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[Cites 22, Cited by 1]

Gujarat High Court

State Of Gujarat vs Manohar @ Manu Chanchaldas Sindhi & 5 on 8 December, 2017

Author: Abhilasha Kumari

Bench: Abhilasha Kumari, B.N. Karia

                 R/CR.A/764/1994                                                CAV JUDGMENT




                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 764 of 1994



         FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


         HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA KUMARI
         and
         HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.N. KARIA
         ==========================================================

1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed Yes to see the judgment ?

2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of No the judgment ?

4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of No law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ? ========================================================== STATE OF GUJARAT....Appellant Versus MANOHAR @ MANU CHANCHALDAS SINDHI & 5 .... Respondents ========================================================== Appearance:

MS JIRGA D JHAVERI, ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Appellant MR J M PANCHAL, ADVOCATE, MR K J PANCHAL, ADVOCATE for the Respondents ========================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA KUMARI and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.N. KARIA Date : 08/12/2017 C.A.V. JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE ABHILASHA KUMARI) Page 1 of 64 HC-NIC Page 1 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT
1. The State of Gujarat has preferred the present  appeal   assailing   the   judgment   and   order   dated  11.04.1994, passed by the City Sessions Court,  Ahmedabad, in Sessions Case No.292/1992, whereby  all six respondents, original accused, have been  acquitted of the Charge under Sections 30234395 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("the  IPC"), by giving them the benefit of doubt. 
2. The   case   of   the   prosecution   is   to   the   effect  that   Nitaben   (the   deceased),   wife   of   the  complainant Premchand Maganlal, used to stay at  the   address   given   in   the   complaint   with   her  husband   and   children.   The   deceased   had   family  relations with respondent accused No.1, Manohar  alias Manu Chanchaldas Sindhi, for a long period  of   time.   She   frequently   visited   his   house   and  respondent No.1 used to visit her home. As per  the   case   of   the   prosecution   on   24.04.1992,   at  about 9:00 PM, respondent No.1 came to the house  of   the   deceased   and   told   her   to   come   to   his  house that day. The deceased went to the house  of   respondent   No.1,   situated   at   G­Ward,  Page 2 of 64 HC-NIC Page 2 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Kubernagar     at   about   10:00   PM,   in   an  autorickshaw.   Respondent   No.1,   his   brothers,  namely,   Dhanraj   alias   Dhanu   Chanchaldas   Sindhi  (respondent   accused   No.2),   Meghraj   alias   Megho  Chanchaldas   Sindhi   (respondent   accused   No.3),  Anita Dharmraj Sindhi (respondent accused No.4 - 

wife   of   respondent   No.2),   Babita   alias   Mamta  Meghraj Sindhi (respondent accused No.5 ­ wife  of   respondent   No.3)   and   Pushpaben   Chanchaldas  Sindhi   (respondent   accused   No.6   ­   sister   of  respondents   Nos.1   to   3),   were   present   there.  Respondent   No.1   and   his   brothers   started  demanding   money   from   the   deceased,   who   stated  that she had no money. Respondent No.1 then told  her   to   sell   her   ornaments   and   give   them   the  money   but   the   deceased   refused   to   sell   her  ornaments.   Therefore,   respondents   Nos.1   to   3,  their   sister   respondent   No.6,   along   with  respondents Nos.4 and 5, colluded together and  started   giving   kick   and   fist   blows   to   the  deceased.   Respondents   Nos.1   to   3   also   started  beating the deceased with sticks. The deceased  began to shout but the respondents covered her  Page 3 of 64 HC-NIC Page 3 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT mouth. Respondent No.6 brought a can of kerosene  and poured it over the deceased and respondent  No.3 lit the match and set the deceased ablaze.  When the clothes of the deceased caught fire and  the   deceased   started   burning,   the   respondents  receded   to   a   distance.     Taking   advantage   of  this, the deceased ran out of the house of the  respondents   and   started   shouting   for   help.  People gathered upon hearing her shouts but none  tried to save her or extinguish the flames. The  deceased saw a heap of sand and extinguished the  flames by rolling herself on it. She then took  an autorickshaw and went to the Police Station.  The   arms,   legs,   face,   back   and   chest   of   the  deceased   had   got   burnt.   Police   Sub   Inspector  Mr.N.C.Oza (PW­7) was on duty at the Sardarnagar  Police   Station   during   the   night   between  24.04.1992   and   25.04.1992,   when   the   deceased  came to the Police Station at 23:00 Hrs. in a  burnt condition. The Police took her in a mobile  van to the Civil Hospital for treatment. As her  Dying Declaration was to be recorded, the said  Police   Officer   took   the   opinion   of   the   Doctor  Page 4 of 64 HC-NIC Page 4 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT and   sent   a   Note   (Yaadi)   to   the   Executive  Magistrate,   who   came   and   recorded   the   Dying  Declaration of the deceased. As the deceased was  conscious, PW­7 recorded her complaint. He could  not  take the  signature  of  the deceased on the  said complaint as both her hands were bandaged.  A   note   was   made   to   this   effect   at   the   places  where her signatures were required. Thereafter,  PW­7   sent   his   report   to   the   Police   Station  Officer to record the offence. Nitaben died on  30.04.1992 at 21:30 Hrs. PW­7 then visited the  Civil   Hospital   and   the   Inquest   Panchnama   was  drawn in the presence of two Panch Witnesses. On  25.04.1992, at 00:45 Hrs., the investigation was  taken over by Mr.D.V.Pandey (PW­8). The clothes  worn by the deceased at the time of the incident  were   taken   into   custody   and   several   Muddamal  articles   were   collected   from   the   scene   of  offence.   The   statements   of   witnesses   were  recorded and experts from the Forensic Science  Laboratory   (FSL)   visited   the   scene   of   offence  and   prepared   a   Panchnama.   A   sample   of   mud,  soaked with kerosene, was taken from the back of  Page 5 of 64 HC-NIC Page 5 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT the house of the respondents. A `Kapaas' brand  match­box, a half burnt match­stick and a half­ burnt   slipper   were   recovered   from   another  street. Respondents Nos.4, 5 and 6 were arrested  on   25.04.1992   and   respondents   Nos.1,   2   and   3  were taken into custody on 26.04.1992. All the  Muddamal articles were sent to the FSL. 

3. As   the   prosecution   had   gathered   sufficient  evidence against the respondents, a Chargesheet  was   filed   in   the   Court   of   the   learned  Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No.17, Ahmedabad,  for  the  offence  under  Section 302  of  the  IPC.  The   offences   with   which   the   respondents   were  charged   were   triable   only   by   a   Court   of  Sessions,   the   learned   Magistrate   committed   the  case   to   the   Sessions   Court   on   10.08.1992.   The  Charge   against   the   respondents   was   framed   on  17.06.1993.   The   respondents   denied   their   guilt  and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the case  was put to trial. 

4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined  nine   witnesses   and   produced   documentary  Page 6 of 64 HC-NIC Page 6 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT evidence.   The   statements   of   the   respondents  under   Section   313   of   the   Code   of   Criminal  Procedure, 1973 ("the Code") were recorded. The  response of the respondents was that of denial.  They added that they were innocent and had been  falsely implicated. 

5. After framing the points for determination and  appreciating   and   examining   the   oral   and  documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court,  by the impugned judgment and order, found that  the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of  the   respondents   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   The  Trial   Court   found   several   contradictions   and  discrepancies   in   the   Dying   Declarations,   which  have been minutely discussed in the judgment. On  the   basis   of   the   reasons   recorded   in   the  judgment,   the   learned   Sessions   Judge   acquitted  the   respondents   by   giving   them   the   benefit   of  doubt. 

6. Ms.Jirga   D.   Jhaveri,   learned   Additional   Public  Prosecutor,   has   submitted   that   the   impugned  judgment and order of acquittal is contrary to  Page 7 of 64 HC-NIC Page 7 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT law, facts and the evidence on record and hence,  deserves to be quashed and set aside. That the  learned   Judge   has   failed   to   appreciate   and  consider that the deceased, herself, went to the  Police Station and informed the Police about the  incident.   She   was   straightaway   taken   to   the  Civil   Hospital   in   a   mobile   van,   where   her  complaint was recorded. She was conscious at the  time, as has  been endorsed by the  Doctor. The  Executive Magistrate was informed and the Dying  Declaration   of   the   deceased   was   recorded.   The  deceased has specifically named all the accused  persons in her complaint as well as in the Dying  Declaration.   The   FIR   has   been   proved   by   the  Investigating   Officer   who   has   recorded   the  complaint. Hence, the version of the complainant  ought   to   have   been   believed   by   the   learned  Judge.

7. That,   in   the   Dying   Declaration   as   well,   the  deceased has named all the accused persons and  narrated the entire sequence of events regarding  the   incident.   The   deceased   was   conscious   when  she   gave   the   complaint   and   when   the   Dying  Page 8 of 64 HC-NIC Page 8 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Declaration   was   recorded   by   the   Executive  Magistrate.   The   incident   took   place   on  24.04.1992 and the deceased died six days later,  on 30.04.1992.

8. That the narration of the victim is corroborated  by the postmortem report. As per the Panchnama,  the   place   of   incident   is   the   house   of   the  accused. There is no contradiction between the  Dying   Declaration   and   the   complaint.   Moreover,  the deceased also gave an oral Dying Declaration  before   her   husband.   Therefore,   in   the   face   of  such evidence, the learned Judge ought to have  given   due   weightage   to   the   case   of   the  prosecution   and   convicted   the   accused   for   the  offences with which they are charged.

9. That, in the present case, there are two Dying  Declarations   apart   from   the   oral   Dying  Declaration before the husband of the deceased.  There   may   be   certain   omissions   and  inconsistencies   in   the   said   Dying   Declarations  but   this   does   not   mean   that   all   of   them   get  vitiated in entirety. 

Page 9 of 64 HC-NIC Page 9 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT In support of the above submission, reliance is  placed   by   the   learned   Additional   Public  Prosecutor upon a judgment of the Supreme Court  in  Shudhakar   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   -  (2012)7 SCC 569.

10. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further  submitted   that   as   per   the   case   of   the  prosecution,   the   incident   occurred   in,   or  outside, the house of the respondents.  However,  in   their   statements   under   Section   313,   the  respondents have merely denied the incident and  have not given any reasonable explanation. 

11. In   light   of   the   above   submissions,   learned  Additional Public Prosecutor has urged the Court  to accept the appeal and set aside the judgment  and order under challenge

12. Opposing the submissions advanced by the learned  Additional   Public   Prosecutor,   Mr.J.M.Panchal,  learned   counsel   for   the   respondents     has  submitted   that   the   case   rests   upon  circumstantial   evidence   as   there   are   no   eye  witnesses. The prosecution has relied upon two  Page 10 of 64 HC-NIC Page 10 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Dying   Declarations,   namely,   the   complaint  (Ex.42)   and   the   Dying   Declaration   recorded   by  the   Executive   Magistrate   (Ex.37).   Reliance   has  also been placed by the prosecution on the oral  Dying Declaration purported to have been given  by   the   deceased   to   her   husband.   These   three  pieces  of  evidence  are  crucial  to  the  case  of  the   prosecution   but   all   three   suffer   from  material contradictions, making them unreliable  and untrustworthy.

13. It   is   submitted   that   there   is   no   dispute  regarding   the   legal   position   that   if   a   Dying  Declaration is found to be reliable, trustworthy  and truthful, it can even form the basis of the  conviction of the accused. At the same time, the  legal   position   is   also   clear   that   the   Dying  Declaration is required to be put to minute and  close scrutiny before  it  can  be  believed  as  a  sole piece of evidence to implicate the accused.  Hence,   the   Dying   Declarations   on   record   are  required   to   be   put  to   minute   scrutiny   with   a  "microscopic eye". 

Page 11 of 64 HC-NIC Page 11 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT In   this   regard,   learned   counsel   for   the  respondents has placed reliance on the very same  judgment cited by the learned Additional Public  Prosecutor, in the case of  Shudhakar   v.   State   of Madhya Pradesh  (supra).

14. Elaborating   further,   learned   counsel   for   the  respondents   submits   that   the   basic   requirement  of   a   Dying   Declaration   is   that   it   should   be  truthful.   If   there   are   more   than   one   Dying  Declarations, they should be consistent in all  material   aspects,   therefore,   the   necessity   of  scrutiny with a microscopic eye has been felt by  the Supreme Court in the above judgment. On one  hand, it can be said that a dying person would  not lie, but it is also true that when the Dying  Declaration is being recorded, the accused would  not   be   present.   Dying   Declarations   are   not  recorded on oath and the victim is not available  for cross­examination. Under the circumstances,  a   minute   scrutiny   of   a   Dying   Declaration   is  required to be made. In  the present  case,  the  two   Dying   Declarations   in   the   form   of   the  complaint   (Ex.42)   and   the   Dying   Declaration  Page 12 of 64 HC-NIC Page 12 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT recorded by the Executive Magistrate (Ex.37) and  the oral Dying Declaration stated to have been  given   by   the   deceased   to   her   husband,   are  totally inconsistent with each other. In fact,  they   are   so   mutually   contradictory   that   they  raise grave doubts.

15. That,   both   the   deceased   and   her   husband   PW­1,  have suppressed the fact that the deceased had  divorced   her   husband   (PW­1)   and   married  respondent   No.1.   She   had   later   divorced  respondent   No.1   and   remarried   PW­1.   Documents  proving these events have been exhibited and are  on   record.   The   deceased   has   stated   in   the  complaint   that   she   had   family   relations   with  respondent No.1 but has failed to disclose that  she had married him after divorcing her husband.  She   then   divorced   him   to   remarry   her   husband.  Such   suppression   of   facts   diminishes   the  truthfulness and credibility of the deceased and  PW­1. That it appears from the Dying Declaration  that the Executive Magistrate asked the deceased  regarding her relationship with respondent No.1,  to which she  answered  that he was  the  brother  Page 13 of 64 HC-NIC Page 13 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT ("Dharam No Bhai") of her husband. This reply is  in   contradiction   to   her   statement   in   the  complaint where she does not refer to respondent  No.1   in   this   manner   but   states   that   she   had  family relations with him.

16. That,   the   deceased   has   falsely   roped   in   the  entire   family   of   the   respondents,   including  three ladies, in a serious case of murder. She  was playing with the lives of six persons and in  that   context,   her   own   conduct   and   character  deserves to be considered. There are documents  on record that throw light upon this aspect. Not  only had the deceased divorced her husband and  married respondent No.1, whom she later divorced  and  remarried  her husband, but  she  was in the  habit   of   luring   and   entrapping   men   to   exhort  money from  them.  A complaint  was filed by one  Kanaiyalal in this regard. There are photographs  and newspaper articles to this effect at Exs.26  and 27. It is submitted by  learned counsel for  the   respondents   that  normally,   he   would   not  refer to the character of the deceased unless it  was   imperative   to   prove   that   she   was   not   a  Page 14 of 64 HC-NIC Page 14 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT truthful person even in her lifetime, therefore,  no   credence   can   be  attached   to   the   Dying  Declarations given by her. 

17. It   is   further   submitted   that   the   Dying  Declarations   are   falsified   by   the   evidence  adduced   by   the   prosecution   itself.   Several  inconsistencies,   contradictions   and  discrepancies   emerging   from   the   case   of   the  prosecution have been pointed out by the learned  counsel   which,   according   to   him,   demolish   it  completely. The basic infirmities pointed out by  him would be referred to later in the judgment. 

18. It   is   next   submitted   that   in   the   Dying  Declaration, the place of the offence has been  changed.   The   Panchnama   recorded   by   the   FSL  Expert states that traces of kerosene, a match­ box and a half burnt match­stick were found in  the lane outside the house of the respondents,  but no signs of kerosene, blackening of walls or  burning  were  to  be  found  inside  the house,  as  stated by the deceased in the complaint. In the  said complaint, the deceased has narrated that  Page 15 of 64 HC-NIC Page 15 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT respondent   No.6   Pushpaben   poured   kerosene   upon  her and respondent No.3 Meghraj set her ablaze,  whereas in the Dying Declaration she has stated  that respondent No.1 asked his sister respondent  No.6 to bring kerosene, respondent No.2 Dhanraj  poured the kerosene on her and respondent No.3  Meghraj took out a match­box from his pocket and  lit it. 

19. That,   there   is   a   material   contradiction  regarding   the   place   of   incident.   In   the  complaint, the deceased states that she was set  ablaze   inside   the   house   of   respondent   No.1,  whereas,   in   reply   to   a   question   put   by   the  Executive   Magistrate,   she   states   that   the  incident took place outside the back­door of the  house of respondent No.1. In reply to a question  by the Executive Magistrate as to who had burnt  her,   the   deceased   took   the   names   of  all   six  respondents   and   roped   in   the   entire   family.  However,   she   has   given   a   different   version   in  the complaint. 

20. That as per the evidence of PW­3 Sonu Rameshlal  Page 16 of 64 HC-NIC Page 16 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Hirani, he saw the deceased coming to the house  of the respondents carrying a polythene bag in  her   hand.   It   is   more   than   possible   that   the  deceased had herself come with kerosene in the  polythene bag. Pieces of the polythene bag were  found   outside   the   house   of   the   respondents,  which smelt of kerosene. No such bag was found  in the  house  of  the  respondents. PW­3  has not  been   contradicted   or   declared   hostile,  therefore, his evidence ought to be relied upon. 

21. That one of the Panch Witnesses of the Panchnama  of the Scene of Offence has turned hostile. The  other   Panch   Witness   was   not   examined   by   the  prosecution   and   the   evidence   was   closed.   The  defence   gave   an   application,   after   which   the  second Panch Witness was examined. 

22. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   has  submitted that the conflicting versions given by  the   deceased   in   the   complaint   and   the   Dying  Declaration   are   material   in   nature.   The   said  contradictions   go   to   the   very   root   of   the  matter,   making   both   the   Dying   Declarations  Page 17 of 64 HC-NIC Page 17 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT unreliable.

23. That,   the   chain   of   circumstantial   evidence   is  not at all complete. The so­called incriminating  circumstances certainly do not point towards the  guilt   of   the   accused   excluding   every   other  hypothesis.   It   is   submitted   that,   as   per   the  settled   position   of   law,   where   two   views   are  possible, the view favouring acquittal, as taken  by the Trial Court, ought to be upheld. It is  urged that in the present case, only one view is  possible   and   that   view   has   been   taken   by   the  Trial   Court   by   rightly   acquitting   the  respondents.   Hence,   the   judgment   and   order   of  the   Trial   Court,   being   just,   proper   and  supported   by   cogent   reasons,   deserves   to   be  confirmed and the appeal dismissed.

24. Before   dealing   with   the   rival   submissions,   it  would be appropriate to take a brief look at the  oral and documentary evidence on record. 

25. Premchand Maganbhai Motwani, the husband of the  deceased, has been examined as PW­1. He claims  to have  been  in  Mumbai  when  the  incident  took  Page 18 of 64 HC-NIC Page 18 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT place. He returned the next day on 25.04.1992.  On   reaching   home,   he   was   informed   by   his  daughter,   Mona,   that   somebody   had   burnt   her  mother and she was in Hospital. On reaching the  Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, he saw his wife in a  burnt   condition.   He,   however,   states   that   she  was conscious and could speak slowly. He claims  to have spoken to the deceased and asked her how  the   incident   occurred.   According   to   this  witness,   the   deceased   told   him   that   "Manubhai  (respondent No.1) had called me to Kubernagar,  so   I   went   there.   Thereafter,   those   people  together beat me up and burnt me". As she could  not speak much, he did not question her further. 

26. In   cross­examination,   this   witness   admits  stating before the Police that the deceased had  an account in the State Bank of India, Saijpur  Bogha   Branch,   in   which   the   balance   was   only  Rs.150/­ for the past eight months. She had no  cheque­book.   He   states   that   he   does   not   know  whether his wife had a gold locket which she had  broken down to make a new necklace. However, he  then states that the locket was broken and after  Page 19 of 64 HC-NIC Page 19 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT adding   more   gold,   a   five   `Tola'   necklace   was  made, but that he did not see the necklace. This  witness   further   states   that   the   deceased   had  sent a telegram against one Kanaiyalal Nathalal  to the Madhupura Police Station in which it was  stated   that   Kanaiyalal   Nathalal   had   looted   a  Kinetic Honda scooter and a gold necklace from  her.   The   Police   took   the   statement   of   this  witness in respect of the complaint and in which  he had stated that he had borrowed Rs.1,50,000/­  from Kanaiyalal, which he could not return. He  states that he does not know whether Kanaiyalal  Nathalal had bought a Kinetic Honda scooter for  his wife from outside Delhi Darwaja. He denies  the   suggestion   that   he   had   stated   before   the  Police  that he had  purchased   a  Kinetic  Honda  scooter   from   Mahesh   Auto   Center   outside  Dariyapur Darwaza one and a half months ago but  could   not   pay   for   it.   As   Kanaiyalal   was   the  guarantor, the owner of Mahesh Auto Centre had  asked   him   for   the   money   which   he   had   paid   on  04.05.1991   and he had given the Kinetic Honda  scooter to Kanaiyalal. This witness was shown a  Page 20 of 64 HC-NIC Page 20 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT photograph which he stated was that of his wife,  with   the   said   Kanaiyalal   Nathalal.   The  photograph is at Ex.26. However, he denies the  suggestion   that   his   wife   used   to   ensnare   and  lure wealthy persons to extort money from them.  He admits that an article was published in the  Western   Times   on   23.09.1991,   containing   a  photograph of his wife. The article is at Ex.27.  He further admits that an article regarding his  wife was also published in "Jay Hind" newspaper  which is at Ex.28.

27. It   further   emerges   from   the   testimony   of   this  witness   that   on   29.04.1991,   his   wife,   the  deceased, had divorced him by way of a Divorce  Deed (Exh.29) which was notarised by a Notary at  the Gheekanta Court. He admits that the deceased  had   then   married   respondent   No.1,   Manohar  Chanchaldas   Sindhi,   on   02.05.1991   and   the  marriage was got registered. The Memorandum of  Marriage   is   at   Ex.30.   He,   however,   denies   the  suggestion that the deceased and respondent No.1  used to live as husband and wife in his flat or  that the deceased had married respondent No.1 in  Page 21 of 64 HC-NIC Page 21 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT order   to   extract   money   from   him.   This   witness  further states that on 25.06.1991, the deceased  divorced respondent No.1. This Divorce Deed is  at   Ex.31.   He   further   states   that   on   the   same  day,   the   deceased   had   remarried   him.   The  Marriage   Registration   Certificate   has   been  admitted by him and is at Ex.32.

28. PW­1 states that when he went to meet his wife  on the day of the incident, he did not see her  wearing two bangles. Even after she died he did  not see bangles or rings on her hand. He states  that   he   last   saw   his   wife   on   19.04.1992   or  20.04.1992 but does not remember whether she had  worn any bangles or rings on that day. He states  that he does not know whether the deceased had  Rs.10,000/­ cash with her. He states that he has  not seen diamond ear­rings with the deceased. He  does   not   remember   whether   the   deceased   was  wearing   glass   bangles   on   the   day   he   left   for  Mumbai.   He   admits   his   statement   before   the  Police   that   his   wife   had   told   him   that   on  24.04.1992, she had gone to Ishwarbhai's house  in Kubernagar to recover the money she had lent  Page 22 of 64 HC-NIC Page 22 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT him and thereafter, respondent No.1 had told her  to come to his house, so she had gone there. He  states   that   before   the   incident,   the   deceased  had never gone to the house of respondent No.1  but   after   June   1991,   respondent   No.1   used   to  come   to   his   house   to   meet   the   deceased.   This  witness   further   states   that   he   does   not   know  whether,   on   the   day   of   the   incident,   the  deceased   had   gone   to   the   house   of   respondent  No.1   with   kerosene   and   a   match­box   or   whether  she   had   poured   kerosene   on   her   person   outside  his house and set herself ablaze.  

29. PW­2,   Durgashankar   Nilkanth   Shrimali   is   the  Panch Witness of the Panchnama of the scene of  offence, at Ex.34. He has turned hostile and has  not supported the case of the prosecution.

30. PW­3,   Sonu   Rameshlal   Hirani,   an   independent  witness, states  that in the  year 1992, he was  employed   by   Bhagwandas   Khalasi.   He   does   not  remember   the   date   on   which   the   incident   took  place but it was about one and a half years from  the  date of his  deposition.  He  states  that  he  Page 23 of 64 HC-NIC Page 23 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT was   going   from   his   shop   when   he   saw   deceased  Nitaben. She had a polythene bag in her hand.

31. In   cross­examination,   this   witness   states   that  it   was   about   9:00   to   9:30   PM   when   he   saw  Nitaben. He reiterates that she had a polythene  bag in her hand but says that he does not know  what   was   inside   the   bag.   He   was   shown   the  Muddamal polythene bag and identified it as the  same   bag   carried   by   the   deceased   when   he   saw  her. 

32. The Executive Magistrate who recorded the Dying  Declaration   of   the   deceased,   Shri   Suryakant  Jivrambhai Patel, has been examined as PW­4, at  Ex.35.   He   states   that   he   had   received   the  "Yaadi"   from   Sardarnagar   Police   Station   to  record   the   Dying   Declaration   at   00:25   Hrs.   On  the   "Yaadi",   the   opinion   of   the   Doctor   was  endorsed,   to   the   effect   that   the   patient   is  conscious. This witness reached the Hospital at  00:45 Hrs. and went to G­2 Ward. A Nurse at the  Hospital     identified   the   deceased.   He   states  that the deceased was conscious when he met her.  Page 24 of 64 HC-NIC Page 24 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT She could speak and reply to his questions. He  started recording the Dying Declaration (Ex.37)  at   00:45   Hrs.   He   asked   deceased   questions   and  wrote down her answers. This witness states that  the  deceased  was  not in a  condition to append  her signatures as both her hands were bandaged.  He   made   an   endorsement   to   this   effect   on   the  Dying Declaration. He states that the deceased  had   stated   before   him   that     "respondent   No.1  came to my house at 9:30 PM and asked me to give  him my scooter. He told me that he had to go to  collect   an   amount   of   Rs.50,000/­   from  Ishwarbhai, that  is  why I  should give  him the  scooter.   Respondent   No.1   took   my   scooter   and  went.   Thereafter,   I   went   to   the   house   of  respondent No.1 at 10:00 PM. He asked me to come  in   and   made   me   sit.   Thereafter,   the   younger  brothers of respondent No.1 caught hold of me.  My   purse   containing   Rs.10,000/­   cash   was  snatched by respondent No.1 who also threatened  to   kill   me."   This   witness   states   that   the  deceased   further   stated   before   him   that  "respondent No.1 told the other respondents to  Page 25 of 64 HC-NIC Page 25 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT bring   the   sword   lying   above   the   room   of   his  mother,   therefore,   being   scared,   I   ran   away.  Respondent No.1 caught hold of me and forcibly  poured kerosene on me and set me ablaze. I ran  out from there and started rolling in the heap  of sand to extinguish the flames. Thereafter, I  sat in a rickshaw and went to Sardarnagar Police  Station   from   where   I   was   taken   to   the   Civil  Hospital". This witness further states that the  deceased   had   told   him   that   when   the   incident  took   place   she   had   worn   four   gold   bangles  weighing   two   tolas,   a   gold   chain   weighing   two  and   a   half   tolas,   diamond   ear­rings   worth  Rs.12,000/­ and a gold ring weighing one and a  half   tolas.   This   witness   states   that   he   wrote  down   whatever   the   deceased   had   stated   in   the  Dying Declaration, which was signed by him. As  the   deceased   could   not   sign,   he   made   an  endorsement to this effect and put his signature  near   the   said   endorsement.   The   Executive  Magistrate   further   states   that   when   he   was  recording   the   Dying   Declaration,   none   of   the  relatives of the deceased were present and this  Page 26 of 64 HC-NIC Page 26 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT endorsement was also made and signed by him.   

33. In   cross­examination,   this   witness   admits   that  when he was recording the Dying Declaration, no  Doctor was present. A Nurse was there but he did  not ask her to call the Doctor. He states that  he is aware that a Doctor is required to make an  endorsement on the Dying Declaration   that the  patient is conscious. However, he did not call  the   Doctor   for   the   entire   duration   while   the  Dying Declaration was being recorded. He tried  to find the Doctor but he could not be found.  However,   he   did   not   state   so   on   the   Dying  Declaration.   He   states   that   he   does   not   know  whether the deceased was wearing bangles or not,  as her hands were bandaged.   He further states  that he did not ask the Nurse whether the Doctor  had injected the deceased with a tranquilizer,  or   not.   When   he   went   to   record   the   Dying  Declaration, the deceased was not being treated  but was just lying there. He further states that  he   recorded   the   Dying   Declaration   in   question  and answer form and wrote the answers as per the  reply of the deceased. He admits that there are  Page 27 of 64 HC-NIC Page 27 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT some corrections in the Dying Declaration.

34. The   Dying   Declaration   is   at   Ex.37.   It   was  commenced   at   00:45   Hrs.   on   25.04.1992   and  concluded at 01:30 Hrs. The Executive Magistrate  asked the deceased where the incident took place  and   she   gave   the   address   of   respondent   No.1's  house. A question was put to her regarding who  had burnt her, in answer to which she took the  names of all the respondents. He then asked her  why   she   had   gone   to   the   house   of   respondent  No.1,   to   which   question   the   deceased   gave   the  following answer: 

"Respondent No.1 had come to my house at 8:30 PM  saying   that   he   wants   to   go   to   the   house   of  Ishwarbhai   Darbar   to   recover   Rs.50,000/­   from  him,   therefore,   I   should   give   him   my   scooter. 
Respondent   No.1   took   my   scooter   and   went   to  Kubernagar and I went at 9:00 PM from Shahibaug  to Kubernagar in a rickshaw." 

The   description   of   the   incident   given   by   the  deceased, as recorded in her Dying Declaration,  is as follows:

Page 28 of 64

HC-NIC Page 28 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT "At  10:00 PM, I took a rickshaw and went to the  house   of   respondent   No.1   who   called   me   inside  and   made   me   sit   down.   Thereafter,   his   brother  came and caught hold of me and asked me to take  off   all   my   jewellery,   stating   that   I   was  cheating him. My ornaments were forcibly taken  off   and   my   purse   with   Rs.10,000/­   cash   was  snatched   from   me.   Respondent   No.1   told   his  younger brother to bring a sword kept above his  mother's room. I got scared and started running  out from the back­door. At that point of time,  respondent No.1 caught hold of me and told his  sister to bring the can of kerosene. His sister  brought the can of kerosene and Dhanraj poured  kerosene   on   me.   Meghraj   took   out   a   match­box  from   his   pocket,   lit   the   match   and   set   me   on  fire.   I   ran   out   into   the   street   and   the  respondents ran after me. I saw a heap of sand  and   tried   to   extinguish   the   flames   on   it. 
Thereafter,   I   ran   to   the   road,   stopped   a  rickshaw   and   went   in   the   said   rickshaw   to  Sardarnagar   Police   Station.   I   lodged   my  complaint and then went to the Hospital." 
Page 29 of 64
HC-NIC Page 29 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT The Executive Magistrate asked the deceased what  her   relationship   with   respondent   No.1   was,   to  which she answered that the said respondent was  her husband's brother "Dharam­no­bhai".

35. Dr.Vinayakrao   Vasudev   Patil,   who   performed   the  postmortem on the body of the deceased, has been  examined as PW­5  at  Ex.38. He states  that the  deceased   had   received   second   and   third   degree  burns on her entire body and describes the burn  injuries in detail. 

36. The postmortem report is at Ex.21, wherein the  cause of death has been stated to be: "Death is  due to shock of Burns and Complications".

37. PW­6,   Sunitaben   Rajkumar   Chavdi,   a   neighbour,  has been declared hostile. In cross­examination  she has stated that on 24.04.1992, when she and  her   family   were   watching   television   at   night,  she  heard  shouts  for help  at  ten o'clock.  She  immediately came out and saw a woman running in  the street opposite her house. She states that  there was a heap of sand beside her house but  she did not see the deceased rolling in the heap  Page 30 of 64 HC-NIC Page 30 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT of   sand   to   extinguish   the   fire.   Nor   has   she  stated so in her Police statement. 

38. PW­7   is   Natvarlal   Chaganlal   Oza,   Police   Sub  Inspector. He states that on the night between  24.04.1992 and 25.04.1992, he was on duty at the  Sardarnagar Police Station from 8:00 PM onwards.  During that time, a lady (deceased) came to the  Police   Station   in   a   burnt   condition   at   about  23:00 Hrs. She was taken to the Hospital by him.  As the Dying Declaration of the lady was to be  recorded,   he   sent   a   Note   to   the   Executive  Magistrate with the endorsement of the Doctor on  it.   The   report   is   in   the   handwriting   of  Constable   Kanaiyalal,   which   he   identified.   The  lady   was   admitted   in   G­2   Ward   of   the   Civil  Hospital.   As   she   was   conscious,   her   complaint  was recorded. This witness states that she could  speak   but   could   not   sign   as   her   hands   were  bandaged.   He   made   an   endorsement   and   put   his  signature   on   it   at   the   places   where   she   was  required to sign. He states that he has recorded  the   complaint   as   narrated   by   the   lady   and  registered it. This witness states that the lady  Page 31 of 64 HC-NIC Page 31 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT has   not   stated   in   the   complaint   that   the  incident   took   place   outside   the   back­door   of  respondent No.1's house. As per the complaint,  the   incident   took   place   inside   the   house   of  respondent No.1. He further states that in the  complaint,   the   deceased   did   not   say   that  respondent No.1 had come to her house at 8:30 PM  to borrow her scooter on the pretext that he had  to   collect   an   amount   of   Rs.50,000/­   from  Ishwarbhai   Darbar   or   that   he   had   taken   the  scooter   and   she   had   gone   to   Kubernagar   in   a  rickshaw.     He  further  states  that  she  did not  state in the complaint that respondent No.1 had  told her to come into the house and sit down or  that   she   had   sat   down   and   respondent   No.1's  brother   came,   caught   hold   of   her   and   demanded  her jewellery, saying that she had cheated him.  He   further   states   that   the   deceased   had   not  stated in the complaint that her jewellery was  forcibly taken by the respondents and her purse  containing Rs.10,000/­ was snatched by them. She  has   also   not   stated   that   respondent   No.1   told  his   younger   brother   to   bring   the   sword   lying  Page 32 of 64 HC-NIC Page 32 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT above   his   mother's   room   or   that   she   felt  frightened and ran out from the back­door. She  has not stated that the respondents caught hold  of her and respondent No.1 asked his sister to  get   a   can   of   kerosene,   which   she   brought,   or  that   respondent   No.2   poured   kerosene   upon   her  and her four gold bangles of two tolas, one gold  necklace of one  and  a half tolas,  two  diamond  ear­rings worth Rs.12,000/­ and two gold rings  with stones weighing one and a half tolas were  looted by the respondents.  Hence, the testimony  of   this   witness   brings   out   the   discrepancies  between   the   version   of   the   deceased   in   the  complaint and that in the Dying Declaration. 

39. The complaint given by the deceased to PW­7 is  at   Ex.42.   In   the   said   complaint,   the   deceased  had   stated   that   she   has   maintained   family  relations   with   respondent   No.1,   who   stays   at  House   No.199,   G­Ward,   Kubernagar   for   a   long  period of time. He frequently visits her house  and   she   frequently   goes   to   his   house.   On  24.04.1992,   at   about   9:00   PM,   respondent   No.1  came to her house and told her to come to his  Page 33 of 64 HC-NIC Page 33 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT house.   The   deceased   went   to   the   house   of  respondent   No.1   at   about   10:00   PM.   Respondent  No.1,   his   brothers   Dhanraj   (respondent   No.2),  Meghraj   (respondent   No.3),   sister   Pushpaben  (respondent No.6), Anita (respondent No.4 - wife  of respondent No.2) and Babita (respondent No.5 

- wife of respondent No.3) were present there.  Respondent No.1 and his brothers demanded money  from the deceased. When she told them that she  had no money, respondent No.1 told her to sell  her   jewellery   and   give   them   the   money.   She  refused   to   give   her   jewellery,   therefore,   all  the respondents started giving her kick and fist  blows. Respondents Nos.1 and 3 started beating  her with sticks. She started screaming but they  all gagged her mouth. The sister of respondent  No.1   brought   a   can   containing   kerosene   from  somewhere and poured it on her. Respondent No.3  lit  a match and  her  clothes  caught  fire.  Soon  her   body   started   burning.   As   she   burned,   the  respondents   retreated   to   a   distance.   Taking  advantage of the situation, she went out through  the   back­door,   screaming.   People   from   the  Page 34 of 64 HC-NIC Page 34 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT neighbourhood gathered but nobody tried to save  her. She saw a heap of sand outside and started  rolling on it, to extinguish the flames. After  the   flames   were   extinguished,   she   hired   a  rickshaw   and   went   to   the   Police   Station,   from  where the Police personnel took her in a mobile  van   to   the   Civil   Hospital   for   treatment.   She  stated   that   she   has   sustained   burns   on   her  hands, legs, face, back and chest, but is fully  conscious. 

40. The   other   Investigating   Officer,  Mr.Damodarprasad   Vaidhnath   Pandey,   Police  Inspector,   has   been   examined   as   PW­8.   He   has  described the procedure undertaken by him while  conducting   the   investigation   and   nothing   much  turns upon his testimony.

41. After PW­8 was examined, a closing Purshis was  filed by the prosecution on 20.01.1994 (Ex.47).  The   defence   gave   an   application   at   Ex.56   to  examine the other Panch witness of the scene of  offence, which was allowed. 

42. Under   the   circumstances,   Rameshkumar   Ramlalit  Page 35 of 64 HC-NIC Page 35 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Thakar,   the   second   Panch   witness   of   the  Panchnama of the Scene of Offence was examined  as PW­9. This witness states that when he was at  his  shop on 25.04.1992, at about 12:15 PM,  he  was called to the Sardarnagar Police Station to  act as a Panch witness of the scene of offence.  He, therefore, went to the spot and   was shown  the   place   by   one   Smitaben.   He   and   the   other  Panch   witness,   the   Police   Inspector   and   the  expert from the FSL, were present there. At the  spot he saw a heap of sand but could not detect  any signs indicating that a person had rolled on  it. Going further down the street, they found a  piece of half­burnt pink cloth which was part of  a blouse. On inspection by him, the other Panch  witness, Police personnel and the FSL expert, it  was found that it smelt of kerosene. Lying next  to it was a pink coloured slipper, smelling of  kerosene. There was also a half­burnt piece of  slipper,   also   smelling   of   kerosene.   A   burnt  match­box was found from the spot, smelling of  kerosene.   These   articles   were   put   in   separate  plastic   boxes   with   paper   slips   containing   the  Page 36 of 64 HC-NIC Page 36 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT signatures of the Panch witnesses and sealed. 

43. In   cross­examination,   this   witness   states   that  all   these   articles   were   found   from   the   street  outside the house of respondent No.1 and nothing  was found from within the house. The FSL expert  examined the interior of the house of respondent  No.1 but did not detect any smell of kerosene.  No traces of kerosene or burning were found in  the  house.  The back­door  of  the  house  did not  smell of kerosene and no traces of kerosene were  found on it. The outside wall of the house did  not contain any signs or odour of kerosene.  

44. The   report   of   the   FSL   is   at   Ex.20.     It   is  clearly   stated   in   the   said   report   that   no  incriminating evidence was found from inside the  house. Articles such as the half­burnt piece of  pink coloured blouse, a match­box with "Kapaas"  written   on   it,   a   burnt   match   stick,   a   pink  slipper and a half­burnt slipper, all smelling  kerosene, were found from the street outside the  house. 

45. After appreciation of the oral and documentary  Page 37 of 64 HC-NIC Page 37 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT evidence on record, the Trial Court arrived at  the conclusion that none of the charges against  the   respondents   could   be   proved   by   the  prosecution   which   had   failed   to   produce  sufficient evidence to hold them guilty beyond  reasonable doubt. The respondents were acquitted  by giving them the benefit of doubt. 

46. The entire case of the prosecution hinges upon  the Dying Declaration recorded by the Executive  Magistrate   at   Ex.37   and   the   complaint   made   by  the deceased prior thereto, at Ex.42, which can  also be considered as a Dying Declaration.

47. It is a settled position of law, reiterated by  the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, that  Section   32   of   the   Evidence   Act,   1872,   is   an  exception   to   the   general   rule   against   the  admissibility   of   hearsay   evidence.   Sub­section  (1)   of   Section   32   makes   the   statement   of   the  deceased admissible in evidence. This statement  is generally described as a Dying Declaration. 

48. In   support   of   her   submissions,   learned  Additional   Public   Prosecutor   has   relied   upon  Page 38 of 64 HC-NIC Page 38 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Shudhakar   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   (2012)7   SCC   569. In the said judgment, in addition to  other judgments, the Supreme Court has discussed  the   ratio   laid   down   by   it   in     the   case   of  Bhajju v. State of M.P. ­ (2012)4 SCC  327  and  Surinder  Kumar v. State of Haryana - (2011)10   SCC 173. Insofar as multiple Dying Declarations  are   concerned,   the   Supreme   Court   has   held   as  below:

The issue, that in cases involving multiple  dying   declarations   made   by   the   deceased,  which   of   the   various   dying   declarations  should be believed by the Court and what are   the principles governing such determination,  is   being   examined.   This   becomes   important  where   the   multiple   dying   declarations   made  by the deceased are  either contradictory or  are at variance with each other to a large  extent. The test of common prudence would be   to   first   examine   which   of   the   dying  declarations   is  corroborated   by   other  prosecution evidence. Further, the attendant  circumstances, the condition of the deceased  at the relevant  time, the medical evidence,  the   voluntariness   and   genuineness   of   the  statement made by the deceased, physical and   mental   fitness   of   the   deceased   and   Page 39 of 64 HC-NIC Page 39 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT possibility   of   the   deceased   being   tutored  are   some   of   the   factors   which   would   guide  the   exercise   of   judicial   discretion   by   the   Court in such matters. 
(Paras 21 to 25)

49. In Bhajju v. State of M.P. (supra), the Supreme  Court has stated that it cannot be laid down as  an absolute rule of law that a Dying Declaration  cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless  it   is   corroborated   by   other   evidence.   If   the  Dying   Declaration   is   found   to   be   reliable,   it  could form the basis of conviction. 

50. However,   as   held   by   the   Supreme   Court   in  Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana (supra), if  the Dying Declaration is shrouded by suspicious  circumstances, no witness in support thereof had  been   examined,   and   it   is   not   found   to   be  reliable, it may not be used as a sole piece of  evidence to convict the accused. The necessary  criteria   in   order   to   base   the   conviction   upon  the  basis  of  the  Dying  Declaration  is  that  it  should be truthful, voluntary and reliable.  Page 40 of 64 HC-NIC Page 40 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT

51. In   the   case   of  Shudhakar   v.   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   (supra),   relied   upon   by   the   learned  Additional Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Court  has   discussed   the   judgment   in   the   case   of  Chirra Shivraj v. State of A.P. ­ (2010)14 SCC   444, in Paragraph­17, as under:

"17.  In   the   case   of   Chirra   Shivraj   v.  State of Andhra Pradesh [(2010) 14 SCC 444],   the   Court   expressed   a   caution   that   a  mechanical   approach   in   relying   upon   the  dying declaration just because it is there,  is   extremely   dangerous.  The   court   has   to   examine   a   dying   declaration   scrupulously   with a microscopic eye to find out whether   the   dying   declaration   is   voluntary,   truthful, made in a conscious state of mind   and   without   being   influenced   by   other   persons   and   where   these   ingredients   are   satisfied,   the   Court   expressed   the   view   that   it   cannot   be   said   that   on   the   sole   basis of a dying declaration, the order of   conviction could not be passed."  

(emphasis supplied) This   paragraph   has   also   been   relied   upon   by  Mr.J.M.Panchal,   learned   counsel   for   the  respondents. 

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52. Learned counsel for the respondents has further  relied   upon   the   case   of  State   of   Punjab   v.  Parveen Kumar - (2006)1 SCC (Cri.) 146, wherein  the Apex Court has held as below:

"10.  While   appreciating   the   credibility   of  the evidence produced before the Court, the   Court   must   view   evidence   as   a   whole   and   come to a conclusion as to its genuineness   and   truthfulness.   The   mere   fact   that   two   different   versions   are   given   but   one   name   is   common   in   both   of   them   cannot   be   a   ground for convicting the named person. The   court   must   be   satisfied   that   the   dying   declaration   is   truthful.   If   there   are   two   dying   declarations   giving   two   different   versions,  a serious  doubt  is created about   the   truthfulness   of   the  dying  declaration.   It   may   be   that   if   there   was   any   other   reliable   evidence   on   record,   this   Court   could   have   considered   such   corroborative   evidence   to   test   the   truthfulness   of   the   dying   declarations.   The   two   dying   declarations,  however,   in  the   instant  case   stand   by   themselves   and   there   is   no   other   reliable evidence on record by reference to   which  their truthfulness  can be tested.  It   is   well   settled   that   one   piece   of   unreliable   evidence   cannot   be   used   to  Page 42 of 64 HC-NIC Page 42 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT corroborate   another   piece   of   unreliable   evidence.  The   High   Court   while   considering  the   evidence   on   record   has   rightly   applied   the   principles   laid   down   by   this   Court   in  Thurukanni   Pompiah   and   another   v.   State   of   Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 939, and Khusal Rao v.  State of Bombay, 1958 SCR 552."

(emphasis supplied)

53. Another judgment relied upon by learned defence  counsel is that in the case of  Gopal  v. State   of Madhya  Pradesh  - (2009)12  SCC  600, wherein  the Apex Court has held as below:

"12. It   is   to   be   noted   that   the   High  Court   had   itself   observed   that   the   dying  declaration   (Exh.P11)   scribed   by   the  Executive Officer (sic Magistrate) (PW9) at  about 0435 hours in the same night was not  in conformity  with the  FIR and the earlier  dying   declaration   (Exh.P3)   scribed   by   ASI  Balram (PW 8) as different motives have been   described.  That  is not  the  only  variation.   Several   other   discrepancies,   even   as   regards the manner in which she is supposed   to   have   been   sprinkled   with   kerosene   and   thereafter   set   on   fire.   Therefore,   the   discrepancies   make   the   last   declaration   doubtful. The nature of the inconsistencies   Page 43 of 64 HC-NIC Page 43 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT is   such   that   they   are   certainly   material.   That   being   so,   it   would   be   unsafe   to   convict the appellant. The conviction is set  aside   and   appellant   is  acquitted   of   the  charges.   He   be   set   at   liberty   forthwith  unless   required   to   be   in   custody   in  connection with any other case."

(emphasis supplied)

54. Reliance is also placed upon the case of  State   of Andhra  Pradesh  v.  P.Khaja  Hussain  ­(2010)2   SCC (Cri.) 380 : (2009)15 SCC 120, wherein the  Supreme Court has held as under:

"3. The   High   Court   noticed   that   there   was  variation between the two dying declarations  about the manner in  which the  deceased was  set   on   fire.   In   fact   that   the   two   dying   declarations   can   be   reconciled   with   each  other   and   since   no   other   evidence  was  available to connect accused with crime the  conviction   as   recorded   was   held   to   be   not  sustainable.   Accordingly   acquittal   was  directed.
4.   Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant­State  submitted that the variation between the two  dying declarations was not very significant  and the High Court should not have discarded   the   subsequent   dying  declaration   on   the  Page 44 of 64 HC-NIC Page 44 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT ground   that   it   was   at   variance   with   the  first   dying   declaration.  There   is   no  appearance   on   behalf   of   the  respondent   in  spite of service of notice.
5.   There   is   no   explanation   as   to   why   the  second dying declaration was recorded by the   Head Constable of Police shortly after such  a   statement   was   recorded   when   the   dying  declaration   have   already   been   recorded   by  the Magistrate. 
6. It   is   not   a   case   where   the   variation   between   the   two   dying   declarations   is   of  trivial   in   nature.   The   scenario   was  described in substantially different manner.  The   High   Court   noted   that   the   improvements   were   made   to   rationalise   with  the   injuries  sustained by the deceased."

55. In   the   case   of  Kashi   Vishwanath   v.   State   of   Karnataka   -  (2013)7  SCC  162, also relied upon  by   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents,   the  Supreme   Court   was   dealing   with   three   Dying  Declarations   which   showed   glaring   material  contradictions.   After   discussing   the   factual  situation   regarding   the   said   discrepancies   and  contradictions   in   the   Dying   Declarations,   the  Supreme Court, following the principle laid down  Page 45 of 64 HC-NIC Page 45 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT in   the   case   of  Mehiboobsab   Abbasabi   Nadaf   v.   State   of   Karnataka   -   (2007)13   SCC   112   :  

(2009)1 SCC (Cri.)287, wherein it was held, in  Paragraph­7   that,  "conviction   can   indisputably  be based on a dying declaration. But, before it  can   be   acted   upon,   the   same   must   be   held   to  have  been  rendered  voluntarily  and  truthfully. 

Consistency   in   the   dying   declaration   is   the  relevant   factor   for   placing   full   reliance   thereupon.   In   this   case,   the   deceased   herself  had  taken  contradictory and  inconsistent  stand  in   different   dying   declarations.   They,  therefore, should not be accepted on their face  value. Caution, in this behalf, is required to   be   applied";   allowed   the   appeal   and   set   aside  the conviction of the appellant therein.

56. In the present case there are two recorded Dying  Declarations   in   the   form   of   Ex.37   by   the  Executive Magistrate and the complaint at Ex.42.  One purported oral Dying Declaration is stated  to have been made by the deceased to her husband  PW­1,   wherein,   she   has   stated   that   respondent  No.1   had   called   her   to   his   house   and   she   had  Page 46 of 64 HC-NIC Page 46 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT gone   there.   "Those   people   (respondents)"   then  beat her and burnt her. 

57. The essence of the principles of law laid down  by the Apex Court in the above­noticed judgments  is   that   consistency   and   truthfulness   are   the  most relevant factors in a case involving more  than one Dying Declaration. Where the deceased  herself   gives   materially   contradictory   and  inconsistent   versions   in   different   Dying  Declarations and the contradictions are not so  minor   that   they   can   be   ignored   but   are   grave  enough   to   make   both   versions   irreconcilable,  certainly,   a   doubt   would   arise   regarding   the  truthfulness   of   such   Dying   Declarations   which  cannot then form the basis for the conviction of  the accused. 

58. The case in hand is a peculiar one, inasmuch as  the   legally   accepted   principle   that   a   person  would   not   lie   on   his,   or   her,   death­bed,   is  seriously challenged. The veracity of the Dying  Declarations given by the deceased is required  to be seen in the background and context of the  Page 47 of 64 HC-NIC Page 47 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT facts of a particular case and the material on  record. Examined in that background, in view of  the   material   contradictions   and   improvements,  the   mutually   inconsistent   versions   in   the  complaint, the Dying Declaration recorded by the  Executive   Magistrate   and   the   oral   Dying  Declaration,   unfortunately,   the   deceased   does  not   emerge   as   a   truthful   person   even   on   her  death­bed.   It   appears   that   she   is   bent   upon  falsely implicating the respondents for reasons  best   known   to   herself.   Her   true   relationship  with respondent No.1 has been concealed by her.  She has not only implicated respondent No.1 but  also   all   his   family   members,   including   three  ladies. 

59. The truthfulness of the Dying Declarations given  by the deceased, is therefore, highly doubtful,  in spite of the fact that she was on the verge  of death and would probably have been aware that  she would not survive. 

60. The   possibility   that   the   deceased   herself  carried kerosene in a polythene bag, with which  Page 48 of 64 HC-NIC Page 48 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT she   doused   herself   outside   the   house   of   the  respondents,   cannot   be   ignored.   PW­3   saw   the  deceased going to the house of respondent No.1  with a plastic bag. Traces of the bag were found  outside the house, smelling of kerosene. Why the  deceased   took   kerosene   in   a   bag,   if   at   all,  whether   she   doused   herself   with   it   with   the  intention   of   blackmailing   the   respondents   or  whether   it   was   an   attempted   but   unintended  suicide   gone   horribly   wrong,   are   questions   to  which   one   cannot   find   any   answers   from   the  material   on   record.   However,   these   questions  raise   several   possibilities   that   cannot   be  lightly brushed aside. 

61. Though we found the reference to the character  of   the   deceased   in   the   judgment   of   the   Trial  Court a little distasteful, however, in order to  place   the   Dying   Declarations   in   proper  perspective   and   context,   the   conduct   and   the  lifestyle   of   the   deceased   and   her   true  relationship with respondent No.1 that she has  tried   to   conceal   is   an   important   aspect.   This  aspect   has   been   brought   on   record   by   way   of  Page 49 of 64 HC-NIC Page 49 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT documentary evidence and gains importance as it  indicates that the deceased was not speaking the  truth. Whatever she has stated on her death­bed,  in the Dying Declarations, has been proved to be  false by documentary evidence on record. 

62. Human   nature   cannot   be   fathomed   and   remains  unpredictable.   One   cannot   generalise   who   would  react   in   what   manner,   in   any   given   situation.  The character, nature and behaviour of a person  may indicate the possible reaction but even then  no     generalisation   is   possible   to   predict   or  guarantee how a person would behave when he or  she   finds   that   life   is   ebbing   away.   One   is  optimistic   enough   to   have   sufficient   faith   in  human   nature   and   expect   that   a   person   would  speak the truth at the last stages of life. It  is this optimistic belief in human nature that  has given rise to the legal principle emanating  from   the   latin   maxim  "nemo   moriturus  praesumitur   mentire",   meaning   that   a   man   will  not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Law  in India has developed along the same lines and  recognises   the   fact   that   "a   dying   man   seldom  Page 50 of 64 HC-NIC Page 50 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT lies" or "truth sits upon the lips of a dying  man". 

63. In the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra -  (2002)6 SCC 710,  the Constitution Bench of the  Supreme   Court   was   deliberating   regarding   the  acceptability of a Dying Declaration, and held  as below: 

"3. The   juristic   theory   regarding  acceptability of a dying declaration is that   such declaration is made in extremity, when  the party is at the point of death and when  every hope of this world is gone, when every   motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man   is   induced   by   the   most   powerful   consideration   to   speak   only   the   truth.  Notwithstanding the same, great caution must  be exercised in considering the weight to be   given to this species of evidence on account   of the existence of many circumstances which   may   affect   their   truth.   The   situation   in  which a man is on death bed is so solemn and  serene, is the reason in law to accept the  veracity   of   his   statement.   It   is   for   this  reason   the   requirements   of   oath   and   cross­ examination   are   dispensed   with.   Since   the  accused   has   no   power   of   cross­examination,  the court  insist that the dying declaration  Page 51 of 64 HC-NIC Page 51 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT should   be   of   such   a   nature   as   to   inspire  full   confidence   of   the   court   in   its  truthfulness  and   correctness.   The   court,  however   has   to   always   be   on   guard   to   see  that the statement of the deceased  was not  as a result of either tutoring or prompting  or a product of imagination....." 

64. Considering   the   frailties   of   human   nature,   it  may not always occur that a dying person would  be   visited   with   spiritual   realization,   making  him   or   her   rise   above   such   human   failings.  Often, the last thoughts in the mind of a dying  person would colour his or her mental horizon.  Such appears to be the case with the deceased,  who could not rise above her nature even on her  death­bed,   and   tell   the   truth.   With   her   last  breath she has sought to falsely implicate the  respondents for reasons best known to herself.  However, the evidence on record does not support  such implication.

65. The   material   on   record   brings   out   a   very  different picture of the deceased than what she  sought to project. Her lifestyle and activities  were not those of a normal homemaker. She led  a  Page 52 of 64 HC-NIC Page 52 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT different   kind   of   life.   The   story   about   her  jewellery   and   money   being   looted   is   belied   by  her own husband, PW­1, who states that he never  saw such jewellery with her and that she had no  more   than   Rs.150/­   in   her   Bank   account.   No  jewellery or cash was recovered from the house  of respondent No.1. Different reasons are given  by   the   deceased   for   going   to   the   house   of  respondent   No.1   to   different   persons,   which  erode   her   trustworthiness.   It   cannot   be   ruled  out   that   the   deceased   was   not   called   by  respondent No.1 to his house but went there on  her own, for some oblique purpose. 

66. Certain glaring contradictions and discrepancies  arising   from   a   comparison   of   the   two   Dying  Declarations   at   Ex.37   and   Ex.42,   emerge,   as  summarised below:

(a) In the complaint at Ex.42, the deceased  has   stated   that   she   had   homely   relations   with  respondent   No.1   and   they   often   visited   each  other. The deceased has concealed the factum of  her   divorce   with   her   husband   PW­1   and   her  Page 53 of 64 HC-NIC Page 53 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT marriage   with   respondent   No.1.   She   has   also  concealed that she had then divorced respondent  No.1 and remarried her husband. 
(b) The deceased has stated in the complaint  at   Ex.42   that   on   24.04.1992,   respondent   No.1  came to her house and asked her to come to his  house. She, therefore went to his house at 10:00  PM. This is not stated in Ex.37. 
(c) As   per   the   complaint   at   Ex.42,  respondent No.1 and his brothers demanded money  from the deceased and when she told them she did  not   have   money,   respondent   No.1   asked   her   to  sell her ornaments and give him the money. The  deceased   refused   to   hand   over   or   sell   her  ornaments,   therefore,   all   the   respondents  started   giving   her   kick   and   fist   blows. 

Respondents Nos.1, 2 and 3 started beating her  with   sticks   and   all   the   respondents   together  gagged her mouth. The sister of respondent No.1  poured kerosene on her person and the match was  lit   by   respondent   No.3.   When   she   started  burning, the accused ran away to a distance. All  Page 54 of 64 HC-NIC Page 54 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT this   is   not   stated   in   Ex.37,   where   another  version is given.

(d) In the Dying Declaration at Ex.37, it is  stated that respondent No.1 came to the house of  the   deceased   and   asked   her   to   give   him   her  scooter as he wanted to go to Ishwarbhai Darbar  to collect Rs.50,000/­. He took the scooter and  the deceased came to Kubernagar at 9:00 PM in a  rickshaw. This is not stated in the complaint. 

(e) The   version   in   the   Dying   Declaration  that   respondent   No.1   called   the   deceased   into  her   house   and   asked   her   to   sit   down   and  thereafter, the brother of respondent No.1 came  and caught hold of her and asked her to take off  her   ornaments,   telling   her   that   she   had  committed breach of trust and that he forcibly  took   off   her   ornaments   and   also   took   away  Rs.10,000/­ from her purse, is not stated in the  complaint.

(f) The   version   in   the   Dying   Declaration  that the younger brother of respondent No.1 was  asked to get  a sword lying above his  mother's  Page 55 of 64 HC-NIC Page 55 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT room   and   the   deceased,   being   frightened,  attempted   to   run   away   from   the   back­door   but  respondent No.1 having caught her and directed  his   sister   to   bring   a   can   of   kerosene   and  respondent No.2 having poured kerosene on her,  is not stated in the complaint.

(g) The version given by the deceased before  the   Executive   Magistrate   in   the   Dying  Declaration   that   she   knew   respondent   No.1   for  about eight years and he was like a brother to  her husband, is also not stated in the FIR.

(h) The version about her having four gold  bangles weighing two tolas, a gold necklace, two  diamond ear­rings weighing one and a half tolas,  is also not stated in the FIR.

67. It   therefore   transpires   that   there   are  fundamental   infirmities   in   both   the   Dying  Declarations   (Ex.37   and   Ex.42),   which   are  riddled   with   material   and   vital   contradictions  that   totally   erode   their   credibility,  truthfulness   and   veracity.   The   material   on  record  gives  rise to a  very  strong  doubt  that  Page 56 of 64 HC-NIC Page 56 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT the deceased was deliberately lying, even on her  death­bed.

68. It   further   emerges   from   the   testimony   of   PW­3  that the deceased had come with a polythene bag.  PW­3   has   not   been   declared   hostile   or  contradicted. Pieces of the polythene bag were  found at the  scene  of  offence,  as  recorded  in  the Panchnama at Ex.58, smelling of kerosene. No  traces   or   odour   of   kerosene   were   found   inside  the  house  of  respondent No.1  or  even  from the  inside or back of the house. This  is proved by  the evidence of PW­8. The person and clothes of  the respondents did not smell of kerosene which  is clear from the evidence of PW­8. The place of  the   incident,   as   per   the   case   of   the  prosecution,   is   inside   the   house   of   the  respondents. This theory is seriously challenged  by   the   evidence   on   record   and   there   is   every  possibility that the incident did not take place  inside   the   house   but   took   place   in   a  lane  outside the house, where the articles described  hereinabove were found. There is no  blackening  in   the   house   of   respondent   No.1,   which   would  Page 57 of 64 HC-NIC Page 57 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT naturally have occurred if the deceased had been  set ablaze there. The report of the FSL at Ex.20  makes this clear. There is no evidence that the  deceased was wearing the ornaments described by  her in the Dying Declaration stated to have been  forcibly   looted   by   the   respondents.   There   is  also no evidence to substantiate the aspect that  she was carrying a purse containing Rs.10,000/­  cash.   On   the   contrary,   her   husband   PW­1   has  stated that there was only an amount of Rs.150/­  in her Bank account. No ornaments were recovered  from   the   respondents   during   the   course   of  investigation   as   stated   by   PW­8,   the  Investigating Officer. The ornaments worn by the  deceased at the time of death, namely, bangles  and   a   ring,   were   found   to   be   made   of   brass,  which is proved from the evidence of PW­8. 

69. No motive appears to have been nurtured by the  respondents   in   order   to   commit   the   crime.   The  entire origin and genesis of the occurrence is  shrouded in doubt. After scrutiny and evaluation  of the entire oral and documentary evidence on  record, we find that the prosecution has failed  Page 58 of 64 HC-NIC Page 58 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. 

70. The present is a case of circumstantial evidence  as there are no eye­witnesses to the incident.  In  Sharad   Birdichand   Sarda   v.   State   of   Maharashtra   ­   (1984)4   SCC   116,    which   is   a  locus classicus on the point of circumstantial  evidence,   the   Supreme   Court   has   laid   down  certain   principles   regarding   the   conditions  required to be fulfilled by the prosecution to  prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable  doubt.   The   relevant   paragraph   is   quoted  hereinbelow:

"153.   A   close   analysis   of   this   decision   would   show   that   the   following   conditions  must be  fulfilled before a case  against an  accused can be said to be fully established: 
(1)   the   circumstances   from   which   the  conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be   fully established.

It   may   be   noted   here   that   this   Court   indicated   that   the   circumstances   concerned  'must   or   should'   and   not   'may   be'   established. There is not only a grammatical   but   a   legal   distinction   between   'may   be  Page 59 of 64 HC-NIC Page 59 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as   was held by this  Court in  Shivaji Sahebrao  Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC   793 : (AIR 1973 SC 2622) where the following   observations were made :

"Certainly,   it   is   a   primary   principle  that the accused must be and not merely  may   be   guilty   before   a   Court   can  convict and the mental distance between  'may   be'   and   'must   be'   is   long   and   divides   vague   conjectures   from   sure  conclusions."

(2)   the   facts   so   established   should   be  consistent   only   with   the   hypothesis   of   the   guilt of the accused, that is to say, they  should   not   be   explainable   on   any   other  hypothesis   except   that   the   accused   is  guilty, (3)   the   circumstances   should   be   of   a  conclusive nature and tendency, (4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible  hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5)   there   must   be   a   chain   of   evidence   so  complete   as   not   to   leave   any   reasonable  ground   for   the   conclusion   consistent   with  the innocence  of the accused and must show  that in  all human probability the act must  have been done by the accused.

154. These five golden principles, if we may   Page 60 of 64 HC-NIC Page 60 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT say   so,   constitute   the   panchsheel   of   the  proof   of   a   case   based   on   circumstantial  evidence."

In the present case, the prosecution has failed  to   prove   that   there   are   any   circumstances  establishing the guilt of the accused. The facts  on   record   are   not   consistent   only   with   the  hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Nor do  they exclude every other hypothesis except the  guilt of the accused. In fact, the circumstances  brought out by the evidence leaves ample room to  doubt   the   hypothesis   that   the   accused   are,   in  any   manner,   guilty   of   the   offences   with   which  they are charged.

71. It   is   a   settled   position   of   law   that   in   a  criminal   Trial,   the   onus   to   prove   the   offence  rests   upon   the   prosecution.   Unless   the  prosecution   is   successful   in   discharging   this  onus   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   its   case   cannot  succeed. Where it is possible to form two views  on the basis of the evidence on record, the view  favourable to the accused ought to be adopted.  This principle is laid down by the Apex Court in  Page 61 of 64 HC-NIC Page 61 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT the   case   of  Kali   Ram   v.   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh   -   AIR   1973   SC   2773,   in   the   following  terms: 

Another golden threat which runs through the   web   of   the   administration   of   justice   in  criminal   cases   is   that   if   two   views   are  possible   on   the   evidence   adduced   in   the  case,   one   pointing   to   the   guilt   of   the   accused and the other to his innocence, the  view   which   is   favourable   to   the   accused  should   be   adopted.   This   principle   has   a  special relevance in cases wherein the guilt   of the accused is sought to be established  by   circumstantial   evidence.   Rule   has  accordingly   been   laid   down   that   unless   the   evidence   adduced   in   the   case   is   consistent   only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the   accused and is inconsistent with that of his  innocence,   the   Court   should   refrain   from  recording a finding of guilt of the accused.  It is also an accepted rule that in case the  Court   entertains   reasonable   doubt   regarding  the guilt of the  accused, the accused must  have   the   benefit   of   that   doubt.   The   rule  regarding the benefit of doubt also does not  warrant   acquittal   of   the   accused   by   resort   to   surmises,   conjectures   or   fanciful  considerations.
Page 62 of 64
HC-NIC Page 62 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT Although   the   benefit   of   every   reasonable  doubt   should   be   given   to   the   accused,   the  courts   should   not   at   the   same   time   reject  evidence   which   is   ex   facie   trustworthy   on  grounds which are fanciful or in the nature  of conjectures.
The guilt of the accused has to be adjudged   not   by   the   fact   that   a   vast   number   of   people believe him to be guilty but whether   his   guilt   has   been   established   by   the   evidence   brought   on   record.  Indeed,   the  courts   have   hardly   any   other   yardstick   or  material to adjudge the guilt of the person  arraigned as accused. Reference is sometimes  made   to   the   clash   of   public   interest   and  that of the individual accused. The conflict   in   this   respect,   however   is   more   apparent  than real.
(Paras 24 to 27)  (emphasis supplied)

72. In conclusion, we find that the Trial Court has  rightly discarded the Dying Declarations as not  worthy   of   credence.   It   has   rightly   concluded  that   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   prove   the  chain of circumstances against the respondents,  or   their   involvement   in   the   offence,   beyond  reasonable doubt.   The Trial Court has arrived  at   a   correct   conclusion   after   a   proper  Page 63 of 64 HC-NIC Page 63 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017 R/CR.A/764/1994 CAV JUDGMENT appreciation   of   the   evidence   on   record,  supported by cogent reasons. The view taken by  the   Trial   Court   is   eminently   probable   and  possible.  We,   therefore,   find   no   justifiable  reason   to   interfere   with   the   acquittal   of   the  respondents.  

73. The   appeal,   being   devoid   of   merit,   stands  dismissed. 

74. Bail Bonds, if any, stand cancelled. The R.& P.  be sent back to the Trial Court.   

(SMT. ABHILASHA KUMARI, J.) (B.N. KARIA, J.) sunil Page 64 of 64 HC-NIC Page 64 of 64 Created On Fri Dec 08 23:22:50 IST 2017