Karnataka High Court
Smt. Shakila W/O Afsarkhan Pathan vs Smt. Pooja W/O. Sunil Patil on 18 September, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL
WRIT PETITION NO. 100148 OF 2022 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN
SMT. SHAKILA W/O. AFSARKHAN PATHAN,
AGE: 59 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. #973, AYODHYA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI, PIN-590006.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. PRASHANT F. GOUDAR, ADVOCATE)
AND
SMT. POOJA W/O. SUNIL PATIL,
AGE: 41 YEARS, OCC: BUSINESS,
R/O. CCB 178, WARD NO.48,
KOLHAPUR CIRCLE, BELAGAVI, PIN-590001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. VISHWANATH HEGDE, ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
CHANDRASHEKAR
LAXMAN
KATTIMANI THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
Location: High Court
of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN
THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI SETTING ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER 24.09.2021 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR
CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, BELAGAVI IN EP NO.80/2018 VIDE
ANNEXURE-A AND ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE OF
DECLARATION DECLARING THAT THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING
BEFORE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, BELAGAVI
IN EP NO.80/2018 IS ILLEGAL AND ETC.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
11.09.2025 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER,
THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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CAV ORDER
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL)
This petition is filed seeking for following reliefs:
"1) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari setting aside
the Impugned Order 24.09.2021 passed by the Principal
Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Belagavi in EP No.80/2018
vide Annexure-A.
2) Issue a writ in the nature of declaration declaring
that the proceedings pending before Principal Senior Civil
Judge and CJM, Belagavi in EP No.80/2018 is illegal.
3) Issue any writ/direction/order of this Hon'ble Court
deems necessary."
2. Sri.Prashant F.Goudar, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioner submits that the suit filed by the
respondent/plaintiff for relief of specific performance was
decreed on 30.03.2017 by directing the petitioner/defendant to
execute registered sale deed in favour of respondent/plaintiff
after receiving balance sale consideration amount of
Rs.5,12,500/- within a period of six months from the date of
judgment, failing which, the plaintiff is at liberty to get the sale
deed registered as per law. It is submitted that the petitioner
challenged the same before the Appellate Court and appeal came
to be dismissed and second appeal in RSA No.100840/2018 filed
before this Court also came to be dismissed. However, the
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decree holder could not deposit or pay the balance consideration
amount of Rs.5,12,500/- during the pendency of the appeal
despite there being no stay. It is further submitted that the
decree holder has deposited the amount in the executing
proceedings without seeking any extension of time for deposit of
amount and none of the aspects have been considered by the
trial Court while rejecting the application filed by the petitioner
under Section 28(1) of the Specific Act, 1963. It is also
submitted that the decree holder has failed to pay the balance
sale consideration amount as per the decree within the stipulated
time of six months. Therefore, the decree would become
unenforceable. It is contended that, without seeking extension of
time to deposit the amount, the execution proceedings are not
maintainable and none of the aspects have been considered by
the trial Court while dismissing the application for rescinding the
contract. The non-payment of amount as per the decree and
non-seeking of extension of time disentitles the
respondent/plaintiff from execution of the decree. In support of
his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of PREM JEEVAN v. K.S.VENKATA
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RAMANA AND ANOTHER1. Thus, he seeks to allow the petition
by rescinding the contract.
3. Per contra, Sri.Vishwanath Hegde, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent supports the impugned order of the
trial Court and submits that as per the judgment and decree, the
burden is on the petitioner/defendant to execute the sale deed
by receiving the balance sale consideration amount within a
period of six months. It is submitted that no time is stipulated for
the defendant to pay the balance sale consideration amount. It is
further submitted that the petitioner/judgment debtor has not
sent notice nor made any demand for payment of balance sale
consideration amount. Hence, there is no lapse on the part of the
respondent/decree holder as per the decree and she has
deposited balance sale consideration amount along with the
execution petition. Thus, he seeks to dismiss the petition.
4. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel
for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent,
meticulously perused the material available on record. I have
given my anxious consideration to the submissions advanced.
1
(2017) 11 SCC 57
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5. The point that arises for consideration in this petition
is whether the impugned order of the trial Court dated
24.09.2021 passed on an application in IA No.6 filed by the
petitioner/judgment debtor under Section 28(1) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 calls for any interference?
6. The above point is answered in the 'negative' for the
following reasons:
(a) The respondent filed OS No.36/2011 for specific
performance of agreement of sale dated 19.07.2005
and supplementary agreement dated 09.01.2007. The
petitioner filed OS No.48/2012 for declaration that the
agreements of sale are invalid. The suit in OS
No.36/2011 filed by the respondent was decreed and
suit in OS No.48/2012 filed by the petitioner was
dismissed vide common judgment and decree dated
30.03.2017. The operative portion of the judgment
reads as under:
"IN O.S. No.36/2011
The suit of plaintiff is hereby decreed with costs.
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The defendant is hereby directed to execute the
registered sale deed by receiving consideration
balance amount sale of Rs.5,12,500 /- in favour of
plaintiff in property the respect of mentioned in the
agreement of sale dated: 19.07.2005 followed by
supplementary agreement dated: 09.01.2007 within
six months from the date of this judgment, failing
which the plaintiff is at liberty to get the sale deed
registered as per law.
The plaintiff is hereby directed to complete the
construction within six months from the date of this
judgment and execute the sale deed in terms of
agreement of sale.
The defendant and her agents, servants or anybody
acting on her behalf are hereby restrained by way of
perpetual injunction to alienate the property
mentioned in the agreement 19.07.2005 of sale dated:
followed by supplementary agreement dated:
09.01.2007.
Draw decree accordingly.
IN O.S. No.48/2012.
The suit of plaintiff is hereby dismissed with costs.
The original judgment shall be kept in O.S.
No.36/2011 and copy of the judgment shall be kept in
O.S. No.48/2012
(Dictated to the stenographer and transcribed by
her, corrected by me and then signed and pronounced
in the open court on this the 30th day of March, 2017"
(b) The records indicate that the petitioner challenged the
judgment and decree dated 30.03.2017 before the
District and Sessions Judge, Belagavi. The regular
appeal in RA No.165/2017 came to be dismissed vide
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judgment and decree dated 07.09.2018. The petitioner
challenged the same in RSA No.100840/2018. This
Court vide order dated 07.06.2019 dismissed the
regular second appeal.
(c) The respondent/decree holder filed execution petition in
EP No.80/2018 seeking to execute the judgment and
decree dated 30.03.2017 in OS No.36/2011. It is to be
noticed that the execution petition is filed on
27.04.2018 and along with the execution petition, the
decree holder has deposited the balance sale
consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- as per the
decree. It is further noticed that the execution petition
is filed during the pendency of RA No.165/2017. There
is no dispute that there was no interim order of stay in
the appeal proceedings. Perusal of the judgment and
decree in OS No.36/2011 indicates that there is a
direction to the petitioner/defendant to execute the
registered sale deed in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff by receiving the balance sale
consideration amount of Rs.5,12,500/- as per the
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agreement of sale dated 19.07.2005 and supplementary
agreement dated 09.01.2007 within a period of six
months from the date of judgment, failing which, the
liberty was reserved to the respondent/plaintiff to get
the sale deed registered as per law. The primary burden
is on the petitioner/defendant to execute the sale deed
within a period of six months. The petitioner/defendant
has not contacted the respondent/plaintiff for execution
of the sale deed making demand for payment of
balance sale consideration amount, which clearly goes
to show that there is a lapse on the part of the
petitioner/defendant/judgment debtor. The records
indicate that the petitioner/defendant was pursuing his
remedies of appeal and the regular second appeal filed
by the petitioner came to be dismissed on 07.06.2019.
In other words, the judgment and decree in OS
No.36/2011 dated 30.03.2011 merged in the decree of
this Court in RSA No.100840/2018. Even from that
date, if the time is calculated, then the decree holder
can make the deposit of the balance amount within a
period of six months. However, the respondent/decree
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holder has deposited the balance sale consideration
amount before the judgment in first appeal.
(d) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar
(Since Deceased) thr. Lrs and others v. Bhim
Singh and Another2 at para numbers 29 and 30 has
held as under:
"29. The contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant(s) that there was no proper prayer for
condonation of delay in making the deposit of the
balance consideration, or that there was no proper
application for extension of time to make deposit, is
unworthy of acceptance. Because, in the execution
application itself, which was promptly filed after expiry
of 60 days from the date of the appellate court decree,
the decree holder had sought permission to make
deposit. Not only that, the application filed after
dismissal of second appeal also sought permission to
make deposit. The prayer to extend the time to make
deposit was therefore implicit in the prayer to permit
the decree holder to make deposit of the balance
consideration. In this view of the matter, we reject the
submission of the appellants that as there was no
proper application for extension of time to make
deposit, the Court held no jurisdiction to extend the
same.
30. In light of the discussion above and on an overall
assessment of the facts, we are of the considered view
that the respondents had all throughout shown their
intention to pay the balance consideration for
execution of the sale deed whereas the appellants
appeared interested only in challenging the decree
before higher Courts. In these circumstances, taking
2
2024 SCC ONLINE SC 2338
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note of all the events, the Execution Court justifiably
exercised its discretion in favour of the decree-
holder(s) by allowing them to deposit the balance
consideration. In our view, therefore, substantial
justice has been done to the parties and if we interfere
with the impugned order only on the technical ground
that the application was not dealt with as one on the
original side, grave injustice would be caused to the
decree holder(s). More so, when the judgment-
debtor(s) themselves applied to the Execution Court
for rescinding the contract under Section 28(1) of the
1963 Act, and raised no such jurisdictional issue either
before the Execution Court or the High Court.
Therefore, in our view, no interference with the
impugned order is called for in exercise of our
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of
the Constitution."
(e) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v.
Jarnail Singh (now Deceased) through its LRS and
Others3 at para numbers 36 to 54 has held as under:
36. However, the judgment and decree passed by the
trial court came to be challenged before the appellate
court. Once the judgment passed by the trial court is
challenged before the appellate court the judgment
and order passed by the trial court would get merged
with the judgment of the appellate court irrespective of
the fact whether the appeal is allowed or dismissed. In
the case on hand the appeal stood dismissed.
37. The law in the aforesaid context is well settled.
The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that
there cannot be more than one operative decree at a
given point of time. The doctrine of merger applies
irrespective of whether the appellate court has
affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial
court.
3
2025 SCC ONLINE SC 584
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38. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC
359, while explaining the doctrine of merger, this
Court held thus:--
"12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is
that there cannot be more than one decree or
operative orders governing the same subject-matter
at a given point of time. When a decree or order
passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was
subjected to a remedy available under the law before
a superior forum then, though the decree or order
under challenge continues to be effective and
binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy.
Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before
it either way -- whether the decree or order under
appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it
is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal
or authority which is the final, binding and operative
decree or order wherein merges the decree or order
passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below.
However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited
application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by
the superior forum and the content or subject-matter
of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall
have to be kept in view."
39. Further, while explaining the position that emerges
on the grant of special leave to appeal by this Court, it
was observed in Kunhayammed (supra) that:--
"41. Once a special leave petition has been granted,
the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of
this Court have been let open. The order impugned
before the Supreme Court becomes an order
appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would
be an appellate order and would attract the
applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make
a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of
modification or of dismissal affirming the order
appealed against. It would also not make any
difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking
one."
40. The position of law as aforesaid has been affirmed
and reiterated by a three-Judge Bench decision of this
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Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara
Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376.
41. The decision in Kunhayammed (supra) was
followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court
in Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724,
which held thus:--
"23. The doctrine of merger is based on the
principles of propriety in the hierarchy of the justice
delivery system. The doctrine of merger does not
make a distinction between an order of reversal,
modification or an order of confirmation passed by
the appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates
that there cannot be more than one operative decree
governing the same subject-matter at a given point
of time.
24. It is trite that when an appellate court passes a
decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the
decree of the appellate court and even if and subject
to any modification that may be made in the
appellate decree, the decree of the appellate court
supersedes the decree of the trial court. In other
words, merger of a decree takes place irrespective of
the fact as to whether the appellate court affirms,
modifies or reverses the decree passed by the trial
court."
42. The decision in Chandi Prasad (supra) was
followed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court
in Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan, (2019) 11 SCC
419 rendered on 24-10-2018 in the following terms:--
"7. ... When an appeal is prescribed under a statute
and the appellate forum is invoked and entertained,
for all intents and purposes, the suit continues. When
a higher forum entertains an appeal and passes an
order on merit, the doctrine of merger would apply.
The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of
the propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery
system. The doctrine of merger does not make a
distinction between an order of reversal, modification
or an order of confirmation passed by the appellate
authority. The said doctrine postulates that there
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cannot be more than one operative decree governing
the same subject-matter at a given point of time."
(Emphasis supplied)
43. The doctrine of merger operates as a principle
upon a judgment being rendered by the appellate
court. In the present case, once the appellate court
affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court,
there was evidently a merger of the judgment of the
trial court with the decision of the appellate court.
Once the appellate court renders its judgment, it is the
decree of the appellate court which becomes
executable.
44. The decree for specific performance is in the
nature of a preliminary decree. Both the parties have
reciprocal rights and obligations flowing out of the
decree. The decree may fix the time limit for
performance and in some cases may also provide for
the consequence for non-performance within the time
limit or the decree may even be silent on this aspect.
45. The decree enforces specific performance of the
contract. The contract between the parties is thus not
extinguished by passing of a decree for specific
performance and it subsists despite the decree.
Section 28 (1) of the Act, makes it clear that the Court
does not become a functus officio after the grant of
the decree for specific performance and it retains its
power and jurisdiction to deal with the decree till the
sale deed is executed.
46. The Court has been conferred with the power to
extend the time to pay the amount and while taking
into consideration the delay that is sought to be
condoned by the plaintiff, the Court does not adjudge
the same like an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, where each day's delay must be
explained. The Court is given the discretion to extend
the time and the provision therefore seeks to provide
complete relief to both the parties in terms of the
decree for specific performance.
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47. The power and jurisdiction granted under Section
28 (1) of the Act, enables the Court to extend the
period for payment of the purchase money if it has not
been paid within the period allowed by the decree. It
also enables the judgment debtor to seek for
rescinding the contract for non-compliance of the
directions given in the decree and while considering
this application, the Court is given the discretion to
rescind the contract or in an appropriate case to even
extend the time for paying the purchase money.
48. It should also be borne in mind that appeal is a
continuation of the original proceedings and the power
of the Court to extend the time for depositing the
amount can be exercised even in the appellate stage
by the Court.
49. In the considered view of this Court, the Appellate
Court, after deciding the appeal on merits, could have
called upon the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale
consideration by fixing a time limit. This would have at
least given an opportunity to the plaintiff to fulfil his
obligation. The non-payment of the balance sale
consideration within the time period fixed by the Trial
Court does not amount to abandonment of the
contract and consequent rescinding of the same. The
real test must be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff
will amount to a positive refusal to complete his part of
the contract. There must be an element of wilful
negligence on the part of the plaintiff before a Court
proceeds to invoke Section 28 of the Act and rescind
the contract. (See
: Krishnamoorthy v. Shanmugasundaram, 2022 SCC
OnLine Mad 963)
50. This litigation is an eye-opener for the appellate
courts reminding that they owe a duty to comply with
the provisions of Order XX Rule 12A of the CPC. Where
an appeal is filed against the decree passed by the trial
court and the appeal is disposed of, the appellate court
should specify time to deposit the balance sale
consideration. It is too much to say that since the trial
court had granted two months time to the decree
holder to deposit the balance sale consideration the
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same time period would apply even to the decree that
may be drawn by the appellate court. What is
executable is the decree passed by the appellate court.
The appellate court owes a duty to specify the time
period. If during the specified time period the decree
holder is not in a position to deposit the balance sale
consideration or, in other words, fails to deposit the
balance sale consideration and later upon expiry of the
specified time period seeks permission to deposit, then
it would be within the discretion of the trial court to
grant further time to deposit the balance sale
consideration or decline. This discretion has to be
exercised judiciously keeping in mind various factors
like bona fide of the decree holder, the cause for
failure to deposit the balance sale consideration in
time, the length of delay and also the equities that
might have been created during the interregnum
period in favour of the judgment debtor. It is the
cumulative effect and considerations of such factors
that should weigh with the court concerned while
permitting the decree holder to deposit the balance
sale consideration beyond the time period that might
have been prescribed by the trial court in its final
decree.
51. In the case on hand, undoubtedly, there was a
delay on the part of the decree holder in filing the
execution petition and thereby seeking permission to
deposit the balance sale consideration. Just because a
decree of specific performance can be executed within
12 years from the date of original decree or from the
date the appellate court affirms such decree that, by
itself, does not mean that a decree holder deposits the
balance sale consideration at his own sweet will.
52. If the appellate court had failed to stipulate any
particular time period then it is expected of the decree
holder to deposit the same within a reasonable period
of time.
53. As noted earlier, the balance sale consideration of
Rs. 4,87,000/- came to be deposited by the decree
holder way back in 2019. In the overall facts and
circumstances of the case we have reached the
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conclusion that High Court should not have interfered
with the order passed by the executing court.
54. In Ramankutty Guptan (supra) this Court while
holding that the application for extension of time for
payment of balance amount of consideration can be
filed in the Court of the first instance as well as in the
appellate court, observed that. "It is to be seen that
the procedure is hand-maid for justice and unless the
procedure touches upon jurisdictional issue, it should
be moulded to subserve substantial justice. Therefore,
technicalities would not stand in the way to subserve
substantive justice"
(f) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BALBIR
SINGH AND ANOTHER Vs. BALDEV SINGH (DEAD)
THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND
OTHERS4 at para numbers 24 to 27 has held as under:
"24. The present section corresponds to Section 35(c)
of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (hereinafter referred to
as "the repealed Act") under which it was open to the
vendor or lessor in the circumstances mentioned in
that section to bring a separate suit for rescission; but
this section goes further and gives to the vendor or
lessor the right to seek rescission in the same suit,
when after the suit for specific performance is decreed
the plaintiff fails to pay the purchase money within the
period fixed. The present section, therefore, seeks to
provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of
a decree for specific performance in the same suit
without requiring one of the parties to initiate separate
proceedings. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Likewise, under the present provision where the
purchaser or lessee has paid the money, he is entitled
4
(2025) 3 SCC 543
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in the suit for specific performance to the reliefs as
indicated in sub-section (3) like, partition, possession,
etc. A suit for specific performance does not come to
an end on passing of a decree and the court which has
passed the decree for specific performance retains the
control over the decree even after the decree has been
passed.
25. The decree for specific performance has been
described as a preliminary decree. The power under
Section 28 of the Act is discretionary and the court
cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it.
Although the power to annul the decree exists yet
Section 28 of the Act provides for complete relief to
both the parties in terms of the decree. The court does
not cease to have the power to extend the time even
though the trial court had earlier directed in the decree
that payment of balance price to be made by certain
date and on failure the suit to stand dismissed. The
power exercisable under this section is discretionary.
[See : Chanda v. Rattni [Chanda v. Rattni, (2007) 14
SCC 26]
26. As stated above upon the decision of the High
Court in the second appeals filed by the plaintiffs
(decree-holders) there was a merger of the judgment
of the trial court with the decision which was rendered
by the High Court in the second appeals. Consequent
upon the passing of the decree of the second appellate
court, the decree of the trial court merges with that of
the same.
27. The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale
that there cannot be more than one operative decree
at a given point of time. The doctrine of merger
applies irrespective of whether the appellate court has
affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial
court. The doctrine has been discussed and explained
succinctly by this Court in Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan
Lal [Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal, (2020) 15 SCC
771]."
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(g) Keeping in mind the enunciation of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear
that non-payment of the balance sale consideration
within the time period fixed by the Trial court does not
amount to abandonment of the contract and
consequent rescinding of the same. The real test would
be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff amounts to
positive refusal to complete his part of the contract and
whether there is any wilful negligence on the part of the
plaintiff before invoking Section 28 of the Act and
rescinding the contract. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
also makes it clear that a decree for specific
performance, when appealed, merges with the decree
of the Appellate court despite the modification or
affirmation to the original decree. It is further the duty
of the Appellate court that when an appeal is filed
against a decree passed by the trial Court and the
appeal is disposed of, the appellate court should specify
the time to deposit the balance sale consideration.
However, if the appellate court fails to stipulate any
particular time period then it is expected of the decree
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holder to deposit the same within a reasonable period of
time.
(h) In the instant case, the respondent/decree holder has
deposited the balance sale consideration amount of
Rs.5,12,500/- along with filing the Execution
proceedings on 27.04.2018. I am of the considered
view that the conduct of the respondent/decree holder
was neither amounting to positive refusal to fulfil his
part of the contract nor wilful negligence. Moreover,
with regard to the time period for making the payment
of balance sale consideration, it is observed that the
Execution petition was filed along with the deposit of
the balance sale consideration before the disposal of RA
No.165/2017 and RSA No.100840/2018. Furthermore,
the decree of the trial Court was subsequently re-
affirmed by the first as well as the second Appellate
Court. Therefore, in my considered view, the deposit of
the balance sale consideration was well within a
reasonable period of time as it was made even before
the passing of the Appellate decrees. Hence, the finding
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of the Trial Court that there was no ground made out by
the appellant-judgment debtor to allow the recession of
contract under Section 28 of the Act is neither perverse
nor opposed to the settled position of law calling for
interference in this present writ petition.
7. For the aforementioned reasons, I proceed to pass
the following:
ORDER
The writ petition is devoid of merits and the same is rejected.
Sd/-
(VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL) JUDGE RH CT-AN List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1