Karnataka High Court
Sri Manjunath P vs The Inspector General Of Registration ... on 8 February, 2023
Author: G.Narendar
Bench: G.Narendar
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WP No. 2938 of 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2023
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE G.NARENDAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
WRIT PETITION NO. 2938 OF 2023 (S-KSAT)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI MANJUNATH P,
SON OF LATE BASAVARAJ,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
FIRST DIVISION ASSISTANT,
(NOW UNDER SUSPENSION)
RESIDING AT VIDYANAGAR,
NEAR NIJALINGAPPA SCHOOL,
HOSADURGA,CHITRADURGA DISTRICT.
...PETITIONER
(BY SMT.MANJULA V A, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed by
BELUR
RANGADHAMA 1. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF REGISTRATION AND
NANDINI
Location: HIGH COMMISSIONER OF STAMPS IN KARNATAKA,
COURT OF
KARNATAKA 8TH FLOOR, KANDAYA BHAVAN,
K G ROAD, BANGALORE - 560009.
...RESPONDENT
(SMT. SHILPA S GOGI, HCGP FOR STATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
I)ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIIORARI BY
QUASHING THE ORDER DATED 30/01/2023 IN APPLICATION
NO.5663/2022 (VIDE ANNEXURE-B) PASSED BY THE
KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE
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WP No. 2938 of 2023
BENCH. II) CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE APPLICATION FILED
BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE KARNATAKA STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE BENCH IN
APPLICATION NO.5663/2022 III)PASS SUCH OTHER ORDERS.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING THIS DAY, G.NARENDAR J., MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
ORDER
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
2. In the instant writ petition, petitioner is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal dated 30.01.2023 whereby the Tribunal has been pleased to reject the petition wherein the validity of the order dated 07.05.2022 (Annexure - A2) was challenged, on account of which petitioner came to be placed under suspension and sought for revocation of the suspension and grant of all consequential benefits.
3.
3. The facts in brief are that the petitioner was holding the substantive post of First Division Assistant and was placed in-charge of the post of Sub-Registrar, Hosadurga and he was discharging the duties as the in-
-3- WP No. 2938 of 2023charge Sub-registrar. A complaint came to be lodged with ACB, Chitradurga by one D H Guruprasad stating that the petitioner had demanded illegal gratification for discharging his official duties as an in-charge Sub-
registrar, that is, for completing the work of registration of mortgage deed. On the basis of the complaint, a trap came to be laid by the ACB Police and the trap was successful leading to the arrest of the petitioner and he was sent to judicial custody on 20.04.2022 and remained in judicial custody till 28.04.2022, on which date he came to be enlarged on bail in Crime No.3/2022.
4. The facts narrated above are clearly covered by the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957.
Sub-rule (2) reads as under:
"10(2) - a Government Servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of Appointing Authority.-
(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours;-4- WP No. 2938 of 2023
(b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-
eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction".
5. In this regard, the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in the case of Sri Basavaraju M and another Versus The Commissioner, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagar Palike and Another1, has observed as under:-
"5. A reading of sub-Rule (2) of Rules 10 of the K.C.S. Rules would clearly negate the contention of the petitioners that the impugned order is passed without authority. The fact remains that the petitioners were arrested and detained on 29.11.2016 and continued in custody till 07.12.2016 i.e., for a period in excess of 48 hours. The provisions of sub-rule(2) of Rule 10 of the K.C.S Rules is a deeming provision, by which a Government servant, who is detained in the custody for a period in excess of 48 hours shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension as if by an order passed by the competent authority. The implication is that the Government servant shall remain automatically suspended from service if he/she is in detention for a period in excess of 48 hours. The order impugned herein has to be read as communication of the deemed suspension.
6. As regards the legality of a rule providing for deemed suspension, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nelson Motis v. Union of India; while interpreting similar provisions of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 Rule 10(4) was pleased to 1 ILR 2017 Kar 2213 -5- WP No. 2938 of 2023 uphold the concept of deemed suspension has observed as follows:
7. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that while in a case governed by sub-rule (3), a government servant, on the order of his punishment by way of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service being set aside, stands suspended only if he had been under suspension earlier, sub-rule (4) provides for automatic suspension of a government servant, even if he was never under suspension at any point of time [emphasis supplied by me]; and this invidious distinction amounts to illegal discrimination which renders sub-rule (4) unconstitutional. The argument is that with a view to save the sub-rule, its application has to be limited to cases in which the government servant has been, during the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, under suspension. The learned counsel proceeded to say that the established principle of interpretation favouring reading down of a statutory provision in order to avoid it being struck down as illegal, is applicable to this case. If this is found not possible in view of the clear language of sub-rule (4), the same should be struck down as unconstitutional. In either event, it should be further held that the appellant, who was not under suspension earlier, cannot be treated to have been placed under suspension when his writ petition was allowed by the Tribunal. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal in N.V. Karwarkar v.
Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu. Reference was also made to certain observations of this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, and Divisional Personnel Officer, Western Railway v. Sunder Dass.
8. The language of sub-rule (4) of Rule 10 is absolutely clear and does not permit -6- WP No. 2938 of 2023 any artificial rule of interpretation to be applied. It is well established that if the words of a statute are clear and free from any vagueness and are, therefore, reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, it must be construed by giving effect to that meaning, irrespective of consequences [emphasis supplied by me]. The language of the sub-rule here is precise and unambiguous and, therefore, has to be understood in the natural and ordinary sense. As was observed in innumerable cases in India and in England, the expression used in the statute alone declares the intent of the legislature. In the words used by this Court in State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj when the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the act speaks for itself. Reference was also made in the reported judgment to Maxwel stating:
The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words.
The comparison of the language with that of sub-rule (3) reinforces the conclusion that sub-rule (4) has to be understood in the natural sense. It will be observed that in sub-rule (3) the reference is to a Government servant under suspension while the words under suspension, are omitted in sub- rule (4). Also the sub-rule (3) directs that on the order of punishment being set aside, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force but in sub-rule (4) it has been said that the Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension. The departure made by the author in the language of sub-rule (4) from that of sub- rule (3) is conscious and there is no scope for -7- WP No. 2938 of 2023 attributing the artificial and strained meaning thereto. In the circumstances it is not permissible to read down the provisions as suggested. We, therefore, hold that as a result of sub-rule (4) a government servant, though not earlier under suspension, shall also be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, provided of course, that the other conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. [emphasis supplied by me]
7. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, a reading of sub-Rule (2) of Rules 10 of the K.C.S. Rules as extracted supra leaves no scope for ambiguity and is framed in categorical terms. The suspension of a Government servant who has been detained in custody for a period exceeding 48 hours is by operation of the statute as if an order is passed by the Competent Authority itself. This is the deeming fiction and whereby it shall be presumed that an order of suspension by the Competent Authority automatically comes into existence in the particular case as set-out in the provisions of sub-
Rule (2) of Rule 10 of K.C.S. Rules and no separate order placing the official under suspension is required to be made by the Competent Authority.
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that this malaise of corruption has pervaded all walks of life and has to be weeded out and has to be dealt with an iron hand. It is seen that the petitioners have been arrested on a complaint of having indulged in corruption and they have been placed in detention for a period in excess of 48 hours.
In view of the above the provision of sub-Rule (2) of Rules 10 of K.C.S. Rules automatically comes into play and the provisions takes effect once the Government servant's detention in custody extends beyond 48 hours. Hence, the challenge to Annexure-"A" on the premise that it is without authority of law is without substance.
-8- WP No. 2938 of 2023The Petition being devoid of merits is accordingly dismissed".
6. The short factual narrations made above, more particularly, the two dates i.e. the date of his arrest and remand to judicial custody i.e. 20.04.2022 and the date on which he was released on bail on 28.04.2022 are not disputed. That being the case, the DGO is deemed to have been placed under suspension once he completes 48 hours in custody. There is no dispute over the fact that the petitioner remained in custody for more than 48 hours.
That being the admitted position, the order of suspension dated 07.05.2022 is a superfluous proceeding.
Suspension being by an act of law, issuing suspension order itself was redundant.
7. In view of the application which is challenged and in view of the deemed provision whereby a Government servant is deemed to have been placed under suspension in the event of his completing more than 48 hours in custody on a criminal charge, the order to which -9- WP No. 2938 of 2023 challenge has been made is a redundant proceeding. The applicant could have only sought for revocation of the deemed suspension. Therefore, it is open to the petitioner to seek for such revocation in accordance with law.
In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. Accordingly, writ petition stands rejected.
SD/-
JUDGE SD/-
JUDGE BRN