Jharkhand High Court
The State Bank Of India vs Kamal Kishore Singh on 25 February, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:5555-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.293 of 2024
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The State Bank of India, having its registered office at Bombay, one
of its local head office at Patna and one of its branches, Kathara
Branch, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal, District-Bokaro (Jharkhand),
represented through the Chief Manager, Kathara Branch, Kathara
... ... Appellant
Versus
1. Kamal Kishore Singh, S/o Rajendra Prasad Singh, R/o Morabadi
New Area, Anand Parivesh, P.O.-Morabadi, P.S.-Lalpur, District-
Ranchi
2. Arbin Kumar Mishra, S/o Jagadish Mishra, R/o At & P.O.-Dumran
Chowk Bazar, P.S.-Dumran, District-Bhojpur (Bihar)
3. C.K. Mishra, S/o Jagdish Mishra, R/o At & P.O.-Dumran Chowk
Bazar, P.S.-Dumran, District-Bhojpur (Bihar)
4. Tarun Kumar Singh, S/o Sri R.P. Singh, R/o At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-
Bokaro Thermal, District-Bokaro
5. Shashi Bhusan Singh, S/o Late Rama Ballah Singh, R/o At & P.O.-
Baranappa, P.S.-Muffasi, District-Hazaribag, Area Sales Officer,
Office of the General Manager, C.C.L., R/o Dhori Area, P.O. & P.S.-
Bermo, District-Bokaro
6. Lalit Narayan Dubey, Assistant District Supply Officer, Tenughat,
Bokaro
7. Chandra Deo Ram, S/o Ram Swaroop Ram, R/o At & P.O.-New Road
Barhiya, P.S. & District-Munger, the then Accountant, State Bank of
India, Kathara Branch
8. M/s Shakti Traders, a Partnership Firm consisting Defendant Nos. 1,
3 & 4 as partners At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal, District-
Bokaro
9. M/s Shiv Shati Coal Agency consisting defendant Nos. 1, 3 & 4 as
partners, situated at & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal, District-
Bokaro
10. Uma Nath Singh, R/o At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal,
District-Bokaro
11. Shailendra Kumar Choudhary, R/o At & P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro
Thermal, District-Bokaro
12. Central Coalfields Ltd, a subsidiary to Coal India Ltd, Government of
India undertaking having its registered office at Darbhanga House,
Ranchi and one of its office at the office of General Manager, Central
Coalfields Ltd., Kathara Area, P.O.-Kathara, P.S.-Bokaro Thermal,
District-Bokaro .... ... Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Appellant : Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Manindra Kumar Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Manoj Prasad, Advocate
Mr. Lalan Kumar Singh
Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay, Advocate
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Reserved on 11.02.2026 Pronounced on 25.02.2026
Per : Rajesh Shankar, J. :
1. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order dated 15.03.2024 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in C.M.P No. 65 of 2021 whereby the said C.M.P. has been dismissed by rejecting the prayer of the petitioner/appellant for restoration of First Appeal No. 121 of 2018 to its original file.
2. The office has raised objection with respect to the maintainability of the present appeal by referring to the order dated 23.11.2010 passed in L.P.A No. 57 of 2009 wherein a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by referring to Section 100-A of CPC, has held that Letters Patent Appeal cannot be entertained if the Single Judge of this court has already exercised his jurisdiction by passing an order.
3. The notices were earlier issued to the respondents in pursuance of which few of them have appeared in this case also raising the issue of maintainability of the present appeal.
4. The factual background of the case is as under: -
(i) The appellant had filed Money Suit No. 02/1993 for recovery of Rs. 1,79,47,752.81 with interest thereon @ 21.75%, however the claim of the appellant was rejected vide judgment dated 05.01.2018 and decree dated 17.01.2018 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) 1st, Bermo at Tenughat.
(ii) Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed first appeal being F.A. No. 121 of 2018 and vide order dated 24.06.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this 2 2026:JHHC:5555-DB court, the appellant was directed to file requisites for service of notices upon the respondent nos. 2 to 11 by registered post with A/D as well as under ordinary process within four weeks, failing which, the First Appeal was to be dismissed without further reference to the Bench.
(iii) The Appellant failed to comply the said direction of the learned Single Judge and consequently, the first appeal was dismissed on 22.07.2020 for non-
compliance of the Court's order dated 24.06.2020.
(iv) The appellant subsequently filed Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 65 of 2021 for restoration of F.A No. 121 of 2018 to its original file claiming that due to poor network during virtual hearing, the counsel for the petitioner/appellant could not clearly hear that a peremptory order was passed by the Single Judge as a result of which the requisites etc. could not be filed.
(v) The said Civil Miscellaneous Petition was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this court vide order dated 15.03.2024 observing inter-alia that even if the learned counsel for the petitioner could not clearly hear the Court's order, it was always expected that he would obtain a copy of the order and take necessary steps in the matter.
(vi) Hence, the present appeal.
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5. The learned counsel for the appellant has given much emphasis to the argument that the first appeal filed by the appellant was never heard by the learned Single Judge of this court, rather the same was dismissed for default. As such, the statutory bar imposed by Section 100-A CPC against filing of appeal before the Division Bench challenging the order passed by the Single Judge, would not be applicable in the case in hand.
6. It is further argued that though Section 100-A CPC bars filing of Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench against the judgment and decree passed by the Single Judge, it does not bar filing of Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the Single Judge rejecting a petition filed for restoration of first appeal. As such the present appeal is maintainable before this court.
7. Under the aforesaid factual matrix, the following issues fall for consideration of this Court:-
(i) Whether section 100-A CPC imposes bar on filing of Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court against the order passed by the Single Judge dismissing the first appeal for default?
(ii) Whether Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court against the order passed in Civil Miscellaneous Petition filed for restoration of first appeal which was dismissed for default by the Single Judge?
8. Originally, the CPC did not expressly bar a second appeal or an appeal to the Division Bench in the nature of Letters Patent Appeal against the 4 2026:JHHC:5555-DB judgment passed by the Single Judge.
9. Section 100-A was introduced for the first time by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (104 of 1976). The said section initially reads as follows: -
"100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment, decision or order of such Single Judge in such appeal or from any decree passed in such appeal."
10. Subsequently, Section 100-A of CPC was introduced in the present form by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002 (effective from July 1, 2002) by substituting the earlier Section 100-A of CPC. The amended Section reads as follows: -
"100-A. No further appeal in certain cases.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge."
11. Thus, Section 100-A CPC amended w.e.f. 01.07.2002 provides that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, the further appeal i.e., the Letters Patent Appeal is barred against the judgment and decree of the Single Judge. The said Section starts with non-obstante clause i.e., "Notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent" and thus section 100-A overrides the power of High Courts to hear Letters Patent Appeals in such eventuality.
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12. In the case of D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in (1988) 3 SCC 26, it has been held that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not, will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration.
13. We have perused the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. Union of India reported in (2003) 1 SCC 49 wherein the legal validity of Section 100-A CPC has been upheld by holding inter-alia that the said Section has been introduced to minimize unnecessary workload on a Division Bench of the High Court and the said provision does not cause any prejudice to the litigants.
14. In the case of Mohd. Saud & Another Vs. Dr. (Maj.) Sk. Mahfooz & Others reported in (2010) 13 SCC 517, an interim order passed by the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court No. III, Bhubaneshwar in Civil Suit No. 498 of 2004 was challenged in first appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC which was decided by the Single Judge of Orissa High Court vide judgement dated 06.08.2008 and thereafter Letters Patent Appeal was filed before the Division Bench challenging the said judgment. The Full Bench of Orissa High Court dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal being not maintainable.
In the appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the claim of the appellant was that Section 100-A CPC as substituted in the year 2002, only bars an LPA against a judgment of the learned Single Judge which contains a decree and since the judgment of the Single Judge passed in first appeal did not accompany a decree, the LPA was not barred 6 2026:JHHC:5555-DB against the said judgment. Their Lordships rejected the said contention of the appellant by observing that there seems to be some apparent contradiction in Section 100-A as amended in the year 2002. While in the first part of the said section it is stated "where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court", in the following part it is stated "no further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge". Thus, while the first part of section 100-A refers to an order which would include even an interlocutory order, the latter part of the section mentions judgment and decree.
It has been further held that a purposive interpretation is needed to resolve the said conflict. The entire purpose of introducing Section 100-A was to reduce the number of appeals as the litigants at large were being harassed by the numerous appeals provided in the statute. If a purposive construction is not made, the resultant will be that against an interlocutory order of the District Judge, there may be two appeals, first to the learned Single Judge and then to the Division Bench of the High Court, but against a final judgment of the District Judge, there can be only one appeal. This situation would be strange and against the very object of Section 100-A, i.e., to curtail the number of appeals. It has further been held that the apparent contradiction in Section 100-A as amended in the year 2002, is only due to improper drafting and for clarity, the very purpose of Section 100-A is to be understood.
15. It is trite law that literal interpretation is given to a statute where the words mentioned in it are clear, unambiguous and lead no absurdity. 7
2026:JHHC:5555-DB Previously, the literal interpretation was treated as golden rule of interpreting a statute. Nowadays, the rule of purposive construction is predominant and the courts are frequently using it where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity to achieve the purpose of enactment of a statute. Purposive interpretation is a pragmatic legal approach adopted by the Courts to interpret any statute by focusing on the underlying purpose, object, and intent behind the legislation, rather than just its strict literal wording. It seeks to actually fulfill the legislature's intent.
16. In the case of Hameedia Hardware Stores represented by its partner S. Peer Mohammed Vs. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar reported in (1988) 2 SCC 513, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the court while construing a provision should not easily read into its words which have not been expressly enacted, but should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful having regard to the context in which a provision is introduced in the statute.
17. In the case of Anwar Hasan Khan Vs. Mohd. Shafi & Others reported in (2001) 8 SCC 540, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -
"8. It is settled that for interpreting a particular provision of an Act, the import and effect of the meaning of the words and phrases used in the statute have to be gathered from the text, the nature of the subject-matter and the purpose and intention of the statute. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved. The 8 2026:JHHC:5555-DB well-known principle of harmonious construction is that effect should be given to all the provisions and a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "dead letter" is not harmonious construction. With respect to law relating to interpretation of statutes this Court in Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama [(1990) 1 SCC 277] held: (SCC p. 284, para 16)
16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. 'Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged' as Mr Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Towne v. Eisner [245 US 418, 425 (1918)] ) Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said:
'Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.' (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage [218 FR 547, 553])"
18. In the case of Shailesh Dhairyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla reported in (2016) 3 SCC 619, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -
31. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother, would clearly demonstrate that the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of"purposive interpretation" or "purposive construction" is based on the understanding that the court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the "purpose" behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharon Barak puts it:
Purposive interpretation is based on three
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components: language, purpose, and discretion.
Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language." [Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press, 2005).]
32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose and discretion "of the court", insofar as purposive component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to actualise. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfil.
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though the literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the "golden rule", it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as well."
19. In the case of Newtech Promoters & Developers Private Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others reported in (2021) 18 SCC 1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus: -
139. It is settled principle of law that if the plain interpretation does not fulfil the mandate and object of the Act, this Court has to interpret the law in consonance with the spirit and purpose of the statute. There is indeed a visible inconsistency in the powers of the Authority regarding refund of the amount received by the promoter 10 2026:JHHC:5555-DB and the provision of law in Section 18 and the text of the provision by which such refund can be referred under Section 40(1). While harmonising the construction of the scheme of the Act with the right of recovery as mandated in Section 40(1) of the Act keeping in mind the intention of the legislature to provide for a speedy recovery of the amount invested by the allottee along with the interest incurred thereon is self-explanatory. However, if Section 40(1) is strictly construed and it is understood to mean that only penalty and interest on the principal amount are recoverable as arrears of land revenue, it would defeat the basic purpose of the Act.
20. Section 100-A of CPC has been introduced to streamline the appellate remedy making it more efficient and less burdensome on the higher adjudicatory forums. The intention of the legislature in introducing the said section is to limit the number of appeals so as to avoid prolonged litigations as well as to reduce judicial backlogs. The principle of finality in judicial proceedings is a cornerstone of procedural law, aiming to prevent indefinite litigation and to ensure certainty in legal outcomes.
21. If the words "heard and decided" as appear in section 100-A of CPC is given a literal interpretation as has been contended by the learned counsel of the appellant, an LPA can be said to be maintainable against the orders passed by a Single Judge of a High Court where an appeal has been dismissed for any reason other than on merit and only in those cases of first appeal where a judgment has been passed after hearing the parties, the LPA would be barred before the Division Bench. This will give rise to the same anomalous situation as discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Saud (supra).
22. Thus, the literal interpretation of the words "heard and decided" will not serve the object sought to be achieved by the introducing legislature in Section 100-A of CPC vide 2002 amendment. Therefore, 11 2026:JHHC:5555-DB the said provision has to be given harmonious/purposive construction.
23. We are of the considered view that the words "heard and decided" as appear in section 100-A of CPC should not to be construed in isolation, rather Section 100-A should be construed in its entirety to achieve the real and meaningful purpose of the said section.
24. In the case of Metro Tyres Ltd. & Others Vs. Satpal Singh Bhandari & Others reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3681, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court had an occasion to deal with a similar matter. In the said case, the Additional District Judge had rejected the application for restoration of suit on the ground that the same had abated due to not bringing on record the legal representative of some of the defendants. The First appeal filed by the appellant of that case before the Single Bench of the High Court was dismissed for default as well as the application filed for restoration of the first appeal was also dismissed. Thereafter, the appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent was filed before the Division Bench, which was held not maintainable observing that the words 'heard and decided' as appear in Section 100A of CPC had to be interpreted keeping in view the context itself as well as that the said Section was amended with effect from 1st July, 2002 to take away the further appeal from a decree or an order and the fundamental purpose of introducing the same was to minimize the sphere of appeals.
25. The Delhi High Court went on to observe that if the appellants' contention is accepted, it may give rise to a situation where a litigant prefers an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 and allows it to dismiss for default or shows total callousness in getting it dismissed for want of 12 2026:JHHC:5555-DB prosecution and thereafter files an application for restoration at his own leisure and being unsuccessful prefers a Letters Patent Appeal contending that it is maintainable. Thus, this interpretation will amount to giving a premium to an unscrupulous or negligent litigant. The courts are required to interprete a provision which would subserve the purpose of the legislative intent unless the same brings in a situation of an irreconcilability or absurdity.
26. A Full Bench of this Court also in the case of Satya Narayan Agiwal and Bishwanath Agiwal Vs. State Bank of India & Others reported in 2005 SCC OnLine Jhar. 228 has held that on plain reading of the provisions of Section 100-A of the CPC, it is evident that the legislative intent in introducing the said provision was to minimize the delay in the finality of a decision by excluding the right to prefer a Second Appeal in the High Court from an order of the Single Judge passed in an appeal from an original or appellate decree.
27. In the case of Mrs. Indira Vishwa Mohini Mishra Vs. Smt. Kiran Devi & Others reported in 2014 SCC OnLine Jhar 229, a Division Bench of this court has held that the words 'no further appeal shall lie' appearing in Section 100-A of C.P.C. is of great significance and the same clearly indicate that no further appeal shall be entertained, if an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court.
28. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Delhi High Court particularly considering the observations made by the Full Bench and the Co-ordinate Bench of this court as cited hereinabove.
29. Furthermore, on perusal of the record, it would be evident that the 13 2026:JHHC:5555-DB appellant was accorded ample opportunity to file requisites for issuance of notices upon some of the respondents, however it failed to comply the said order. If a party who given a proper, fair and sufficient opportunity, chooses not to respond, cannot subsequently contend that he was not appropriately heard. It may thus be construed that an "opportunity of hearing provided" is to be treated in consonance with the word "heard" mentioned in Section 100-A of 2002 amendment. Thus, the appellant cannot claim that it was not heard before deciding the first appeal leading to its dismissal for any reason whatsoever.
30. Thus, we are of the considered view that Section 100-A of CPC also imposes a bar in filing of Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court against the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the first appeal for default.
31. The first issue is decided accordingly.
32. So far as the second issue is concerned, we are of the view that since LPA is not maintainable against the judgment and order of the Single Judge of the High Court passed in first appeal, the same will also not be maintainable against the order passed by the Single Judge rejecting an application seeking restoration of the first appeal to its original file.
33. We also wish to observe here that if the present LPA is held maintainable, it may lead to a situation where an unscrupulous litigant will deliberately try to linger the first appeal by letting it dismissed for default, then will file restoration and on its rejection, will file LPA. Any other interpretation of section 100-A would frustrate the intent of the legislature in introducing it resulting in multiplicity of the proceedings before the courts, whereas the purposive interpretation will be in 14 2026:JHHC:5555-DB conformity with the legislative mandate aimed at achieving finality in litigation and avoiding multiple tiers of intra-court scrutiny.
34. Since Section 100-A of CPC bars filing of the Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of this Court challenging any judgment or order passed by the Single Judge, the present appeal filed in the form of LPA or even against the order passed by the Single Judge rejecting the application seeking restoration of first appeal dismissed for default, is held to be not maintainable.
35. The second issue is also decided in above terms.
36. The present appeal is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable.
37. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Rajesh Shankar, J.) 25th February, 2026 Vikas/A.F.R. Uploaded on 25.02.2026 15