Madras High Court
The General Manager vs M/S.Veeyar Engineers & Contractors on 4 April, 2019
Author: M.Sundar
Bench: M.Sundar
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Dated :04.04.2019
Coram
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.SUNDAR
O.P.D.No.18377 of 2018
1. The General Manager
Southern Railway
Head Quarters
Part Town
Chennai – 600 003
2.The Divisional Railway Manager
Words Branch
Chennai Division
Southern Railway
Park Town
Chennai – 600 003
3.ADRM/II/MAS
Southern Railway
Chennai-600 003
4.Sr.DEN/Metro & Bldgs/MAS
Chennai Division
Southern Railway
Part Town
Chennai – 600 003 ... Petitioners
vs.
M/s.Veeyar Engineers & Contractors
Rep. By Managing Partner S.J.Alphonse
Flat No.7, Rio Lok Apartments
Old No.37, New No.4, Club Road
Chetpet, Chennai – 600 031 ... Respondent
http://www.judis.nic.in
2
Original Petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, to set aside the arbitration award dated 19.12.2017 and
subsequently corrected and returned vide Sole Arbitrator's letter dated
07.03.2018.
For Petitioners : Mr.M.T.Arunan
For Respondent : Ms.Chitra Sampath
Senior Counsel
for Mr.G.Viswanathan
ORDER
Instant 'Original Petition' ('OP' for brevity) has been placed before this Court under the caption 'FOR MAINTAINABILITY' along with a note drawn up by the Registry.
2. Instant OP has been filed under Section 34 of 'The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996' ('A & C Act' for brevity) assailing an arbitral award dated 19.12.2017 (hereinafter 'impugned award' for brevity) made by an 'Arbitral Tribunal' ('AT' for brevity) constituted by a sole arbitrator, who is a former judge of this Court.
3. To be noted, instant OP has been placed under the same caption i.e., 'FOR MAINTAINABILITY' along with two other original petitions. Therefore, there http://www.judis.nic.in 3 is a common maintainability note in O.P.Diary.Nos.18377 to 18377 of 2018 and the same reads as follows:
'It is most respectfully submitted that, Mr.M.T.Arunan, Counsel for petitioner has filed Original Petition bearing Diary Nos.18377, 18376 and 18377 of 2018 respectively for setting aside the award dated 19.12.2017.
It is submitted that the arbitral award was passed on 19.12.2017, but the Counsel for the petitioner in his memo dated 08.02.2019 has stated that he has received the Award only on 07.03.2018. Therefore the petitioner has not filed the petition within the time allowed under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
He has filed only the petitioner enclosing the copy of the petition on 17.04.2018. Hence, the Registry has returned on 19.04.2018 and 24.07.2018 to rectify the defects and also to filed required papers. But the Counsel has represented the required paper and copy of the Award in all three cases only on 18.12.2018.
Proviso to the Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, reads as follows:-
If the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
In the circumstances, the Registry entertains a doubt about the petition which has been filed on 11.07.2018 after a period of 120 days (3 months + 30 days i.e., beyond the time prescribed http://www.judis.nic.in 4 under the Act.
In the meanwhile, the counsel for petitioner represented the petitions on 18.12.2018 have filed wherein he has stated as follows:
O.P.Diary No.18377 to 18377 of 2018 '1. The Petitioners are T.Ravi, and Kondappa Naidu working as Sr. Divisional Engineer, Southern Railways, Chennai – 600 003. The petitioners filed the above O.P.Nos.462, 452 and 463 of 2018 for setting aside the Arbitration Award dated 19.12.2017 and received on 07.03.2018 and the Hon'ble Arbitration was made as 2nd Respondent.
2.The Petitioners humbly submit that the Arbitration Award was passed on 19.12.2017 and it was received on 07.03.2018, that is under challenge before this Hon'ble Court.
3.The 1st Respondent also challenged this Arbitration Award numbered as O.P.Nos.226, 227 and 228 of 2018 which is pending before this Hon'ble Court for argument. The Petitioner informed this Hon'ble Court the above O.P is also filed, challenging the very same Arbitration Award. The Hon'ble High Court Madras passed an order directing the registry to list the above case also together with the earlier O.P.Nos.226, 227 and 228 of 2018. On hearing both O.Ps filed by Petitioner and Respondent, this Hon'ble Court may passed a common order after hearing both sides.
4.It is submitted that there was a delay in calculating the Court fee payable by the Petitioner while filing the above O.P. The delay is neither willful nor wanton but it happened due to http://www.judis.nic.in 5 unavoidable circumstances. After under going all the process the necessary Court fees was fully paid.
5.It is further submitted that there was a 256 days representation delay this was allowed by Hon'ble Master Court on 31.01.2019. At present, there is a delay of 256 days for filling the above O.P. The petitioner has got very good case for getting a favourable order for Railways. If the delay is not condoned Petitioner will be put into irreparable loss and hardship. The petitioner may be provided an opportunity to plead the case respectively.
In the above circumstances, it is most respectfully submitted for orders as to whether the Original Petition Diary Nos.18377, 18376 and 18377 of 2018 may be posted for maintainability before the Hon'ble Court.'
4. Petitioners 1 to 4 in instant OP are respondents 1 to 4 respectively before the AT. Sole respondent in instant OP is the lone claimant before AT.
5. In this order, parties are referred to by their respective ranks in the instant OP.
6. Mr.M.T.Arunan, learned counsel for petitioners is before this Court. Mr.G.Viswanathan, learned counsel voluntarily came before this Court and submitted that he has instructions to represent the sole respondent. http://www.judis.nic.in 6 Mr.G.Viswanathan, learned counsel is led by Ms.Chitra Sampath, learned senior counsel. Though maintainability is a matter between the Court and the petitioner, as the counsel representing the sole respondent led by a senior counsel voluntarily came before this Court, this Court decided to take the assistance of learned senior counsel also.
7. In the aforesaid backdrop, both sides made submissions on maintainability.
8. Undisputed facts, as they unfurl from the case file placed before this Court and the submissions made before this Court reveal that impugned award is dated 19.12.2017 and it was received by the parties i.e., petitioners and respondent on 20.12.2017. Thereafter, the petitioners sought certain corrections in the impugned award.
9. It is the stated position of the petitioners that such corrections in the impugned award were sought in accordance with Section 33 of A & C Act. It is also the stated position of the petitioners that the corrected impugned award was made available to the petitioners only on 08.03.2018 under a cover of letter dated 07.03.2018 from the AT. On this basis, it was submitted by petitioners that 08.03.2018 is the reckoning date for the purposes of Sub- http://www.judis.nic.in 7 Section (3) of Section 34 of A & C Act. In other words, 08.03.2018 is the date on which the petitioners received the impugned award i.e., amended impugned award and therefore three months prescribed under Sub-Section(3) of Section 34 of A & C Act should be computed from this date, is learned counsel's say. If three months is computed from this date i.e., 08.03.2018, it expires /elapses on 07.06.2018, which falls on a Thursday. In the interregnum, instant OP along with the aforesaid two OP Diary Numbers were filed on 17.04.2018 vide Diary Nos.293 to 295 of 2018 is learned counsel's say.
10. From the maintainability note placed before this Court by the Registry and a scrutiny of the entire case file placed before this Court, viewed in the context of submissions made by learned senior counsel for respondent, it comes to light that filing on 17.04.2018 is not proper filing and it does not arrest the running of limitation period.
11. The reason, as to why this is improper presentation, is as follows:
a) The entire Court fee payable on instant OP, even according to the memo of valuation of petitioners is Rs.55,480/-
(Rupees Fifty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Eighty only).
b) On 17.04.2018, a perusal of the case file and the objections/return sheet of the Registry reveals that petition and http://www.judis.nic.in 8 petition copy alone had been filed. This is objection No.34. Therefore, it is obvious that on 17.04.2018, even one rupee Court fee was not paid and obviously the impugned amended award had not been filed along with the petition. (A careful perusal of case file placed before this Court reveals that this position is correct)
c) Therefore, Registry returned the papers on 19.04.2018.
12. Post return, papers were presented on 11.07.2018, but only with partial Court Fee of Rs.32,300/- (Rupees Thirty Two Thousand Three Hundred only) as opposed to Rs.55,480/- (Rupees Fifty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Eighty only) being total court fee payable. Therefore, even on 11.07.2018, the delay did not get arrested. There was a second return/objection by Registry on 24.07.2018 wherein it has been clearly stated that previous returns /objections are to be complied with/removed.
13. Ultimately OP was presented on 18.12.2018 together with full Court Fee of Rs.55,480/- (Rupees Fifty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Eighty only). To be noted exact court fee paid is Rs.55,480/- (Rupees Fifty Five Thousand Four Hundred and Eighty only). This is evidenced from the seal of the Court Fees stamp papers also (besides other aspects of case file which have been examined carefully as mentioned supra).
http://www.judis.nic.in 9
14. There was a third return on 13.02.2019 and further re-presentation on 15.02.2019. This is mentioned only for completion of facts as this has no bearing qua maintainability issue.
15. Therefore, the crucial and critical question is as to whether the delay in filing instant OP was arrested on 17.04.2018 and whether it is saved by being hit by sub-section (3) of Section 34 of A & C Act. This Court is of the considered view that it was certainly not arrested on 17.04.2018 and only petition and a copy of the petition alone were filed i.e. without a single rupee towards court fee and without the impugned award or a copy of the same. This view is fortified by a Division Bench judgment of this Court made in A.S.No.375 of 1989 in the case of K.Natarajan Vs. P.K.Rajasekaran, being judgment dated 30.04.2003. Principles in this regard in such situation were culled out and laid down. Such principles are contained in paragraph 21 of the said judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench and Paragraph 21 reads as follows:
'21.We deem it necessary to clarify the legal position and lay down the procedure to be followed as under:
(1) Section 149 of Code of Civil Procedure is a proviso to Section 4 of the Tamilnadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. (2) The word 'document' employed in Section 149 of Code of Civil Procedure would include plaint also.
(3) Whenever a plaint is received, the same shall be verified and if http://www.judis.nic.in 10 found to be not in order, the same shall be returned at least on the third day (excluding the date of presentation so also the intervening holidays).
(4) If the suit is presented on the last date of limitation affixing less Court fee, than the one mentioned in the details of valuation in the plaint, an affidavit shall be filed by the plaintiff giving reasons for not paying the requisite Court fee.
(5) In such cases, the Court shall before exercising its discretion and granting time to pay the deficit Court fee, shall order notice to the defendants and consider their objections, if any. However, such notice is not necessary in cases where the plaintiff has paid almost the entirety of the requisite court fee and the Court is satisfied on affidavit by the party that the mistake happened due to some bona fide reasons such as calculation mistake or the alike. (6) The discretion referred to in Section 149 of Code of Civil Procedure is a judicial discretion and the same has to be exercised in accordance with the well established principles of law.
(7) But however, in cases where the time granted to pay the deficit Court fee falls within the period of limitation, the defendant need not be heard.
(7A) In case where the plaint is presented well within the period of limitation with deficit court fee and the court returns the plaint to rectify the defect giving some time (2 or 3 weeks), which also falls within the period of limitation, but the plaint is re-presented paying deficit court fee after the period of limitation, the Court is bound to hear the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has paid substantial court fee (not almost entirety) at the first instance, before condoning the delay in paying the deficit court fee. (8) In cases where part of the time granted to pay the deficit Court fee falls outside the period of limitation and the deficit court fee is paid http://www.judis.nic.in 11 within the time of limitation (i.e., the plaint is represented with requisite court fee), the court need not wait for the objections of the defendant and the plaint can be straight away numbered. (9) The court should exercise its judicial discretion while considering as to whether time should be granted or not. Cases where the plaintiff wrongly (bona fide mistake) valued under particular provisions of law under Court Fee Act or where he could not pay the required Court fee for the reasons beyond his control, due to some bona fide reasons, the Court shall condone the delay. Payment of substantial court fee is a circumstance, which will go in favour of the claim of the plaintiff that a bona fide mistake has crept in. But however, in cases where the plaintiff acted wilfully to harass the defendant (like wilful negligence in paying court fee, awaiting the result of some other litigation, expecting compromise, etc.).
(10) If the court had exercised its discretion without issuing notice, then it is open to the defendant to file application under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure for proper relief. It will be open to the defendant to file a revision under Article 227 of Constitution of ndia.
That apart, objection can also be raised at the trial or even at the appellate stage, since the failure to exercise judicial discretion in a manner known to law (as laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court) amounts to Court applying a wrong provision of law.'
16. It comes to light that 11 principles have been laid down.
17. Besides this, it is necessary to notice paragraph 19 of the said judgment, which reads as follows:
'19. Keeping in mind the above legal position, let us proceed to consider the case on hand. According to the plaintiff, he gave http://www.judis.nic.in 12 Rs.25,000/- on 19.8.1981 and another Rs.10,000/- on 18.9.1981 to the defendant. He filed the suit on 17.8.1984, just one day before the last date of limitation. In the plaint, under the heading "Details of Valuation", he has clearly stated that the Court fee payable is Rs.4,030.75 . But however, he has affixed court fee of only Re.1/-. The plaint was returned on 21.8.1984 giving two weeks time to rectify the defects which would include paying of deficit Court fee. Along with the plaint, plaintiff filed only a xerox copy of the letter dated 19.4.1982 , written by the defendant to the plaintiff. Admittedly, he did not re- present the plaint with requisite Court fee within the time granted. Only long thereafter i.e, on 2.9.1986 it was re-presented with requisite Court fee. Along with the same, plaintiff also filed an affidavit explaining the reasons for delay in representing it. In the affidavit he has stated as under, "03. I have also filed a criminal complaint in C.C.No.576 of 1984 in Crime No.786 of 1983 under Sec.420 I.P.C. against the respondent defendant. I have produced the original voucher in the said proceedings and the trial has ended in July, 1986 only. So I could not represent the plaint as the records were handed over to the Public Prosecutor and the crime Police, Karur.
04. Only now I am able to get back the records after the completion of the trial and re-presenting the suit.
05. So I could not re-present the plaint with necessary court fees." Apart from that, plaintiff also filed another petition to dispense with the notice to respondent. The learned Judge returned the petition, wherein the plaintiff sought for dispense with notice to the defendant, as unnecessary. In the other petition (i.e.,) to excuse the delay in paying deficit court fee, the learned Judge passed the order in two words as http://www.judis.nic.in 13 'delay excused'. On the face of it, it is clear that the learned Judge has not exercised his discretion, but passed the order for mere asking. It is unfortunate the learned Judge has not even looked into the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay in paying deficit court fee. In the said affidavit, the plaintiff has stated that he has produced the original vouchers in the criminal proceedings and hence the delay occurred. we have already pointed out, along with the plaint the plaintiff produced only xerox copy of the voucher.
Certainly he would have handed over the plaint or xerox copy of the letter dated 19.4.1982 in the criminal Court. That being so, nothing prevented the plaintiff to re-present the plaint within the time allowed. Also to be noted is, the plaintiff has been a Financier and it is not his case that at any point of time he was in need of money. It is crystal clear from the facts and circumstances that plaintiff thought by harassing the defendant by resorting to criminal proceeding, he can extract the money that he desired and in the meantime he never wanted to spend the amount by paying Court fee. Thus, there is utter lack of bona fides on the part of the plaintiff. He seems to have taken the Court just for a ride and it can be well said that he abused the process of law. We are also shocked to find that the police authorities have registered a case against the defendant under Section 420 I.P.C. and he had to undergo an ordeal of full-fledged trial. The learned Judicial Magistrate rightly acquitted the defendant in that case. In the above circumstances, we hold that the trial Court ought not to have taken the case on file on the ground that there was no proper presentation of plaint by the plaintiff.'
18. To be noted, in the instant case, even that one rupee Court Fee has http://www.judis.nic.in 14 not been paid on 17.04.2018 and the petitioners in instant OP are worse off in comparison to plaintiff in aforesaid case law.
19. This takes us to the question as to (on a demurrer though) whether presentation made on 11.07.2018 with partial Court fee comes to the aid of the petitioners. It does not come to the aid of the petitioners in any manner because 11.07.2018 by itself was beyond 3 months and 30 days from the reckoning date i.e., 08.03.2018. As mentioned supra, computed from the reckoning date, 3 months expired/elapsed on 08.06.2018, which falls on a Friday and 30 days there from upto which delay can be condoned expired on 08.07.2018, which falls on a Sunday. Therefore, the petitioners could have at best filed it on 09.07.2018 i.e., Monday, but this presentation with partial Court fee also was only on 11.07.2018. Ultimately, proper presentation was only on 18.12.2018, as alluded to supra.
20. This takes us to the question as to whether a petition filed beyond 3 months and 30 days from the date of receipt of the impugned award can be entertained in the light of clear bar in this regard contained in Sub-Section (3) and proviso thereto of Section 34 of A & C Act, which reads as follows:
'34.Application for setting aside arbitral award (1).....
http://www.judis.nic.in 15 (2).......
(3)An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application had received the arbitral award, or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral Tribunal.
PROVIDED that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.
21. In this regard, it is necessary to refer to a recent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure being Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in 2018 SCC Online SC, 2681. The relevant paragraph is paragraph 18 and the same reads as follows:
18. 'A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-
section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read http://www.judis.nic.in 16 along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate.' (Underlining made by this Court to supply emphasis and highlight)
22. In the light of paragraph 18 of said judgment, instant OP which has been properly made/presented clearly beyond 3 months and 30 days from the date of receipt of the impugned amended award and is, therefore, not maintainable.
23. As a last desperate submission Mr.M.T.Arunan, learned counsel pointed out that the respondent herein has also filed three petitions under Section 34 of A & C Act assailing the same impugned amended award and they have been taken on file as O.P.Nos.226 to 228 of 2018. It was submitted that as the same impugned amended award is under challenge at the instance of the respondent also, the petitioners should be given a fair opportunity of having these OPs numbered and heard along with those three OPs. In the considered view of this Court, pendency of original petitions under Section 34 of A & C Act filed by the respondent assailing the same impugned amended award can be no ground to give a go by to Sub-Section (3) and proviso thereto of Section 34 of A & C Act,more so, in the light of authoritative pronouncement in this regard by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure case. http://www.judis.nic.in 17
24. Before concluding, there is one other aspect of the matter which needs to be adverted to. This aspect of the matter is being adverted to only for the purpose of making this order as comprehensive and as completely as possible.
25. There is a provision under 'The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908' ('CPC' for brevity) which provides for making up deficiency of Court Fee i.e., Section 149 CPC and the same reads as follows:
'149. Power to make up deficiency of court-fees.
Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance.'
26. In the instant case no petition has been filed under Section 149 of CPC by the petitioners. Even if a petition under Section 149 is filed, the same cannot be entertained in the light of specific bar under Sub-Section (3) and proviso thereto of Section 34 of A & C Act. No elucidation or elaboration is required for the proposition that CPC is a general procedure Code and A & C Act is a special statute. Most relevant portion of Special statute has also been http://www.judis.nic.in 18 explained in the authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e., Simplex Infrastructure principle. In the light of A & C Act, being a special statute even, if there be a petition (though there is none) under Section 149 of CPC, the same cannot be entertained.
27. This exercise of adverting to this aspect is done to examine whether there is any lifeboat available for the petitioners to extricate themselves from this predicament . Exercise of powers under Section 149 will virtually set at naught and nullify Section 34 (3) and the proviso thereto. It will neutralize and virtually negate Sub-Section(3) and proviso thereto of Section 34 of A & C Act.
A provision in a general code like CPC cannot be used to negate a provision in a special statute like A & C Act. That a provision in a general Code like CPC will yield to a provision in a Special Statute is a obtaining legal principle that needs no illumine articulation by this Court as it is clear as daylight. Therefore, though there is no petition under Section 149 of CPC by the petitioners, this aspect of the matter was also examined by this Court to make this order as exhaustive as possible.
28. Besides the rigour of sub-section 3 of section 34 of A & C Act, i.e., besides sub section (3) of section 34 and proviso thereto of A & C Act being non-negotiable, more so in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of http://www.judis.nic.in 19 Hon'ble Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd., there is another aspect of the matter which according to this court is of significance and it may be necessary to set out the same before parting with this case.
29. Expeditious disposal, finality of arbitral awards, limited judicial intervention and limited review of awards (within the contours and confines of Section 34 of A & C Act) can be described as four pillars on which the edifice of law governing 'Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism' ('ADR Mechanism') is built. To be noted, these four pillars are not exhaustive, but can be described as essential pillars. Sub-sections (5) and (6) which have now been added to section 34 buttress this.
30. In State of Bihar Vs. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti reported in (2018) 9 SCC 472, while holding that notice under sub-section (5) of section 34 of A & C Act is directory and not mandatory, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that courts hearing applications under section 34 of A & C Act shall make every endeavour to adhere to time lines / time frame prescribed under sub-section (6) of section 34 of A & C Act. Relevant paragraph in Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti case is paragraph 26 and the same reads as follows :
“26. We are of the opinion that the view propounded by the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta represents the correct state of the law. However, we may add that it shall be the endeavour of every court in which a Section 34 application is filed, to stick to the time-limit of one year from the date of http://www.judis.nic.in 20 service of notice to the opposite party by the applicant, or by the Court, as the case may be. In case the Court issues notice after the period mentioned in Section 34(3) has elapsed, every court shall endeavour to dispose of the Section 34 application within a period of one year from the date of filing of the said application, similar to what has been provided in Section 14 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015. This will give effect to the object sought to be achieved by adding Section 13(6) by the 2015 Amendment Act. “
31. Though law is well settled that when a special statute prescribes a special time frame, Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963 does not apply, this Court has reminded itself that sub-section (3) and proviso thereto to section 34 of A & C Act which fall in this category should also be seen in the perspective of aforesaid pillars of ADR Mechanism. If parties who have opted for ADR Mechanism are allowed to leisurely come before this Court under section 34, it will lead to a situation where salutary principles and sublime philosophies underlying the ADR Mechanism (which have been described as pillars on which edifice of law governing ADR Mechanism is built) can be easily neutralised, nullified and defeated by resorting to procrastination. This Court deems it appropriate to set out that this court has reminded itself about this aspect of the matter also.
32. If the instant petition is held to be maintainable, besides being http://www.judis.nic.in 21 impermissible owing to section 34(3) and proviso thereto and the overriding section 149 of CPC (though not invoked), it will also create an avenue and may open the floodgates for litigants to approach this court leisurely and defeat the objectives of ADR Mechanism. Therefore, this court is convinced that the instant OP is clearly not maintainable. In other words, entertaining instant OP will pave the way for litigants, who intend to procrastinate, to merely file some sheets of paper without proper presentation, i.e., without proper court fee or impugned order and thereafter, endlessly extend the limitation prescribed. This will open floodgates which will dilute and wash away the principle underlying ADR Mechanism. Though this Court has no hesitation in holding that O.P.Diary No.18377 of 2018 is not maintainable owing to plain operation of provisions of law itself, these aspects/principles touching upon 'ADR Mechanism' have been alluded to only as additional phenomena.
In the light of all that have been set out supra, instant OP is clearly barred by limitation and the same is dismissed as not maintainable. No costs.
04.04.2019 gpa/mp http://www.judis.nic.in 22 M.SUNDAR.J., gpa/mp O.P.D.No.18377 of 2018 04.04.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in