Madras High Court
Thirupuram vs A.Natarajan on 13 December, 2011
Author: S.Manikumar
Bench: S.Manikumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 13.12.2011 CORAM : THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR Second Appeal No.1152 of 2006 1. Thirupuram 2. Thilagavathy ... Appellants Vs ... 1.A.Natarajan 2.A.Akambaram 3.A.Gopal 4.Tmt.Dhairiyalakshmi 5.A.Lingesan 6.A.Viswanathan ... Respondents Prayer: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 CPC against the judgment and decree dated 23.01.2004 made in A.S.No.25 of 2002, on the file of the VII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, confirming the decree and the judgment made in O.S.No.897 of 1998, dated 08.10.2001, on the file of VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. For Appellants : Mr.R.Balasubramanian For Respondents 1, 3 & 6 : Mr.V.Subramani For Respondents 2, 4 & 5 : Given-up J U D G M E N T
The unsuccessful plaintiffs, who have lost a suit for partition of the suit schedule properties in both the Courts, are the appellants in this second appeal.
2. The Plaint averments are as follows:
The schedule mentioned property originally belonged to Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, son of Chinnasamy Mudaliar. The said Annmalai Mudaliar owned ancestral properties in his native village, Narthampundi, Thiruvannamalai District. He sold away the properties with a view to purchase properties at Madras, for which, his elder son, Mr.Selvaraj and his wife contributed their earnings and efforts. The said Mr.Selvaraj, predeceased his father, Annamalai Mudaliar on 23.12.1963 and that the said Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar also died intestate on 05.02.1996, leaving behind his wife, sons and daughter respectively.
3. The plaintiffs, legal heirs of late Mr.Selvaraj and the defendants, legal heirs of late Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, are entitled to share in the suit properties, purchased from out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties, as per the Hindu Succession Act. As the defendants had taken steps to alienate the properties, without consulting the other members of the family, a legal notice, dated 07.09.1996, was issued, claiming share over the properties and that the same was not replied. Hence, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition of the schedule mentioned properties, for a declaration of their 2/6th share and for separate possession. In the suit, injunction was also sought for, restraining the defendants from taking any steps to dispose of the schedule mentioned properties, in any manner.
4. The second defendant has filed a written statement and that the same has been adopted by all the defendants. He has contended that his father, Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, was a building contractor. Suit Item Nos.1 and 2 were purchased out of his own income and not from the sale proceeds of ancestral properties. He further submitted that the first plaintiff's husband, Selvaraj was a tuberculosis patient and took treatment in T.B. Sanatoriam Hospital at Tambaram, for about 1= years. The first plaintiff left the matrimonial home, due to severity of his illness. His wife gave birth to a child, after six months of her husband's death.
5. The second defendant has further submitted that the property, house and ground, bearing Door No.74, Bhasha Saheb Street, Choolaimedu, Chennai, absolutely belonged to the first defendant, wife of Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar. It is also his contention that Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, being the absolute owner of the suit Items 1 and 3 in the plaint schedule, by a registered will, dated 28.07.1994, bearing Document No.148 of 1994, in Book No.III in Volume 76 in Sub-Register Office, Kodambakkam, had bequeathed the said properties in his favour along with defendants 4 and 7. It is also his contention that the defendants have already filed Original Petition before this Court, for the grant of letters of administration.
6. During the pendency of the suit, the 1st defendant, wife of Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, died. Defendants 2 to 7 were impleaded as legal heirs of the first defendant, vide order, dated 07.10.1999. On the above pleadings, the lower Court has framed the following issues for consideration,
1.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to 2/6th share in the suit properties?
2.Whether the suit Item No.2 did not belong to Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar,as contended in the written statement?
3.Whether the suit Items 1 and 3 belong to Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar and whether he had bequeathed the said properties under a Will to the defendants 2, 4 and 7?
4.To what relief?
7. On behalf of the plaintiffs, two witness have been examined and they marked Exs.A1 to A9. The second defendant has examined himself as DW.1 and marked Exs.B1 to B18. The lower Court itself marked two documents as Exs.C1 and C2. On evaluation of pleadings and evidence, the trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that suit Items 1 and 3 were self-acquired properties of Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar. Suit Item No.2 has been held to be the property of Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, wife of Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, who died during the pendency of the suit. The trial Court has also observed that Mr.Selvaraj, husband of the first plaintiff, had already executed a release deed, Ex.B7, dated 20.05.1958, releasing his rights in the ancestral properties, after receiving a sum of Rs.800/- and that therefore, the plaintiffs, wife and daughter of Mr.Selvaraj, have no right or claim over in the plaint schedule properties.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court made in O.S.No.897 of 1998, dated 08.10.2001, on the file of the VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, the plaintiffs have filed an appeal in A.S.No.25 of 2002, on the file of the learned VII Additional City Civil Judge, Chennai, contending inter alia that Ex.B7, Release Deed, said to have been executed by Mr.Selvaraj, husband of the 1st plaintiff, will not take away the rights of inheritance of the plaintiffs to the suit properties and it was also inter alia contended that the trial Court has grossly erred in placing reliance on Ex.B14, Will, dated 28.07.1994, to exclude the right of the plaintiff to claim for partition of her husband's share in the suit properties. It was also contended that the lower Court has grossly erred in marking the attested copy of Ex.B14, Will, for arriving at the conclusion that by virtue of the abovesaid Will, alleged to have been executed by Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar that the suit Items 1 and 3 were bequeathed to and in favour of defendants 2, 4 and 7. According to the plaintiffs, Ex.B14, Will, requires to be proved under Section 63-A of the Indian Succession Act, by examining the attestors of the original document. Reliance has also been placed on few decisions,
(i)2001 SAR (CIVIL) 59 (B)
(ii)1986 ILR (MAD) 113
(iii)1994 AIR SCW 237
(iv)2001 SAR (CIVIL) 778
(v)2001 SAR (CIVIL) 258
(vi)2001 (2) An.W.R. 358 (D.B.) (A.P.)
(vii)AIR 2001 Kerala 184
9. The lower appellate Court, upon perusal of the pleadings and the material on record, has framed two points for consideration,
1.Whether the judgment and decree of the lower Court in O.S.No.897 of 1998, dated 08.10.2001, has to be set aside and consequently, the appeal has to be allowed?
2.To what relief, the appellants/plaintiffs are entitled to?
10. Holding that there is no infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the lower appellate Court has confirmed the decision made in the suit. Being unsuccessful in their claim for partition in both the Courts, the plaintiffs have filed the present second appeal, which has been entertained on the following substantial questions of law:
(1) Whether the Courts below committed error relating to the marking of documents Ex.D14 namely copy of the Will without examination of the witnesses attested in the Will in conforming with the provision under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act?
(2) Whether the production of the copy of the Will marked as Ex.D14 is valid in the absence of production of the original will as a primary documents under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act under Section 63?
(3) Whether the Courts below committed error without proof and validity of the relinquish deed, Ex.D7, dated 20.05.1958 and D13, dated 17.03.1958 in the absence of the original marked without examination of any witnesses in support and proof of the document?
11. Assailing the correctness of the judgments and decrees of the Courts below on the substantial questions of law, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs submitted that the 1st appellant's husband, namely, Selvaraj, who predeceased his father, is the eldest son of Annamalai Mudaliar and respondents/defendants 1 to 3, 5 & 6 are also sons of Annamalai Mudaliar and younger brothers of 1st appellant's husband, Selvaraj. 4th respondent/defendant is the younger sister of the 1st appellant's husband. Late Annamalai Mudaliar, was engaged in building construction work. Mr.Selvaraj, 1st appellant's husband, eldest son, was also working along with him as a carpenter and contributed his earnings to his father, Annamalai Mudaliar, who was the Kartha of all the properties.
12. Placing reliance on Exs.B3 and B4, vide Document Nos.37 and 1061 of 1958 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Kodambakkam, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs further submitted that the late Annamalai Mudaliar, had disposed of ancestral properties and self acquired properties situated in the native place, at Narthampundi Village and purchased the suit properties and constructed a house at Choolaimedu at Chennai, and therefore, the plaintiffs, wife and daughter of the said Selvaraj, have a right to seek for partition of their share. She also submitted that Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, W/o. Late Annamalai Mudaliar, the 1st defendant, who died during the pendency of the suit, was only a house wife and that she has no source of income to purchase the suit Item No.2, in her name and therefore, both the Courts below have failed to advert to the abovesaid aspect in proper perspective and in such circumstances, the second item of the suit property has been purchased by Annmalai Mudaliar, only out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties. In this context, she also invited the attention of this Court to the oral testimony of the 1st respondent, wherein, he has admitted that there was no recital in Ex.B2 to the effect that the property, Suit Item No.2, was purchased from her own income.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs further submitted that the Will has to be proved in the manner set out under the provisions of the Evidence Act. She further submitted that though Ex.B14, Photocopy of the Will, was sought to be marked, despite objections, the same was admitted as evidence and placing reliance on the recitals contained in the unprobated Will, both the Courts below have erred in giving credence to the Will, which was not proved, by examining any witness. No evidentiary value can be attached to the Will and that therefore, the contention of the defendants, that they have acquired exclusive right and interest, over the suit items 1 and 2, on the basis of an unprobated will, ought to have been rejected, at the threshold.
14. She also invited the attention of this Court that at the time of filing of the written statement, the defendants had contended that the probate proceedings were only at the initiation state that the O.P., for the grant of letters of administration, was not even numbered. She further submitted that both the Courts below have erred in marking a xerox copy of the settlement deed, attested by the Sub-Registrar, which is not admissible in evidence.
15. Learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs further submitted that the Courts below have erred in giving weightage to Ex.B7, dated 20.05.1958, relinquishment deed, said to have been executed by the 1st plaintiff's husband, without considering its validity and making Ex.B13, dated 17.03.1958, in the absence of production of its original and that examining any witnesses to prove the same, is an error committed by the lower Court. She further submitted that the alleged relinquishment deed executed by the 1st plaintiff's husband, would not bind his legal heirs, who have a substantial right in the suit properties purchased out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties. It is her further contention that the lower appellate Court has failed to consider that documents, Exs.B1 to B14 and B17, were only copies and that no explanation or reason was given for non-production of the originals. In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed on the following judgments,
(i)Ramagopal v. Muthukrishna [AIR 1957 Mad. 1]
(ii)P.R.Nallathambi Goundan v. Vijaya Raghavan [AIR 1973 Mad. 25]
(iii)Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti [AIR 1990 SC 396]
(iv)Govt., of A.P., v. Karri Chinna Venkata Redy [AIR 1994 SC 591]
(v)Arul Migu Viswewaraswami and Veeraraghava Perumal Temple, Tirupur, v. Venkatachala Gounder [1996 (II) CTC 199]
(vi)Cherichi v. Ittianam and others [AIR 2001 Kerala 184]
16. Per contra, Mr.V.Subramani, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants fairly admitted that at the time of filing of the suit, an Original Petition was filed in this Court, seeking for grant of letters of administration. He further submitted that even though, the plaintiffs have raised objections for rejecting the case of the defendants, on the basis of an unprobated will, executed by Annamalai Mudaliar, to and in favour of the defendants 2, 4 and 7, the judgments and decrees of the lower Courts can very well be sustained on the evidence, let in by the defendants to prove that suit Item No.1, was purchased by Annamalai Mudaliar, even before the sale of ancestral properties under Exs.B2 and B3.
17. He further submitted that the husband of the 1st plaintiff, Selvaraj, died in the year 1963 and that suit Item No.3, had been allotted by the Tamil Nadu Slum clearance Board, Chennai, after nearly 20 years, in favour of Annamalai Mudaliar and therefore, the contention of the appellants/plaintiffs that it has been purchased out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties and from the contribution made by the husband of the 1st plaintiff, is highly improbable. He also submitted that suit Item No.2, has been purchased by Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, on 19.01.1951, from out of her own source, much earlier to the sale of the ancestral properties, which were sold in the years 1957 and 1958 and therefore, the claim of the appellants/plaintiffs is baseless.
18. On the question of receipt of the unprobated will, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the same was received, subject to the objections, but nevertheless, the respondents/defendants, by letting in sufficient evidence, have proved that none of the suit items were purchased out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties and therefore, Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar and his wife, Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, have every right to dispose of the property, as per their desire.
19. On the aspect of receiving Ex.B7, Release Deed, dated 20.05.1958, executed by the husband of the 1st plaintiff, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there was no serious objections for the same and that therefore, it is not open to the plaintiff to raise a substantial question of law in this appeal. It his further contention that whatever rights, the husband of the 1st plaintiff, had in the ancestral properties, on his own volition, he had executed a release deed, after receiving a sum of Rs.800/-, commensurate to his share and that therefore, the plaintiffs cannot seek for any partition. It is therefore submitted that the well considered judgments and decrees of the lower Court do not require any interference.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
20. Before adverting to the issues raised, let me consider some of the decisions on the aspect of burden and the proof, that is required by the propounder of a case that properties have been purchased from out of the sale proceeds of a joint family property.
(i) In Babubai v. Ujamlal, AIR 1937 Bom. 446 where Beaumont, Chief Justice had summarised the position on this aspect as follows:-
"The law, I think, is clearly established that from the existence of a joint family, it is not to be presumed that there is any joint family property. There is no presumption that property which belongs to a member of a joint family is joint family property. The plaintiff in setting out to prove that property 'B' is joint family property must in the first instance discharge the burden of proving that fact. But it is also established that if there is a joint family, which possesses a nucleus of joint family property, then property acquired by a member of that family is presumed to be a joint family property. But the question arises what is meant by a nucleus. In my opinion the nucleus of joint family property necessary to give rise to the presumption must be family property from which the purchase money for the property in suit might have been derived wholly, or, 'at any rate, in considerable part.....'. It would, I think, be unfortunate if the Court was bound to presume that something had occurred which on the evidence would not possibly have occurred, and if it be shown that the only joint family property existing at the date of the acquisition of the property in suit was of such a nature that it could not possibly have been the means of acquiring the property in suit, then in my opinion the presumption that the property in suit is joint family property does not arise."
(ii) In Narayanaswami Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer 1965 (I) MLJ (SC) 78 the Supreme Court stated the law on the subject as follows:-
"The legal position is well-settled that if in fact at the date of acquisition of a particular property the joint family had sufficient nucleus for acquiring it, the property in the name of any member of the joint family should be presumed to be acquired from out of family funds and so to form part of the joint family property, unless the contrary is shown."
(iii) In Nagayasami Naidu v. Kochadai Naidu reported in 1970 (I) MLJ 105, it has been held as follows:
"There is an essential distinction as to the scope of the presumption in the case of acquisitions in the names of male members of a joint family and the female members of a joint family. In the case of male members of a joint family, there is a presumption that if the joint family had sufficient ancestral nucleus, (italics mine) the properties standing or acquired in the name of junior members are joint family properties unless the presumption is rebutted by showing that the properties are the separate properties of the particular member or members in whose names the properties stand or were acquired. There is no such presumption in the case of properties standing in the name female members. In the latter case, it is for the party who claims properties as joint family properties to specifically plead the particulars and details, in the pleadings and establish the same, by adducing necessary evidence. If there is no pleading and if on the side of the plaintiffs there is no evidence, there is no need for detailed scrutiny of the case of the female members or persons claiming through them, as to the resources of the female members and as to how they acquired the properties in question. If the plaintiff on whom the burden lies adduces no evidence, no further question arises and the female member in whose name the property stands, must be held to be the beneficial owner of the property in question."
(iv) In Srinivasan v. Sundaramurthi reported in 1972 (I) MLJ 141, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:-
"It is well established that if the property stands in the name of the co-parcener of a joint family, mere proof of the existence of the joint family owning some joint family property, does not give rise to any presumption and that it must be established that there was sufficient nucleus of the joint family for purchasing the property which stands in the name of the coparcener."
(v) In M.Narisimhan v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-op. Societies, reported in 2003 (1) CTC 327, presumption of the joint family property would arise in such case, only when ancestral nucleus is established. Properties purchased from and out of exclusive fund of the person would be self-acquired property.
(vi) In R.Deivanai Ammal v. G.Meenakshi Ammal reported in 2004 (4) CTC 208, this Court, at Paragraphs 14 to 16, held as follows:
14. The doctrine of blending of self-acquired property with joint family has to be carefully applied with reference to the facts of each case. No doubt it is settled that when members of a joint family by their joint labour or in their joint business acquired property, that property, in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention, would be owned by them as joint family property and their male issues would necessarily acquire a right by birth in such property. But the essential sine qua non is the absence of a contrary intention. If there is satisfactory evidence of an intention on the part of the acquirer such property to treat it as his own, but not as joint family property, the presumption which ordinarily arises, according to the personal law of Hindus that such property would be regarded as joint family property, will not arise.
15. It is a well-established principle of law that where a party claims that any particular item of property is joint family property, the burden of proving that it is so rests on the party asserting it. Where it is established or admitted that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the presumption arises that it was joint property and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family. But no such presumption would arise if the nucleus is such that with its help the property claimed to be joint could not have been acquired. In order to give rise to the presumption, the nucleus should be such that with its help the property claimed to be joint could have been acquired. A family house in the occupation of the members and yielding no income could not be nucleus out of which acquisitions could be made even though it might be of considerable value.
16. In a Hindu joint family, if one member sues for partition on the foot that the properties claimed by him are joint family properties then three circumstances ordinarily arise. The first is an admitted case when there is no dispute about the existence of the joint family properties at all. The second is a case where certain properties are admitted to the joint family properties and the other properties in which a share is claimed are alleged to be the accretions or acquisitions from the income available from joint family properties or in the alternative have been acquired by a sale or conversion of such available properties. The third head is that the properties standing in the names of female members of the family are benami and that such a state of affairs has been deliberately created by the manager or the head of the family and that really the properties or the amounts standing in the names of female members are properties of the joint family. While considering the term 'nucleus' it should always be borne in mind that such nucleus has to be established as a matter of fact and the existence of such nucleus cannot normally be presumed or assumed on probabilities. The extent of the property, the income from the property, the normal liability with which such income would be charged and the net available surplus of such joint family property do all enter into computation for the purpose of assessing the content of the reservoir of such a nucleus from which alone it could, with reasonable certainty, be said that the other joint family properties have been purchased unless a strong link or nexus is established between the available surplus income and the alleged joint family properties. The person who comes to Court with such bare allegations without any substantial proof to back it up should fail.
(vii) In P.R.Kannaiyan v. Ramasamy Mandiri reported in 2005 (4) CTC 457, this Court has held that if it is shown that there exists some nucleus of the joint family and that the Kartha had no independent income, the Kartha has to prove that the property in his name had been acquired by him, without the aid of joint family and with his separate income as Kartha. This Court has further held that if the Kartha has some separate and independent income, then the burden of proving that the property is a joint family property is on the person, who claims that such acquisition standing in name of Kartha is a joint family property and that there was sufficient surplus from joint family property from and out of which property in question could have been acquired by the Kartha. This Court has considered various case laws on the subject, which are reproduced hereunder:
18. The general rule applicable to presumptions relating to joint family properties have been stated and restated in many decisions. In A.I.R. 1947 Privy Council 189 (APPALASWAMI v. SURYANARAYANAMURTHI AND OTHERS), it was observed :-
11. ... Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property is joint to establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property. ...
19. In A.I.R. 1954 SC 379 (SRINIVAS KRISHNARAO KANGO V. NARAYAN DEVJI KANGO AND OTHERS), the Supreme Court cited the aforesaid observation from the decision of the Privy Council with approval and went on to add :-
10. Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to shift the burden which initially rested on him of establishing that there was adequate nucleus out of which the acquisitions could have been made is one of fact depending on the nature and the extent of the nucleus. The important thing to consider is the income which the nucleus yields. A building in the occupation of the members of a family and yielding no income could not be a nucleus out of which acquisitions could be made, even though it might be of considerable value. On the other hand, a running business in which the capital invested is comparatively small might conceivably produce substantial income, which may well form the foundation of the subsequent acquisitions. These are not abstract questions of law, but questions of fact to be determined on the evidence in the case.
20. Similar views were expressed in AIR 1969 SC 1076 (MUDIGOWDA v. RAMACHANDRA).
21. In a later decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 10 SCC 310 (D.S.LAKSHMAIAH AND ANOTHER v. L. BALASUBRAMANYAM AND ANOTHER), all such earlier decisions have been noticed and the same principle has been reiterated.
22. The above well settled principle is accepted by all concerned. However, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that in addition to such general principle, which is applicable to acquisition by a junior member of the coparcenary as well as the manager or kartha of the coparcenary, a further principle is applicable in case acquisition is by the kartha himself. He has submitted that even where the existence of some income yielding property is proved and yet the person is unable to prove that claiming that there is sufficient surplus from the income of the joint family property, if it is proved that karta or the manager had no independent source of income, such acquisition should be presumed to be out of the joint family at the disposal of the kartha and it is for the kartha to prove that the property is his own separate acquisition. For the aforesaid purpose, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1961 SC 1268 (MALLESAPPA BANDEPPA DESAI AND ANOTHER V. DESAI MALLAPPA alias MALLESAPPA AND ANOTHER) and the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in A.I.R. 1977 MADRAS 171 (SANKARANARAYANAN AND ANOTHER V. THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER, TIRUNELVELI AND OTHERS) and also certain observations made in several other decisions subsequently.
23. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the other hand has combated these aspects of the submission and submitted that unless it is proved that there was sufficient surplus out of the joint family property, no such presumption can be raised even if the property is acquired in the name of the kartha. For the aforesaid purpose, she has placed reliance upon the decisions reported in 1998-2-L.W.259 (MUNIAPPA NAICKER V. BALAKRISHNA NAICKER), 1999-2-L.W. 713 ( AMIRTHALINGAM v. UTHAYATHAMMA AND 15 OTHERS) and 2002-3-L.W. 809 (RANGANAYAKI AMMAL & 4 OTHERS v. V. BALAKRISHNA NAIDU & 24 OTHERS).
24. In AIR 1961 SC 1268 (cited supra) it was observed:-
15. In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind that respondent-1 has not shown by any reliable evidence that the expenses for the said litigation were borne by him out of his pocket. It is true that both the courts have found that respondent-1 purchased certain properties for Rs.600/- in 1925 (Ex.B-4). We do not know what the income of the said properties was; obviously it could be on any significant order; but, in our opinion there is no doubt that where a manager claims that any immovable property has been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. (Emphasis added)
25. This decision of the Supreme Court was followed in A.I.R. 1977 MADRAS 171 (cited supra).
26. The observations in 1994 LW 273 (SONNAPPA IYER v. K.R.RAMUTHIAMMAL AND 6 OTHERS) to the following effect:-
... Thus, the evidence on record conclusively shows that the first defendant had ancestral properties comprising of houses and was running a business which was also ancestral. He had no other source of income with which he could have purchased properties of his own. When there is no evidence as to his independent source of income and when he admittedly was the manager of the undivided family consisting of himself and his sons, the presumption under the Hindu Law has to be drawn and the property should be presumed to be joint family property. ... (Emphasis added) also supports the stand of the appellant.
27. In 1996-2-L.W. 422 (THAMBIRAN NAICKER AND ANOTHER V. DURAISWAMY NAICKER AND 10 OTHERS), a learned single Judge relying upon the latter observation in 1994 LW 273, observed :-
15. ... The defendants who are in management are bound to account the management and their possession is that of a Trustee. It is for them to prove that no part of the family income was made use of for acquiring C Schedule items. A similar question came for consideration by this Court, and the same is reported in 1994-I-M.L.J.44 = 1994-1 L.W. 273 (SONNAPPA IYER v. K.R.RAMUTHAIAMMAL AND OTHERS)
28. However, in the two later decisions, namely, 1998-2-LW 259 and 1999-2-LW 713 (cited supra) the very same learned Judge seems to have taken a slightly different view by recounting the general principle applicable as reflected in the decisions AIR 1947 P.C. 189, AIR 1954 SC 379 and AIR 1969 SC 1076.
29. Apart from the aforesaid decisions, which have been cited at the bar, we have come across several decisions of this Court and one decision of Allahabad High Court. In AIR 1950 Allahabad 54 (BHAGWANT KISHORE AND ANOTHER v. BISHAMBHAR NATH AND OTHERS), it was observed :-
4. As already observed Har Narain was possessed of some ancestral property, which was the right to receive a moiety share of the offerings. Har Narain was the karta or the manager of the joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his sons. I have not the least doubt that when a purchase is made by the karta or manager of a joint Hindu family and it is proved that he was in receipt of an income on behalf of the joint Hindu family, and it is not proved that he had any separate source of income, the presumption to be made is that the purchase was made by the karta on behalf of the family from family funds, unless the contrary is proved.
5. Learned counsel contends that it is not enough to prove that the family had some income but before the presumption can be made it should be proved that the income was such as to leave a surplus available for the purchase. I am aware of the rulings in which it has been held that the mere existence of ancestral nucleus is not enough but that it must be proved that the nucleus was a fruitful nucleus, namely that the nucleus was such as to give rise to a presumption that the purchase might have been made out of it. But if I am not mistaken it was definitely proved in all these cases that the nucleus was so meagre that the purchase could not have been made out of that. The further question upon which the decision of this case depends is that if it is not known either way, whether the nucleus was so meagre that the purchase could not be made out of it or whether the nucleus was sufficient to enable the purchase to be made, what is the presumption to be made about it. In my opinion when no other source of income is disclosed from which the property could be purchased and all that is known is that the family possessed some ancestral nucleus the presumption to be made is that the nucleus was sufficient to enable the purchase of the property to be made. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the finding of the lower appellate Court with regard to the nature of the property, namely that it is joint family property is not vitiated by any error of law.
30. In Appeal No.75 of 1973 (RAMIAH AND ANOTHER v. PECHI AMMAL AND OTHERS) {reported in 1977 TLNJ 7}, disposed of on 18.11.1976, a Division Bench of this Court after noticing the general principle that if a coparcener comes to Court asserting certain properties standing in the name of another member of the family should be brought to the hotchpot for the purpose of division, then the burden is on the challenging coparcener to prove by material and clinching evidence that the source of purchase price of that properties in the name of the challenged coparcener emanated from the surplus income of the admitted joint family properties, observed :-
... These general observations are susceptible to an exception, if the challenged co-parcener is the manager. If the properties are acquired by a manager of a Hindu Joint family and if those properties stand in his name and if such acquisitions are made in the course of his management as manager of the joint family, then the burden shifts on him to establish that such properties are his own and they are not joint family properties. In a case where such acquisitions are questioned, it is not for the challenging co-parcener to establish as already expressed by us; but it is for the challenging manager to show by independent evidence that the acquisitions made by him and in his name are the result of an independent activity of his, totally unconnected with the joint family nucleus or its income. These are wellestablished propositions. In 162(2) M.L.J. 154, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider nature and content of the burden of proof in such situations. It expressed the view that where the manager claims any immoveable property acquired by him with his separate funds and not with the help of the joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it was for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that the purchase-money proceeded from his separate fund. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his co-parceners. There is, therefore, high authority for the proposition that it is for the first defendant whom we have characterised as the manager of the present joint family to prove that any acquisitions standing in his name are his properties.
31. The decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1268 and the subsequent Division Bench decision in 1977 TNLJ 7 was followed by a learned single Judge in 1984 (VOL.97)-LW-406, wherein after recognising the general principle, exception in the case of acquisition by the manager was recognised. It was observed :-
10. ... Therefore, even though the respondents have not proved what was the income derived from the joint family property and what amount would have remained as surplus after the expenses of the joint family had been met, there is a high degree of possibility that there must have been some surplus and that the properties must have been yielding adequate income for supporting all the members of the family. In such circumstances there is certainly scope for inferring that there should have been certain amount of surplus and from out of the surplus, the suit property might have been purchased.
32. In 1993(2) MLJ 613 (K.V.DURAISAMY AND ANOTHER V. D.PERUMALSAMY (MINOR) AND ANOTHER), after coming to the conclusion that there was some joint family nucleus, it was observed :-
8. ... Since he was the manager of the family at the time of acquisition of the lands, as it has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Nallasappa v. Mallappa, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1268, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that the lands were acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge. The onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on the coparceners. ...
33. The fine distinction in such matters seems to have been recognised by a Division Bench of this Court in (2002)3 M.L.J. 187 (M. RANGAMMAL AND OTHERS v. B. BALAVENKATESAN), wherein it was observed :- 26. ... We cannot therefore accept Mr. Srinivasans arguments as regards the nature of the properties on the ground that there is no evidence with regard to the income from the leasehold property. This proposition goes against the very grain of the concept of Hindu Joint Family. Being the joint family Manager he has certain advantages as well as handicaps. In contradistinction to a property standing in the name of a junior member being treated as his separate acquisition, unless the contrary is proved, in the case of the Kartha it is the other way about and if he has to claim any real estate standing in his name as his own he has to do a lot of explaining how he had not touched the joint family funds for acquiring it, and utilised his own independent means which was always so identifiable, how he had brought it into the common hotchpot and so on and so forth, he or persons claiming under him as his separate property have a tough job ahead.
34. This slight distinction in the matter relating to presumption in respect of the property acquired by the kartha seems to have been recognised in Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 14th Edition (19 96), page 653, wherein while concluding that onus is on the coparcener to prove nucleus, it has been observed :-
... The case of the manager however is somewhat different from that of the ordinary coparcener. Where there is an acquisition by the manager in his own name and there is no independent source of income, the presumption arises that the new acquisition was joint family property. Where the manager claims that what is acquired is his separate property he should prove that he had acquired it with his separate funds.
35. It may be noticed that in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2003) 10 SCC 310 (cited supra), the decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 1268 (cited supra) has been distinguished on facts, but the learned Judges have not disapproved of such decision.
36. In the decisions of the learned single Judge, relied upon by the counsel for the respondents, there is no reference to earlier decision reported in AIR 1977 Madras 171 nor there is any reference to the decision of the Division Bench reported in summary form in 1977 TLNJ 7 (cited supra) Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1268 seems to have not been noticed. From the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1268, AIR 1977 Madras 171 and also from the observations made by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1950 Allahabad 54 and in Maynes Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, and all other decisions noticed above, it is apparent that an exception is carved out in the matter relating to acquisition in the name of Karta, where it is proved that Karta had no independent income and he is in possession of some nucleus and not necessarily sufficient nucleus of the joint family property. In such a case, even where sufficient nucleus is not proved but existence of some nucleus is proved and it is further proved that Karta or Manager, in whose name property had been purchased, had no independent income, the burden is shifted to the Karta to prove that the property has been acquired without the aid of the joint family and with the own separate income of the Karta or the Manager. We hasten to add that such principle is inapplicable, where it is shown that Karta has some separate and independent income, in which event, the normal principle that it is for the person claiming a particular acquisition to the joint family property to prove that there was sufficient surplus from the joint family property from out of which the property in question could have been acquired.
37. The decisions relied upon by the counsel for the respondents to the extent that they have ignored this exception based on AIR 1961 SC 1268 must be taken to have stated the position of law in general way.
(viii) In Savithiri Ammal v. Ilayaperumal reported in 2005 (5) CTC 264, the defendant sold away the property that stood in his name. The sale was questioned by the plaintiff. The defendant contended that there was no joint family property, except a residential house and that the suit property was purchased by him, from and out of his own funds, earned through his avocation as Weaver and from the amounts given by his mother in law. The plaintiff could not establish the existence of nucleus of the joint of family property, prior to purchase of property, in the name of the defendant. In such circumstances, this Court held that burden of proving property, as self-acquired property would arise only when other person establishes that there existed adequate nucleus of joint family property. In the reported case, the plea of the plaintiff has been rejected and that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, dismissing the suit for declaration and recovery of possession, were confirmed in the second appeal. While dismissing the second appeal, this Court has considered a decision of the Apex Court in Mudigowda v. Ramachandra reported in AIR 1969 SC 1076, which is worth reproduction. The Apex Court held as follows:
there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because, it is joint, possesses any joint property. The burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property, is, therefore, in. the first instance upon the person who claims it as coparcenary property. But if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be joint family property. This is, however, subject to the limitation that the joint family property must be such as with its aid the property in question could have been acquired. It is only after the possession of an adequate nucleus is shown, that the onus shifts on to the person who claims, the property as self acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without any aid from the 'family estate.
21. The main contention of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule properties have been purchased out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties of the father-in-law of the first plaintiff. According to her, her husband, Selvaraj, was a carpenter, working along with his father, Annamalai Mudaliar and contributed his earnings for the purchase of the suit property at Madras. Husband of the first plaintiff, pre-deceased Annamalai Mudaliar, on 23.12.1963. The said Annamalai Mudaliar, died intestate on 05.02.1996, leaving behind the following persons,
1.Loganayaki Ammal (wife) aged 90 years
2.Natarajan (Son) aged 60 years
3.Ekambaram (Son) aged 57 years
4.Gopal (Son) aged 52 years
5.Dhairiyalakshmi (Daughter) aged 49 years
6.Lingesan (Son) aged 35 years
7.Viswanathan (Son) aged 32 years According to the plaintiffs, being the wife and daughter of Selvaraj, predeceased Annamalai Mudaliar, was also entitled to share in the suit properties, as per the Hindu Succession Act.
22. In order to ascertain as to whether the suit properties had been purchased by Annamalai Mudaliar, out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties, this Court deems it fit to consider the documents, relied on by both the parties. As per the plaint, schedule of properties are, viz., (1) House and ground bearing Door No.5, Sharbudeen Street, Choolaimedu, Madras-94, (2) House and ground bearing door No.74, Basha Street, Choolaimedu, Madras-94 and (3) House and ground bearing New Door No.10 (Old No.132), Namachivayapuram, Choolaimedu, Madras-94. Under Ex.B1, suit Item No.1, has been purchased by Annamalai Mudaliar on 17.05.1952. Under Ex.B2, dated 19.01.1951, Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, has purchased a land, which has been sold to a third party, under Ex.A3. Thereafter, the said Loganayaki Ammal, had purchased the suit Item No.2, under Ex.B4, dated 04.07.1966 for value of Rs.10,000/-. It is evident from Ex.B5, dated 04.09.1996 that Annamalai Mudaliar, was a Carpenter and that he was also a member of Madras State Improvement Trust. Under Ex.B6, dated 23.01.1986, the Chairman, Tamil Nadu Slum clearance Board has allotted the suit Item No.3, for Rs.3,445/- to be paid in monthly instalments at Rs.39/- for 10 years, from 01.02.1986, date of allotment. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the husband of the first plaintiff, Mr.Selvaraj, died in the year 1963 and therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents/defendants that there would not be any contribution from the deceased for the purchase or allotment of suit Item No.3.
23. Ex.A3, dated 27.12.1957, is a sale deed executed by Annamalai Mudaliar for himself and on behalf of his sons, Natarajan, Ekambaram, Gopal and Lingesan, defendants 2 to 4 and 6 in the suit, in respect of the ancestral property in Narthampundi Village for family expenses and for the construction of a house in Choolaimedu in Chennai. The said sale deed was in favour of Annmalai Mudaliar. Similarly, Ex.A4, Sale Deed, dated 03.01.1958, has been executed by Annamalai Mudaliar for himself and on behalf of his sons, in respect of some ancestral properties, situated in Narthampudi Village, for construction of a house in Choolaimedu. Exs.A3 and A4, relied on by the plaintiffs shows that there were ancestral properties in Narthampundi Village, the sale proceeds have not been utilised for purchase of the new property. But the recitals indicate that the ancestral properties were sold in the years 1957 and 1958, for the purpose of construction of a property in Chennai. Ex.B1, which pertains to the purchase of a suit Item No.1 and it is dated 17.05.1952, much earlier to the sale of ancestral properties. The purchase is also supported by Exs.B9, B11 to B13. Therefore, the contention of the appellants/plaintiffs that the property under Ex.B1, has been purchased from out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties, cannot be countenanced.
24. As stated supra, suit Item No.3 is an allotment made in favour of Annamalai Mudaliar, after 20 years from the death of the husband of the first plaintiff. As regards 2nd Item of the suit schedule property, Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, has purchased a property under Ex.B2 and that the same has been sold. Merely because, in Ex.B4, there is no recital that Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, has purchased suit Item No.2, from out of her own source, it cannot be contended that she had no means to purchase the property. As it could be seen from the oral and documentary evidence that even before the purchase of suit Item No.2, she had owned properties and that there was a sale.
25. Further, though the appellants/plaintiffs have contended that suit Item No.2, had been purchased in the name of Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal, out of the sale proceeds of ancestral properties, no materials evidence has been produced to substantiate the same. In Exs.A3 and A4, dated 27.12.1957 and 03.01.1958 respectively, indicate that there was a sale of the ancestral properties in Narthampundi Village, by Mr.Annamalai Mudaliar, for himself and on behalf of other defendants, as stated supra. Merely because, Ex.B4 has been executed in the year 1966, ie., subsequent to the sale of ancestral properties, it cannot be contended that suit Item No.2 has been purchased, out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral properties.
26. It is the case of the defendants that the said Mrs.Loganayaki Ammal has settled suit Item No.2 in favour of the 6th defendant. To ascertain the same, the lower Court has summoned the settlement deeds, Exs.C1 and C2 and on perusal of the same, has categorically found that there has been a valid settlement. Further, during the course of trial, the defendants have marked Ex.B7, dated 20.05.1958, release Deed, executed by the husband of the first plaintiff. Material on record also shows that there was no objection for the receipt of a certified copy of the release deed, registered as Document No.1270 of 1958, in the Office of the Sub Register, Kodambakkam, in Book No.1, Vol.350. Recitals of the release deed makes it clear that Selvaraj, husband of the first plaintiff, on receipt of a sum of Rs.800/-, had executed the release deed for his 1/3rd share in the ancestral properties.
27. Though the learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs, inter alia, contended that Ex.B7, dated 20.05.1958, release deed, ought not to have been given weightage and it was not registered in the manner known to law, it is evident from the material on record that there was no objection to the marking of the said document. The document is a registered document. Even otherwise, as stated supra, the suit Item No.1, has been purchased by Annamalai Mudaliar fromhis own source.
28. The decisions in Ramagopal v. Muthukrishna [AIR 1957 Mad. 1] and P.R.Nallathambi Goundan v. Vijaya Raghavan [AIR 1973 Mad. 25] are not applicable to the facts of the case. In Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti [AIR 1990 SC 396], the Supreme Court explained the proof, which is required, at Paragraph 20, the Apex Court, held as follows:
"A will is one of the most solemn documents known to law. The executant of the Will cannot be called to deny the execution or to explain the circumstances in which it was executed. It is, therefore, essential that trustworthy and unimpeachable evidence should be produced before the Court to establish genuineness and authenticity of the Will. It must be stated that the factum of execution and validity of the Will cannot be determined merely by considering the evidence produced by the propounder. In order to judge the credibility of witnesses and disengage the truth from falsehood the Court is not confined only to their testimony and demeanour. It would be open to the Court to consider circumstances brought out in the evidence or which appear from the nature and contents of the documents itself. It would be also open to the Court to look into surrounding circumstances as well as inherent improbabilities of the case to reach a proper conclusion on the nature of the evidence adduced by the party."
29. In Govt., of A.P., v. Karri Chinna Venkata Redy [AIR 1994 SC 591], certain documents, photostat copies were admitted in a writ proceedings by the High Court, without recording any finding that the respondents therein, had made out a case for acceptance as secondary evidence. In such circumstances, the Apex Court remanded the matter to the authority to examine the correctness of the documents. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case. As the defendants in the case on hand, have established the genuineness of the will, the judgment relied on by the plaintiffs in Cherichi v. Ittianam and others [AIR 2001 Kerala 184], would not lend any support to the facts of this case. Per contra, the decisions stated at the beginning of this judgment, squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The plaintiffs have not proved their case of purchase from joint family property.
30. As rightly found by the lower appellate Court, the plaintiffs/appellants have not established their case for partition. In the light of the above discussion, the appellants have not made out a case for interference. For the abovesaid reasons, this Court is unable to subscribe to the contentions of the appellants/plaintiffs and they have failed to establish that the suit properties have been purchased out of the joint family or ancestral properties. No relief can be granted. The substantial questions of law are answered against the appellants.
31. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.
skm To
1. The VII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai.
2. The VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai