Punjab-Haryana High Court
Punjab Tourism Development ... vs Presiding Officer, Labour Court And ... on 13 August, 1996
Equivalent citations: (1997)115PLR379
Author: M.L. Singhal
Bench: M.L. Singhal
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. This petition is directed against the award dated 9.2.1993 passed by the Labour Court, Amritsar in referenced case No. 176 of 1984 whereby it directed the reinstatement of respondent No.2 with continuity of service and full back wages except the amount of three increments.
2. Respondent No. 2 was employed with the petitioner-Corporation in July, 1975 with monthly wages of Rs. 377/-. His services were terminated on 15.3.1984. Respondent No. 2 raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court, Amritsar, vide Government of Punjab order dated 30.8.1984. The workman pleaded before the Labour Court that his services were terminated without any notice, charge sheet etc. and without compliance of the principles of natural justice. On that basis, he prayed that the termination of his service be declared illegal and employer be directed to reinstate him with continuity of service and back wages. In reply, it was pleaded by the employer i.e. the petitioner that the workman was found playing cards in the Tourist information Centre on 14.1.1984 at about 6.25 P.M. when the Managing Director of the Corporation paid a surprise visit at the Youth Hostel. His explanation was called and as it was found unsatisfactory, a departmental enquiry was ordered on 3.2.1984. It was pleated by the petitioner that the workman took part in the enquiry and confessed his guilt. At the very commencement of the proceedings of enquiry and on that basis his services wore terminated w.e.f. 27.2.1984.
3. After analysing the evidence produced by the parties on the issue of violation of the principles of natural justice, the Labour Court held that in view of the confession made by the workman admitting his guilt that he was found playing cards, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been suffered by him and if by taking into consideration his confession, the respondents punished him, the enquiry cannot be said to be unfair. After recording this conclusion, the Labour Court examined the nature of the misconduct alleged against the workman and observed that it was of a minor nature and lenient view should have been taken instead of weeding him out of service. The Labour Court felt that ends of justice would be served by substituting the punishment awarded by the employer by invoking the provisions of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act'). Accordingly, it modified the order of punishment and held that the workman would suffer punishment of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect.
4. The only argument advanced by Shri Siddarth Sarup learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment awarded by the employer after it found that the enquiry held by the employer was fair and proper. Learned counsel argued that even after incorporation of Section 11-A in the Act, it is not within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to substitute the punishment awarded by the employer. On the other hand, Shri B.R.Mahajan,learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, submitted that proceedings held against the workman were in clear violation of the principles of natural justice in as much as no evidence was produced by the employer to prove the allegation levelled against the workman. Learned counsel submitted that the Labour Court should have recorded a finding that enquiry was not fair and proper. Another submission of Shri Mahajan is that under Section 11-A, the Labour Court is possessed with very wide jurisdiction to examine the justness of the punishment awarded by the employer and direct the substitution of punishment in case it finds that punishment awarded by the employer is arbitrary or excessive or wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved and as the workman was found guilty of a trivial misconduct, the Labour Court has rightly exercised jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Act.
5. We have thoughtfully considered the rival arguments and have carefully perused the impugned award, On the issue of fairness of the enquiry, the Labour Court has taken into consideration the confession made by respondent No. 2 before the enquiry officer and observed that in view of this confession, the workman was not entitled to raise any objection to the fairness of the domestic enquiry. We fully agree with the observation of the learned Labour Court and are of the view that Shri Mahajan's argument regarding invalidity of the enquiry is without any substance. Respondent No. 2 has not chosen to challenge the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the issue of fairness of enquiry by filing a writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India or by filing an appeal before the Supreme Court. Therefore, he cannot, as a respondent, challenge the finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry held by the Corporation was fair and proper.
6. In order to determine whether the Labour Court has acted without jurisdiction or has acted illegally in substituting the punishment of removal from service by the one of stoppage of three increments without cumulative effect, we may refer to Section 11-A which reads as under:-
" 11-A Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen: Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunals as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:
Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter."
7. Section 11-A was inserted in the Act of 1947 by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971. Prior to the insertion of Section 11-A, the Apex Court had rendered several decisions indicating the limited jurisdiction of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals to interfere with the finding of guilt recorded in domestic enquiry held against the employee and quantum of punishment awarded by the management. In Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130, their Lordships of the Supreme Court discussed the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals while adjudicating the dispute relating to dismissal or discharge and observed:-
"Undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline, but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises, Industrial Tribunals have been given the power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practices (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials the finding is completely baseless or perverse."
8. The same principle was reiterated in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 160; Management of Ritz Threatre Ltd. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 295; Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd, v. Their Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 917 and other decisions.
9. However, with the insertion of Section 11-A. the legal position has undergone substantial change in regard to the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals.
10. The ambit and scope of Section 11-A came to be considered by the Supreme Court in 'Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. The Management, AIR 1973 SC 1227. In that case the Apex Court in the first place referred to the law laid down by the Court in respect of the jurisdiction of the industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. It also referred to the statement of objects and reasons and proceeded to say:-
"The object is stated to be that the Tribunal should have power in cases where necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement or award any lesser punishment." Their Lordships' further held that," Even a mere reading of the section, in our opinion, does not indicate that a change in the law as laid down by this Court has been effected".
11. Their Lordships then took notice of the rival contentions raised on behalf of the employees and employers and then referred to some principles of interpretation of welfare legislations and held that even after section 11-A has been inserted the employer and employee can adduce evidence regarding legality and validity of the domestic enquiry if one had been held by an employer. The Court further held that the Tribunal has to consider the evidence and come to the conclusion one way or the other. Even in cases where an inquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in an appropriate case and hold that no misconduct is proved. The Court further observed:-
"It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may hold that the punishment is not justified because the misconduct alleged' and found proved is such that it does not warrant dismissal or discharge. The Tribunal may also hold that the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified because the alleged misconduct itself is not established by the evidences to come, to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to re-appraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately, it may hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved does 'not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge.
That is why, according to us, section 11 A gives full power to the Tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these points. Now the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and come to its conclusion ensures to it when it has to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it in which an employer relies on the findings recorded by him in a domestic enquiry. Such a power to appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was always recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both categories are now put on a par by Section 11A."
12. In Para 45 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took notice of the departure made by the Legislature in certain respects in the law laid down by the Supreme Court by observing that, for the first time power has been given to the Tribunal to satisfy itself whether misconduct is proved. This is particularly so even when findings have been recorded by an employer in an inquiry properly held. The Tribunal has also been given power to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer. The proviso to Section 11A emphasizes that the Tribunal has to satisfy itself one way or the other regarding misconduct, punishment and the relief to be granted to the workman only on the basis of material on record before it. In para 48 their Lordships further observed that, if a proper enquiry is conducted by an employer and a correct finding is arrived at regarding misconduct, even though, it now has power to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the Management it will have to give very cogent reasons in not accepting the view of the employer.
13. In para 58 of the judgment their Lordships reiterated this position by making following observations:-
"We have already expressed our view regarding the interpretation of Section 11A. We have held that the previous law, according to the decisions of this Court, in cases where a proper domestic enquiry had been held, was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of misconduct except under certain circumstances. The position further was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer both in cases where the misconduct is established in a proper domestic enquiry as also in cases where the Tribunal finds such misconduct proved on the basis of evidence adduced before it. These limitations on the powers of the Tribunals were recognised by this Court mainly on the basis that the power to take disciplinary action and impose punishment was part of the managerial functions. That means that the law, as laid down by this Court over a period of years, had recognised certain managerial rights in an employer. We have pointed out that this position has now been changed by Section 11 A. The section has the effect of altering the law by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as the punishment imposed by him."
14. Following the law laid down in Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd's case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court themselves interfered with the punishment awarded by the employer and/or upheld the interference made by the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as would appear from the following decisions:
(i) Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1980 SC 1896;
(ii) Jaswant Singh v. PEPSU Roadways Transport Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 355;
(iii) Management of Hindustan Machine Tools v. Mohammad Usman, AIR 1984 SC 321;
(iv) Ved Parkush v. M/s Delton Cables India Ltd, AIR 1984 SC 914;
(v) Jitendra Singh v. Vaidya Nath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 976;
(vi) Baldev Singh v. Presiding Officer labour Court}, AIR 1987 SC 104;
(vii) Rama Kant Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 19B2 SC 1552; and
(viii) Palghat BPL and PSP Thozilali Union v. BPL India Ltd. and Anr., 1995(6) SLR 22.
15. In Rama Kant Mishra's case, interference was made by the Apex Court with the award of the Labour Court which had upheld the dismissal of an employee for that discreet, improper and abusive language and threatening postures. The Apex Court held that mere use of such language without any other misconduct did not warrant penalty of dismissal, in Ved Parkash's case (supra) dismissal of the employee on the charge of abuse of some other workers and officers of the Management was held to be unjustified. In Palghat BPL and PSP Thozilali Union's case (supra), the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court under Section 11-A of the Act was upheld even in a case where the workmen had thrown stones and officers were attacked which resulted in grievous injuries to them. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Madras High Court and held:-
"The Labour Court had discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act to consider the quantum of misconduct and the punishment. In view of the surging circumstances, viz., the workmen were agitating by their collective bargain for acceptance of their demands and when the strike was on; the settlement during conciliation proceedings, though initially agreed to, was resiled later on. They appear to have attacked the officers when they were going to the factory. Under-these circumstances, the Labour Court was well justified in taking lenient view and in setting aside the order of dismissal and giving direction to reinstate the workmen with a cut of 75% of the back wages upto the date of the award. In our considered view, the discretion exercised by the Labour Court is proper and justified in the above facts and circumstances."
16. In Municipal Corporation, Amritsar v. Presiding Officer, Labour-Court-Amritsar and Anr., (1995-3)111 P.L.R. 603, a Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (G.S.Singhvi,J) was a member upheld the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court whereby it interfered with the punishment awarded by the employer by exercise of power under Section 11A. After discussing various facets of the changes brought about by Section 11A, the Division Bench held:-
"In view of the above discussed legal position, we have no hesitation to hold that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is vested with the power to consider the question of fairness of the inquiry. It also got the power to reappreciate the evidence produced during domestic/departmental inquiry and a further power to interfere with the punishment awarded by the employer where it is found that the employer has not considered the past record of the employee, the nature of the charge etc. while imposing the punishment. If the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal, on an objective consideration of the record is satisfied that the order of punishment is shockingly disproportionate or patently unreasonable, it can interfere with the quantum of punishment."
17. Similar view has been expressed by a learned Single Judge in Rajesh Kumar Datta v. Presiding Officer, 1995(2) RSJ. 371 and in Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation v. Balbir Singh, 1995(7) SLR 486.
18. In view of this legal position, we do not find any merit in the submission of Shri Sidarath Sarup that the labour Court did not have jurisdiction to interfere with he punishment awarded by the employer. Rather, it is held that the Labour Court is not only possessed with the power to interfere with the punishment awarded by the employer in an appropriate case, but, it is under a duty to examine the issue of punishment awarded by the employer and decide for itself whether the punishment is justified or not. In cases where the Tribunal or the Labour Court comes to a conclusion that the punishment is unduly harsh or highly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved Court/Tribunal can interfere with the award of punishment.
19. There is one more aspect of the matter which deserves to be taken note of by us. While exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court can interfere with an award of the Labour Court only if it is shown to be without jurisdiction or contrary to the principle of natural justice or it is established that the impugned award suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of it. However, this Court cannot in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction interfere with award of the Labour Court merely because on a total re-appreciation of the material produced by the parties, it is possible to form an opinion different than the one formed by the Labour Court. This possibility cannot be equated with an error of law apparent on the face of record. Similarly, a mere error of fact cannot be corrected by the High Court in the exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction nor can the Court act as an Appellate Court over the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the following observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Jitendra Singh v. Vaidya Nath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (supra):-
"Under Section 11A advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power though as a superior court, it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinise the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. The High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it."
20. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the writ petition is without any substance and the same is liable to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly. The petitioner shall pay costs of Rs. 2000/- to the respondent-workman.