Gujarat High Court
Shantilal Shanabhai Makwana vs State Of Gujarat on 12 April, 2019
Author: G.R.Udhwani
Bench: G.R.Udhwani
C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2524 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1043 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1044 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1045 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1046 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1047 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1048 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1049 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1050 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1051 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1052 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1053 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1054 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1055 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1056 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1057 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1058 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1059 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1060 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1061 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1062 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1064 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1065 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1066 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1067 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1068 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1069 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1070 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1071 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1072 of 2017
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R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2780 of 2017
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI SD/-
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to NO
see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? NO
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the NO
judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law NO
as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any
order made thereunder ?
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KRISHNA KESHAV LABORATORIES LTD.
Versus
LEGAL HEIRS OF DIPAKBHAI J SHUKLA & 3 other(s)
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Appearance:
MR RASESH H PARIKH(3862) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR.HEMANG H PARIKH(2628) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS RITU GURU AGP ADVANCE COPY SERVED TO GOVERNMENT
PLEADER/PP(99) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT
MR PRABHAKAR UPADYAY(1060) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
NOTICE SERVED(4) for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3,4
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI
Date : 12/04/2019
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
All the captioned matters, except SCA No.2524 of 2017 and SCA No.2780 of 2017 raise the question of recovery under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act) and SCA No. 2524 of 2017 and SCA No.2780 of 2017 are instituted by the employer questioning the dismissal of the application moved by the employer under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. Since the subject matter of two petitions being SCA No.2524 of 2017 and SCA No.2780 of 2017 are different, SCA No.1043 to 1072 of 2017 are detached and shall be heard separately as a separate group.
1.1 This Court proceeds to decide SCA No. 2524 of 2017 and SCA No.2780 of 2017 together.
2. The petitioner in SCA No.2524 of 2017 and SCA No.2780 of 2017 is the employer of the respondentworkmen who are, represented by their legal representatives in SCA No.2524 of 2017.
3. From the rival submissions, it appears that the workman was proceeded against in a departmental inquiry mainly on the charge of having instigated and prevented other workmen from resuming or discharging their duties on 06/07/2008. As the facts emerging from the record would indicate, the charge also proceeded to state that Page 3 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT the respondentworkman herein claimed that the strike has been called by Gujarat Majdoor Union and on that basis, the workman allegedly prevented other workman doing their duties or resuming their duties. The workman allegedly threatened and abused those workmen who were inclined to do their duty.
3.1 It also appears that until the stage of 2 nd showcause notice, the respondentworkman did not participate in the inquiry; however representation was made in response to the 2nd showcause notice. Eventually, the petitioner passed an order of termination of the services of the workman on 29/09/2018 and sought its approval by an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act which has been declined.
3.2 It also appears that the industrial dispute being Reference (IT) No.79 of 2008 was pending to the knowledge of the petitioner with Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad in which aforementioned application under Section 33(2)(b) came to be made. It also appears that one more dispute being Reference (IT) No.156 of 2008 was registered with the same tribunal; however during the course of arguments, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had a knowledge of the fact that reference was made; but on the date of the application under Section 33(2)(b), he was not aware that Reference (IT) No.156 of 2008 was registered with the Industrial Tribunal. Learned Counsel has also placed on record the notice in the said reference dated 07/10/2008 issued to the petitioner.
Page 4 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT 3.3 Learned Counsel for the respondentworkman
however submitted that the said reference was registered on 20/09/2008 i.e. before about ten days of the date of termination i.e. 29/09/2008. He, therefore, would contend that such reference being No.156 of 2008 was pending when the application under Section 33(2)(b) in Reference (IT) No.79 of 2008. This Court will revert to the issue appropriately in the later part of this judgment.
4. The first issue deserving consideration at this stage is whether the impugned order declining the approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act warrants an interference in the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
4.1 Learned Counsel for the petitioner has pressed into service Divisional Controller Versus Sanjaykumar Shaymjibhai Parmar [2017 (0) AIJELHC 238913] to buttress the submission that the scope of Section 33(2)(b) as indicated in the said pronouncement did not warrant the Labour Court to appreciate the merits of the order of dismissal.
4.2 The legal position with regard to Section 33(2)
(b) as indicated in the aforesaid decision is that the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Courts and the tribunal or judicial forum under the ID Act, as contemplated in Sections 10, 7 or other similar provision is distinguishable from the jurisdiction under Section 33(2)
(b). This Court in Divisional Controller Versus Sanjaykumar Shaymjibhai Parmar (supra) held thus:
Page 5 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT "6. Thus, during the pendency of the specified
proceedings, the employer can act in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workman concerned with the specified dispute, and in absence of such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract between him and the workman, the employer can alter in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the service conditions applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of the specified proceedings or for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, the employer can discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise the workman concerned after paying wages for one month as also the employer can make an application to the authority before which the proceeding may be pending, for approval of the action taken by him. Thus the plain reading of subsec.(2) of Section 33 indicate that the dismissal can be effected on satisfaction of the conditions: (1) payment of wages for one month and (2) application for approval by the employer in the pending proceedings. In absence of the pendency of the proceedings as contemplated in Section 33 of the I.D. Act, it goes without saying that the employer would have the authority to take disciplinary or nondisciplinary action against its employees within the bounds of its authority without seeking the approval from the specified authority under Section 33 of the Act. Thus it is an absolute domain of the employer to deal with his employee in accordance with law, without any intervention from any court. The approval under subsec.(2) of Section 33 seems to be necessitated to safeguard the interest of the workman against unfair labour practice, victimisation or malafide action or the likes for his having raised the demand against the employer or having instituted any other proceedings under the I.D. Act raising industrial dispute. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the scope of inquiry under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act would be confined to preserving and safeguarding the interest of the workman to the above referred extent, and if the order of dismissal is found to be bonafide; backed by relevant material, interference on merits or procedural lapses during the inquiry would not be warranted, for `discipline' is absolute domain of the employer and the expression `approval' used in the provision cannot be equated with the expression `adjudication'. In an approval application, the workman cannot agitate the merits of the subject matter of approval. Thus when no adjudicatory process is involved, there is no question of entering into merits of the subject matter of approval. In fact the `industrial dispute' may be raised only on grant of approval and such a dispute may eventually be referred as an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the I.D. Act. Thus when subject matter of the approval is not an `industrial Page 6 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT dispute', there can be no adjudication of `nonexistent' industrial dispute.
7. There may not be any problem when occasion for approval arises before authorities other than judicial or quasijudicial forums, for by very nature of the proceedings before them, it is plain that they are not adjudicating authorities. The problem may arise when such occasion arises during the pendency of the proceedings before adjudicating authorities like Arbitrators, Labour Courts, Tribunals or National Tribunals. These authorities are obligated to adjudicate the disputes when they act under Section 10 read with Section 7 and other relevant provisions of I.D. Act. Problem arises when they are called upon to deal with non adjudicatory proceedings like the one under Section 33(2) of I.D. Act. It is crucial for such authorities to be mindful about the nature of jurisdiction they are called upon to exercise under such provisions rather than being swayed away by the fact that they are adjudicators; forgetting the fact that they are not to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction under Section 33(2). It must be borne in mind that discipline is absolute domain of the employer and it is only after the grant of approval that the disciplinary action would conclude rendering the option to the employee to have recourse to the machinery including Section 10 read with Section 7 of the I.D.Act for redressal of his grievance, if any. It is only at that juncture that the adjudicatory/quasiadjudicatory forums would be entitled to exercise appropriate adjudicatory jurisdiction. If this distinction between the powers under Section 33(2) and Section 10 read with Section 7 is borne in mind, it would be easier for the authorities referred to under Section 33(1) of the I.D. Act to decide the application under Section 33(2). The very nature of jurisdiction under Section 33(2) requires such authorities to presume that the employer is entitled to take disciplinary action against its erring employee. Whether the employer has erred in the matter of discipline should better be left to be adjudicated under the appropriate provisions of law as and when such occasion arises. For grant or refusal of approval, the authorities under Section 33(2) must begin with the question whether subject matter of approval is influenced by pendency of the principal industrial dispute or conciliation proceedings or is it an attempt of the employer to dissuade or discourage the workman from pursuing the remedy resorted to by him or is it bonafide action falling in the domain of employee. With such question, it must proceed to examine the relevant record already produced by employer or may require it to produce and find out whether cause for taking disciplinary action exists on the file of the employer and whether there is material in support of such a cause. If answer is in the Page 7 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT affirmative, then adequacy of such cause or adequacy of the material should not be gone into under Section 33(2). If the disciplinary action is shown to have been supported by material on record and is not found to be perverse or imprudent, there can be no reason for denial of approval on satisfaction of other relevant conditions enumerated in Section 33(2) of the I.D. Act. Having said that; the proposition of law in this regard emerging from various judicial pronouncements relied upon by the respective learned counsel may now be referred to thus:"
4.3 Various judicial pronouncements were considered by this Court in paragraph 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6.
4.4 This Court in paragraph 9 laid down test for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act thus:
"9. From the above judicial pronouncements, the test for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act can be culled out thus:
(1) Whether there existed some tangible material with the employer (its adequacy or sustainability being immaterial) justifying the action for which approval is sought under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. (2) Is that material not perverse i.e. is it prudent to say that if such material is taken at its face value, the employer is justified to take action for which approval is sought under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act.
(3) Whether the standing orders justified the order of dismissal.
(4) Whether the inquiry was held as provided in standing orders.
(5) Whether the wages for the month has been paid as required by proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act.
(6) Whether an application has been made as prescribed by the proviso.
xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx" 4.5 In the context of the said legal position, the
first question abovereferred is required to be answered.Page 8 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021
C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT 4.6 Learned Counsel for the petitioner has taken
this Court through the impugned order wherefrom it inter alia appears that by an interim order dated 19/04/2012, the departmental inquiry against the respondentworkman was not held to be illegal or unreasonable. It would also appear that for proving the perversity, oral evidence was avoided. Order of dismissal was also found to be in conformity with the condition contemplated in Section 33(2)(b) i.e. service of notice and compensation upon the workman.
4.7 In paragraph11 of the impugned order, contention on behalf of the Union was raised that permission for dismissal was required to be obtained and not the approval.
4.8 After being alive to the legal position as to Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act by adhering to several judicial pronouncements, cited before it, the Labour Court proceeded to consider the case on hand. It found that the question whether permission or approval for dismissal was concluded by order dated 20/04/2009 wherein it was held that in the facts of the present case, approval was appropriately prayed for. It was also held that the departmental proceedings against respondent employee were legal and reasonable.
4.9 The industrial tribunal took into consideration the showcause notice dated 06/07/2008 making the allegations as abovereferred against the workman. It also noted the contents of the showcause notice that the Page 9 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT workman allegedly resorted to illegal strike which had caused a loss of Rs.10.00 Lakh per day to the management. Documentary evidence as well as testimony of one Chandrakant Rane and Prabhatsing Gohil recorded in the departmental inquiry was also taken into consideration by the Labour Court wherefrom it noted that the strike was called, the workman willing to discharge their duties were prevented from doing so. Witnesses also referred to the public notice by Management labelling the strike as illegal; the registration of the FIR by the management in connection with the instigation by the respondentworkman to prevent the workman willing to do their job was also noted.
4.10 After noting the relevant facts as above, the Labour Court after referring to the documentary as well as oral evidence could not find the evidence as to raising of slogans, abuses, intimidation from the evidence of the two witnesses in relation to the illegal strike against the workman. It was noticed that none of the workman charged under the departmental inquiry was named by the two witnesses. It was held that there must be an evidence in support of the charge. It was also found that despite lack of evidence against the workman, the case in departmental inquiry was held to be proved against them.
4.11 Thus, the aforesaid discussion would indicate that, in the opinion of the Labour Court, the workmen were not named by the two witnesses examined in the departmental inquiry and the factum of their involvement Page 10 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT in the misconduct charged against them could not be established by the petitioner. In other words, the case against the workman was based upon no evidence.
4.12 Learned Counsel for the petitioner would press into service the 2nd showcause notice, reply thereto and the FIR abovementioned to buttress the submission that misconduct against the workmanrespondent was proved.
4.13. This Court is unable to agree with such submission for the simple reason that the said documents contains one sided statement, which cannot be considered as gospel truth; more particularly; when the petitioner's own witnesses in the departmental inquiry could not name the respondentworkmen as the culprits. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the findings in the departmental inquiry against the respondentworkmen were perverse which is one of the germane considerations for declining the approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act.
5. It was also argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that once having come to the conclusion that the departmental inquiry was legal by interim order abovestated, the issue could not have been revisited as the principles of resjudicata would bar it. Reliance is placed on Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Anr. [AIR 1960 SC 941]. In the said case, it was thus held in paragraph 7 and 8:
"7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and Page 11 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT future litigation. When a matterwhether on a question of fact or on a question of lawhas been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where s.11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.
8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court, whether the trial court or a higher court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the litigation a court has decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again ?"
5.1 No doubt, issues raised and determined and the issue which ought to have been raised would constitute res judicata. Having considered the said proposition, this Court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, it would not apply, since it appears that the question of perversity was not raised and determined by interimorder. Perversity is an issue which could be decided only by final order as it would involve consideration of material in its entirety. Moreover, the gist of the interim order was that it was in compliance with three fold conditions contemplated in Section 33(2)
(b). Still there remained the scope of considering the case on the points pointed out by this Court in paragraph 9 which is quoted herein above.
Page 12 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT 6. There is one more facet of the case which requires consideration. As indicated above, Reference (IT) No.156 of 2008 was filed seeking salary by the
workman upto the date the lockout was prohibited under Section 10(3) of the ID Act. While agreeing with the submissions made by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the subject was a salary for the aforesaid period in the said reference, the matter would not rest there. In view of the clear language of Section 33(1)(a) and (b) of the ID Act, pendency of the proceedings before Conciliation Officer or Board or Arbitrator or Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal; of an industrial dispute, would bar the actions contemplated in clauses
(a) and (b) respectively of subsection(1) and (2) of Section 33 in absence of the express written permission / approval of the authority where the industrial dispute may be pending.
6.1 The question is whether the misconduct in question was connected with the pending dispute. There is no denial to the fact that the dispute was in relation to the same act i.e. the act of the respondent-workman on 06/07/2008. As is evident from the impugned order, the Management treated the said act as illegal strike and the respondentworkman treated the same as illegal lockout. Orders were passed under Section 10(3) prohibiting the illegal lockout. The workman was proceeded against for the very same act and eventually the dismissal order was passed. Since the lockout was prohibited as above, he had the cause to claim the salary until the date of prohibitory order. Merely because the salary was prayed, Page 13 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT it would not mean that charge made against the workman was not connected with the pending dispute. In the opinion of this Court, if the source of two disputes is the same, the inevitable conclusion would be that for action under clause (a) and (b) of Section 33(1), the management would be obliged to seek the permission in writing from the judicial forum under Section 33(1) of the ID Act. Since action of the management was not bona fide, the approval under Section 33(2)(b) was rightly denied by the industrial tribunal.
6.2 As indicated above, it appears that dismissal of the workman was ordered after registration of Reference (IT) No.156 of 2008; may be that notice was issued to the management later on; however the requirement of Section 33(1)(a) i.e. the pendency of the dispute is fulfilled, the actions under clause (a) and
(b) under section 33(1) and under clause (a) and (b) of Section 33(2) would be barred; except where permission or as the case may be, the approval is obtained. Thus, as indicated above, the action against the workman by the management was in respect of the misconduct which was connected with the pending dispute and therefore, in the opinion of this Court, in the facts of the present case, Section 33(1)(b) would apply and in absence of necessary permission, dismissal of the workman would not be sustainable. Therefore, even if this Court were to hold that the approval under Section 33(2)(b) was wrongly denied to the petitioner, it would be of no consequence in absence of the permission contemplated under Section 33(1)(b) of the ID ACT.
Page 14 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT 6.3 The said finding of the tribunal was in context
of the subject matter of Reference IT No.79 of 2008; which was not connected with the action of the management which arose out of general demands and had nothing to do with the departmental proceedings against the workman. That being factual position, the tribunal was justified in holding that the application for approval was validly filed under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. In contrast, Reference IT No.156 of 2008; though was concerned with the workman's entitlement to the salary until the prohibitory orders against the lockout; it did touch the action of the management who treated the act of the workman as strike; whereas workman defended the very same act as the lockout by the management. The decision in the Reference IT No.156 of 2008 thus rested on the determination of the question whether there was a strike or lockout. In the departmental inquiry, the workman was proceeded against with charge of he having resorted to illegal strike and having prevented the willing workmen to discharge their duties.
6.4 The legal necessity of permission/prior sanction on one hand and the mere approval of the action already taken on the other hand has different connotations under Section 33 of the ID Act. The question determined in relation to the subject under consideration under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, in the opinion of this Court, would not amount to resjudicata vizaviz; issue arising for consideration under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act. Under any case, in absence of determination of the Page 15 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT application under Section 33(1)(b), the exercise under Section 33(2)(b) on the same subject would be futile; inasmuch as, if the prior sanction or permission by law before the action by the management on the subject matter involved in Section 33(1)(b) is contemplated, the question of mere approval under Section 33(2)(b) would not arise. The Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would not ignore the above said fact situation emerging from the record merely because the tribunal has held that the permission under Section 33(1)(b) was not required. Therefore, submission that in absence of the challenge by the respondentworkman to the interim order holding that approval application was validly filed and application for permission was not necessitated in the facts of the case, cannot be accepted.
7. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the industrial tribunal did not act contrary to the ratio in Divisional Controller Versus Sanjaykumar Shaymjibhai Parmar (supra). No substance is found in the aforestated two petitions. Both these petitions must fail and are accordingly dismissed.
8. It is stated that during the pendency of these petitions, negotiations were held for settlement; pursuant to which a sum of Rs.47,59,961/ has been deposited; but subsequently, on the workmen taking objection to the factum of settlement, order recording settlement was recalled. Since the order was recalled, the amount for the said purpose would also revert back to Page 16 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021 C/SCA/2524/2017 JUDGMENT the petitioner. Therefore, submission by learned Counsel for the respondentworkmen that the said amount should be adjusted towards the dues of the workmen cannot be accepted. Accordingly, the above said amount is ordered to be refunded to the employerpetitioner in these two petitions, within a week.
(G.R.UDHWANI, J) sompura Page 17 of 17 Downloaded on : Sat Jan 23 06:14:14 IST 2021