Delhi District Court
M/S Uppal And Co vs Union Of India on 23 April, 2016
IN THE COURT OF SHRI AMAR NATH
DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE : NEW DELHI
PPA No. 25/2015
M/s Uppal and Co.
Plot No. 30, Thyagraj Lane,
New Delhi. ........ Appellant
Versus
1. Union of India
Ministry of Defence,
Through Secretary,
South Block,
New Delhi.
2. The Joint Secretary,
(Training & CAO)
Ministry of Defence,
C2, Block, Hutments,
Dalhousi Road,
New Delhi. ....... Respondents
Date of Institution of Appeal : 18.05.2015
Judgment reserved on : 23.04.2016
Judgment announced on : 23.04.2016
J U D G M E N T
The appeal u/s 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorized occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred as "The Act") is directed against the order dated 05.05.2015 passed by Sh. Apendu Ganguly, Ld. Estate Officer whereby the appellant is directed to vacate the premises in question i.e. business establishments located on the Plot no. 30, Thyagraj Marg, New Delhi by 25.05.2015, after holding the appellant as an unauthorized occupant in respect of the premises referred to above. In the event of refusal or failure of the appellant to vacate the same within the stipulated date, the appellant shall be physically evicted from the said premises by use of force, if so required, praying PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 1 of 9 therein; to set aside the impugned order.
2. The appeal was admitted for hearing. Notice of the appeal was given to the respondents who have resisted the same by filing the written reply. Trial Court record was requisitioned.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant challenged the impugned order mainly on the following grounds:
(a) Impugned order dated 05.05.2015 is bad under the law and the facts on the record and as such cannot be said to be legal and valid in the eyes of law.
(b) The Ld. Estate officer failed to appreciate that the appellant cannot be evicted from the public premises without providing the alternative accommodation.
4. I have heard the rival contentions advanced on behalf of both the parties and have given thoughtful consideration to the record.
5. According to the appellant, a letter was circulated for invitation of tenders mentioning thereon that free site will be provided to the parties whose tenders are accepted for carrying out the carpentry job and an agreement of land was drawn between Union of India and the appellant whereby he was allowed to establish the furniture repair shop to carry on the carpentry work and the said agreement was renewed thereafter in the name of the appellant. A letter was sent to the appellant for revision of the license fee and as such, the license fees of the leased area was duly revised and paid. An agreement dated 19.02.2001 purported to be executed between the appellant and the Government of India renewing the contract for the further period of three year w.e.f. 09.12.2000 to 08.12.2003 on the same terms and conditions. A notice for immediately vacating the business establishments measuring 5.41 acres of land PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 2 of 9 at plot no. 30, Thyagraj Marg, New Delhi was sent to all the business concerned by Ministry of Defence the site being required for construction of Nau Sena Bhawan. The said notice was duly replied stating therein that they should be allowed to continue to occupy the premises till the date of reallocation to any alternate space but the Ministry declined to provide an alternative accommodation submitting that there is shortage of space. Since the license fee was not accepted after 01.01.2013 and thus, the status of the appellant became that of an unauthorized occupant. A notice under section 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act dated 19.08.2013 was served upon the occupants of the plot as fully described above mentioning the grounds for the proposed eviction and hence, the action for eviction of the public premises was initiated against the appellant as per law.
6. The first limb of argument of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant is that the agreement dated 19.02.2001 executed between the President of India (hereinafter referred to as The Government) and the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Contractor was infact a lease deed created in favour of the appellant which is apparent from the nature of the transaction. It needs to be noticed that initially the period of the license was three years which came to an end by the efflux of time. Thereafter, the contract was renewed for a period of three years w.e.f. 09.12.2000 to 08.12.2003 on the same rates, terms and conditions. After the expiry of the contract, there was neither any renewal nor extension of the contract period and thus, the respondents were bound to take the possession of the public premises any time after 08.12.2003 but the respondents chose to remain silent and allowed the appellant to continue to occupy the premises meaning thereby the appellant became the tenant on monthly basis. He further urged that the instant case is that of a lease deed and not a license in as much as the possession of the said premises is with the respondents who have their own set of locks & keys and electricity connection. The purported document cannot be considered to be a 'license deed' and as such Ld. Estate Officer did not have a jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. To PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 3 of 9 substantiate his line of argument, he has drawn the attention of the judgment reported as (1968) Supp. (2) SCR 203 titled as Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by his Legal Representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. wherein it was observed that law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess the person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court.
7. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that the parties had signed the agreement which also governed their rights and liabilities. The possession of the premises all along remained with the respondents. Undoubtedly, the appellant was in lawful occupation till the period of the contract however, after completion of the period of contract, his occupation became unlawful. In so far the relied upon citation is concerned, the same would not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case as the property in question is a public premises which was given to the appellant on contract basis and on expiry of the contract period, the appellant was required to vacate the said accommodation.
8. The contention sought to be raised during the course of arguments with regard to the nature of transaction entered into between the parties being a lease or the license by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant seems to be an afterthought after perusing the terms and conditions of the contract/agreement. The appellant had entered into a relationship with the respondents while executing a contract/agreement with open eyes and did sign the same after admitting their contents to be correct and as such one cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time. The contract was granted for the period of three years commencing in the year 1997. The extended period of renewal shall only be for the period of three years i.e. from 09.12.2000 to 08.12.2003. If the licensee continues to occupy the premises, even after the expiry of the initial period of license or if renewed, after the period of renewal expires, then his occupation shall be declared as unauthorized and the licensor, PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 4 of 9 in his discretion, can enforce and the licensee shall be liable to pay damages for unauthorized occupation.
9. It is an admitted position of the fact that the appellant had been given a bare contract for a specific purpose which had expired by the efflux of time and the license was neither renewed nor extended for further time. The appellant chose to occupy the premises even thereafter. It is settled preposition of law that the licensee has no legal right to stay in the property after termination of the contract. Thomas Cook (India) Ltd. Vs. Hotel Imperial & Ors. 2006 (127) DLT 431 wherein it was held that the nature of occupancy is clearly permissive. Infact, it does not amount to possession at all. A license does not create any interest in the property. It merely permits another person to make use of the property. There is no parting with possession as a legal possession continues with the owner (licensor).
10. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition as laid down by their lordship's in the aforesaid judgment Lallu Yeshwant Singh but the regard is to be had to the facts of the case in hand. In the cited judgment, a civil suit for possession of some agricultural land was filed. The plaintiffs were sairdakhilkar cultivators and got the disputed land cultivated by the defendant no. 2 and 3 by interfering with their possession. But in the instant case, the appellant was allowed to do all the carpentry job by the Ministry of Defence for the period of three years from 09.12.2000 or the date of acceptance of the rates, which ever is later and hence, the judgment (supra) is inapplicable in the facts of the present case.
11. Another relied upon judgment ILR 1954 Bombay 950 titled as K.K. Verma & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. of the appellant is also not applicable to the facts of the present case as now the law has been changed as per the latest judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. Suhas H Pophale Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 2014 SC 1509 wherein it was observed that PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 5 of 9 if the premises is in occupation prior to the Act coming into force then it shall be clearly outside the coverage of PPA (Public Premises Act). Turning to the facts of the case in hand, the appellant alleged to have claimed to be in premises in question much after the date as incorporated in the aforesaid judgment Dr. Suhas H Pophale (supra). Thus, undoubtedly the case in hand is covered under the PP Act and any eviction proceedings with regard to the eviction of the person from the public premises has to take place as per the Act. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:
"As far as the eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises is concerned, undoubtedly it is covered under the Public Premises Act, but it is so covered from 16.09.1958, or from the later date when the concerned premises become public premises by virtue of the concerned premises vesting into a Government Company or a Corporation like LIC or the Nationalised Banks or the General Insurance Companies like the respondent. Thus there are two categories of occupants of these Public Corporations who get excluded from the coverage of the Act itself. Firstly, those who are in occupation since prior to 16.09.1958, i.e. prior to the Act becoming applicable, are clearly outside the coverage of the Act. Secondly, those who come in occupation, thereafter, but prior to the date of the concerned premises belonging to a Government Corporation or a Company, and are covered under a protective provision of the State Rent Act. Hence, with respect to such occupants it will not be open to such Companies or Corporations to issue notices, and to proceed against such occupants under the Public Premises Act, and such proceedings will be void and illegal. Similarly, it will be open for such occupants of these premises to seek declaration of their status, and other PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 6 of 9 rights under State Rent Act."
12. In so far the alternative accommodation is concerned, I am to state that the request of the appellant with regard to the reallocation of the space in place of the present public premises has already been dealt with infact, his request has been turned down after saying that there is a shortage of space.
13. I am coming to the next plea of the respondents that the claim of the respondents being a permissive user of the premises in question is required to be protected under the Rent Control Act. The license fee is applicable as per the norms of the Delhi Rent Control Act and the rules of the CPWD for renewal of license deed with the enhancement by 10 per cent. I disagree with the contention of the counsel for respondents simply for the reason that none of the terms of the license deed executed between the parties makes it obligatory upon the respondent/UOI to renew the license. On the contrary, it is an absolute discretion to the respondents either to renew or not to renew the terms of the license as so observed in case titled M/s Gesture Hotels and Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra). It was further observed in the judgment that " the dispute between the parties is purely contractual and the rights and obligation of the parties had to be determined in view of the terms of the license and not on the principles of equity or public law". There is also no allegation of a personal bias against any of the officer of UOI. Furthermore such type of plea was negated by the Constitution Bench in the judgment titled as Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank (1990) 4 SCC 406 with the observations that the provisions of PPA were held to override the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Relevant para 20 of the aforesaid judgment Supra is reproduced as under:
The provisions of the PP Act were held to override the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It was further held, that the PP Act had been enacted to deal with the mischief of rampant unauthorized occupation of public premises, by providing speedy machinery for PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 7 of 9 eviction of persons in unauthorized occupation. It was further held that while the Delhi Rent Act is intended to deal with the general relationship of landlords and tenants, the PP Act is a special statute and not a general enactment. The Constitution Bench noticed that in the statement of objects and reasons of the PP Act was to safeguard public interest by making available for public use premises belonging to Central Government, companies in which the Central Government has substantial interest, corporations owned or controlled by the Central Government and certain other autonomous bodies and to prevent misuse of such premises. It was further notices that the Delhi Rent Act itself excluded the Government premises from its purview and all that the PP Act did was to exclude the building belonging to such statutory corporations and autonomous bodies also from the ambit of the Rent Act. The Constitution Bench also noticed that the investments in such statutory corporations are from the consolidated fund, that is to say from the tax prayers and it is the public at large which has an interest in the functioning and profitability of the said statutory corporations.
14. After the expiry of the license deed, there was neither any renewal nor extension of the license period and thus, the respondents were bound to take the possession of the public premises any time after 08.12.2003 but the respondents chose to remain silent and allowed the appellant to continue to occupy the premises but it does not necessarily mean that license deed shall be treated as deemed renewal. In view of the agreed terms of the license deed, it cannot be said that the appellant was in legal or settled possession.
PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 8 of 915. The nature of occupancy of licensee is permissive which does not create any interest in the premises in question. Once permission granted to the licensee ceases, then its possession becomes to be unauthorized. The full bench judgment of our own Hon'ble High Court in case of Chandu Lal etc Vs. MCD, ILR 1978 (1) DEL 292 had expressed a similar view and the same is relied upon.
16. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order dated 05.05.2015 passed by learned Estate Officer. Appeal stands dismissed on all grounds. Impugned order dated 05.05.2015 is upheld and confirmed. Copy of the order be placed in the trial court record and thereafter, it be sent back. Appeal file be consigned to the record room. Announced in the open court on this 23rd day of April, 2016 (AMAR NATH) District & Sessions Judge New Delhi PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 9 of 9 IN THE COURT OF SHRI AMAR NATH DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE : NEW DELHI PPA No. 25/2015 M/s Uppal & Co. Vs. UOI & Anr.
23.04.2016
Present: Proxy counsel for the appellant.
Captain R.B. Srivastava and Assistant Sh. Rajesh Kumar Jha for the respondent along with Ld. Counsel Ms. Geeta Malhotra.
Vide separate judgment of the even date, the appeal stands dismissed on all grounds. Impugned order dated 05.05.2015 is upheld and confirmed. Copy of the order be placed in the trial court record and thereafter, it be sent back. Appeal file be consigned to the record room.
(AMAR NATH) District & Sessions Judge New Delhi/23.04.2016 PPA No. 25/2015 Page No. 10 of 9