Madras High Court
S.Ramasamy vs State Represented By on 1 August, 2014
Author: M.Venugopal
Bench: M.Venugopal
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:1.08.2014 C O R A M THE HONOURABLE Mr. JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL Crl.R.C.No.1301 of 2013 and M.P.No.1 of 2013 S.Ramasamy ... Petitioner/A4 Vs State represented by The Deputy Superintendent of Police, V & A.C., Erode Unit, Cr.No.1/AC/2012/ER ... Respondent/Complainant Prayer: Criminal Revision Petition filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the order dated 06.09.2013 made in Crl.M.P.No.227 of 2013 in Spl.C.C.No.22 of 2012 passed by the Learned Special Judge, Special Court for Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, Coimbatore. For Petitioner : Mr.N.Manokaran For Respondent : Mr.S.Shanmuga Velayutham Public Prosecutor ORDER
The Petitioner/A4 has filed the present Criminal Revision Petition as against the order dated 06.09.2013 in Crl.M.P.No.227 of 2013 in Spl.C.C.No.22 of 2012 passed by the Learned Special Judge, Special Court for Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, Coimbatore.
2.The Learned Special Judge, while passing the impugned order, in Crl.M.P.No.227 of 2013 in Spl.C.C.No.22 of 2012 (filed by the Petitioner/A4), on 06.09.2013, had, among other things, observed that '... This court considering the said contention of learned petitioner counsel determines that in Sajjan Kumar case our Hon'ble Apex Court has held that at the stage of framing of charges appreciation of evidence is not permissible and in a discharge petition the Magistrate or Judge should not analyse all materials including pros and cons, reliability or acceptability and only at the trial Judge concerned has to appreciate evidenciary value, credibility or otherwise of the material, veracity of various documents and is free to take a decision one way or other and so based on the above decision of our Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court determines that in this discharge petition this Court cannot consider and appreciate the evidenciary value of the witnesses and documents proposed to be produced by the prosecution against the petitioner and so this court also cannot determine in this petition whether charges against petitioner are sustainable or not and so in this petition this court rejects the contention of learned petitioner counsel that the charges against petitioner are not sustainable.' and resultantly, dismissed the petition.
3.According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/A4, the Respondent/Complainant on 31.01.2012 registered a case in Crime No.1/AC/12/ER against A1 to A3 for the alleged offence under Sections 13(2) r/w.13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
4.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the Respondent/Police filed a final report before the trial Court after completion of investigation against A1 (NKKP Raja), A2 (Parimala Devi @ Parimala), A3 (R.Umamaheswari), A4 (S.Ramasamy), A5 (K.M.Sathyamurthy) and A6 (Senthilkumar) alleging that A1 to A3 had committed the offence under Sections 13(2) r/w.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and that A4 to A6 had committed an offence under Section 109 I.P.C. r/w Sections 13(2) r/w.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
5.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the prosecution case is that A1, while holding the position as public servant between 13.05.2006 and 31.03.2010, had acquired pecuniary recourses and properties to the tune of Rs.3,51,03,480/- in his name and also in the name of his first wife (A2) and second wife (A3).
6.Advancing his arguments, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that as per allegations stated in the final report, the Petitioners/Accused Nos.4 to 6 are the private individuals who were closely known to A3 and that they facilitated A3 to use their bank accounts for converting the ill-gotten money into legal money in the name of A3, with a view to aid A1 in acquiring and possession pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to his known source of income. Further, during the period in question, the total income of the Accused 1 to 3 from their known sources was Rs.2,17,90,781/- and after deducting the expenditure of Rs.1,04,89,024/- the likely savings of the Accused Nos.1 to 3 should have been Rs.1,13,01,757/-. However, the Accused Nos.1 to 3 had allegedly acquired and are in possession of pecuniary resources and properties which were disproportionate to an extent of Rs.3,32,65,295/-.
7.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/A4 strenuously contends that the Petitioner was unnecessarily implicated without any legal evidence to connect him with the other accused persons or the offences allegedly against them. The only allegation stated in the final report was that his bank account was utilised to enable the third accused to convert the ill-gotten money into legal money and thereby abetted A1 to acquire the properties disproportionate to his known sources of income.
8.Further, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner projects an argument that even as per the case of prosecution, LW2 G.Rajagopal, LW132 V.Balamurugan, LW181 C.B.Subramaniam, LW187 Alaguraj, LW188 Usharani, LW199 T.E.Ramesh and LW 236 A.Nachimuthu had not stated anything against him or produced any incriminating documents in the form of document Nos.117, 133, 143, 170, 171, 177, 178 and 179.
9.It is the stand of the Petitioner/A4 that the only allegation against him was that a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- each was paid on 05.02.2008 and 06.02.2008 and that the said amount was transferred to the account of A3 by way of two cheques, dated 14.02.2008 in cheque Nos.683277 and 683278 for Rs.5,00,000/- respectively and as such, he was implicated as 4th Accused in the case.
10.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/A4 contends that the Petitioner after serving in the Electricity Board attained the age of superannuation on 31.10.2003 as the Assistant Executive Engineer (Distribution), Rayapuram, Chennai and that his retirement benefits to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- was paid between November 2003 and February 2004. The said amount was withdrawn on various dates for giving hand loan to his close friends and subsequently, the said amount was repaid and re-deposited in his account on 05.02.2008 and 06.02.2008 respectively. Moreover, the said retirement benefits were paid to A3 by means of loan on 14.02.2008. Also that, the Petitioner had produced all the relevant documents to prove his earnings from the agricultural sources to the Respondent/Police. The final report projected under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. would amply support the source of income of the Petitioner.
11.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that his bank's statements from 12.07.2003 till date of filing of the Criminal Revision Petition would exemplify that the aforesaid payments through his known source of income to A3 and also that, the Petitioner neither abetted A1 or A3 nor helped A3 to convert the ill-gotten money into legal money.
12.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the recorded statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. from LW 2, 132, 181, 187, 188, 198 and 236 would prove that the Petitioner/A4 had not committed any offence. Also that, the Petitioner retired on 31.10.2003 and his retirement benefits were given due credit in his account between November 2003 and February 2004 and as such, the Respondent/Police could not expect the Petitioner to disclose the source in his income tax returns filed for the Assessment year 2007-2008. Moreover, only if a person does anything within the knowledge that it facilitated him to commit an offence the question of abetment would arise. Otherwise, the ingredients of Section 107 cannot be invoked by the prosecution.
13.In effect, the main plea taken on behalf of the Petitioner is that the report filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. would show that there is no prima facie case made out against him.
14.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that LW.132 is the Bank Manager of ICICI Bank, L.W.181 is the Branch Manager of IOB Bank, and L.W.199 is the Branch Manager of IOB and they had stated about the depositing of the amount, issuance of the cheques and transfer of amounts. Also, LW.188 is the officer of the Income Tax Department and none of them had stated anything against the Petitioner.
15.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/A4 cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Hyderabad V. K.Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 512 at special page 521 to 523, whereby and whereunder, in paragraph 14, it is observed as follows:
14.While considering the very same provisions i.e., framing of charges and discharge of accused, again in Sajjan Kumar (supra), this Court held thus:
19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.
20. A Magistrate enquiring into a case under Section 209 CrPC is not to act as a mere post office and has to come to a conclusion whether the case before him is fit for commitment of the accused to the Court of Session. He is entitled to sift and weigh the materials on record, but only for seeing whether there is sufficient evidence for commitment, and not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction. If there is no prima facie evidence or the evidence is totally unworthy of credit, it is the duty of the Magistrate to discharge the accused, on the other hand, if there is some evidence on which the conviction may reasonably be based, he must commit the case. It is also clear that in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC, the Magistrate should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC
21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.
16.He also relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dilawar Balu Kurane V. State of Maharshtra, (2002) 2 Supreme Court Cases 135, at special page 140, wherein in paragraph 12, it is held as follows:
12.Now the next question is whether a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant. In exercising powers under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the settled position of law is that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under the said section has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully justified to discharge the accused, and in exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court but should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial [See Union of India V. Prafulla Kumar Samal, 1979 SCC (Cri) 609.
17.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Limited and others V. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 3 Supreme Court Cases 282, at page 283, wherein, it is observed and held thus:
From the plain language of Section 251-A of Code of Criminal Procedure or on its judicial interpretation or on any recognized principle of law it cannot be accepted that at the stage of framing the charges the Court has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused, the order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution.
18.He also brings it to the notice of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra V. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 Supreme Court Cases 605 at page 610 and 611, wherein in paragraph 12 to 18, it is observed as follows:
12. The parameters of "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the IPC, which defines abetment of a thing as follows:
"107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who -
First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1- A person who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing."
13. As per the Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 of the IPC.
14. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the allegations levelled against the appellant in the FIR and the material collected during the course of investigations, would attract any one of the ingredients of Section 107 IPC?
15. As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in the IPC. The meaning of the said word was considered by this Court in Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarhm (2001) 9 SCC 618 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088.
16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.
17. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action: provoke to action or reaction" (See: Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (See: Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary - 7th Edition).
18. Similarly, "urge" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter.
19.The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.K.Jaffer Sharief V. State (Through CBI), (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases 205, at page 206, wherein it is, inter alia, held that 'dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is implicit in the words used i.e. Corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant'.
20.In response, the Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent submits that from the evidence produced before the trial Court in the form of documents and statements produced, the prosecution has established a prima facie case against the Petitioner/ A4.
21.It is the contention of the Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent that there was no sufficient source of income for the Petitioner/A4 to establish that he had given Rs.10,00,000/- to A3 by way of loan and the Petitioner by using his bank account to convert the ill-gotten money of A3 as legal money had abetted the offence charged with. In this regard, the prosecution filed a final report against the Petitioner/A4 under Sections 109 I.P.C. read with Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for actively assisting and abetting A1 through his second wife A3.
22.The Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent proceeds to submit that the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. from LWs 2, 132, 181, 187, 188, 199 and 236 clearly prove that the Petitioner had no sufficient income to lend Rs.10,00,000/- to A3 and the Petitioner/A4 allowed A3 to misuse/abuse his (Petitioner's) savings bank account and thereby abetted the offence charged with.
23.The Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent forcefully contends that at the time of framing charge, the trial Court is not expected to marshal materials on record, but has to prima facie consider whether there are sufficient materials against the accused.
24.The Learned Public Prosecutor for the Respondent submits that even a strong suspicion founded on materials before the trial Court, which leads had to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge against an accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
25.At this stage, this Court recollects and recalls the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad and another V. P.Suryaprakasam, 1999 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 373, whereby and whereunder, it is held as follows:
At the time of framing of a charge, what the trial court is required to, and can consider are only the police report referred to under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and the documents sent with it. The only right the accused has at that stage is of being heard and nothing beyond that. Of course, at that stage the accused may be examined but that is a prerogative of the court only.
In the present case the High Court in quashing the proceedings not only looked into the documents filed by the respondent in support of his claim that no case was made out against him even before the trial had commenced but relied upon them to conclude that no offence was committed by him. This approach of the High Court is also contrary to the settled law of the land.
26.Further, this Court aptly points out the decision Sanjeet Ranjan and another V. State of Jharkhand, 2004 CRI. L. J. 1043 at special page 1051, wherein, at paragraph 8, it is, inter alia, observed as follows:
... The materials on the record given an inkling of the fact that income of the principal accused i.e., Dr.Sinha got from the unlawful sources has definitely been shown in the income-tax returns of both the petitioners only for the purpose of creating some explanation and accounting for the disproportionate income of the principal accused. There is no illegality in taking into consideration of the Gold Bonds worth Rs.16,34,000.00 in calculating the disproportionate income of the petitioner Sujeet Ranjan for proceeding against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in view of Section 4(2) of the Gold Bond Ordinance, 1993. Therefore, there is sufficient material for proceeding against both the petitioners in abetting the principal accused Dr.Sinha for the purpose of accounting for his disproportionate income beyond known sources and, as such, a prima facie case is definitely made out against both the petitioners. Furthermore, in view of the materials on the record it cannot be said that the charge against both the petitioners is groundless. Therefore, I see no illegality in the impugned order of the learned Special Judge requiring an interference therein.
27.In the decision of this Court in J.Prem and another V. State, 2000 CRI. L.J. 619 wherein it is held thus:
The income received by a public servant should be from a lawful source and such receipts ought to have been intimated to the authorities concerned also. Admittedly, the petitioners herein have not filed any income-tax returns relating to the check period in question including the income now proposed by them. Under the circumstances, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a prima facie material to proceed further against these petitioners and it cannot be said that the charge is groundless against them.
28.In the decision The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. Hyderabad V. Kundavaram Chandrachari, 1996 CRI. L.J. 1540 wherein it is held that 'Under Section 239 Cr.P.C., Court is not required to marshal the evidence to prove the guilt of an accused.'
29.In the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu V. J.Jayalalitha, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 1589, at special page 1595, whereby and whereunder, in paragraph 34, it is observed as follows:
34.We would choose to refrain from dealing with the above contention, lest any comment made by us may turn out to be detrimental to one or the other side of the case. Nevertheless, it is for the prosecution to explain how certain relevant sheets were found missing and whether respondent had any knowledge of and also why the respondent should have caused them to be removed. This is not the stage for weighing the pros and cons of all the implications of the materials nor for sifting the materials presented by the prosecution. The exercise at this stage should be confined to considering the police report and the documents to decide whether the allegations against the accused are groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offences. Presumption therein is always rebuttable by the accused for which there must be opportunity of participation in the trial.
30.It is to be borne in mind at the time of framing charge, evidence is not to be weighed with meticulous consideration. Even a strong suspicion based on material and a presumptive opinion would enable a Court of Law in framing a charge against the accused. Further, it is not open to a Court of Law at the time of framing of charge to evaluate the material to bring home the guilt of an accused. It is enough if the material on record supports triable issues.
31.As a matter of fact, a Court of Law is not expected to go into the probative value of the materials value of the record, nor required to discuss every material placed before it by the police along with the charge sheet. To put it succinctly, an in depth appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the time of framing of charge. Also that, at the time of framing charge, the Court is not to conduct an elaborate enquiry, and only a prima facie case is to be looked into.
32.It cannot be gainsaid that an approach of a Court of Law to the issue of framing of charge is to be pragmatic. While framing charge /charges, there is no necessity for a Court of Law to maintain the same yardstick to be adopted by it in scrutinising the evidence at the time of trial. However, due diligence must be taken even at the time of framing the charge by a Court of Law as to whether the charges framed is supported with prima facie and sufficient material evidence. While exercising the power to frame charge/charges, the Judge is not required to record his reasons for framing the charge against an accused, as per decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah V. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 522. In fact, the order should disclose ex facie that the Court had not proceeded mechanically in framing the charge just because an accusation was made by the prosecution against the accused concerned but that it had looked into the material brought on record till then. If that was done, then that would be a sufficient compliance with the requirement of law. No doubt, to seek discharge at any stage of trial is the right of an accused, but after framing of charges, it is not open to a Court to discharge the accused, as per decision Tapati Bag V. Patitpaban Ghosh and others, 1993 Crl.L.J. 3932 (Culcutta) (DB).
33.Be that as it may, on a careful consideration of respective contentions and this Court, bearing in mind the total effect of the material collected by the Respondent/Complainant, is of the considered view that in the impugned order in Crl.M.P.No.227 of 2013 in Spl.C.C.No.22 of 2012, dated 06.09.2013, the trial Court had taken into account the broad probabilities of the case and also, came to the prima facie conclusion that none of the grounds raised by the Petitioner seeking discharge from the case, were acceptable and ultimately, rejected the petition, as not maintainable because of the reason that in Discharge Petition, it could not consider and appreciate the evidenciary value of the witnesses and documents proposed to be produced by the prosecution against the Petitioner. As such, this Court is in agreement with the view taken by the trial Court in this regard and also, a Court of Law, while dealing with the Discharge Petition, should not embark upon the process evaluating the materials collected /evidence by the prosecution, by deciding its worth or credibility. Consequently, the Criminal Revision Petition fails.
34.In the result, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. The order passed by the Learned Special Judge, Coimbatore, in Crl.M.P.No.227 of 2013 in Spl.C.C.No.22 of 2012, dated 06.09.2013, is confirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this Revision. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
1.08.2014 Index : Yes Internet : Yes Sgl To The Special Judge, Special Court for Cases under Prevention of Corruption Act, Coimbatore. M.VENUGOPAL,J. sgl ORDER IN Crl.R.C.No.1301 of 2013 1.08.2014