Himachal Pradesh High Court
Tulsi Ram vs State Of H.P. And Ors on 13 March, 2015
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. 67 of 2015.
.
Date of decision: 13.3.2015.
Tulsi Ram ...... Petitioner.
Vs.
State of H.P. and ors. ..... Respondents.
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes 1
For the petitioner : Ms. Anita Parmar, Advocate vice Mr.
Anshul Bansal, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Advocate General
with Mr. Virender Kumar Verma, Ms.
Meenakshi Sharma and Mr. Rupinder
Singh, Additional Advocate General,
for respondents No. 1 & 2.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge ( Oral):
By medium of this petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to lay challenge to the order passed by learned District Judge, Bilaspur whereby the application preferred by him for grant of compensation under section 16(3) of Indian Telegraph Act read with Section 51 of the Indian Electricity Act was dismissed as being time barred.
2. The case set up by the petitioner is that he is the owner of land comprising khasra No. 61 measuring 0-15 bighas and khasra No. 56 measuring 3-6 bighas situate in village Dhadus, Pargna Bhadurpur, Tehsil Sadar, District Bilaspur. When the power grid Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgement? Yes ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:46:21 :::HCHP ...2...
corporation forcibly tried to lay transmission line over the suit land, he alongwith others approached this court by filing CWP No. 829 of .
2000 and vide order dated 21.3.2001 this court directed the power grid corporation to pay compensation to the petitioner in accordance with law.
3. The petitioner(s) accordingly gave notice to the respondents on 31.5.2001 for settlement of their claim resulting in respondent No. 3 issuing four cheques of Rs.1570/- each to the petitioners but looking into inadequacy of the amount these cheques were not encashed. However, prior to the issuance of these cheques, the petitioner had received an amount of Rs.7,000/- towards compensation.
4. On 16.1.2009, the petitioner filed the aforesaid application for grant of compensation wherein it was mentioned that petitioner could not approach the court immediately after the decision of CWP No. No. 829 of 2000 because he remained under bonafide belief that the case had been remanded to the court of District Judge, Bilaspur. It was only at the fag end of September 2008 when he obtained a certified copy of the judgement that he came to know that his case in fact has been decided and not remanded. The petitioner claimed that respondent No. 3 had caused extensive damage to his property and Rs.10 lacs.
5. The respondent No. 3 in its reply contested the averments made by the petitioner by denying the aforesaid damage and it was further submitted that petitioner had preferred the above petition in order to grab more amount on the basis of false and ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:46:21 :::HCHP ...3...
fictitious claim. It was denied that respondent No. 3 had tried to interfere in the land of the petitioner. Besides aforesaid the .
respondent No. 3 also took preliminary objections regarding maintainability of petition, cause of action, non-joinder of necessary parties, limitation and improper verification.
6. Respondent No. 1 and 2 vide statement dated 3.1.2014 adopted the reply filed by respondent No. 3. On 20.2.2014, the following issues came to be framed by the trial court:-
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation as prayed for? OPP.
2. Whether the petition is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPR 1 to 3
3. Whether the petition is not within limitation? OPR 1 to 3.
4. Relief.
7. The learned trial court after recording the evidence dismissed the petition as being time barred as according to it the cause of action to file the present claim arose on 26.6.2001, but the petitioner had not chosen to file a claim within three years as per the provisions of Article 137 of Limitation Act, which had expired on 25.6.2004, while the petitioner had approached the court on 16.1.2009. The starting point of limitation was worked out on the basis of judgement passed by this court in CWP No. 829 of 2000 on 21.3.2001 whereby the petitioner was directed to approach respondent No.3 within a period of six weeks and the latter was directed to dispose of the claim within a further period of eight weeks. In case the land owners were not satisfied with the decision of ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:46:21 :::HCHP ...4...
respondent No.3, they were given the right to approach the court of learned District Judge under sub-section (3) of Section 16 of .
Telegraph Act. In this way the petitioner was required to approach the court after the expiry of fourteen weeks, which would come to an end on 26.6.2001. However, the present application had been filed after about seven and half years (7½) years of decision in CWP No. 829 of 2000.
8. The petitioner has assailed this order on the ground that he was an illiterate person not knowing the intricacies of law and that the learned court below has failed to take into consideration the fact that provision of the Limitation Act, more particularly, Section 5 thereof is required to be construed liberally. It is contended by the petitioner that since there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 16(3) of Indian Telegraph Act and the aforesaid Act is silent so far as the limitation part is concerned, therefore, the learned court below has wrongly come to the conclusion that Article 137 of Limitation Act was applicable.
I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have also gone through the records.
9. In so far as the applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act is concerned, suffice it to say that the proceedings under section 16(3) of Indian Telegraph Act read with section 51 of Indian Electricity Act are original in nature like suits and therefore section 5 of Limitation Act is not applicable to such proceedings.
10. Moving on to the question of applicability of Article 137 of Limitation Act, notably this issue stands settled nearly four decades ::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:46:21 :::HCHP ...5...
ago by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Kerala State Electricity Board vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma AIR 1977 SC 282 wherein the Hon'ble .
Supreme Court applied the provisions of Limitation Act to the applications made before the District Judge under section 16(3) of Indian Telegraph Act. It was held that court of District Judge being a court "under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Limitation Act would apply to such applications." The Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the language of Article 137 of Limitation Act and held that "any other application" contemplated under Article 137 are not applications confined to the Civil Procedure. It is apt to reproduce the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court:-
"18. The alteration of the division as well as the change in the collocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963 compared with Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows that applications contemplated under Article 137 are not applications confined to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other application as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words "any other application" under Article 137 cannot be said on the principle of edjusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division. Any other application under Article 137 would be petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed and extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period
20. The provisions in the Telegraph Act which contemplate determination by the District Judge of payment of compensation payable under Section 10 of the Act indicate that the District Judges acts judicially as a court. Where by statutes, matters are referred for determination by a Court of Record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the court will determine the matters as a court. (See National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. The Postmaster-::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:46:21 :::HCHP
...6...
General, 1913 AC 546). In the present case the statute makes the reference to the District Judge as the Presiding Judge of the District Court. In many statutes reference is made to the District Judge .
under this particular title while the intention is to refer to the Court of the District Judge. The Telegraph Act in Section 16 contains intrinsic evidence that the District Judge is mentioned there as the court of the District Judge. Section 16 (4) of the Telegraph Act requires payment into the court of the District Judge such amount as the telegraph authority deems sufficient if any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation. Again, in Section 34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of court-fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes. Section 3 (15) of the General Clauses Act states that the District Judge in any Act of the Central Legislature means the Judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction other than the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, unless there is anything repugnant in the context.
In the Telegraph Act there is nothing in the context to suggest that the reference to the District Judge is not intended as a reference to the District Court which seems to be the meaning implied by the definition applicable thereto. The District Judge under the Telegraph Act acts as a civil court in dealing with applications under Sec. 16 of the Telegraph Act.
21. The changed definition of the words "applicant" and "application" contained in Sections 2 (a) and 2(b) of the 1963 Limitation Act indicates the object of the Limitation Act to include petitions, original or otherwise, under special laws. The interpretation which was given to Article 181 of the 1908 Limitation Act on the principle of ejusdem generis is not applicable with regard to Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act Article 137 stands in isolation from all other Articles in Part I of the third division. This Court in Nityananda Joshi's case (AIR 1970 SC 200) (supra) has rightly thrown doubt on the two Judge Bench decision of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case (AIR 1969 SC 1335) (supra) where this Court construed Article 137 to be referable to applications under the Civil Procedure Code. Article 137 includes petitions within the word "applications." These petitions and applications can be under any special Act as in the present case.::: Downloaded on - 15/04/2017 17:46:21 :::HCHP
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22. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the .
view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case (AIR 1969 SC 1335) (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act."
11. In view of the settled position of law, there is hardly any scope of interference with the impugned order. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed in limine.
March 13, 2015. ( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ),
(Hem) Judge.
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