Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
R P Meena vs Union Of India on 15 October, 2025
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench,
New Delhi
O.A. No.2835 of 2025
Orders reserved on : 17.10.2025
Orders pronounced on : 15.10.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjit More, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A)
R.P. Meena, DANICS-1995, Group 'A'
presently posted as
Special Development Commissioner
Govt. of NCT of Delhi
S/o Shri Manohari Lal Meena
R/o 666, Kamaljeet Singh Sandhu Block,
Asian Games Village, New Delhi - 110 049.
...Applicant
(By Advocate: Shri M.K. Bhardwaj)
VERSUS
1. Union of India,
through its Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs,
North Block, New Delhi-110001
2. The Joint Secretary (UT),
Ministry of Home Affairs,
North Block, New Delhi-110001
3. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
through Chief Secretary, GNCT,
Delhi Secretariat
New Delhi
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri Gyanendra Singh)
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Item No.143/C-1 2 OA No.2835/2025
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. Rajinder Kashyap, Member (A):
By way of the present OA filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant is seeking the following reliefs:-
"i) To quash and set aside the impugned Chargesheet No.14033/06/2025-UTS-II dated 03.02.2025 and direct the respondents to release all consequential benefits.
ii) To declare that action of respondents in initiating disciplinary action against the applicant vide impugned charge-memo as illegal and arbitrary and issue appropriate directions to give all encashment etc. with 9% interest.
iii) To allow the OA with exemplary cost.
iv) Any other orders may also be passed as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case."
2. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, the respondents have filed their reply opposing the claim of the applicant.
3. While hearing this matter for admission on 29.7.2025, this Tribunal granted ad interim stay of the operation of the impugned Charge Memorandum dated 03.02.2025.
FACTS OF THE CASE
4. The applicant belongs to 1995 batch of DANICS. On 01.07.2004, his claim was considered for grant of Selection Grade in the pay scale of Rs. 10000-15200 and on being found suitable, he was granted Selection Grade from the date of completion of 8 years i.e. w.e.f. 01.07.2004. On 13.01.2016, the applicant was also granted JAG-II w.e.f. 07.07.2009 and JAG-I w.e.f. 2015 vide notification dated 13.01.2016.
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Item No.143/C-1 3 OA No.2835/2025
4.1 On 12.04.2019, as per the record and the factual position
available within the domain of all concerned officials, the process for induction of DANICS Officers for the Select List 2020 was initiated vide letter dated 12.04.2019. Although in the year 2020, in spite of completion of all formalities, the respondents did not take appropriate steps for induction of applicant to IAS of Joint AGMUT Cadre (UT Segment) for the select list 2020. As the applicant was due to retire in July 2025, delay in his induction of DANICS to IAS of AGMUT Cadre was causing prejudice, therefore, he kept on requesting to send the proposal to the competent authority for induction of eligible officers to IAS. The respondents also issued letter dated 12.10.2021 vide which the requisite documents/particulars of DANICS Officers were sent to Respondent No. 1 in terms of their letter dated 30.09.2021. 4.2 As no action was taken on the applicant's grievance, he filed OA No. 4163/2024 seeking induction into the IAS, wherein notice was issued to the respondents. However, on 03.02.2025, during the pendency of the said OA, the respondents issued the impugned Charge Memorandum, which was served upon the applicant on 18.03.2025. The charges levelled against the applicant under the said Charge Memorandum are as follows:
"Article-I That the said R.P. Meena, while functioning as Addl. Commissioner of Transport, Govt. of NCT of Delhi during the year 2011-13, committed gross misconduct in as much as he, by abusing his official position, did not appoint Station Manager, with malafide intention to favour M/s ESP India Pvt Ltd in charging extra money.
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Item No.143/C-1 4 OA No.2835/2025
By the above acts of omission & commission, the aforesaid Sh. R.P. Meena, exhibited lack of absolute integrity and devotion to duty, which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant, thereby violating the provisions of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Sh. R. P. Meena committed gross misconduct in as much as he, by abusing his official powers and position, did not take any initiative for refunding the illegal money charged by M/s ESP India Pvt Ltd for Loaded Mode Emission Test thus giving undue favour to the company.
By the above acts of omission & commission, the aforesaid Sh. R. P. Meena exhibited lack of absolute integrity and devotion to duty, which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant, thereby violating the provisions of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-III That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Sh. R. P. Meena committed gross misconduct in as much as he, by abusing his official powers and position, did not stop M/s ESP India Pvt Ltd for charging extra money of Loaded Mode Emission Test thus giving undue favour to the company.
By the above acts of omission & commission, the aforesaid Sh. R. P. Meena exhibited lack of absolute integrity and devotion to duty, which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant, thereby violating the provisions of Rule 3 of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. "
(emphasis supplied) 4.3 On 03.04.2025, the applicant submitted a detailed reply to the said Charge Memorandum (Annexure A/1). According to the applicant, the Memorandum was issued after an inordinate delay of 13 years, solely with the intention of creating an impediment in his appointment to the IAS.
4.4 On 18.04.2025, by referring the said charge memo, the respondents have deprived the applicant from induction to IAS even in the subsequent years i.e. Select List year 2021 and his juniors had been inducted to IAS vide notification dated 18.04.2025 by ignoring the claim of applicant.
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Item No.143/C-1 5 OA No.2835/2025
4.5 On 15.05.2025, the said OA No. 4163/2024 filed by the applicant
was allowed by this Tribunal with the following directions:
"10. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, we quash and set aside the notification dated 27.02.2024 (A- 1) to the extent the same contain a note to treat the inclusion of applicant in select list as approved by President of India for appointment of applicant to IAS as provisional and direct the respondents to appoint the applicant to IAS unconditionally from due date with all consequential benefits including arrears of pay. This exercise shall be completed by the respondents as earlier as possible, and in any case, within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order."
4.6. However, the respondents have not considered the said reply of the applicant till date just to deprive him from his retirement benefits. The said act of the respondents in initiating disciplinary action against the applicant on false and frivolous allegations and just before the retirement is highly illegal. Hence, this OA.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT'S COUNSEL 5.1 At the outset, Mr. Bhardwaj, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, submits that, with respect to Article I of the charge memorandum, reliance is placed on the communication dated 09.07.2025 issued by the Transport Department, GNCTD (Annexure A-3). The said communication, prima facie, indicates that there was no sanctioned post of Station Manager in the Transport Department. With regard to Articles II and III of the memorandum, reliance is placed on another communication of the same date, which records that, as per the agreement, the question of charging extra money for the Loaded Mode Emission Test (LME) did not arise, since no such extra money was charged. The receipts further confirm that no LME fee was collected, and the issue was supervised by MLO/CMVI and DC (VIU).
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Item No.143/C-1 6 OA No.2835/2025
5.2 Learned counsel strenuously argued that the impugned charge
memorandum dated 03.02.2025 pertains to alleged misconduct committed during 2011-2013. The respondents have offered no explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the said charge sheet. To buttress this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in UCO Bank v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92, wherein the Court held that a charge-sheet issued after an unexplained delay of seven years was unreasonable and liable to be set aside. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
"12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submissions made by the learned counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge-sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge-sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance."
5.3 Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned memorandum is mala fide, arbitrary, discriminatory, and issued in utter violation of rules, regulations as well as Articles 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution, as well as principles of natural justice. The agreement with M/s ESP India Pvt. Ltd. was executed much prior to the applicant's joining as Additional Commissioner (Transport). Moreover, no LME test was ever conducted nor was any fee charged for the same. Since there was no sanctioned post of Station Manager in the Transport Department, there was no occasion for the applicant 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 7 OA No.2835/2025 to appoint any one. In practice, the duties of Station Manager are being discharged by the Chief Motor Vehicle Inspector (CMVI), a position now clarified by the Department itself in its comments dated 09.07.2025. Once this clarification was issued, the applicant's defence ought to have been accepted and proceedings should have been dropped. Instead, the charge memorandum is being used to deprive the applicant of gratuity and other retirement dues, which the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jitender Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, reported in AIR 2013 SC 3383, has held to be equivalent to a right to property.
5.4 Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the case reflects clear victimisation. The applicant is being harassed on false allegations, culminating in issuance of the impugned charge Memorandum after a gap of 13 years. It is shocking that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated when no post of Station Manager ever existed, and when its duties were always performed by CMVIs. Statutorily, the functions of Station Manager and CMVI are identical; hence, any act performed by the CMVI is deemed to be an act of the Station Manager. This factual position has already been clarified by the Transport Department in its comments dated 09.07.2025. Learned counsel further argued that officers responsible for initiating proceedings on such false premises should themselves be subjected to disciplinary action.
5.5 Learned counsel also highlighted that the applicant has served with absolute integrity and devotion to duty for 30 years, as reflected 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 8 OA No.2835/2025 in service records and APARs. Hence, the charges under Articles I, II and III of the impugned charge Memorandum cannot be sustained. No conduct unbecoming of a government servant, within the meaning of Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, has been established. The applicant's detailed defence dated 03.04.2025 has not been considered by the respondents as well as the comments sought by the Directorate of Vigilance pursuant to the said reply of the applicant, which clearly demonstrates that the allegations levelled against the applicants by the impugned charge Memorandum are baseless and not sustainable in the eyes of law.
5.6 Learned counsel again reiterated that the respondents have failed to explain the extraordinary 13-year delay in issuing the charge memorandum, which was served at the verge of the applicant's retirement and during consideration of his induction into the IAS for the select year 2020. The timing, according to the applicant, demonstrates mala fide intent to frustrate his induction into the IAS. 5.7 Learned counsel also contended that the allegations in the impugned charge Memorandum do not constitute misconduct, since the agreements and CMVR rules did not prescribe any specific role for the applicant, who merely discharged duties as Additional Commissioner/Joint Commissioner (VIU) under the Commissioner's directions. All three charges are baseless, unsupported by evidence, vague, and in fact contradicted by the very documents listed in the impugned Memorandum. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.V. 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 9 OA No.2835/2025 Mahadevan v. MD, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed belated disciplinary proceedings, holding that a prolonged enquiry against a senior government officer causes mental agony, undermines public confidence, and must be curtailed in the interest of justice. The relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.
12. We, therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge memo issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No costs."
As per above observation of Hon'ble Supreme Court, which clearly says that departmental proceedings at this belated stage will be very prejudicial to the interest of the applicant. The said legal position has also been further reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High Courts in the following cases:-
i) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh, 1990 Supp (1) SCC 738;
(ii) State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2)
SCC 570; and
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(iii) State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakrishnan, 1998 (4) SCC 154;
(iv) M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India & Ors. JT 2006 (4) SC 469;
(v) Union of India Vs. A-Kannan, WP (C) No.33591/2007 decided on 15.02.2008 by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras;
(vi) P.K. Mathur Vs. Union of India & Anr. WP (C) No.7982/2007 decided on 04.06.2008 by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court;
(vii) Union of India Vs. Shri V.K Sareen, in WP (C) No. 4757/2007 decided on 03.07.2009 by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court;
(viii) Union of India & Anr. Vs. Hari Singh, Writ Petition (C) No. 4245/2013 decided on 23.09.2013 by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court.
(ix) Anish Gupta Vs. Union of India in WP (C) No.2267/2022 & 2590/2022 decided on 05.07.2022 by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court;
5.8 Learned counsel further submitted that most of above relied upon judgments had also been taken into consideration by this Tribunal while adjudicating the similar issue raised in OA No.3533/2019, titled K. Dhanalakshmi vs. Union of India and another, and this Tribunal vide order/judgment dated 12.03.2025 quashed the belatedly issued charge Memorandum challenged in the said OA.
5.9 On the strength of the above judgments, counsel submitted that initiation of proceedings after 13 years of the alleged incident, when the 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 11 OA No.2835/2025 applicant was on the verge of retirement on 31.07.2025 and otherwise entitled to induction to IAS, violates Articles 14, 16, and 20(2) of the Constitution, amounting to denial of equality, equal opportunity, and protection against double jeopardy. He also drew attention to OA No.4163/2024 filed by the applicant before this Tribunal, which was disposed of on 15.05.2025 with directions to induct him into IAS with consequential benefits.
5.10 Learned counsel emphasised that the respondents have not produced relevant records or documents to substantiate the charges. Crucial files and fee receipts sought by the applicant under the RTI Act were denied on the ground that they were "not available". After 13 years, and in the absence of key evidence, it is impossible for the applicant to defend himself fairly.
5.11 Learned counsel for the applicant drew our attention to each Article of charge, demonstrating with reference to the agreement dated 27.02.2008, the supplementary agreement dated 03.02.2011, contemporaneous minutes of meetings, fee receipts, and reports of Justice Mudgal Committee (2013), that:
(i) The Station Manager's functions were, in practice and in law, discharged by CMVIs; hence, the allegation of non-appointment is misconceived;
(ii) No fee was ever charged for LME tests, since those tests were never initiated. The operator charged only fitness test fees and TPTI fees, as authorised.
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(iii) The applicant took all necessary actions within his jurisdiction, including directing audit and recovery action, and rejecting the operator's extension request.
(iv) Hence, Articles I to III are vague, baseless, contradictory, and unsustainable.
5.12 Finally, learned counsel submitted that the entire exercise reflects arbitrariness, bias, and violation of natural justice. The impugned charge Memorandum was issued immediately after the Select Committee meeting for IAS induction held on 17.03.2025, indicating mala fide intent. The language of the covering letters itself shows prejudice and reliance on the CVC's advice rather than independent application of mind by the disciplinary authority. Learned counsel emphasised that simultaneous prosecution and departmental proceedings are permissible under DoP&T's O.Ms, but in this case, the initiation of departmental proceedings was engineered solely to scuttle the applicant's induction to IAS. Therefore, the present OA deserves to be allowed by this Tribunal.
REPLY OF THE RESPONDENTS 6.1 Learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the contents of the reply submitted that the instant OA has been filed by the applicant against the MHA's chargesheet dated 03.02.2025, vide which disciplinary proceedings are initiated against him and 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 13 OA No.2835/2025 s e e k i n g q u a s h i n g a n d setting aside of the aforementioned charge-sheet.
6.2 Learned counsel submitted that on the basis of a complaint received in Anti-Corruption Branch on 11.05.201 2; ACB, GNCTD had conducted an enquiry and found several irregularities' regarding allotment of contract for Inspection & Certification (I&C) tests for commercial vehicles, and related issues. Accordingly, a case FIR No. 21/2012 dated 17.12.2012 was registered against the officials of Transport Department and M/s ESP India Pvt. Ltd. The allegations against the applicant is that while being posted as Addl. Commissioner of Transport Department, GNCTD during April, 201 1 to March, 2013, he has provided enormous pecuniary benefits to M/s. ESP India Pvt. Ltd. by not stopping ESP India Pvt. Ltd. in its illegal activities, as the company was charging extra fees without conducting loaded mode emission test. The applicant never stopped or interfered with the illegal activities of the company despite being informed by his juniors and misused his official position to facilitate M/s ESP India Pvt. Ltd. In this regard, it is submitted that LG Secretariat vide letter dated 28.08.2015 sought prosecution sanction against the applicant, the then Addl. Commissioner in Transport Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, under section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the case FIR No. 21/2012 dated 1 7.12.2012. However, the same was not received in this Ministry. LG Secretariat vide letter dated 21.06.2016 provided the letter dated 28.08.2015. The LG Secretariat has recommended to grant prosecution sanction against the applicant.
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Item No.143/C-1 14 OA No.2835/2025
But the case was returned to the L.G. Secretariat, Delhi to provide the authenticated copies of all supportive documents along with draft prosecution sanction against the applicant, the then Addl. Commissioner of Transport Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Later on, ACB, Govt. of NCT of Delhi vide letter dated 22.06.2017 forwarded documents related to Prosecution Sanction in respect of the applicant. After perusal of the documents, some discrepancies were found and this Ministry vide letter dated 05.07.2017 requested the ACB, GNCTD Delhi and LG Secretariat to remove the discrepancies and provide requisite documents to the said Ministry. The ACB, GNCTD vide its letter dated 29.09.2017 has stated that investigation agency is under obligation to place entire evidences collected during investigation before the sanctioning authority to take decision regarding issuing the sanction independently in the matter in hands and since the investigation in the case is still on, they cannot sand the required documents to the said Ministry. Further, ACB, GNCTD requested the Ministry to return the existing proposal, pending consideration with the Ministry in original. Accordingly, the Ministry decided to treat the matter as closed until investigation conducted by Investigating Agency is completed and any new proposal is received for any further proceedings in MHA.
6.3 Later, ACB, GNCTD vide letter dated 06.02.2018 again forwarded the proposal regarding sanction of prosecution against the applicant u/s 19 of the POC Act, 1985 to the Ministry of Home Affairs. After perusal of the documents, this Ministry observed that even after 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 15 OA No.2835/2025 lapse of 05 years, Anti-Corruption Branch had not submitted the complete documents along with the aforesaid letter dated 06.02.2018 and also not obtained the approval of the Competent Authority. Accordingly, the Ministry vide letter dated 08.03.2018 returned the proposal of Anti-Corruption Branch in original to DOV, GNCTD with the request to direct ACB, GNCTD to submit complete and conclusive report at the most by 20.03.2018. Further, DOV, GNCTD was also requested to examine the report in totality and then submit complete and conclusive proposal, along with the recommendations of the Competent Authority, for seeking Sanction for Prosecution latest by 05.04.2018 to the Ministry.
6.4 The DOV, GNCTD vide letter dated 20.05.2018 simply forwarded the same previous proposal dated 06.02.2015 of ACB, GNCTD, without examining the same. The case was again returned to DOV, GNCTD vide the Ministry's letter dated 12.09.2018 to provide requisite replies to the Ministry for further necessary action. The same was sought vide reminders dated 03.12.2018, 14.01.2019, 19.02.2019, 02.05.2019, 27.09.2019, 02.12.2019, 24.02.2020, 12.06.2020, 09.09.2020, 18.02.2021 and D.O. letter dated 05.03.2020 and 04.12.2020 with request to provide clear-cut proposal along with para- wise specific comments on ACB, GNCTD's report for prosecution sanction, with the approval of Hon'ble L.G., Delhi to the Ministry. 6.5 Later on, DOV, GNCTD vide letter dated 15.04.2021 (received on 28.05.2021) sought prosecution sanction in respect of accused IAS/DANICS officers, including the applicant. The Govt. of NCT of 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 16 OA No.2835/2025 Delhi further informed that as regards the documents/information sought by the MHA with respect to the applicant; para-wise specific comments/ points reply, on ACB's reports/letters dated 06.02.2018 and 02.01.2019 and representation dated 11.10.2018 & 14.11.2018 of the applicant, the same was forwarded along with the aforementioned letter dated 14.04.2021. The DOV, Govt. of NCT of Delhi also forwarded a draft charge sheet along with proposal listed documents against the applicant and informed that disciplinary proceedings against other officers have become time barred as per provisions of rule 9 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and sent the case record/documents. DOV, GNCTD also intimated that the ACB, GNCTD filed charge sheet in the Court on 03.09.2015 against nine accused, including Seven Government Officers except Sh. R.P. Meena. However, the l e a r n e d Court of Special Judge, District and Session Judge, Central, Tis Hazari Court, vide its Order dated 11.03.2019, returned the charge sheet to the ACB, GNCTD, in original, for further investigation.
6.6 Meanwhile, CVC vide its letter dated 28.06.2021 and 02.07.2021, requested Ministry of Home Affairs to return the requisite case paper in the matter to Govt. of NCT of Delhi expeditiously. Accordingly, the Ministry of Home Affairs vide letter dated 13.05.2022 returned the case records pertaining to the applicant (now Retired) to DOV, GNCTD with request to obtain approval of Hon'ble LG, Delhi, and further to obtain the advice of CVC.
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6.7 Thereafter, in the CVC, a meeting was held on 07.06.2022 for
review of vigilance cases, wherein Govt. of NCT of Delhi informed that the case records pertaining to the applicant will be returned to Ministry of Home Affairs by 10.06.2022. Accordingly, the Ministry vide letter dated 23.06.2022, requested Govt. of NCT of Delhi to return the case record of the applicant after obtaining the approval of Hon'ble LG, Delhi and along with the requisite documents.
6.8 In respect of the above, DOV, Govt. of NCT of Delhi vide letter dated 23.06.2022, informed the Ministry of Home Affairs that in the CVC meeting held on 07.06.2022, it was decided that the CVC advice for the disciplinary proceedings and grant of prosecution Sanction shall be taken by the MHA (being the Disciplinary Authority and Competent Authority). As regards the draft Charge-sheet i n respect of the applicant and comments o f GNCTD in the matter were also provided vide the above said Govt. of NCT of Delhi's letter dated 23.06.2022. The matter of the applicant was submitted before the Hon'b1e Home Minister, i.e., the Disciplinary Authority, for approval for submitting the case to CVC for obtaining their advice in the matter of Prosecution Sanction and initiation of disciplinary action against the applicant. The then Hon'ble Home Minister approved the same on 06.09.2022. Accordingly, after the approval of Disciplinary Authority, a proposal seeking first stage advice from CVC for issue of prosecution sanction and initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (now retired) in case FIR No.21/201 2 of P.S. ACB was sent to Vigilance Cell, MHA vide O.M. dated 18.10.2022 along with the 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 18 OA No.2835/2025 relevant file, for submitting the case to CVC for obtaining their advice in the matter. However, Vigilance Cell, MHA, pointed out certain discrepancies and returned the file vide note dated 25.10.2022, for needful action before referring the case to CVC for its advice. The Ministry of Home Affairs vide letter dated 23.11.2022 followed by reminders dated 20.12.2022 and 03.02.2023 requested the DOV, Govt. of NCT of Delhi to provide the requisite documents for obtaining the advice of CVC. The DOV, Govt. of NCT of Delhi vide letter dated 21.04.2023 furnished the requisite documents with draft order for grant of Sanction for Prosecution, Draft Charge-sheet, Tabular Statement and Vigilance Report. Further, it is stated that ACB, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, vide their letter dated 15.04.2021 had also sought Sanction of Prosecution in respect of other DANICS Officers. Hence, the Ministry of Home Affairs vide letter dated 18.08.2023 followed by reminder dated 20.11.2023, requested Directorate of Vigilance, Govt. of NCT of Delhi to provide draft Order for grant of Sanction for Prosecution in respect of Shri M.A. Usmani, DANICS (Retd.), Shri V.K. Gupta, DANICS (Retd.) & Shri A.K. Gupta, DANICS (Retd.). Since, the requisite documents in respect of the applicant were already received, therefore, it was decided to refer the case of the applicant to CVC for advice on grant of Prosecution Sanction and initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. Accordingly, the approval of Hon'ble MoS (N) was obtained on 07.02.2024 for referring the case to CVC for advice.
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Item No.143/C-1 19 OA No.2835/2025
6.9 Thereafter, the case file of the applicant was sent to CVC on
09.02.2024, for obtaining the advice in the matter of Prosecution Sanction and initiation of disciplinary action against the applicant. However, Vigilance Cell, Ministry of Home Affairs returned the file/proposal pointing out that the certain documents for seeking 1st Stage Advice of DVC in the matter. The Ministry of Home Affairs vide letter dated 19.04.2024 sought the requisite documents from DoV, Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The same was again sought vide reminders dated 06.03.2024, 29.04.2024 and 19.07.2024. The DOV, Govt. of NCT of Delhi vide letter dated 03.06.2024 and 17.09.2024 forwarded the complete requisite documents to seek CVC advice. Thereafter, the proposal/file was sent to Vigilance Cell, MHA on 21.10.2024 to seek advice from CVC. Vigilance Cell, Ministry of Home affairs submitted the proposal before CVC on 05.11.2024 for advice in the matter. The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) vide OM No.015/DLH/024- 49758 dated 10.01.2025 had advised for initiation of Major Penalty Proceedings and Sanction for Prosecution against the applicant. As such, the applicant has been charge-sheeted vide this Ministry's Memorandum dated 03.02.2025. Further, this Ministry vide letter dated 03.02.2025 has also granted prosecution sanction against Shri by the CVC. Later, the applicant submitted his representations dated 03.04.2025 and 26.06.2025 against the charge-sheet Memorandum dated 03.02.2025. The said representations were forwarded to Govt. of NCT of Delhi for their comments. Accordingly, the Ministry of Home Affairs vide letter dated 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 20 OA No.2835/2025 05.04.2025 followed by reminders dated 03.06.2025 10.06.2025, 02.07.2025 and 1 5.07.2025, had requested Govt. of NCT of Delhi to provide the para-wise comments on the representation submitted by the CO against the charge Memorandum. In response, Govt. of NCT of Delhi vide letter dated 25.07.2025 provided para-wise comments on the CO's representation dated 03.04.2025 and also informed that further comments on another representation dated 23.06.2025 of CO will be conveyed in due course. As such, the complete comments of GNCTD on the CO's representation are yet to be received in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
6.10 Learned counsel further submitted that the applicant has now filed the present OA seeking quashing and setting aside of the impugned chargesheet dated 03.02.2025 and also seeking interim relief to stay the chargesheet dated 03.02.2025, wherein this Tribunal vide order dated 29.07.2025 has granted an interim stay on the operation of the impugned charge Memorandum dated 03.02.2025. Learned counsel also submitted that the disciplinary proceedings initiated vide charge Memorandum dated 03.02.2025 are based on serious allegations of misconduct and misuse of official position by the applicant during his tenure as Addl. Commissioner, Transport Department, GNCTD from April, 2011 to March, 2013, resulting in pecuniary benefits to a private firm, M/s ESP India Pvt. Ltd. The matter has undergone thorough examination and multiple rounds of correspondence between Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and CVC during the period. After due process and scrutiny, the 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 21 OA No.2835/2025 CVC, vide its advice dated 10.01.2025, recommended initiation of Major Penalty Proceedings and Prosecution Sanction. As such, the applicant has been charge-sheeted vide Memorandum dated 03.02.2025. Further, the Ministry of Home Affairs, vide letter dated 03.02.2025 has also granted prosecution sanction against the applicant to ACB, as advised by the CVC.
6.11 Learned counsel argued that majority of the pleas taken by the applicant in the instant OA are the part of investigation and pertains to Transport Department of GNCT of Delhi. The applicant's claim that the chargesheet issued without basis is untenable, as the initiation of proceedings is based on CVC advice, Vigilance inputs, and material arising out a registered aforesaid FIR, which is currently sub-judice. 6.12 Learned counsel also submitted that the representations dated 03.04.2025 and 23.06.2025 of the applicant have already been forwarded to Govt. of NCT of Delhi. In response, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, vide letter dated 25.07.2025 provided para-wise comments on the applicant's aforesaid representation dated 03.04.2025 and also informed that further comments on another representation dated 23.06.2025 of the applicant will be conveyed in due time. 6.13 Learned counsel also submitted that the present OA is premature and seeks to impede a lawful and ongoing disciplinary process, as the representation of the officer has not yet been decided. The charge- sheet was issued after observing due procedure and on the advice of competent authorities. Learned counsel further submitted that the 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 22 OA No.2835/2025 charge-sheet was issued in February, 2025. However, the applicant has filed the present OA just before his retirement date i.e. 31.07.2025. If the applicant genuinely had any grievance, he ought to have filed the OA much before his retirement. Lastly, submitted that the present OA deserves to be dismissed in view of the facts and circumstances of the case as above and the interim stay granted on the operation of the impugned charge memorandum dated 03.02.2025 be vacated, allowing the disciplinary proceedings to continue in accordance with law.
6.14 In support of the stand of the respondents, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court :-
(i) Union of India and others vs. Subrata Nath in Civil Appeal Nos.7939-7940 of 2022 decided on 23.11.2022; and
(ii) The State of Rajasthan and others vs. Bhupendra Singh in Civil Appeal Nos.8546-8549 of 2024 decided on 08.08.2024.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the pleadings available on record as well as the judgments relied upon by the respective parties.
ANALYSIS
8. The facts in nut shall are that alleged misconduct while posted as Addl. Commissioner (Transport), GNCTD during the period 2011- 2013 pertains to a complaint/ACB enquiry/FIR as the complaint was received in ACB on 11.05.2012 and the said FIR was registered on 17.12.2012. Multiple communications/attempts for prosecution sanction and exchange of files between ACB, DOV (GNCTD), L.G. Secretariat and Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) during 2015-2024, numerous reminders are noted in the record. However, CVC first stage 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 23 OA No.2835/2025 advice recorded on 10.01.2025 recommending initiation of Major Penalty proceedings and prosecution sanction. The impugned Charge- Memorandum issued by the MHA dated 03.02.2025 was served on 18.03.2025 to the applicant. The Applicant replied on 03.04.2025. The said representations dated 03.04.2025 and 23.06.2025 submitted by the applicant against the impugned charge memorandum were forwarded to GNCTD and in response to which GNCTD provided partial para-wise comments on 25.07.2025 and indicated further comments would follow. An interim stay on operation of the charge- memorandum was granted by this Tribunal on 29.07.2025. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that the applicant had earlier filed OA No.4163/2024 seeking induction into IAS and the said OA was allowed by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 15.05.2025 with a direction to the respondents therein to appoint the applicant to IAS unconditionally with consequential benefits within 8 weeks.
9. Having regard to the factual matrix of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered view that the following issues are required to be adjudicated in the instant case:-
(A) Whether the impugned charge-memorandum dated 03.02.2025 stands vitiated on account of inordinate and unexplained delay, coupled with mala fide intent, so as to warrant its quashing?
(B) Whether the applicant has suffered or will suffer irremediable prejudice, including denial/frustration of induction to IAS and loss of retiral benefits, by initiation of the proceedings at the present belated stage?
(c) If the impugned charge-memorandum is quashed, what consequential relief should be granted to the applicant and 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 24 OA No.2835/2025 what directions (if any) should be issued to the respondents?
10. Before delving upon the above issues, we deem it appropriate to observe that a charge-sheet/disciplinary proceedings may be quashed where there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating proceedings and such delay causes prejudice to the officer or indicates mala fide. Delay by itself is not always fatal; the State/respondents must satisfactorily explain the delay as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of UCO Bank v. Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra) and P.V. Mahadevan (supra) reliance on which has been made by the learned counsel for the applicant. We further observe that where proceedings are instituted at a belated stage, so as to cause grave prejudice to an officer (mental agony, stigma, denial of retirement dues or promotion) and where the explanation for delay is inadequate or belatedly obtaining the records is due to the official agencies own negligence, the Courts/Tribunals have interfered and quashed such proceedings. Further, even where vigilance/corruption agencies, such as CVC advised initiation of disciplinary or criminal proceedings, that advice does not automatically shield the initiation from being examined on the touchstone of delay, mala fide or procedural unfairness.
11. The Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in WP No. 4145/2015 titled Dinesh Awasthi Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Others decided on 14.06.2022, after surveying various 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 25 OA No.2835/2025 judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of inordinate delay, observed as under:
"8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the charge-sheet was issued on
12.05.2014 for the misconduct pertaining to the year 2002-03 and 2003-04. Thereafter, preliminary enquiry was also got conducted by the then Deputy Collector and District Vigilance Officer. Thereafter, no action was taken against the petitioner for more than 10 years. It is only in the year of 2014 charge-sheet has been issued and the petitioner has been asked to participate in the enquiry and to conclude the same within a period of 03 months. Moreover, as per the notification No. C/5-2/87/3/11 dated 16.04.1987, the State Government has specifically asked all the departments to conclude the departmental enquiry within a year. Pendency of the departmental enquiry for more than 18 years has caused great prejudice to the petitioner and had to suffer mental agony as well as monetary loss. Hence, this case is squarely covered by the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Umesh Pratap Singh Chouhan (supra). No explanation for issuance of charge- sheet after a delay of more than 10 years has been putforth by the respondents in their reply."
11.1 The Hon'ble Madras High Court has also dealt with the issue of inordinate delay in issuing a charge memorandum in Union of India vs. Central Administrative Tribunal in W.P. No. 16651/2019, wherein observed as under:
"7. In the present case on hand, though a complaint has been received from the Assessee immediately, there is no need to wait for seven long years to issue a charge memo and therefore, it is obvious that there is a delay in issuance of charge memo. It is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1996) 3 SCC 157 in the case of Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excised Department Vs L. Srinivasan, while deciding the case of delay in issuance of charge memo, held that in the nature of charges, it would take a long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false records which should be done in secrecy. The matter may take time and that sufficient evidence have got to be taken before the issuance of charge memo and the limitation cannot be applicable in those cases and that the charge memo cannot be interfered on the ground of delay. But, at the same time, the present case on hand does not fall in that category for the simple reason that the Department, inspite of receipt of the complaint from the Assessee, failed to act upon it with an immediate effect, proceed with the enquiry by issuance of charge memo and the Department would have completed the said exercise well before seven years instead of sleeping over for seven years. In a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank and others Vs Rajendra Shankar Shukla, reported in (2018) 14 SCC 92, it was held in Paragraph Nos.12 & 13, which are extracted below:-
2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 26 OA No.2835/2025
"12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submission made by the learned counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge-sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge-sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance.
13. What compounds the default on the part of the Bank is that Shukla was placed in a higher category as a Manager on 19.07.1994 while all these discussions were going on in the Bank. He was also allowed to cross the efficiency bar on 12.08.1996 again while the discussions were going on. Surely, if the Bank was serious about proceeding against Shukla for misconduct, they would not only have taken prompt action in issuing a charge-sheet but would not have granted him the benefit of being placed in a higher category or crossing the efficiency bar." 11.2 Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhupinder Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, reported in 2025 INSC 83, in which also the issue was whether the delay in issuing the charge sheet and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings were justified. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case observed that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated just before the appellant's retirement, leading to questions about the timing and intent behind the action. The Court noted that the delay and the manner of initiation could raise concerns about the fairness and bona fide nature of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the said judgment are as under:-
"18. It is true that limited notice was issued by the Division Bench while admitting the intra-court appeal. However, a reading of the impugned order does not reveal that the Division Bench while disposing of such appeal considered the sole point on which limited notice was issued; on the contrary, arguments were advanced by the parties on similar lines as advanced before us and after noting the rival claims, the Division Bench proceeded to dispose of the appeal by holding as follows:
"In the present case also, the petitioner has put in service of 34 years and not an iota of material has been brought on record 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 27 OA No.2835/2025 to even remotely suggest that the writ petitioner had been a trouble maker or undisciplined employee or habitual of absenting himself from work without permission. On the contrary, the factors that ostensibly appear to have influenced the competent authority have also been candidly pleaded and brought on record i.e. actively pursuing litigation in which the highest authority of the department i.e. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Punjab was as such a party respondent by name, as contemnor, in COCP No. 2304 of 2013 titled 'Dr. Bhupinder Pal Singh Gill v. Smt. Vini Mahajan'. No material has been brought to our notice that the aforesaid factual aspect was ever denied or refuted or appropriately dealt with, at the time of imposing the punishment.
Keeping in view the above discussion, the material available on record, ratio of the judgments referred to and the peculiar facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the punishment inflicted on the writ petitioner being a 2% cut in pension, in perpetuity, even if the finding with regard to the charges is left untouched, is disproportionate to the misconduct and is sufficient to shock the conscience of the Court. Thus, the writ petitioner does not deserve to be treated any differently and as such taking a consistent view, the present appeal is liable to be allowed partly and the order of punishment deserves to be modified accordingly. Therefore, the ends of justice would be met if the impugned punishment is modified to be for a limited specific period other than being in perpetuity i.e. with cumulative effect. None the less, the same would still act as a deterrent for other employees to discharge the duties in a proper manner and remain careful to follow all instructions issued from time to time.
Accordingly, the order dated 26.02.2021 and the order dated 28.04.2021 passed by the writ Court are set aside and the order dated 11.10.2019 (Annexure P-13) passed by Principal Secretary, Punjab Government, Health and Family Welfare Department, imposing 2% cut in pension with cumulative/permanent effect, is modified to that of 2% cut in pension for a period of 5 years. Consequently, full pension would be restored on the completion of give years period from the date the inflicted punishment has been effected."
(emphasis supplied) After having elaborately discussing the proceedings initiated in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"32. Before we embark on a judicial review of the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority to penalise the appellant and examine the correctness of the impugned order, we need to remind ourselves of the well-settled principles relating to interference with decisions taken in pursuance of disciplinary proceedings to discipline and control errant employees.
33. Certain generic principles governing interference with orders of punishment that are passed following inquiry proceedings have evolved over a period of time. Law is well settled that an administrative order punishing a delinquent employee is not ordinarily subject to correction 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 28 OA No.2835/2025 in judicial review because the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the high court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, should on consideration of the materials on record, the court be satisfied that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted contrary to statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry, or that the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is ex facie arbitrary or capricious, so much so that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusion, or there is any other ground very similar to the above, the high court may in the exercise of its discretion interfere to set things right. After all, public servants to whom Article 311 of the Constitution apply do enjoy certain procedural safeguards, enforcement of which by the high court can legitimately be urged by such servants depending upon the extent of breach that is manifestly demonstrated.
34. It would further be of immense profit, at this stage, to consider a specific principle which is tailored to the particular situation and could clinch the issue. The Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking through Hon'ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C. Goel8 laid down a specific test which could be applied if a contention were raised that the conclusion is based on no evidence. Relevant passages from the said decision evincing one of the two questions arising for decision and the answer thereto, read as follows:
"1. Two short questions of law arise for our decision in the present appeal. The first question is ... ; and the other question is whether the High Court in dealing with a writ petition filed by a Government Officer who has been dismissed from Government service is entitled to hold that the conclusion reached by the Government in regard to his misconduct if (sic, is) not supported by any evidence at all. As our judgment will show, we are inclined to answer both the questions in the affirmative. Thus, the appellant, the Union of India, succeeds on the first point, but fails on the second. ...
20. ... It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311(2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 29 OA No.2835/2025 proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence....
23. ... In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally (sic, legally) the impugned conclusion follows or not. ...
26. ... Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the fact that in carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquires held under the statutory rules. ..."
(emphasis supplied)
35. It also needs to be emphasised that although the traditional concept of natural justice comprises of the two rules that prohibit anyone from being condemned unheard and anyone from being a judge of his own cause, jurisprudence on natural justice principles have seen a distinct shift ever since the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. India9 constitutionalised principles of natural justice, as held in Madhayamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India10. Drawing inspiration from such authorities, it would be apt to observe that in relation to disciplinary proceedings, subject to just exceptions, natural justice would envisage observance of procedural fairness before holding a public servant guilty of misconduct and imposing a punishment on him for such misconduct. While it is true that principles of natural justice supplement, and not supplant, the law, such principles have been declared by this Court to be a constituent feature of Article 14. Validity of any disciplinary action, whenever questioned, has to be tested on the touchstone of Articles 14, 16 and 21 as well as Article 311(2), wherever applicable. To test whether interference is warranted, this Court has laid down that the scrutiny ought to be confined to finding out whether the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted fairly; if not, an inference can be drawn that this has caused prejudice to the charged employee. Be that as it may, there can be no gainsaying that the consequences of violation of a fair procedure, which principles of natural justice embody, in a given situation has to be considered on a case-by-case basis bearing in mind that judicial review is not intended to be an appeal in disguise.
36. Though the rules closely associated with the traditional concept of natural justice may not have been breached in this case, the contention of the appellant that the process of decision-making stands vitiated for lack of procedural fairness has to be examined given the nature of challenge raised.
2025.10.15
RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30'
Item No.143/C-1 30 OA No.2835/2025
37. Memory refreshed; we now proceed to examine whether the appellant has set up any case for interference.
38. The second and the fourth charges levelled against the appellant that he had proceeded on leave without sanction thereof and in not complying with the orders of his superior officers seem to be the most vital charges. Undoubtedly, no public servant can claim leave as a matter of right. Leave is a matter regulated by rules and such rules need to be duly adhered to by each public servant. While there can be no quarrel on this aspect, we have not found any such circumstance from the record to afford ground for holding that the appellant did commit a serious misconduct. In order to establish that the appellant had committed a serious misconduct by proceeding on leave without leave being sanctioned (leave cancelled as per PW-1), the prosecution endeavoured to prove that the Civil Surgeon had refused to sanction leave, prayed by the appellant, and that he was telephonically informed by the Senior Assistant of such refusal. That the appellant had visited the office of the Civil Surgeon, remained there from 3.00 pm to 5.00 pm and submitted his application for leave which was duly acknowledged, have not been disputed by the prosecution. Interestingly, the Inquiry Officer while exonerating the appellant of the second part of the third charge reasoned that neither the Senior Assistant had been produced in the inquiry as a witness nor were call details produced, and what PW-1 said is mere hearsay; hence, in the absence of proof, that part of the charge is not proved. This was a valid reason assigned by the Inquiry Officer, which the Disciplinary Authority even accepted. On the same analogy and for the same reason, the appellant could not have been held guilty in respect of the second charge. There is no record of the Civil Surgeon's refusal to sanction leave being communicated to the appellant either. In such view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that there was no legal evidence based whereon the appellant could have been held guilty of the second and fourth charges.
39. That the appellant did not comply with the directions of the Election Commission and did not participate in the pulse polio programme constitute the first charge and the first part of the third charge, respectively. The second part of the third charge of the appellant having threatened the Senior Assistant has not been found to be proved. It is the clear finding of the Inquiry Officer, based on the evidence on record, that the appellant was not assigned any duty in connection with election duty and pulse polio programme during the period he wished to avail leave to attend court proceedings before the High Court. Insofar as defiance of Election Commission's directions by the appellant are concerned, no such written directions were part of the documentary evidence led before the Inquiry Officer. Though the letter of the M.D., PHSC was not made part of the evidence, we shall assume that the appellant, PW-1 and the Inquiry Officer knew the contents of the said letter and were aware that in view of the ensuing elections in February, 2017, instructions had been received not to grant leave to any officer unless permitted by the Director, Health. However, the appellant's contention that public servants on the verge of retirement are not assigned election duty was not shown to be incorrect and untenable. Rather curiously, the Inquiry Officer resorted to ingenuity to hold the appellant guilty. As is evident from the report, the prosecution having failed to establish that the appellant had been assigned election duty as well as duty associated with the pulse polio programme, the Inquiry Officer went on record to hold the charges under consideration proved by referring to what was, in his perception, the duty of a senior medical officer who has been in charge of an organisation. It needs no discussion that the Inquiry Officer found the appellant guilty for a perceived failure 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 31 OA No.2835/2025 to perform a moral duty. Not only was it completely extraneous, but such a finding was clearly at variance with the charge levelled against the appellant. We hold that holding the appellant guilty of a perceived failure to perform a duty not being the charge in respect of which any opportunity of explanation was given, such a finding could not have been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority to impose penalty on the appellant.
40. The order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 11th October, 2019, on another count, does not also commend to be legal and valid. A detailed response to the inquiry report had been submitted by the appellant. Dismissing the claims by a single sentence that the same are not acceptable, is not part of a fair procedure. This is a substantial ground for which appellant's grievance seems to be justified.
41. We have extracted verbatim (supra) the reasons assigned by the Division Bench in support of the ultimate order it passed modifying the penalty. It is not in doubt that in a rare and appropriate case, to shorten litigation and for exceptional reasons to be recorded in writing, a high court may substitute the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee. However, what has overwhelmed our ability of comprehension is that the Division Bench despite having returned clear findings in favour of the appellant adopted a hands-off approach by leaving the findings with regard to the charges untouched. In our considered opinion, the tenor of the impugned order does suggest that the Division Bench found the appellant to have been wronged and regard being had thereto, the Division Bench ought to have set things right by interfering with the findings and granting full relief that we intend to grant to the appellant. The impugned order, insofar as it declines to interfere with the findings on the charges, being clearly indefensible, we proceed to grant relief to the appellant as indicated hereafter."
12. Keeping in view the above principles in mind, we adjudicate the issue (A) mentioned in paragraph 9 above, namely, whether the impugned charge-memorandum dated 03.02.2025 stands vitiated on account of inordinate and unexplained delay, coupled with mala fide intent, so as to warrant its quashing. We find that the alleged misconduct pertains to the period 2011-2013, while the formal charge- memorandum was issued only on 03.02.2025, i.e., after a lapse of nearly 13 years from the earliest alleged events and that too just before the applicant's retirement. This is, undeniably, an unusually long period. The respondents have, however, produced a detailed chronology of file/correspondence exchanges, reminders, and deficiencies in documents, which indicates that: (i) an ACB enquiry 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 32 OA No.2835/2025 and FIR existed since 2012; (ii) several rounds of correspondence took place between the ACB, DOV (GNCTD), LG Secretariat, and MHA; (iii) the documents required for sanction/proceedings were repeatedly found incomplete and became the subject of repeated reminders; and
(iv) the CVC ultimately rendered its advice on 10.01.2025, after the MHA processed the file. The said chronology shows active but protracted agency action. This explanation, i.e., that the documents and authoritative inputs were not complete earlier and successive reminders were necessary is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Although the respondents have offered a factual explanation for delay, which is not a mere afterthought, however, the said explanation does not fully absolve the inordinate period that elapsed. Where the State's own machinery (ACB/DOV/LG Secretariat/MHA) repeatedly required time and resubmission, responsibility for delay is partly traceable to the official agencies themselves. We also observe that a long systemic delay does not automatically translate into a lawful initiation of disciplinary proceedings at the stage of applicant's retirement as the timing and the consequences must be examined in terms of prejudice and fairness.
13. Further, on issue (B) referred to in paragraph 9 above, we observe that the applicant's grievance is that the impugned charge- memorandum has, in effect, been used to scuttle his induction into the IAS and to deprive him of his retiral dues. It is not disputed that the applicant had filed an OA before this Tribunal for induction into the IAS, which was allowed vide Order/Judgment dated 15.05.2025 in OA 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 33 OA No.2835/2025 No.4163/2024. Although the charge-memorandum bears the date 03.02.2025, i.e., prior to the Select Committee meeting allegedly held on 17.03.2025 and before the OA was finally decided, the surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct of the respondents give credence to the applicant's contention that the route of issuance of charge-memorandum was resorted to frustrate or delay the implementation of applicant's induction into the IAS. We note that while the technical date of issuance predates 17.03.2025, the timing, the manner in which the applicant's reply dated 03.04.2025 was not considered and the belated forwarding of para-wise comments by GNCTD on 25.07.2025, together, lend support to the applicant's allegation of prejudice and raise a reasonable apprehension of mala fides.
14. The said proximate effect of the departmental steps, the respondents' delay in considering the applicant's detailed reply dated 03.04.2025 and delay in deciding his representations even after the Tribunal's order of 15.05.2025, give rise to a reasonable inference of prejudice to the applicant. The record shows that the applicant's defence and representations were not decided before he approached this Tribunal and that GNCTD's para-wise comments were furnished very late, i.e., only on 25.07.2025 and that too only after repeated reminders from the MHA. A disciplinary process begun but not concluded during which replies were not decided, offends the principles of natural justice and causes stigma and prejudice, especially close to retirement of the applicant and while also an order to induction 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 34 OA No.2835/2025 the applicant into IAS is pending. Although there is no direct documentary proof of mala fides in the issuance of the charge- memorandum dated 03.02.2025, however, the subsequent conduct of the respondents, namely, their failure to consider the applicant's reply and the delayed submission of comments by GNCTD gives rise to a justifiable concern that the disciplinary mechanism, at least in its present form and timing, operates to the applicant's prejudice and may have had an inhibitory effect on the effective implementation of his rights, including induction into the IAS and the grant of retirement benefits. As such, we find that the timing and the failure to consider the applicant's representations weigh heavily in his favour.
15. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to state that it is not in dispute that the applicant sat through long service with clean APARs and that induction to IAS was granted by this Tribunal vide Order/Judgment dated 15.05.2025 passed in OA No.4163/2024, i.e., a direction to appoint unconditionally and to provide consequential benefits to the applicant. The respondents have not completed the said appointment despite the Tribunal's direction and the time given. The applicant stands to lose or is being deprived of both the prospect of induction and his retiral dues by reason of unresolved disciplinary steps started after a long gap. The submission on the legal right to retiral benefits as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jitender Kumar (supra) and other authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, as noted above, was pressed upon before us and is of persuasive value.
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16. We also deem it appropriate to refer to the para-wise comments furnished by the Government of NCT of Delhi vide letter dated 09.07.2025 (Annexure A-3), which were sought by the Directorate of Vigilance in respect of the applicant's representation dated 03.04.2025 against the impugned charge-memorandum. In response to reply of the applicant to Article I of the charge sheet, the Transport Department categorically stated that "it is a matter of record that the agreement dated 27.10.2006 was signed and had come into force before the joining of Shri R.P. Meena, DANICS, in the Transport Department. Shri R.P. Meena was allocated work of VIU Burari vide order dated 01.07.2011." The Department further clarified that "the Dy. Commissioner (VIU) was stationed at Burari and supervised the work of VIU on a day-to-day basis, while the MLO and PCO acted as supervisory authorities for each shift and were functioning as In-charge of each shift to oversee the work of the Board of Inspectors. As there was no sanctioned post of Station Manager in the Transport Department....". In view of the aforesaid official comments, the allegation under Article I that the applicant while functioning as Addl. Commissioner (Transport), GNCTD during 2011-2013 committed gross misconduct by allegedly abusing his official position and failing to appoint a Station Manager with mala fide intent to favour M/s ESP India Pvt. Ltd. in charging extra money appears, on the face of it, to be unsustainable in the eyes of law.
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17. Further, in response to the defence submitted by the applicant with respect to Articles II and III, the Department stated in the said para-wise comments that "as per record, no such document is available in the Department to indicate that the minutes of the meeting dated 19.04.2011 were placed before Shri R.P. Meena, DANICS, which were in fact issued prior to his joining. The minutes of the meeting are a matter of record." The Department further clarified that "as per record, the concerned subordinate authority never approached the higher authority regarding the extra money charged by M/s ESP in VIU Burari... Opportunity of personal hearing, as sought by Shri R.P. Meena, should be considered by the Disciplinary Authority as requested by him." From the above comments of the Department, it is evidently clear that the allegations contained in Articles II and III do not withstand scrutiny on the touchstone of law. However, the Disciplinary Authority, acting solely on the advice tendered by the DoV and without applying its independent mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, proceeded to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
18. Further, we observe that Public interest in investigating allegations of corruption and in protecting public exchequer is a strong and legitimate interest. CVC's advice dated 10.01.2025 to initiate major penalty proceedings and prosecution sanction is an important piece of the administrative puzzle. We observe that the respondents were not acting capriciously in ultimately seeking to act on the CVC advice.
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Nevertheless, the existence of such advice do not render immune from judicial scrutiny, which vitiated by inordinate delay, lack of fair procedure or evident prejudice to the rights of a public servant. While dealing with such matters, we must balance the public interest against the individual's right to a fair process and the right not to be kept under a cloud indefinitely. We also note that CVC advice is a material factor but is not determinative on the face of inordinate delay and demonstrated prejudice. The public interest must be vindicated in a manner, which is consonant with basic fairness and natural justice.
19. Furthermore, the applicant has demonstrated that crucial material evidence, such as fee receipts and relevant files, which he had sought, was either unavailable or not produced, thereby significantly impeding his ability to present an effective defence, especially after the lapse of many years.
20. We deem it profitable also to refer the order/Judgment dated 23.09.2013 of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Union of India & Anr. V. Hari Singh, W.P.(C) No.4245/2013 & CM No.9885/2013, in which, while affirming the decision of this Tribunal rendered vide common Order/Judgment dated 20.03.2023 in OA Nos.1447 & 1527 of 2018, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that the respondents have not been able to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The relevant portion of the said Order/Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated 23.09.2013 is reproduced as follows:
2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 38 OA No.2835/2025 "20. The question which arises for consideration in the present matter is whether the delay in issuance of the charge sheet stands adequately explained and what is the impact of the delay so far as the rights of the respondent are concerned.
21. It is an admitted position before this court that the transaction on which the disciplinary action is based related to the period of 1999. The petitioners do not dispute that they had full knowledge of the transactions. The communications received from the DRI are admitted before us. This correspondence manifests that proceedings had been initiated against the exporter on the documents which adequately informed the petitioners of the nature of the inquiry as well as the charges.
22. The disciplinary proceedings against the respondent were commenced by issuance of the charge memo dated 25th February, 2011.
23. We may first examine the principles of law which would govern the consideration of the issues raised herein. So far as delay in issuance of the charge sheet is concerned, we may usefully refer to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Another. Just as the case before us, in Bani Singh as well, the State had appealed against the order of the Tribunal on the ground that it ought not to have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches. The alleged irregularity had allegedly taken place in 1975-77 and the department was aware of them. The Supreme Court held that it is unreasonable to think that it would take more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. The contention was rejected by the court holding as follows:-
"4. The appeal against the order dated December 16, 1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and latches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April, 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigation were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal."
24. Again in the judgment reported at 1998 (4) SCC 154 State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, the Court considered the same issue and laid down the following principles:-
"19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 39 OA No.2835/2025 terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
25. It is therefore trite that delay which is unexplained and unreasonable would cause prejudice to the delinquent employee. Such delay clearly manifests the lack of seriousness on the part of the disciplinary authority in pursuing the charges against the employee. In the event of any employee deviating from path of honesty, efficiency and diligence, action should expeditiously be taken as per prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court has laid down the principles holding that unexplained and unreasonable delay per se results in prejudice to the charged officer except when the employer can show that the employee was responsible for delay or is otherwise able to explain the delay. While evaluating the impact of the delay, the court must consider the nature of the charge, its complexity and for what reason the delay has occurred.
26. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the judgment dated 3rd July, 2009 passed in WP(C) No.4757/2007, Union of India v. V.K. Sareen. In this case, the petitioner had proposed to commence disciplinary action against the respondents for imposition of major penalty with regard to his functioning between 12th June, 1990 to 12th April, 1993. An Enquiry Officer was appointed on the 22nd of April, 2003 and the report of the inquiry was submitted on the 1st of July, 2005. The charge sheet and the proceedings were quashed by the Central Administrative Tribunal by an order passed on 20th of March, 2007 which order came to be questioned by way of the writ petition filed before this court. In the judgment dated 3rd July, 2009, this court had culled out the principles as follows:-
"13. It is trite law that disciplinary proceedings should be conducted soon after the alleged misconduct or negligence on the part of the employee is discovered. Inordinate delay 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 40 OA No.2835/2025 cannot be said to be fair to be Delinquent Officer and since it would also make the task of proving the charges difficult. It would also not be in interest of administration. If the delay is too long and remains unexplained, the court may interfere and quash the charges. However, how much delay is too long would depend upon the facts of each and every case and if such delay has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice the delinquent in defending the enquiry ought to be interdicted."
In the judgment in Union of India v. V.K. Sareen (Supra), the court also rejected the explanation for the delay in instituting the disciplinary proceedings as well as in taking final order on the enquiry report.
27. It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that disciplinary proceedings are necessary in public interest as well. They are essential in inculcating a sense of discipline and efficiency. The proceedings should not be protracted. In this regard, our attention has been drawn to the pronouncement reported at JT 2005 (7) SC 417 P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In this case, a charge memo has been issued to the appellant on the 8th of January, 2000 pertaining to alleged irregularity in issuing a sale deed in the year 1990. There was no explanation for the extraordinary delay of ten years in initiating the proceedings. The respondent had attempted to explain that the irregularities for which the disciplinary action had been initiated had come to light only in the second half of 1994-95, when the audit report was released. This explanation was not accepted by the Supreme Court. The court noted the unbearable mental agony and distress caused to the officer concerned and held as follows:-
"The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a Government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the Government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the Government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer."
28. The judgment of the Division Bench of this court dated 5 th February, 2010 in WP (C) No.750/2010 Union of India and Another v. M.S. Bhatia is on a similar terms.
29. Mr. R.V. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered in the proceedings inasmuch as the respondent had approached it at the stage of issuance of charge sheet and that the matter had not proceeded to the stage of a final order. It is urged that the issuance of the charge sheet does not infringe the rights of a party and it is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action in his favour.
30. In this regard, reliance is also placed on the judgment reported at 2012 (11) SCC 565 Secretary Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha. Perusal of this judgment would show that the charge memorandum dated 8th of January, 1992 was issued to the 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 41 OA No.2835/2025 respondents on the alleged demand of bribe of Rs.37,000/- and its acceptance on 3rd August, 1991. The Supreme Court did not lay down any absolute proposition that a charge sheet cannot be ever challenged. In para 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has specifically noted that the law does not permit quashing of the charge sheet in a 'routine manner'. The case considered by the Supreme Court also shows that a charge sheet in that case had been issued within one year of the alleged action by the employee. In para 9 of the judgment, the Supreme Court had noted that the delay in concluding the domestic enquiry is not always fatal and that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In para 10 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has noted that a writ application does not ordinarily lie against the charge sheet or show cause notice and that it should not ordinarily be quashed. In para 12, after considering the law on this aspect, the court reiterated the principles thus:-
"Thus the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the charge-sheet cannot generally be a subject-matter of challenge as it does not adversely affect the rights of the delinquent unless it is established that the same has been issued by an authority not competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge-sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Proceedings are not liable to be quashed on the ground that proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage or could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee. Gravity of alleged misconduct is a relevant factor be to taken into consideration while quashing the proceedings."
31. The Supreme Court has, therefore, reiterated well settled principles that proceedings initiated at belated stage would be quashed if the delay creates prejudice to the delinquent employee.
32. We have noted above the pronouncements of the Supreme Court wherein the court has observed the manner in which the delay would result prejudice. In view thereof, this judicial precedent is of no assistance to the case of the petitioner in the present writ petition.
33. It is further contended that the respondent had failed to show as to how he has been prejudiced by the delay. Reliance is placed on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court reported at 2007 (3) Scale 1 The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Appala Swamy and JT 2012 (11) SC 533 Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani in support of this submission.
34. We find that in The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Appala Swamy (Supra), the Supreme Court has again reiterated the well settled principles that no hard and fast rule can be laid on the effect of delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings or on the aspect of its impact on the delinquent. It was observed that the employee has to make out a case of prejudice. The court also noted that the question had to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case keeping in view of the nature of the charges.
35. So far as the judgment in Chairman, LIC of India & Ors. v. A. Masilamani (Supra) is concerned, the Supreme Court in para 10.2 has held as follows:-
2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 42 OA No.2835/2025 "10.2 The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts and to balance the weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion."
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Further the very same Bench of this Tribunal had an occasion to deal with the matter in which also the issue of delay in issuance of the chargesheet was involved in OA No.3533/2019, titled K. Dhanalakshmi vs. Union of India and another, decided on 12.03.2025, and this very Bench keeping in view the factual matrix of the said case and the guiding principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as Hon'ble High Courts and held :
"29. On perusal of the laid down law and other details discussed supra, we find that there is hardly any explanation for the inordinate and unexplained delay, much less a satisfactory one. Therefore, in the above circumstances, we are of the considered view that the second Article of charge is also liable to be quashed and set aside purely on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay of about seven years."
22. With regard to the reliance placed by the respondents on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v. Subrata Nath (supra) and The State of Rajasthan and Others v. Bhupendra Nath (supra), we have carefully 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 43 OA No.2835/2025 examined the said decisions and are firmly of the view that they are distinguishable on facts and, therefore, not germane to the present case.
23. In view of the foregoing analysis, and in light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble High Courts (supra), issues (A) and (B), as referred to in para 9 above, are answered in favour of the applicant. We are of the considered view that the impugned charge Memorandum dated 03.02.2025 pertains to alleged incidents of the years 2011-2013 and has been issued after an inordinate lapse of time. Although the respondents have attempted to justify the delay by citing correspondence and certain documentary reasons, the delay is of such magnitude that it has already caused, and continues to cause, serious prejudice to the applicant. We further note that the applicant's reply/representations were not dealt in with a fair or timely manner, as the para-wise comments of the Government of NCT of Delhi were furnished only after repeated reminders, and that too belatedly on 9th July, 2025. Even the belated reply dated 9th July, 2025 (supra) issued by the Transport Department, Vigilance Branch, Government of NCT of Delhi to the Directorate of Vigilance, Government of NCT of Delhi, containing para-wise comments on the applicants' reply dated 03.04.2025 to the impugned Charge Memorandum, reveals that the articles of charge framed against the applicant under the impugned Charge Memorandum are not sustainable. The cumulative effect of such inordinate delay, coupled with the purported lapses and the above reply of Vigilance Branch of 2025.10.15 RAVI KANOJIA16:04:48+05'30' Item No.143/C-1 44 OA No.2835/2025 Transport Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi to Directorate of Vigilance, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, clearly demonstrate prejudice caused to the applicant warranting judicial intervention. Accordingly, the impugned charge memorandum dated 03.02.2025 is quashed and set aside.
24. Now the only issue left to be decided in this case is the issue (C) as mentioned in para 9 above, i.e., if the impugned charge- memorandum is quashed, what consequential relief should be granted to the applicant and what directions (if any) should be issued to the respondents. This aspect has been dealt with while finally pronouncing the order in this matter, as reflected in the following paragraph:
25. In view of the foregoing findings, we allow the present OA with the following directions: -
(i) The impugned charge Memorandum dated 03.02.2025 (Annexure A-1) is quashed and set aside.
(ii) The respondents are directed to release all the withheld retiral benefits due and admissible to the applicant.
(iii) The above exercise shall be complied with by the respondents as early as possible and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this Order.
(iv) In the event of non-compliance by the respondents within the aforesaid period, the delay in such compliance shall carry interest at the applicable GPF rate on the delayed payment of retiral dues.
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26. Pending MA(s) shall stand disposed of accordingly.
27. Although the manner in which the respondents have proceeded in the present matter would ordinarily warrant the imposition of costs, however, we refrain from doing so in view of the fact that the applicant has retired only recently this year. Nevertheless, the respondents are cautioned that any recurrence of such lapses in future shall invite exemplary costs.
(Rajinder Kashyap) (Justice Ranjit More)
Member (A) Chairman
/ravi/
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