to suspect on the basis of information received, that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound to record the information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a complete investigation that he may be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish all the details, he must find out those details in the course of investigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The information given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the information furnished provides a reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the concerned police officer is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the information and proceed to investigate the case either himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation. The question as to whether the report is true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegations are all matters which are alien to the consideration of the question whether the report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the information does not give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he can.
10. The residue of the above discussion is that the impugned order cannot be sustained and has to be set aside so far as it stays the arrest of the accused. Consequently, this revision is allowed at the admission stage itself. The impugned order dated 8.11.2006 passed by Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar in Criminal Revision No. 122 of 2006 Ram Avtar and nine Ors. v. Smt. Sharda and Anr. is hereby set aside so far as it stays the arrest of the accused and the order dated 3.10.2006 passed by A.C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar in Miscellaneous Case No. 72 of 2006 is hereby restored. The police of police station concerned is directed to register and investigate the matter and it is free to arrest the accused in accordance with the law keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh ; D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. .
11. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Sessions Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar for his further guidance.