Mahesh Nagar vs Uoi And Ors on 22 December, 2022

[Cites 48, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Mahesh Nagar vs Uoi And Ors on 22 December, 2022

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018

M/s Sky Light Hospitality LLP, 268 Sukhdev Vihar, New Delhi-
110025 Through Authorized Representative Amit Mehta S/o
Shatrudhan Mehta Age 36 Yrs
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The Union Of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of
Finance, Govt Of India, 3rd Floor, Jeevandeep Building,
Sansad Marg, New Delhi.
2. Enforcement Directorate, Ministry Of Finance, Govt Of
India, Having Its Zonal Office At Second Floor, Jeevan
Nidhi-II, LIC Building Bhawani Singh Road, Jaipur
302005.
3. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Ministry of
Finance, Govt. of India, having its Zonal Office at Second
Floor, Jeevan Nidhi-ii, LIC building, Bhawani Singh Road,
Jaipur-302005.
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018
Mahesh Nagar S/o Shri B.s Nagar, aged about 48 years, R/o 457,
Sector 17, Faridabad, Haryana- 121002
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India Through, Secretary, Ministry Of Finance,
Government Of India, 3rd Floor, Jeevandeep Building,
Sansadmarg, New Delhi.
2. Enforcement Directorate, Government Of India, Having
Its Zonal Office At Second Floor, Jeevannidhi-II, LIC
Building, Bhawani Singh Road, Jaipur-302005
3. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Government
Of India, Having Its Zonal Office At Second Floor,
Jeevannidhi-II, LIC Building, Bhawani Singh Road, Jaipur-
302005
----Respondents

For Petitioners : Mr. KTS Tulsi, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Faraz Khan, Mr. MS Husain, Mr.
Anup Kumar Pandey & Mr. Farman
Bilal Rayeeni on VC
Mr. Vikas Balia, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Abhishek Mehta.

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Dr. Shamsuddin on VC
Mr. S.Tabrez on VC
For Respondents : Mr. RD Rastogi, Sr. Adv. & Addl.
Solicitor General of India assisted by
Mr. Akshay Bhardwaj,
Mr. B.P. Bohra, Sr. CGS.
Mr. Pukhraj Servi and Mr. Pooshan

HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

Judgment

REPORTABLE

Reserved on 21/12/2022
Pronounced on 22/12/2022

1. These Criminal Writ Petitions have been preferred

claiming the following reliefs:-

In S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018:-

"In the facts and circumstances stated
hereinabove, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed
that this criminal writ petition may kindly be allowed
and by an appropriate, writ, order or direction:-

a. the respondents may kindly be directed to place on
record the ECIR No. JPZO/09/2015 and the same may
be ordered to be quashed in so far as it relates to the
petitioner, its partners and its employees with all
consequential directions;

b. all proceedings initiated by the respondents
consequent upon the registration of ECIR against the
petitioner, its partners and its employees may kindly
be quashed;

c. any other appropriate order or direction which this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in
favour of the petitioner.

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d. costs of the writ petition may kindly be passed n
favour of the petitioner."

In S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018:-

"In the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove, it
is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be
graciously pleased to-

a. issue appropriate writ quashing the ECIRs and all
incidental proceedings initiated thereto;

b. issue orders that no coercive action is taken by the
Respondents against the Petitioner till final disposal of
this Writ Petition; and

c. issue orders or directions for any other appropriate
relief in favour of the Petitioner which this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case."

2. At the outset, a preliminary objection was taken on

behalf of the petitioners that since review petitions as against the

judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay

Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. v. Union Of India and Ors.

Special Leave Petition (Criminal No. 4634/2014) decided on

27.07.2022, therefore in view of the present controversy being

akin to the one therein, no adjudication ought to be made by the

High Court, at this stage.

3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by

Mr.K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Faraz Khan,

Mr. MS Husain, Mr. Anup Kumar Pandey & Mr. Farman Bilal Rayeeni

on VC; Dr. Shamshuddin on VC & Mr. S.Tabrez on VC, appearing

on behalf of petitioner-M/s. Sky Light Hospitality LLP (in short,

'Sky Light'); Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel assisted by

Mr. Abhishek Mehta, appearing on behalf of petitioner-Mahesh

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Nagar, are that in the year 2007, land admeasuring 31.61

hectares (125 Bigha) situated in Village Gajner, Tehsil Kolayat,

Bikaner was allotted to one Natha Ram (12.65 hectares i.e. 50

bighas) s/o Kesha Ram and Hari Ram (18.96 hectares i.e. 75

bighas) s/o Luna Ram, whereafter on 19.11.2007, Natha Ram sold

his portion of land to one Mr. Rajendra Kumar Swami s/o Gopal

Das Swami; mutation No.120 was duly recorded in regard to such

sale. Hari Ram acting through Power of Attorney (in short, 'POA'),

namely, Gugangar, sold his portion of land to one Mr. Kishore

Singh.

3.1 On 04.01.2010, Rajendra Kumar and Kishore Singh,

acting through their POA, namely, Ashok Kumar sold the

aforementioned lands to petitioner-Sky Light, acting through his

authorized representative, namely, petitioner-Mahesh Nagar.

3.2 On the same date i.e. 04.01.2010, land admeasuring

37.94 hectares was purchased by petitioner-Sky Light from Satish

Goel, Baburam Goel, Ghanshyam Bansal, Rajendra Prasad Agarwal

and Kailash Agarwal, for a consideration of Rs.42,00,000/-.

3.3 On 23.01.2012, petitioner-Sky Light sold the above-

mentioned lands, admeasuring 31.61 hectares (12.65 + 18.96)

and 37.94 hectares to M/s. Allegeny Finlease Private Limited for a

consideration of Rs.2,81,13,540/-.

3.4 On 08.08.2014, the Colonization Commissioner

informed the concerned Collector regarding certain forged pattas

upon the basis of which, the aforementioned lands were allotted,

and thus, suggested cancellation of the concerned mutation

entries in the revenue record(s).

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3.5 In the aforesaid factual backdrop, four FIRs bearing

Nos.104, 106, 114 & 115, of 2014, came to be registered at Police

Station, Gajner, Tehsil Kolayat, Bikaner, for the offences under

Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B of the Indian Penal Code

(IPC) against the original allottees of the lands in question.

3.6 On 03.02.2015, civil suits were instituted by petitioner-

Sky Light against the persons from whom it purchased the lands

in question.

3.7 On 04.08.2015, after investigation, charge-sheets were

filed by the concerned police authorities, in relation to the

aforementioned FIRs.

3.8 On 17.09.2015, Enforcement Case Information Report

(for short 'ECIR') No.JPZO/09/2015 was recorded by the

respondent-Enforcement Directorate.

3.9 On 15.06.2016, summons was issued to Mahesh Nagar,

to appear before the Enforcement Directorate. Again, fresh

summons bearing dates 28.06.2016, 14.07.2016, 26.07.2016,

18.08.2016, 30.08.2016, 29.09.2016 were issued to him, for the

same.

3.10 Similarly, on 15.06.2016, summons was issued to

petitioner-Sky Light, directing its authorized representative(s) to

appear before the Enforcement Directorate along with certain

documents. Again, fresh summons bearing dates 28.06.2016,

14.07.2016, 26.07.2016, 25.08.2016, 29.09.2016 and

27.10.2016, were issued to the petitioner-Sky Light, for the same.

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3.11 As a consequence of the same, Mahesh Nagar preferred

S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 72/2016 and Sky Light preferred

S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 73/2016 before this Hon'ble Court.

3.11.1 On 26.10.2016, the proceedings, under the Prevention

of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short, 'PML Act'), as initiated

against the petitioners, were stayed by this Hon'ble Court and on

16.12.2016, the petitioners were directed to appear before the

Enforcement Directorate.

3.12 On 27.03.2017, the above-mentioned writ petitions

were disposed of by the Hon'ble Court, with the direction to the

respondents to decide the objections of the petitioner-Sky Light,

regarding the issue of jurisdiction, in regard to the proceedings in

question. And, the objections so raised by the petitioners, came to

be rejected by the respondents vide letter dated 02.06.2017.

3.13 On 20.08.2017 & 24.08.2017, the investigations in

question were transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation

(for short 'CBI').

3.14 Petitioner-Mahesh Nagar preferred the instant S.B.

Criminal Writ Petition No.18/2018, and on 21.02.2018, this

Hon'ble Court directed that no coercive action shall be taken

against the said petitioner.

3.15 On 13.11.2018, partner of the petitioner-Sky Light,

namely, Robert Vadra was summoned by the Enforcement

Directorate alongwith certain documents. Again on 26.11.2018 &

07.12.2018, summons were issued afresh to Robert Vadra, for the

same.

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3.16 The petitioner-Sky Light filed the instant S.B. Criminal

Writ Petition No. 462/2018 before this Hon'ble Court, challenging

the issuance of summons by the Enforcement Directorate and on

19.12.2018, this Hon'ble Court directed that no coercive action

shall be taken against the said petitioner.

4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-

Sky Light made his submissions on the following grounds;

4.1 Neither the petitioner-Sky Light, nor any of its

partners/employees were named in any of the impugned FIRs, nor

were they named in the charge-sheets so filed, either as accused

or witnesses, nor were they named in the supplementary charge-

sheets, so filed in FIR Nos.114/2014 & 115/2014.

4.1.1 That the petitioners have not been accused of offences

of money laundering under Sections 3/4, nor have they been

accused of a predicate/scheduled offence as under the PML Act.

4.1.2 That after thorough investigation by the concerned

police authorities of the State, nothing emerged against the

present petitioners. And thereafter, the investigation was

transferred to the CBI; after due investigation into the matter at

hand, the CBI also did not find any material against the

petitioners.

4.1.3 In this regard, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance

upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. (supra), and drew

the attention of this Court to Paragraph 33 of the said judgment.

For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:-

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"33. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived
or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence can be regarded as
proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot
resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an
assumption that the property recovered by them must be
proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been
committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional
police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the
competent forum. For, the expression "derived or obtained" is
indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence
already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in
the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally
absolved by a Court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order
of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case
(scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for
money-laundering against such a person or person claiming
through him in relation to the property linked to the stated
scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced
on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular
Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would
be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express
language of definition clause "proceeds of crime", as it obtains as
of now."

(emphasis supplied)

4.1.4 Learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance on the

judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High

Court of Delhi in the case of Harish Fabiani & Ors. v.

Enforcement Directorate & Ors. (W.P.(CRL) 408/2022,

along with other connected matters) decided on 26.09.2022,

and drew the attention of this Court to Paragraphs 3, 16, 17 and

24 of the said judgment.

For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced as hereunder:-

"3. The immediate concern of the petitioners relates to
prayers in the nature of para 1 (ii) - (vi), whereby the

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petitioners are concerned about the continuation of
proceedings in relation to the ECIR No. ECIR/07/HIU/2021
("the said ECIR") issued by the Directorate of Enforcement
("ED") despite the predicate offence registered under FIR
No. 129/2021 ("the said FIR") having been quashed by the
judgment dated 4th May, 2022 of the High Court of
Bombay. The petitioners pray for issue of a writ of certiorari
setting aside summons issued by the ED to various
petitioners in respect of the said ECIR, the Look Out Circular
("LOC") and any other consequential proceedings
emanating out of the said ECIR, and quash the same in
view of the predicate offence having been quashed by
judgment dated 4th May, 2022 passed by the High Court of
Bombay in relation to the said FIR. The thrust of the
petitioners‟ contention is based upon the conclusion of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra) in para 467 (v)(d) which reads as under:

"(v)(d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is
dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is
concerning the process or activity connected with such
property, which constitutes the offence of money-
laundering. The Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot
prosecute any person on notional basis or on the
assumption that a scheduled offence has been committed,
unless it is so registered with the jurisdictional police and/
or pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal
complaint before the competent forum. If the person is
finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or
the criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of
competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-
laundering against him or any one claiming such property
being the property linked to stated scheduled offence
through him."

16. As per the petitioners, the above named persons are
various employees of Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited
and related companies and have been roped in by the
respondents in the said ECIR without there being any
underlying predicate offence registered against them. In
light of the conclusion and finding of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) this Court
finds no reason for the said ECIR to be sustained against
them, without there being any evidence of a predicate

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offence or an FIR against them which is in existence or is
legally alive.

17. In all these cases therefore, both of the employees
against whom no complaint was ever filed for the scheduled
offences and those against whom it was filed and has been
quashed subsequently by a Court of competent jurisdiction,
it would only be appropriate that the said ECIR against
them under PML be quashed and all proceedings
consequent thereto undertaken or directed by the
Respondents or any authority are set aside.

Conclusion

24. In light of the above analysis and discussion this Court
concludes as under:

a) The relief sought regarding constitutionality or vires
of various provisions of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 is infructuous having been
decided by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Union of India &
Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929.

b) The ECIR no. ECIR/07/HIU/2021 registered by the
Directorate of Enforcement, Department of Revenue,
Ministry of Finance, Government of India, under FIR
No. 129/2021 dated 13th April, 2021 registered by P.S.
Wada, Dist. Palghar, Maharashtra stands quashed.

c) All proceedings arising from the ECIR No.
ECIR/07/HIU/2021 are set aside and there would be no
further coercive action or search and seizure or
summons arising from the said ECIR.

d) The Look out Circulars issued by respondents
pursuant to the ECIR No. ECIR/07/HIU/2021 are also
set aside."

4.1.5 Reliance was also placed upon the judgments rendered;

by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the cases of Mahanivesh

Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement (W.P.

1925/2014) decided on 25.01.2016, M/s Ajanta Merchants

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Pvt. Ltd. v. Directorate of Enforcement (Crl. M.C. No.

5581/2014) decided on 09.04.2015 and Arun Kumar Mishra v.

Directorate of Enforcement (Crl. M.C. 5508/2014) decided

on 09.04.2015, by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case

of Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Joint

Director, Directorate of Enforcement [Writ Petition No.

5962/2016 (GM-MM-C)] decided on 13.03.2017.

4.2 Neither was the petitioner-sky light nor any of its

partners named in the prosecution complaint, that came to be

filed in pursuance of the aforementioned ECIR. And that the

prescribed statutory time limit for filing the same, under the

provisions of law contained in the PML Act, is over.

4.2.1 That despite investigation by more than one

investigating agency, nothing was found against the petitioners

and yet the respondent-Enforcement Directorate sought custodial

interrogation of the partners of the petitioner-Sky Light has been

sought.

4.2.2 That the statutory time limit for filing the prosecution

complaint as provided under Section 8 (3) (a) of the PML Act was

of 90 days in the present case, which stood expired on

15.05.2019. And that therefore, the attachment of properties in

the said case stands lapsed. Reliance in this regard was placed on

the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab and

Haryana in the case of Seema Garg v. Dy. Director,

Directorate of Enforcement [PML No. 1 of 2019 (O&M) and

connected matters] decided on 06.03.2020. And that the same

was upheld by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dy.

Director, Directorate of Enforcement v. Seema Garg

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(Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 14713-14715/2020),

vide order dated 30.04.2021.

4.2.3 That Section 45 of the PML Act was struck down by the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah v.

Union of India & Anr. (Writ Petitions (Crl.) No. 67/2017

with Nos. 103,144 and 152 of 2017 and connected matters)

decided on 23.11.2017.

4.2.4 That merely because the partners of the petitioner have

not confessed to any wrongdoing, the same cannot be tantamount

to non-cooperation on their behalf. Reliance in this regard was

placed upon the judgment rendered in the case of Santosh v.

State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 1759/2017)

decided on 10.10.2017, and the attention of this Court was drawn

towards Paragraph 7 of the said judgment.

Relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereunder:-

"7. It appears, the IO was of the view that the custody
of the appellant is required for recording his confessional
statement in terms of what the co-accused had already stated
in the Statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The IO was of the opinion that the appellant
was not cooperating because he kept reiterating that he had
not purchased the food-grains. The purpose of custodial
interrogation is not just for the purpose of confession. The
right against self-incrimination is provided for in Article 20(3)
of the Constitution. It is a well settled position in view of the
Constitution Bench decision in Selvi and others v. State of
Karnataka, that Article 20(3) enjoys an "exalted status". This
provision is an essential safeguard in criminal procedure and is
also meant to be a vital safeguard against torture and other
coercive methods used by investigating authorities. Therefore,
merely because the appellant did not confess, it cannot be said
that the appellant was not cooperating with the investigation.

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However, in case, there is no cooperation on the part of the
appellant for the completion of the investigation, it will
certainly be open to the respondent to seek for cancellation of
bail."

4.3. Statements of the partners of the petitioner-Sky Light,

recorded by the respondent-authorities under Section 50 of the

PML Act cannot be used as confessional statement.

4.3.1 It was submitted that statement recorded under

Section 67 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,

1985 (for short "NDPS Act") cannot be used as a confessional

statement; analogous to the provision of law as contained in

Section 50 of the PML Act, and is therefore, hit by the bar

contained in Section 161 CrPC. Reliance in this regard was placed

upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal

No. 152/2013 with other connected matters) decided on

29.10.2020. And that, the said law is a good law, and drew the

attention of this Court to the paragraph 173 of the judgment

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay

Madanlal Choudhary (supra).

For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:-

"173. We may note that the learned Additional Solicitor General
was at pains to persuade us to take the view that the decision in
Tofan Singh is per incuriam. For the reasons already noted, we do
not deem it necessary to examine that argument."

4.3.2 It was thus submitted that even if officials of the

Enforcement Directorate are not police officers, they discharge

police duties within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act,

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1872, and permitting the same would tantamount to a violation

under Articles 14, 20 (3) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

5. Summons issued under Section 50 of the PML Act are

non-est and suffer from want of jurisdiction.

5.1 The petitioner-Sky Light is entitled to be supplied a

copy of the ECIR, in order to defend himself and that Chapter XII

of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short 'CrPC') has been

held by the Hon'ble Apex Court to be applicable in all cases;

irrespective of the investigating agency, and unless there is a

provision to the contrary in the statute.

6. The practice of not supplying the copy of the ECIR is

only to carry on with a roving and fishing inquiry against the

present petitioners.

7. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in

compliance of the order dated 16.12.2016 passed by this Hon'ble

Court, the petitioners have duly made their appearance before the

Enforcement Directorate, through their authorized

representative(s), and fully cooperated with the investigation.

7.1 It was further submitted that the summons so issued

by the Enforcement Directorate to Robert Vadra were

misconceived as the documents that were demanded from him,

were already submitted on behalf of the petitioner-Sky Light

through its authorized representative at an earlier date. And that

despite the same, a detailed reply was submitted twice on his

behalf, wherein all the documents were again submitted before

the Enforcement Directorate, in response to each of the summons

so issued to him.

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7.2 It was also submitted that the last summons, bearing

date 07.12.2018 issued by the Enforcement Directorate was not

received by the petitioner-Sky Light or on its behalf by anyone.

7.3 And that the petitioner is a bonafide purchaser of the

lands in question, and is a victim of fraud, played by the other

accused persons, against whom cognizance has been taken by the

concerned Court for scheduled offences under the PML Act.

8. Dr. Shamsuddin, learned counsel who is also appearing

for the petitioner-Sky Light, stressed upon the definition, as under

Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (u) of the PML Act, which defines

'proceeds of crime'.

For the sake of brevity, the same is reproduced hereunder:-

"2. Definitions.--

(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--

(u) "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a
result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence or the value of any such property 2[or where such
property is taken or held outside the country, then the
property equivalent in value held within the country] 3[or
abroad];"

(emphasis supplied)

8.1 He further drew the attention of the Court to Section 8

sub-sections (5) and (6) of the PML Act, and submitted that the

said Section covers both; civil proceedings i.e. attachment

proceedings, and criminal proceedings i.e. confiscation.

8. Adjudication.--

(1) ...

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(2) ...

(3) ...

(4) ...

(5) Where on conclusion of a trial of an offence under this Act,
the Special Court finds that the offence of money-laundering has
been committed, it shall order that such property involved in the
moneylaundering or which has been used for commission of the
offence of money-laundering shall stand confiscated to the
Central Government.

(6) Where on conclusion of a trial under this Act, the Special
Court finds that the offence of moneylaundering has not taken
place or the property is not involved in money-laundering, it
shall order release of such property to the person entitled to
receive it.

(7) ...

(8) ...

8.2 It was further submitted that there must be some

material, which points towards 'criminal activity', to proceed

against the present petitioners, and that the respondent

authorities cannot proceed against them on a mere assumption.

8.3 It was also submitted that the petitioner has been

subjected to over 80 hours of interrogation, and it would be an

abuse of power to permit the same to continue, and that the

petitioner cannot be held liable for the forgeries committed at the

time of allotment of the sale deeds of the lands in question by the

original allottees.

8.4 The attention of this Court was also drawn to Paragraph

187 (v) (d) of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), which reads

as under:

CONCLUSION

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187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to
summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the
following terms: -

(v) (d) The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is
dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the
process or activity connected with such property, which
constitutes the offence of money laundering. The
Authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any person
on notional basis or on the assumption that a scheduled
offence has been committed, unless it is so registered with
the that confiscation can take place only at the time of
conclusion of trial jurisdictional police and/or pending
enquiry/trial including by way of criminal complaint before
the competent forum. If the person is finally
discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the
criminal case against him is quashed by the Court of
competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money-
laundering against him or any one claiming such property
being the property linked to stated scheduled offence
through him.

8.5 It was further submitted that the burden of proof, to

prove his innocence, under Section 24 of the PML Act, is not on

the petitioner-Sky Light, as the petitioner does not fall within the

ambit of sub-section (a), but falls under sub-section (b), of the

said Section. And that, it would be upon the Court to presume that

proceeds of crime, if any, are involved in money-laundering.

For the sake of brevity, the said Section is reproduced hereunder:-

24. Burden of proof.--

In any proceeding relating to proceeds of crime under this
Act,--

(a) in the case of a person charged with the offence
of money-laundering under section 3, the Authority or
Court shall, unless the contrary is proved, presume that

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such proceeds of crime are involved in money-laundering;
and

(b) in the case of any other person the Authority or Court,
may presume that such proceeds of crime are
involved in money-laundering.

8.6 It was also clarified that the reason behind praying for

quashment of the ECIR in question, is that the ECIR is the starting

point of an investigation, and that an attachment order has been

issued to the petitioner pursuant to the ECIR in question.

8.7 Reliance was placed upon the judgments rendered; by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Parvathi Kollur & Anr. v.

State By Directorate Of Enforcement Criminal Appeal No.

1254/2022 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 4258 of 2021)

decided on 16.08.2022, and it was submitted that the ECIR

therein was quashed as there was no incriminating material

available against the petitioners therein.

9. Mr. Vikas Balia, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, reiterated the submissions

made on behalf of petitioner-Sky Light. However, he additional

submitted that the first summons so issued to petitioner-Mahesh

Nagar, on 23.06.2016, was issued after the lapse of one year from

date of filing of charge-sheet against the other accused persons,

wherein neither the petitioner-Sky Light nor the petitioner-Mahesh

Nagar were named, as submitted by learned Senior Counsel for

the petitioner-Sky Light. And that, despite due replies in time,

being filed to each of the summons so issued to Mahesh Nagar,

summons were issued in quick succession.

10. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Senior Advocate & Additional

Solicitor General of India assisted by Mr. Akshay Bhardwaj, Mr. B.P.

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Bohra, Sr. CGS, Mr. Pukhraj Servi and Mr. Pooshan, appearing on

behalf of the respondents in response to the preliminary objection

raised on behalf of the petitioners submitted that although the

review is pending, there is no stay on the operation of the said

judgment. Thereafter, he sought to briefly recapitulate the facts of

the case and drew the attention of this Court to the following;

10.1 That the property in question pertains to 31.61

hectares (125 bighas) of land situated at Village Gajner, Tehsil

Kolayat, Bikaner. That the said land, of 50 bighas (12.65 hectares)

and 75 bighas (18.96 hectares) was originally allotted to two

fictitious and non-existent persons, being Natha Ram S/o Kesha

Ram and Hari Ram s/o Luna Ram; both the lands, were then

subsequently sold by Gugangar, the power of attorney of the

aforementioned two persons; the said power of attorney holder,

namely Gugangar also allegedly is a fictitious and non existent

person, to Rajendra Kumar S/o Gopal Das Swami and Kishore

Singh S/o Ram Singh respectively.

10.2 It was further submitted that the said lands were then

subsequently sold to one Ashok Kumar s/o Hukam Singh, the

driver of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, who in turn, sold the same, as

a power of attorney holder, on 04.01.2010, to the petitioner-Sky

Light LLP, of which Robert Vadra and his mother, Maureene Vadra

were partners.

10.3 It was further submitted that petitioner-Sky Light LLP,

through power of attorney-Mahesh Nagar sold the lands in

question to M/s. Alegany Finlease Pvt. Ltd. on 21.02.2012.

10.4 It was also submitted that the cheque issued for the

lands in question were issued by Robert Vadra for an amount of

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Rs. 30 lakhs on 22.12.2009, in favour of Ashok Kumar (Driver of

petitioner-Mahesh Nagar), which was credited to his account on

29.12.2009, whereas the POA in question was executed in favour

of Ashok Kumar only on 31.12.2009. Moreover, Ashok Kumar

withdrew the said amount of Rs.30 lakhs on 01.01.2010 and

returned the same to petitioner-Mahesh Nagar.

11. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the Commissioner,

Settlement vide letter dated 08.08.2014, informed the original

allottees about the cancellation of allotment of lease in view of the

wrongful allotment thereof.

11.1 It was also submitted that on 26.08.2014, two FIR's

bearing Nos. 114/2014 and 115/2014, were lodged at Tehsil

Gajner, Bikaner against Natharam and Hariram alleging that

original allottees had connived with the revenue authorities and

obtained forged documents.

11.2 It was also submitted that vide orders dated

31.10.2014 (Nos. 01/2014 and 03/2014) passed by SDO (Civil),

Kolayat, the allotments were cancelled and the land in question

was transferred back to vest in the State.

11.3 It was further submitted that on 04.08.2015, on the

basis of investigation conducted by the concerned police

authorities, first sets of charge-sheets were filed for the offences

under Sections 120B, 201, 204, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 471A of

the IPC against the various persons.

11.4 It was also submitted that on 17.09.2015, ECIR

bearing No. JPZO/09/2015 was recorded by Enforcement

Directorate, Jaipur Zonal Office on the basis of FIR registered for

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the offences under Sections 420, 467, 471, 120-B of Indian Penal

Code.

11.5 It was further submitted that the summons were issued

by Enforcement Directorate to Mahesh Nagar on various occasions

i.e. 14.07.2016, 26.07.2016, 18.08.2016, 30.08.2016 and

29.09.2016; even thereafter, he did not appear before the

concerned authorities.

12. That the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar filed a Writ Petition

bearing Criminal Writ Petition No. 72/2016 challenging the

issuance of summons under Section 50 of the PML Act by the E.D.

Criminal Writ Petitions No.74/2016 and 73/2016 were preferred

before this Hon'ble Court, by Ashok Kumar and Sky Light on

04.11.2016; both the said petitions came to be disposed of by this

Hon'ble Court on 27.03.2017, with liberty to the petitioners to

move before the competent authority for the purpose of raising

the issues pertaining to jurisdiction and competent authority was

directed to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

12.1 That on 24.04.2017, Ashok Kumar sent a

representation to the E.D. raising issues with regard to the

jurisdiction, and that on 02.06.2017, the E.D. wrote a letter to

Shri S. Tabrej and Associates stating that the E.D. has the

complete jurisdiction to investigate the matter.

And, in the above mentioned factual backdrop, the present

petitions came to be preferred.

13. Vide order dated 19.12.2018 in the instant petition

bearing S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 462/2018 passed by this

Court, the respondents were directed not to take any coercive

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action against the petitioner-Sky Light. The said order was

modified vide order dated 21.01.2019 passed by this Court,

directing the petitioner to appear before the respondent

authorities, for the purpose of the necessary investigation, as

required under the PML Act; the partners were however, granted

protection from arrest.

13.1 Vide order dated 21.02.2018 in the instant petition

bearing S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018 passed by this

Court, the petitioner was directed to appear before the respondent

authorities, and cooperate with the concerned investigating

agency, while also directing that no coercive action be taken

against him; the same interim protection is still in vogue.

13.2 That on 09.12.2020, an application for custodial

interrogation was preferred in S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No.

462/2018, alleging that the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar at the time

of recording of statements under Section 50 of the PML Act. A

similar application was also preferred by the respondents, in S.B.

Criminal Writ Petition No. 18/2018.

13.3 It was further submitted that the persons were arrayed

as accused, namely Jai Prakash Bagrwa, Uma Charan, Mahaveer

Prasad, Fakir Mohammed, Deepa Ram, Ranjeet Singh, Kishore

Singh, Gugangar and Rajendra Kumar Shandilya and Madan

Gopal, after prima facie finding them guilty of commission of

predicate offences. That the a prosecution complaint, under

Section 45 (1) of the PML Act, was filed against the said accused

persons, and presented before the concerned Special Court;

whereupon cognizance was taken by the concerned Court against

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them, and the trial against them is pending, at the stage of

framing of charges.

13.4 It was also submitted that, with respect to the present

petitioners, they were merely summoned by the respondents

authorities with the intention to complete the investigation in

question.

14. Learned A.S.G. stressed that the law as it stands today,

in the form of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) the position

is clear as crystal that a copy of the ECIR cannot be made

available to the petitioners at the present stage and vehemently

submitted that the offence of money laundering is an independent

and standalone offence from that of a predicate/scheduled

offence.

Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is

reproduced hereunder:-

"51. We may also note that argument that removing the
necessity of projection from the definition will render the
predicate offence and money-laundering indistinguishable.
This, in our view, is ill founded and fallacious. This plea cannot
hold water for the simple reason that the scheduled offences
in the 2002 Act as it stands (amended upto date) are
independent criminal acts. It is only when money is generated
as a result of such acts that the 2002 Act steps in as soon as
proceeds of crime are involved in any process or activity.
Dealing with such proceeds of crime can be in any form --
being process or activity. Thus, even assisting in the process
or activity is a part of the crime of money-laundering. We
must keep in mind that for being liable to suffer legal
consequences of ones action of indulging in the process or
activity, is sufficient and not only upon projection of the ill-
gotten money as untainted money. Many members of a crime
syndicate could then simply keep the money with them for

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years to come, the hands of the law in such a situation cannot
be bound and stopped from proceeding against such person, if
information of such illegitimate monies is revealed even from
an unknown source.

52. The next question is: whether the offence under Section 3
is a standalone offence? Indeed, it is dependent on the
wrongful and illegal gain of property as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence. Nevertheless, it is
concerning the process or activity connected with such
property, which constitutes offence of money-laundering. The
property must qualify the definition of "proceeds of crime"
under Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act. As observed earlier, all
or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence
need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties
qualifying the definition of "proceeds of crime" under Section
2(1)(u) will necessarily be crime properties. Indeed, in the
event of acquittal of the person concerned or being absolved
from allegation of criminal activity relating to scheduled
offence, and if it is established in the court of law that the
crime property in the concerned case has been rightfully
owned and possessed by him, such a property by no stretch
of imagination can be termed as crime property and ex-
consequenti proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section
2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the other hand, in the trial in
connection with the scheduled offence, the Court would be
obliged to direct return of such property as belonging to him.
It would be then paradoxical to still regard such property as
proceeds of crime despite such adjudication by a Court of
competent jurisdiction. It is well within the jurisdiction of the
concerned Court trying the scheduled offence to pronounce on
that matter."

15. The learned A.S.G. also produced before this Court the

supplementary charge-sheets, bearing Nos.76A and 77A, both

dated 07.03.2017, filed in FIR Nos. 114/2015 and 115/2015, and

submitted that the same clearly state that the investigation as

under Section 173 (8) CrPC is being sought to be continued.

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16. The learned A.S.G. also submitted that the concerned

authorities of the C.B.I. have filed a chargesheet against the

accused persons. It was further submitted that Ashok Kumar is a

conduit in the conspiracy, also having being named in the

aforementioned supplementary chargesheets and that his

statements on the record reveal that he is a poor person incapable

of purchasing the lands in question of his own accord.

17. The learned A.S.G. fairly admitted that Mahesh Nagar,

had appeared before the concerned authorities of the Enforcement

Directorate, but that the same was not satisfactory to conclude

the investigation, and he was not cooperative and that further

investigation was required in the said matter.

18. The learned A.S.G. sought to mete out the contentions

made on behalf of the present petitioner, by making the following

submissions:-

18.1 It was admitted, as contended on behalf of the

petitioners that the present petitioners, are not accused of

commission of any predicate offences yet.

18.2 It was was further submitted that the charge-sheet in

question was filed by another investigating agency, and that the

offence of money laundering under the PML Act, is a standalone

and independent offence. It was also submitted that it is not

disputed that the inquiry conducted by the concerned police

authorities of Rajasthan, whereby no offence(s) against them were

found to be made out; however it was pointed out that the ECIR

as drawn against them, which exists as on date, did not exist

during that time. It was further submitted that the case with

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regard to the controversy in question was transferred from the

Rajasthan Police to the C.B.I. and that the investigation in the

same has not been completed yet.

18.3 On being asked by this Court, as to how multiple

agencies could prosecute the petitioners, the learned A.S.G.

stated that the F.I.R.s and the ECIR stood on a different footing,

while the first was instigated by the concerned police authorities in

the State, the latter was instituted by the E.D. Further reliance

was placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in the case of Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury (supra) which held

that the PML Act cannot be classified as a penal statute.

Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced

hereunder"-
1.

"176. As per the procedure prescribed by the 1973 Code,
the officer in-charge of a police station is under an
obligation to record the information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence, in terms of Section
154 of the 1973 Code. There is no corresponding provision
in the 2002 Act requiring registration of offence of money
laundering. As noticed earlier, the mechanism for
proceeding against the property being proceeds of crime
predicated in the 2002 Act is a sui generis procedure. No
comparison can be drawn between the mechanism
regarding prevention, investigation or trial in connection
with the scheduled offence governed by the provisions of
the 1973 Code. In the scheme of 2002 Act upon
identification of existence of property being proceeds of
crime, the Authority under this Act is expected to inquire
into relevant aspects in relation to such property and take
measures as may be necessary and specified in the 2002
Act including to attach the property for being dealt with as
per the provisions of the 2002 Act. We have elaborately
adverted to the procedure to be followed by the authorities

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for such attachment of the property being proceeds of
crime and the follow-up steps of confiscation upon
confirmation of the provisional attachment order by the
Adjudicating Authority. For facilitating the Adjudicating
Authority to confirm the provisional attachment order and
direct confiscation, the authorities under the 2002 Act (i.e.,
Section 48) are expected to make an inquiry and
investigate. Incidentally, when sufficient credible
information is gathered by the authorities during such
inquiry/investigation indicative of involvement of any
person in any process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime, it is open to such authorities to file a
formal complaint before the Special Court naming the
concerned person for offence of money-laundering under
Section 3 of this Act. Considering the scheme of the 2002
Act, though the offence of money-laundering is otherwise
regarded as cognizable offence (cognizance whereof can be
taken only by the authorities referred to in Section 48 of
this Act and not by jurisdictional police) and punishable
under Section 4 of the 2002 Act, special complaint
procedure is prescribed by law. This procedure overrides
the procedure prescribed under 1973 Code to deal with
other offences (other than money-laundering offences) in
the matter of registration of offence and
inquiry/investigation thereof. This special procedure must
prevail in terms of Section 71 of the 2002 Act and also
keeping in mind Section 65 of the same Act. In other
words, the offence of money-laundering cannot be
registered by the jurisdictional police who is governed by
the regime under Chapter XII of the 1973 Code. The
provisions of Chapter XII of the 1973 Code do not apply in
all respects to deal with information derived relating to
commission of money-laundering offence much less
investigation thereof. The dispensation regarding
prevention of money-laundering, attachment of proceeds
of crime and inquiry/investigation of offence of money-
laundering upto filing of the complaint in respect of offence
under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is fully governed by the
provisions of the 2002 Act itself. To wit, regarding survey,
searches, seizures, issuing summons, recording of

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statements of concerned persons and calling upon
production of documents, inquiry/investigation, arrest of
persons involved in the offence of money-laundering
including bail and attachment, confiscation and vesting of
property being proceeds of crime. Indeed, after arrest, the
manner of dealing with such offender involved in offence of
money-laundering would then be governed by the
provisions of the 1973 Code - as there are no inconsistent
provisions in the 2002 Act in regard to production of the
arrested person before the jurisdictional Magistrate within
twenty-four hours and also filing of the complaint before
the Special Court within the statutory period prescribed in
the 1973 Code for filing of police report, if not released on
bail before expiry thereof.

2. 177. Suffice it to observe that being a special
legislation providing for special mechanism regarding
inquiry/investigation of offence of money-laundering,
analogy cannot be drawn from the provisions of 1973
Code, in regard to registration of offence of money-
laundering and more so being a complaint procedure
prescribed under the 2002 Act. Further, the authorities
referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act alone are
competent to file such complaint. It is a different matter
that the materials/evidence collected by the same
authorities for the purpose of civil action of attachment of
proceeds of crime and confiscation thereof may be used to
prosecute the person involved in the process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime for offence of
money-laundering. Considering the mechanism of
inquiry/investigation for proceeding against the property
(being proceeds of crime) under this Act by way of civil
action (attachment and confiscation), there is no need to
formally register an ECIR, unlike registration of an FIR by
the jurisdictional police in respect of cognizable offence
under the ordinary law. There is force in the stand taken by
the ED that ECIR is an internal document created by the
department before initiating penal action or prosecution
against the person involved with process or activity
connected with proceeds of crime. Thus, ECIR is not a

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statutory document, nor there is any provision in 2002 Act
requiring Authority referred to in Section 48 to record ECIR
or to furnish copy thereof to the accused unlike Section
154 of the 1973 Code. The fact that such ECIR has not
been recorded, does not come in the way of the authorities
referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act to commence
inquiry/investigation for initiating civil action of attachment
of property being proceeds of crime by following prescribed
procedure in that regard.

3. 178. The next issue is: whether it is necessary to
furnish copy of ECIR to the person concerned apprehending
arrest or at least after his arrest? Section 19(1) of the
2002 Act postulates that after arrest, as soon as may be,
the person should be informed about the grounds for such
arrest. This stipulation is compliant with the mandate of
Article 22(1) of the Constitution. Being a special legislation
and considering the complexity of the inquiry/investigation
both for the purposes of initiating civil action as well as
prosecution, non-supply of ECIR in a given case cannot be
faulted. The ECIR may contain details of the material in
possession of the Authority and recording satisfaction of
reason to believe that the person is guilty of
moneylaundering offence, if revealed before the
inquiry/investigation required to proceed against the
property being proceeds of crime including to the person
involved in the process or activity connected therewith,
may have deleterious impact on the final outcome of the
inquiry/investigation. So long as the person has been
informed about grounds of his arrest that is sufficient
compliance of mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
Moreover, the arrested person before being produced
before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for
that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is
free to look into the relevant records made available by the
Authority about the involvement of the arrested person in
the offence of money-laundering. In any case, upon filing
of the complaint before the statutory period provided in
1973 Code, after arrest, the person would get all relevant
materials forming part of the complaint filed by the

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Authority under Section 44(1)(b) of the 2002 Act before
the Special Court.

179. Viewed thus, supply of ECIR in every case to
person concerned is not mandatory. From the
submissions made across the Bar, it is noticed that in
some cases ED has furnished copy of ECIR to the
person before filing of the complaint. That does not
mean that in every case same procedure must be
followed. It is enough, if ED at the time of arrest,
contemporaneously discloses the grounds of such
arrest to such person. Suffice it to observe that ECIR
cannot be equated with an FIR which is mandatorily
required to be recorded and supplied to the accused as
per the provisions of 1973 Code. Revealing a copy of
an ECIR, if made mandatory, may defeat the purpose
sought to be achieved by the 2002 Act including
frustrating the attachment of property (proceeds of
crime). Non-supply of ECIR, which is essentially an
internal document of ED, cannot be cited as violation
of constitutional right. Concededly, the person
arrested, in terms of Section 19 of the 2002 Act, is
contemporaneously made aware about the grounds of
his arrest. This is compliant with the mandate of
Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is not unknown
that at times FIR does not reveal all aspects of the
offence in question. In several cases, even the names
of persons actually involved in the commission of
offence are not mentioned in the FIR and described as
unknown accused. Even, the particulars as unfolded
are not fully recorded in the FIR. Despite that, the
accused named in any ordinary offence is able to apply
for anticipatory bail or regular bail, in which
proceeding, the police papers are normally perused by
the concerned Court. On the same analogy, the
argument of prejudice pressed into service by the
petitioners for non-supply of ECIR deserves to be

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answered against the petitioners. For, the arrested
person for offence of money-laundering is
contemporaneously informed about the grounds of his
arrest; and when produced before the Special Court, it
is open to the Special Court to call upon the
representative of ED to produce relevant record
concerning the case of the accused before him and
look into the same for answering the need for his
continued detention. Taking any view of the matter,
therefore, the argument under consideration does not
take the matter any further."

18.4 It was submitted that the ECIR is akin to a fact finding

report generated as an internal document, and upon the basis of

which the investigation is conducted by the officials of the E.D.

And that if the offences are found to be made out against the

accused then the prosecution complaint is filed. It was also

submitted that the copy of the E.C.I.R. is produced given to the

accused persons only after the same is produced before the

concerned Special Court and the concerned Court takes

cognizance against the accused, but not a stage prior to that.

18.5 And that, with respect to the accused persons, as

above mentioned, they were supplied copies of the ECIR therein,

at the stage wherein cognizance, vide order dated 26.10.2018,

was taken against them by the concerned Special Court. And that,

should such a stage arise in the present case, that such request

for a copy of the ECIR would be valid, but certainly not at the

present stage.

18.6 Learned A.S.G. also sought to draw a clear distinction

between the present case and the precedent law of Harish

Fabiani & Ors. (supra) as cited on behalf of the petitioners, and

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submitted that in the said case the FIR therein had already been

quashed, upon the basis of which the ECIR therein was quashed;

which is not the position in the instant case.

18.7 It was also submitted that under Section 44 of the PML

Act, offence(s) of money laundering under Section 3/4 of the PML

Act, and the trial for scheduled/predicate offence(s) are not tried

jointly, but simultaneously, even though the same Court will try

the person(s).

For the sake of brevity, the said Section is reproduced hereunder:-

44. Offences triable by Special Courts.--

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--

(a) an offence punishable under section 4
and any scheduled offence connected to the
offence under that section shall be triable by the
Special Court constituted for the area in which the
offence has been committed:

Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled
offence before the commencement of this Act, shall
continue to try such scheduled offence; or;

(b) a Special Court may, 2 *** upon a
complaint made by an authority authorised in this
behalf under this Act take 3 [cognizance of
offence under section 3, without the accused
being committed to it for trial];

Provided that after conclusion of investigation, if no
offence of money-laundering is made out requiring filing of
such complaint, the said authority shall submit a closure
report before the Special Court; or]

(c) if the court which has taken cognizance of the
scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which
has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of
money-laundering under sub-clause (b), it shall, on an

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application by the authority authorised to file a complaint
under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled
offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall,
on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the
stage at which it is committed.

(d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence
or the offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 ( 2 of 1974) as it applies to a trial before
a Court of Session.]

Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is clarified
that,--

(i) the jurisdiction of the Special Court
while dealing with the offence under this
Act, during investigation, enquiry or trial
under this Act, shall not be dependent upon
any orders passed in respect of the
scheduled offence, and the trial of both sets
of offences by the same court shall not be
construed as joint trial;

(ii) the complaint shall be deemed to
include any subsequent complaint in respect of
further investigation that may be conducted to
bring any further evidence, oral or documentary,
against any accused person involved in respect
of the offence, for which complaint has already
been filed, whether named in the original
complaint or not.

(2) Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed
to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding
bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such
powers including the power under clause (b) of sub-
section (1) of that section as if the reference to
"Magistrate" in that section includes also a reference to a
"Special Court" designated under section 43.

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19. It was further submitted that the present petitions are

misconceived, as on date, only summons under Section 50 of the

PML Act, have been issued to the petitioners and it was argued

that the petitioners have approached this Court at a premature

stage. With respect to the arguments advanced on behalf of the

petitioners, that the summons issued by the respondents herein is

time barred and has gone beyond the prescribed statutory time

period, that of 90 days (which was the statutory prescription then,

which was only subsequently amended to be 365 days), the

learned A.S.G. vehemently argued that such arguments were

baseless and without merit, as under the PML Act, there are two

types of proceedings, civil; with respect to the attachment

proceedings wherein certain statutory time limitations are placed,

and criminal; upon which Chapter III of the PML Act has no

bearing and as such no statutory time limits are placed upon

criminal proceedings. Reliance in this regard was placed upon the

judgment rendered in the case of Kavitha G. Pillai v. The Joint

Director (M.F.A. No. 11/2016) decided by the Hon'ble High

Court of Kerala on 26.07.2017.

Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

"59. Another adjudicatory safeguard commanding
attention is that any ambiguity in the penal provisions
should be resolved in favour of the accused, for his life,
liberty, and reputation are at stake. And the penal
provisions must be construed strictly, too. The question
here is whether the attachment and the forfeiture under
Sections 5 and 8 are civil or criminal proceedings. As we
shall see, they are civil : the Adjudicatory Authority's
conclusions do not prove the guilt of an accused, nor are
they a step-in-aid to the accused's conviction. The

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conviction depends on the prosecution's proving the
predicate offence--attachment or no attachment."

20. The learned A.S.G. also submitted that reliance was

incorrectly placed upon the judgments rendered in the cases of

Mahanivesh Oils & Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Obulapuram

Mining Company (supra), as the same was no longer good law.

21. The learned A.S.G. also submitted that the argument

advanced in passing, on behalf of the petitioners, that the E.D. did

not have jurisdiction, is also without merit as a representation was

ordered to be given to the respondents by this Court and the

petitioners on complying with the same were duly served a reply

to the same, wherein it was clearly notified to them that the E.D.

has pan India jurisdiction.

22. It was also submitted that the learned Senior Counsel

erred in highlighting only Paragraph 33 of the judgment rendered

by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal

Choudhary (supra), as the judgment ought to read in its

entirety and appreciated in toto.

23. It was further submitted that the present petitioners

have only approached the Court for orders of 'no coercive action'

and that the High Courts in their jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. are not the appropriate forums for the same. Reliance in

this regard was placed upon the judgment rendered by the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure

Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Criminal Appeal

No. 330/2021) decided on 3.04.2021 and the case of Dr.

Anand Rai Vs. State of M.P. & Anr. (Writ Petition No.

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7744/2022) decided on 04.04.2022 by the Hon'ble High Court of

Madhya Pradesh.

Relevant portions of the said judgments, as relied upon, are

reproduced hereunder:-

In Dr. Anand Rai (supra):-

"5. Placing reliance upon the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315, wherein after
detailed analysis the Hon'ble Supreme Court has framed
certain guidelines and conclusions for consideration of the
matters by all the High Courts in the country that what
steps are to be taken while considering the applications for
quashment of FIR under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and Article
226 of the Constitution of India. It is argued that the
powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India to quash the First Information
Report is to be exercised in a very sparing manner and is
not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is
legitimate. Placing reliance upon the judgment in the case
of State of Telangana Vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani reported
in (2017) 2 SCC 779, it is submitted that the counsel
appearing for the State was not even supplied with the
copy of the petition then also an order not to take any
coercive steps against the petitioner was passed by this
Court. It is argued that within three days of registration of
an FIR, the writ petition was filed. Notices under Section 91
of Cr.P.C. dated 28.03.2022 and 30.03.2022 were issued
to the petitioner for appearance along with all the relevant
documents with respect to the aforesaid complaint for
carrying out the proper investigation, but the petitioner has
not complied with aforesaid notices and has chosen to file a
present petition before this Court. He has not appeared
before the authorities at any point of time. Thus, on one
hand the petitioner is not cooperating with the
investigation and on the other hand, he has filed a petition

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directly before this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India praying for quashment of FIR being
not maintainable.

6. It is submitted that various High Courts have gone
to the extent that the proceedings for quashment of the
FIR should be exercised sparingly and in the rare cases.
The investigation which is to be carried out by the
Authority generally should not be interfered. In the case of
State of Tamilnadu Vs. S. Martin reported in (2018) 5 SCC
718, it was held that during investigation the High Court
ought not to have interfered in investigation and
investigating agency ought to have been permitted to
continue the investigation and come to a logical conclusion.
It is argued that the investigation is yet to be carried out
and it cannot be said at this stage whether the State
Authorities are filing a charge sheet against the petitioner
or filing a closure report looking to the contents of the
complaint made by the respondent No.2 in the FIR. He has
further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the
Supreme Court in Nivedita Sharma Vs. Cellular Operators
Association of India reported in (2011) 14 SCC 337,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the
party must exhaust statutory remedy available under the
law before resorting to writ jurisdiction for a relief. The
petitioner is having statutory remedy available under
Section 438 of Cr.P.C. seeking an anticipatory bail, but
instead of the same he has directly filed a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The provision
of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. being inherent in nature are
available to the petitioner seeking quashment of an FIR,
but bypassing the legal statutory provisions which are
available to the petitioner, the petitioner has directly filed a
writ petition before this Court which is itself is not
maintainable. It is further submitted that the case of the
petitioner does not fall under the category of guidelines
framed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State
of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC
335 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically
held that power of quashing criminal proceedings should be

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exercised sparingly and with circumspection that too in
rare of the rarest cases. In such circumstances no case for
interference is made out in the present writ petition.

17. The aforesaid aspect was considered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure
(supra) wherein after a detailed analysis of various
provisions of criminal law and various judgments passed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn conclusion in para
80 of the judgment which reads as under:-

"80. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
above, our final conclusions on the principal/core
issue, whether the High Court would be justified in
passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/
or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the
pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482
Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India and in what circumstances and whether the
High Court would be justified in passing the order of
not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps to be
adopted" during the investigation or till the final
report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C.,
while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not
quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our
final conclusions are as under:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate
into a cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first
information report that the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised
sparingly with circumspection, as it has been
observed, in the 'rarest of rare cases (not to be

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confused with the formation in the context of death
penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of
which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at
the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR
should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping
the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of
the State operate in two specific spheres of activities
and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and
the judicial process should not interfere at the stage
of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to
act according to its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an
encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and
details relating to the offence reported. Therefore,
when the investigation by the police is in progress,
the court should not go into the merits of the
allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to
complete the investigation. It would be premature to
pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that
the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of
law. After investigation, if the investigating officer
finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer
may file an appropriate report/summary before the
learned Magistrate which may be considered by the

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learned Magistrate in accordance with the known
procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very
wide, but conferment of wide power requires the
court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and
more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing
and the self-restraint imposed by law, more
particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in
the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal
(supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint;

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
the alleged accused and the court when it exercises
the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to
consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose
commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court
is not required to consider on merits whether or not
the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable
offence and the court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the
FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable
and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be
considered by the High Court while passing an
interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an
interim order of stay of investigation during the
pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with
circumspection. Such an interim order should not
require to be passed routinely, casually and/or
mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in
progress and the facts are hazy and the entire
evidence/material is not before the High Court, the
High Court should restrain itself from passing the
interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to
be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to
apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C.

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before the competent court. The High Court shall not
and as such is not justified in passing the order of
not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during
the investigation or till the investigation is completed
and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under
Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of
the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/
or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima
facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made
out for grant of interim stay of further investigation,
after considering the broad parameters while
exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/
or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give
brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted
and/or is required to be passed so that it can
demonstrate the application of mind by the Court
and the higher forum can consider what was weighed
with the High Court while passing such an interim
order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the
High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted"
within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must
clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be
adopted" as the term "no coercive steps to be
adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad
which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied."

18. It is seen that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
aforesaid case has gone to an extent that no such orders
not to arrest or no coercive steps either during the
investigation or till the investigation is completed or till the
final report or charge sheet is being filed under Section
173(3) of Cr.P.C. while dismissing or disposing of the
quashing of petition shall be passed under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that
even in a case where the High Court is prima face of the
opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of
interim stay of further investigation after considering the

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broad para meters then also the reasons are required to
be recorded while passing an interim order so that it can
demonstrate the application of mind by the learned Court.
It is seen from the order dated 01.04.2022 that an order
has been passed not to take any coercive action against
the petitioner but no reasons have been assigned in the
impugned order. Even in the contention of the learned
Solicitor General and learned Advocate General of the
State of Madhya Pradesh, it is pointed out that copy of the
petition along with annexrues are not even supplied to
them to argue on the issue and they have only prayed for
an adjournment on that date but the Court has passed an
interim order in the matter. In such circumstances, when
clearly a case of cognizable offence is made out no such
blanket orders can be passed. The authorities are required
to complete an investigation into the matter and person
showing himself to be an innocent person can take a
recourse under the relevant provisions of criminal law that
is under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. for seeking an anticipatory
bail in the matter.

20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nivedita
Sharma (supra) has held that "where hierarchy of appeals
was provided by the statute, a party must exhaust the
statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for
relief, but inspite of having alternative remedy the writ
petition has been preferred seeking multiple reliefs,
therefore, the petition was not entertained being devoid of
merits is not maintainable and is dismissed." In the
present case, without exhausting the remedy of seeking
anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. or
approaching this Court by way of filing a petition under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. petition seeking quashment of an
FIR or a criminal proceedings, he has taken a recourse to
file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.

21. Looking to the contents of the FIR, a prima facie case
is made out against the petitioner, which requires a
detailed investigation to be carried out by the Authorities.
In such circumstances, the case does not fall under the

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category of rarest of the rare cases, therefore, the relief
praying for quashment of FIR and for interim relief not to
take any coercive action, without adhering to the statutory
provisions of criminal jurisprudence, this relief cannot be
extended to the petitioner."

24. It was further submitted that no writ petition can lie

against a summons, reliance was placed upon the judgment

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner

of Customs, Calcutta & Ors. Vs. M.M. Exports & Anr. (Civil

Appeals Nos. 82-83/2002) decided on 01.03.2007.

Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is

reproduced hereunder:-

"1. By consent the impugned order is set aside. However,
we wish to make it clear that as far as possible the High
Court should not interfere at the stage when the
Department has issued the summons. This is not one of
those exceptional cases where the High Court should have
interfered at the stage of issuance of the summons. It may
be mentioned that all other questions on merits are
expressly kept open. We have not examined the merits of
the case. The Department is entitled to proceed in
accordance with law. The appeals are accordingly disposed
of."

25. It was further submitted that while the sale of the lands

in question, to the petitioner-Sky Light, was made on 04.01.2010,

the cheque in question is issued by Robert Vadra, partner of

petitioner-Sky Light, as consideration against the same bears date

31.12.2009. It was thus submitted that the said cheque predates

the execution of the POA, which reveals that the transactions in

question pertaining to the lands in question are fictitious, false and

fabricated, only carried out with the intention to create a paper

trail.

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26. In this regard, the learned A.S.G. drew the attention of

this Court to the statements of Rajendra Kumar, which were

recorded by the concerned authorities of the Enforcement

Directorate under Section 50 of the PML Act, wherein he stated

that he did not sign any POA nor was aware of anything of the

sort. It was also contended to be admissible in evidence as

officials of the Enforcement Directorate are not 'police officers' and

would therefore not be hit by the bar contained in Section 25 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

27. It was also submitted that the statements, recorded by

the concerned officials of the E.D. under Section 50 of the Act of

2002, petitioner-Mahesh Nagar stated that he acted on the behalf

of instructions received from Robert Vadra, and also stated that he

is in his employment.

28. It was also contended that the argument raised on

behalf of the petitioners, that the judgment rendered by the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tofan Singh v. The State Of

Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No.152/2013) decided on

29.10.2020, has been categorically dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal

Choudhary (supra).

29. In this regard, it was further submitted that in the case

of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), it has been clearly held

that Toofan Singh (supra) dealt with offences under the NDPS

Act, 1985 whereas under the PML Act, officials of the E.D. are not

'police officers'. It was also submitted that an exception was

carved out by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tofan Singh

(supra).

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Relevant portion of the said judgment as relied upon is reproduced

as hereunder:-

"168. The petitioners, however, have pressed into
service exposition of this Court in the recent decision in
Tofan Singh, which had occasion to deal with the provisions
of the NDPS Act wherein the Court held that the designated
officer under that Act must be regarded as a police officer.
The Court opined that the statement made before him
would be violative of protection guaranteed under Article
20(3) of the Constitution. This decision has been rightly
distinguished by the learned Additional Solicitor General on
the argument that the conclusion reached in that judgment
is on the basis of the legislative scheme of the NDPS Act,
which permitted that interpretation. However, it is not
possible to reach at the same conclusion in respect of the
2002 Act for more than one reason. In this decision, the
Court first noted that the Act (NDPS Act) under
consideration was a penal statute. In the case of 2002 Act,
however, such a view is not possible. The second aspect
which we have repeatedly adverted to, is the special
purposes and objects behind the enactment of the 2002
Act. As per the provisions of the NDPS Act, it permitted
both a regular police officer as well as a designated officer,
who is not a defined police officer, to investigate the
offence under that Act. This has resulted in discrimination.
Such a situation does not emerge from the provisions of
the 2002 Act. The 2002 Act, on the other hand, authorises
only the authorities referred to in Section 48 to investigate/
inquire into the matters under the Act in the manner
prescribed therein. The provision inserted in 2005 as
Section 45(1A) is not to empower the regular police
officers to take cognizance of the offence. On the other
hand, it is a provision to declare that the regular police
officer is not competent to take cognizance of offence of
money-laundering, as it can be investigated only by the
authorities referred to in Section 48 of the 2002 Act. The
third aspect which had weighed with the Court in Tofan

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Singh is that the police officer investigating an offence
under the NDPS Act, the provisions of Sections 161 to 164
of the 1973 Code as also Section 25 of the Evidence Act,
would come into play making the statement made before
them by the accused as inadmissible. Whereas, the
investigation into the same offence was to be done by the
designated officer under the NDPS Act, the safeguards
contained in Sections 161 to 164 of the 1973 Code and
Section 25 of the Evidence Act, will have no application and
the statement made before them would be inadmissible in
evidence. This had resulted in discrimination. No such
situation emerges from the provisions of the 2002 Act.
Whereas, the 2002 Act clearly authorises only the
authorities under the 2002 Act referred to in Section 48 to
step in and summon the person when occasion arises and
proceed to record the statement and take relevant
documents on record. For that, express provision has been
made authorising them to do so and by a legal fiction,
deemed it to be a statement recorded in a judicial
proceeding by virtue of Section 50(4) of the 2002 Act. A
regular police officer will neither be in a position to take
cognizance of the offence of moneylaundering, much less
be permitted to record the statement which is to be made
part of the proceeding before the Adjudicating Authority
under the 2002 Act for confirmation of the provisional
attachment order and confiscation of the proceeds of crime
for eventual vesting in the Central Government. That may
entail in civil consequences. It is a different matter that
some material or evidence is made part of the complaint if
required to be filed against the person involved in the
process or activity connected with money laundering so as
to prosecute him for offence punishable under Section 3 of
the 2002 Act. The next point which has been reckoned by
this Court in the said decision is that in the provisions of
NDPS Act, upon culmination of investigation of crime by a
designated officer under that Act (other than a Police
Officer), he proceeds to file a complaint; but has no
authority to further investigate the offence, if required.
Whereas, if the same offence was investigated by a regular
Police Officer after filing of the police report under Section

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173(2) of the 1973 Code, he could still do further
investigation by invoking Section 173(8) of the 1973 Code.
This, on the face of it, was discriminatory."

30. It was vehemently submitted that all of the financial

transactions with respect to the lands in question is a fabrication,

and that it a conspiracy to launder money. It was further

submitted that the same is clear as Kishore Singh S/o Ram Singh

is a witness to the POA, with respect to the transaction of land of

50 bighas (12.65 hectares), executed by Rajendra Kumar in

favour of Ashok Kumar; while Rajendra Kumar is a witness to the

POA executed, with respect to the transaction of land of 75 bighas

(18.96 hectres), by Kishore Singh in favour of Ashok Kumar.

31. The learned A.S.G. in support of his submissions also

placed reliance upon the following judgments;

31.1 Shyam Sunder Singhvi v. Union of India (S.B.

Criminal Revision Petition No. 273/2019) with connected

matters; passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on

24.01.2020.

Relevant portion of the said judgment, as relied upon, is

reproduced hereunder:-

"44. The submission of learned Senior Advocate
Mr.Rajendra Prasad that the petitioner Tamanna Begum
cannot be punished for the scheduled offences and as
such she cannot be made accused under the provisions of
PML, 2002 and her no activity can become an offence
either under the PML, 2002 or under the provisions of
Prevention of Corruption Act, this court finds that for the
purpose of Sections 3 and 4 of the PML, 2002, a person
accused under the PML, 2002 may not have committed
the scheduled offence and such person can be prosecuted

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for the offence of money laundering even if such person
is not guilty of the scheduled offences.

47. This court finds that position of law which
emerges is that offence of money laundering under
Section 3 of the PML, 2002 is an independent offence and
money laundering is a stand alone offence under the PML,
2002."

31.2 Anandrao Vithoba Adsul. Vs. Enforcement

Directorate, Government of India & Anr. (Criminal Writ

Petition No. 3418/2021), decided on 14.10.2021 by the

Hon'ble Bombay High Court.

Relevant portion of the same is reproduced hereunder:-

"18. The prayer by the Petitioner that Respondent
No.1 be restrained from taking the Petitioner in custody is
nothing but prayer for a grant of anticipatory bail. The
contention of the Petitioner that without having copies of
the ECIRs, the Petitioner cannot approach the competent
court with a prayer for anticipatory bail under section 438
of Cr.P.C. is misplaced. The Petitioner apprehends his
arrest, and section 438 of Cr.P.C. provides a statutory
remedy for such a contingency. In the case of Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd., the Apex Court has observed that
when the entire material is not before the High Court, the
High Court should restrain itself from passing any interim
order not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted"
and the accused should be relegated to apply for
anticipatory bail under section 438 of CrP.C. to the
competent court. At this stage, we refer to the argument
mentioned earlier that Respondent No.1 demonstrated
what material is against the Petitioner since the Petitioner
is the one who has filed the FIR regarding predicate
offence. The learned ASG has shown the file containing
the statements recorded in furtherance of ECIRs.
Considering that the Petitioner has a statutory remedy
under section 438 of Cr.P.C. and any observation by us on

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the merits of the matter against the Petitioner will
prejudice the Petitioner in case the Petitioner approaches
the competent court for anticipatory bail; we refrain from
elaborating the same in this order. However, since this
point was argued before us, all we state is that it cannot
be said that there is no material against the Petitioner.
Furthermore, having concluded after examining the facts
that exercise of jurisdiction under section 226 of the
Constitution of India and 482 of Cr. P.C is not warranted.
There is no question of granting any such relief as sought
for by the Petitioner as it would be contrary to the
observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph
23(xvi) of the decision in the case of M/s.Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd.

19. To conclude, therefore, having considered the
grounds urged by the Petitioner in the invocation of 226 of
the Constitution and 482 of Cr.P.C., we do not find that
the Petitioner has failed to make out a case for
interference. As regards the protection from arrest is
concerned, the Petitioner has a remedy under the Cr.P.C.
In these circumstances, the Writ Petition is rejected.

20. Needless to state that if the Petitioner
approaches the competent court under section 438 of
Cr.P.C., the court will decide the matter on its own merits
and in accordance with the law."

31.3 P. Rajendran Vs. The Assistant Director,

Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Original Petition

No.19880 of 2022) and connected matters; decided on

14.09.2022 by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras.

Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

"9. Mr.Sharath Chandran, learned counsel,
contended that when the accused in the predicate offence
is discharged, acquitted or the proceedings against him
are quashed, the prosecution under the PML cannot be
maintained, which means that if a person is not

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(50 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

prosecuted in the predicate offence, his position being far
better than the former, cannot be prosecuted under the
PML.

10. At the first blush, this argument did appear
convincing. However, the fallacy in the aforesaid
submission was highlighted by Mr.N.Ramesh, learned
Special Public Prosecutor [ED], who brought to our notice
that paragraph Nos.253 and 467(d) of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal's case [supra] deal with
only the cases of persons named as accused in the
predicate offence against whom the prosecution in the
predicate offence is quashed or he is
discharged/acquitted. This benefit cannot be extended to a
person, who has not been arrayed as an accused in the
predicate offence because the offence under the PML is a
stand alone offence and is different and distinct from the
predicate offence.

11. Learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that
for generating "proceeds of crime", a "scheduled offence"
must have been committed, after the commission of the
scheduled offence and generation of proceeds of crime,
different persons can join the main accused either as
abettors or conspirators for committing the offence of
money laundering by helping him in laundering the
proceeds of crime; such persons may not be involved in
the original criminal activity that had resulted in the
generation of "proceeds of crime", therefore, just because
they were not prosecuted for the predicate offence, their
prosecution for money laundering cannot be said to be
illegal. There appears to be much force in the aforesaid
submission, especially, in the light of paragraph 271 of the
judgment in Vijay Madanlal's case [supra], which is
extracted below:

"271. As mentioned earlier, the rudimentary
understanding of 'money-laundering' is that there are
three generally accepted stages to money-
laundering, they are:

(a) Placement : which is to move the funds from
direct association of the crime.

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(51 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

(b) Layering : which is disguising the trail to foil
pursuit.

32. In his rejoinder arguments, Mr. Vikas Balia, learned

Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar

submitted that the offence of money laundering, as contended by

the learned A.S.G. to be a standalone and independent offence

has been incorrectly placed before this Court. It was submitted

that the offence of money laundering is always dependent on

predicate offence(s) and that the PML Act envisages that only once

predicate offence(s) is/are established then can the trial be

separated, and may be seen independently for he said purpose

alone.

33. Arguendo, it was submitted that there may be certain

issues/defences available to the accused with respect to predicate

offence(s) which may not be applicable/available to offence(s) of

money laundering, and the differentiation and separation between

predicate offence(s) and money laundering offence(s) is to be

taken at such stage once predicate offence(s) is/are established

against the accused, and not at any stage before that.

34. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that it was

contended by the learned A.S.G. that the judgment rendered in

the case of Harish Fabiani (supra), as relied upon on behalf of

the petitioners, is distinguished from the factual matrix of the

present case as in that case the FIR impugned therein had already

been quashed; he submitted that keeping the same analogy in

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(52 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

mind, there must be no ECIR if there no FIR for a predicate

offence(s) against any person.

35. It was further submitted that looking into Section 3 of

the PML Act, it a clear departure from such jurisprudence that has

evolved around fiscal and taxation statutes; that the element of

mens rea is of no consequence, and that in the lack of the same

the accused may be prosecuted and penalty be automatically

levied. However, he sought to distinguish the PML Act from the

same by stressing upon the fact that the words, 'knowingly

assists or knowingly is' which have been inserted into the

Statute by the Union Legislature, which, he submitted to be a

clear departure from the jurisprudence as aforementioned. And

that, in the present case, such mens rea or consensus ad idem is

absent and has not been attributed to the petitioners by the

respondent authorities. In order to fortify such submission, he

submitted that had it been the case, the charge for the offence

under 120-B IPC would have been levelled against the petitioner,

which is not the case herein.

3. Offence of money-laundering.--Whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or
activity connected with the 1[proceeds of crime including its
concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or
claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of
money-laundering.

36. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that if the

person(s) are finally acquitted of the charge for the offence(s)

under the PML Act, what would be the effect on the property so

attached under the PML Act.

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(53 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

36.1 He further stated that cooperation cannot be connoted

to have an ambit as wide as has been argued on behalf of the

respondents, and that just because the present petitioners did not

confess or admit to wrongdoing; the same cannot amount to non

cooperation. Taking a step further, it was further argued that if the

petitioner(s) did not know the answer to a particular question,

then an answer stating that he/she/they does/do not know,

cannot be construed as non-cooperation. That, whatever the

outcome of such interrogation, the investigating agency i.e. the

Enforcement Directorate ought to either proceed with the

investigation to the next logical step, or stop and refrain from

issuing unwarranted summons to the petitioners and harassing

them. While all the respondent-Enforcement Directorate has done

is to keep the case at the stage of investigation, as it has

remained for the past 7 odd years.

36.2 It was also submitted that the onus of proof of the twin

conditions of bail as laid down in the case of Nikesh Tarachand

(supra) cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to prosecuting the

petitioners.

36.3 Pointing to the language used in the judgment

rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), it

was argued that there is no absolute bar on providing a copy of

the ECIR to person(s), situated as the present petitioners. Going a

step further, learned counsel argued that for any kind of criminal

action instituted against a person(s), a copy of the ECIR ought to

be given. And, a reasoning that the ECIR is merely an internal

document for the purposes of record, relating to a stage prior to

that stage of investigation, as submitted by the counsel for the

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(54 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

respondents in the reply so filed by them; reveals that they are

bound to provide such person(s) with a copy of the ECIR when the

stage of investigation has been crossed, as in the present case,

and that confidentiality cannot be a valid ground for denial of the

same.

36.4 It was also argued that if such copy of ECIR is not

provided, then such person(s) cannot avail of their right to seek

anticipatory bail, and that of the two review petitions pending

before the Hon'ble Apex Court, one petition speaks to such

anomaly, which has risen as a consequence of the judgment

rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), as

essentially the non-providing of a copy of the ECIR would be

tantamount to the taking away the right to anticipatory bail of

person(s), directly weakening and hitting the fundamental liberties

of individual(s).

36.5 Learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of this Court

to the Paragraph 187 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) the

same is reproduced hereunder:-
"CONCLUSION

187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to
summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the
following terms: -

(xviii) (a) In view of special mechanism envisaged by
the 2002 Act, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR
under the 1973 Code. ECIR is an internal document of
the ED and the fact that FIR in respect of scheduled
offence has not been recorded does not come in the
way of the Authorities referred to in Section 48 to
commence inquiry/investigation for initiating "civil
action" of "provisional attachment" of property being
proceeds of crime.

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(55 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

(b) Supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the
person concerned is not mandatory, it is enough if ED
at the time of arrest, discloses the grounds of such
arrest.

(c) However, when the arrested person is produced before
the Special Court, it is open to the Special Court to look into
the relevant records presented by the authorised
representative of ED for answering the issue of need for his/
her continued detention in connection with the offence of
money-laundering.

37. In his rejoinder, learned ASG further clarified that the

stand of the respondents is not that the present petitioners are

not named as accused, but that the investigation with regard to

their involvement in the crime in question is under contemplation.

37.1 The learned ASG again drew the attention of this Court

to Section 3 of the PML Act and stated that the element of mens

rea, as contended on behalf of petitioner-Mahesh Nagar to be an

essential element for the offence under the said Section to be

made out, is a fallacious argument. As per Mr. Rastogi, a bare

perusal of the said Section 3 of the PML Act would reveal, that

mens rea is not an element absolutely essential for the offence of

money laundering to be made out.

Relevant portion of the said Section as emphasized upon, is again

reproduced as hereunder, for ready reference:

3. Offence of money-laundering.--Whosoever directly or
indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its
concealment, possession, acquisition or use and
projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty
of offence of money-laundering.

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(56 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
clarified that,--

(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-
laundering if such person is found to have directly or
indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or
more of the following processes or activities connected
with proceeds of crime, namely:--

(a) concealment; or

(b) possession; or

(d) use; or

(e) projecting as untainted property; or

(f) claiming as untainted property,

in any manner whatsoever;

(ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of
crime is a continuing activity and continues till such
time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the
proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or
acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property
or claiming it as untainted property in any manner
whatsoever.

38. Dr. Shamsuddin, learned counsel also appearing for

petitioner-Sky Light, interjected and submitted that the above-

referred explanation to Section 3, came into effect only on

01.08.2019, while the ECIR in question was recorded much prior

thereto, i.e. in the year 2015.

38.1 He also submitted that the judgments rendered; by the

Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case of Mahanivesh Oils & Foods

Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in

the case of Obulapuram Mining Company (supra), were not

overruled.

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(57 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

39. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as

perused the record of the case, alongwith the judgments cited at

the Bar.

40. At the outset, this Court observes that the judgment as

rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) has

not been stayed, holds the field as on today and is a complete law

binding on all the Courts in the country, and thus in the interest of

judicial discipline no deviation from the same can be made owing

to mere pendency of the review petitions filed against the said

judgment, more particularly when the said precedent law has

already laid down exhaustive directions.

41. This Court further observes that the present petitions

have been preferred with the prayer that the ECIR in question be

brought on the record, and the same, alongwith all the

proceedings emanating therefrom, be quashed qua the present

petitioners, and, pending consideration of the present petitions, no

coercive action shall be taken against petitioner-Mahesh Nagar, in

pursuance of the ECIR in question.

42. This Court observes that two issues arise for the

consideration in the present petitions;

42.1 Whether the copy of the ECIR in question may be given

to the petitioners,

42.2 Whether the ECIR in question may be quashed and if

so, on on what grounds.

43. This Court observes that with regard to the first issue,

the law has been crystallized in the judgment rendered by the

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(58 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary

(supra) and therefore is no more res integra.

Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

"177. Thus, ECIR is not a statutory document, nor there is
any provision in 2002 Act requiring Authority referred to in
Section 48 to record ECIR or to furnish copy thereof to the
accused unlike Section 154 of the 1973 Code.

179. ... Suffice it to observe that ECIR cannot be equated
with an FIR which is mandatorily required to be recorded
and supplied to the accused as per the provisions of 1973
Code.

...

CONCLUSION

187. In light of the above analysis, we now proceed to summarise our conclusion on seminal points in issue in the following terms: -

(xviii) (a) In view of special mechanism envisaged by the 2002 Act, ECIR cannot be equated with an FIR under the 1973 Code.

...

(b) Supply of a copy of ECIR in every case to the person concerned is not mandatory, it is enough if ED at the time of arrest, discloses the grounds of such arrest."

43.1 This Court therefore observes that it is at the discretion of the Enforcement Directorate whether to give a copy of the ECIR to persons seeking the same. The copy of the ECIR in question thus cannot be given to the petitioners. The first issue thus stands answered in the aforesaid terms.

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(59 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

44. This Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations with respect to the factual matrix of the instant case, before moving onto the second issue;

44.1 While the present petitioners have not been named as accused or witnesses in the FIRs registered for predicate offences against the accused persons; namely Jai Prakash Bagrwa, Uma Charan, Mahaveer Prasad, Fakir Mohammed, Deepa Ram, Ranjeet Singh, Kishore Singh, Gugangar and Rajendra Kumar Shandilya and Madan Gopal, and in the charge-sheets so filed, as was contended on behalf of the petitioners, a perusal of the supplementary chargesheets bearing Nos.76A and 77A, both dated 07.03.2017, filed in FIR Nos. 114/2015 and 114/2015, mention that the permission was sought to continue with the investigation as under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C. against the present petitioners.

Relevant portion of the same is reproduced as hereunder:

Supplementary Charge-sheet No.76A:

". . . v'kksd dqekj ds fo:) vkjksi i= vUrxZr /kkjk 299 lhvkjihlh esa is'k djus ,oa eSllZ LdkbZykbZV gksLihVhfyVh izk-fy- o vU; ds fo:) vUos"k.k vUrxZr /kkjk 173¼8½ lhvkjihlh eas tkjh j[kus ds vkns'k izkIr fd;sA "

Supplementary Charge-sheet No.77A:

". . . .v'kksd dqekj ds fo:) vkjksi i= vUrxZr /kkjk 299 lhvkjihlh esa is'k djus ,oa eSllZ LdkbZykbZV gksLihVhfyVh izk-fy- o vU; ds fo:) vUos"k.k vUrxZr /kkjk 173¼8½ lhvkjihlh eas tkjh j[kus ds vkns'k izkIr fd;sA "

44.2 The learned A.S.G. also made a statement at Bar that the investigation with relation to the crime in question is still pending and that the same has not reached its logical conclusion. (Downloaded on 22/12/2022 at 09:19:45 PM)

(60 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

45. Moving onto the second issue, this Court observes that an ECIR is not akin to an FIR, and the contentions made on behalf of the petitioners that they ought to be provided a copy of the same as a matter of right does not hold water. In arriving at this conclusion, this Court derives strength from the judgment rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), which has made the legal position amply clear; that an ECIR is merely an internal document created by the Enforcement Directorate upon the basis of which an investigation is conducted. It is equated to a fact finding report, a copy of which cannot be demanded by any persons, unless the competent Court, on the basis of such ECIR, proceeds to take cognizance against any such person(s) under the PML Act.

46. However, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that this is a fit case for the Court to interfere, and it was argued that the exercise of executive power in the instant case was arbitrary.

47. This Court, on an analysis of the catena of judicial precedent cited on the behalf of the petitioner, in order to fortify the said contention, makes the following observations; 47.1 In the judgment rendered in the case of Parvathi Kollur & Anr. (supra), the learned Trial Court had already discharged the persons therein of the offences with which they were charged, under the PML Act, and aggrieved by the order of the Hon'ble High Court whereby such order of discharge was quashed, they had approached the Hon'ble Apex Court. The said (Downloaded on 22/12/2022 at 09:19:45 PM) (61 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018] case thus stands on a different footing than the instant case, as it is was at the stage of discharge, wherein the learned Trial Court upon appreciating evidence before commencement of trial had already discharged the persons therein, and thus the same, does not render any assistance to the case at hand. 47.2 The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement v. M/S Obulapuram Mining Company Private Limited (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4466/2017) vide order dated 24.07.2017 has stayed the operation of the judgment rendered in the case of Obulapuram Mining Company (supra) in the following terms:-

"Leave granted.

In the meantime, the impugned judgment and order will not operate as a precedent.

..."

47.3 The judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Harish Fabiani (supra) also stands on a different footing than the instant case, as the FIR impugned therein, lodged for the predicate i.e. scheduled offence(s) was already quashed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore, the ECIR therein was quashed by the Hon'ble Court.

47.4 The judgment rendered in the case of Arun Kumar Mishra (supra) was challenged before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. Arun Kumar Mishra (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10018/2015) and tagged with the case file of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), and the same are to be decided, while taking into consideration the view as (Downloaded on 22/12/2022 at 09:19:45 PM) (62 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018] taken in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Similar is the status in respect to the judgment rendered in the case of M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. (supra), which is pending consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. M/s Ajanta Merchants Pvt. Ltd. Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 009987/2015).

47.5 The Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the challenge laid to the judgment rendered in the case of Seema Garg (supra) and dismissed the same vide order dated 30.04.2021 passed in the case of Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (supra) with the following observation:-

"In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 (1) of the Constitution of India.

The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of."

47.5.1 A bare perusal of judgment rendered in the case of Seema Garg (supra) reveals that the ECIR therein was quashed because upon looking into the facts and circumstances therein it could not be ascertained that the property in question, alleged to be proceeds of crime were directly or indirectly obtained or derived from the scheduled offence. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Apex Court refused to interfere in the said case owing to the peculiar facts therein.

47.5.2 Therefore, as is clear from the above discussion, the said case is distinguishable from the factual matrix of the present case. Furthermore, such a determination of the property in (Downloaded on 22/12/2022 at 09:19:45 PM) (63 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018] question, as was made in Seema Garg (supra) cannot be made in the instant case at the present stage.

47.6 This Court further observes that in the case of Santosh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the appeal therein was seized of a matter pertaining to the CrPC and not the PML Act. And that, therefore, the same cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the present case.

47.7 The judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) is not applicable to the issues before this Court, and therefore, does not require any deliberation.

48. This Court further observes that the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that since they have not been named in the prosecution complaint, the same ought to be considered as a ground for quashment of the ECIR in question cannot be accepted, as the same is an irrelevant consideration for quashment of ECIR in question, for reasons already stated hereinabove.

49. It was also contended on behalf of the present petitioners that the officers of the Enforcement Directorate are also not categorized as police officers and therefore, the bar under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not apply to them, however, the same cannot be accepted for reasons already stated hereinabove.

50. This Court finds force in the submissions of the learned ASG that the criminal and civil proceedings under the PML Act are (Downloaded on 22/12/2022 at 09:19:45 PM) (64 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018] independent and separate from each other, and may run simultaneously. In arriving at such a conclusion, this Court derives strength from the language of the provision of law as contained in Section 8 of the PML Act, further clarified by the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in the case of Kavitha G. Pillai (supra).

51. Needless to say, and as has already been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), the PML Act was brought in with a special legislative intention, and therefore, it prevails over the provisions of Cr.P.C., in case of any conflict. Moreover, this Court is inclined agree with the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in the judgment rendered in the case of P. Rajendran (supra), wherein it was observed that the offence of money laundering under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the PML Act is an independent and standalone offence, and as such is a criminal act independent from that of predicate offence(s).

52. In the present case, FIRs have been registered against the accused persons, with respect to offences under the PML Act, whereby they have been chargesheeted for predicate offence(s), and the same upon having been presented before the concerned Special Court; cognizance has been taken against them, and the case against them is currently at the stage of framing of charge.

53. Moreover, in the instant case, the present petitioners have not been arrayed as accused, and at the given stage, seeking the intervention of this Court for quashment of the ECIR in question, is pre-mature.

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(65 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018]

54. At the cost of repetition, this Court observes that the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), has settled the legal position, that at a stage, akin to the one prevailing the case at hand, the scope of interference by the Courts is limited and narrow, more so, looking into the attendant facts and circumstances of the case at hand.

55. This Court also does not find any force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner-Mahesh Nagar that the element of mens rea is a pre-requisite for the offence under Section 3 of the PML Act, to be made out.

56. The Courts must certainly step in and thwart any and all kinds of injustice, malafide and/or arbitrary exercise of executive power on the liberty of the citizens of this country; however, in absence of the same, any judicial interference in the domain of the executive, would be unwarranted.

57. The precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), as it stands today, is the law of the land, and what is sought before this Court in the present petitions regarding providing a copy of ECIR in question, if granted to the present petitioners, the same would be in direct violation of the mandate of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as laid down in the said case. More so, in the given factual matrix wherein predicate offences have been found to be made out against the accused persons, and the process of investigation as under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is pending with respect to present petitioners, the petitioners have failed to indicate any violation; of (Downloaded on 22/12/2022 at 09:19:45 PM) (66 of 67) [CRLW-462/2018] any procedure as provided for under the PML Act, or of the principles as laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) so as to warrant the interference of this Court in the impugned ECIR.

58. As an upshot of the above discussion, and keeping in mind the above cited catena of judicial precedents, more particularly, Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), and the submissions made, this Court does not find that any case is made out so as to grant the relief to the present petitioners, as prayed for in the instant petitions, at the present stage; more so when the issue in question is no longer res integra, in view of the judgment rendered in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra).

59. Consequently, the present petitions do not merit acceptance, and the same are accordingly dismissed.

60. However, in the interest of justice, it is directed that the interim orders dated 19.12.2018 (in petition No.462/2018) and 21.02.2018 (in petition No.18/2018) passed by this Hon'ble Court, which have been operative all throughout the adjudication, shall remain in currency for the next two weeks i.e. 05.01.2023, and thereafter, the same shall automatically stand vacated.

61. After the judgment was pronounced, Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing through Video Conferencing made a request that the aforementioned interim orders, which have been extended for two weeks from today i.e. upto 05.01.2023, may be extended for four weeks i.e. upto 19.01.2023.

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                                                                           (67 of 67)                 [CRLW-462/2018]


                                   61.1       In the given circumstances, such request made by

                                   learned   Senior   Counsel        is     acceded         to,    and   thus,   the

aforementioned interim orders dated 19.12.2018 (in petition No.462/2018) and 21.02.2018 (in petition No.18/2018) passed by this Hon'ble Court, which have been operative all throughout the adjudication, shall remain in currency for a period of four weeks from today i.e. upto 19.01.2023, and the same shall automatically stand vacated on that date itself.

(DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI), J.

Skant/-

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