Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jagdish Singh S/Of Pal Singh vs Sgpc on 14 November, 2013
Author: Mahesh Grover
Bench: Mahesh Grover
CWP No. 3109 of 2001(o&m) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
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CWP No. 3109 of 2001 (o&m)
Date of decision : November 14, 2013
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Jagdish Singh s/of Pal Singh
............Petitioner
Versus
SGPC
...........Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHESH GROVER
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Present: Mr. Vanita Sapra Kataria, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. K.D Sachdeva, Advocate for the respondent.
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MAHESH GROVER, J (ORAL)
This writ petition along with numerous others has been pending in this Court on the premise of a similarity and commonality of question of law involved in all of them. The question of law which were propounded are as below:-
1. Whether the services of an employee of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (hereinafter referred to as the S.G.P.C) can be terminated without following the process of law contained in the statute i.e. The Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ?
2. Whether the proceedings arising out of the said order of termination are amenable to an alternative relief under Section 142 Kukreja Ritu 2013.11.27 16:40 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 3109 of 2001(o&m) 2 of the Act?
Upon due consideration of the matter, I am of the opinion that the aforesaid issues are no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Mewa Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee J.T. 1998(8) S.C. 503 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-
"7. A mere reading of various provisions of the Act and rules set out above unmistakably show that SGPC is a creation of statute and Service Rules framed by it in exercise of its statutory power have force of law. Any violation of the provision of the Act and the Rules will certainly make SGPC amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We do not find any basis for the SGPC to contend that no writ can be issued against it even if its action is contrary to the provision of law and the Rules framed thereunder. SGPC is a creation of the statute. It has to act within the four corners of the law constituting it and the rules framed by it under the powers conferred upon it under the Act. We do not think any discussion is needed to dispel this argument by the SGPC that it is immune from the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Language of Kukreja Ritu 2013.11.27 16:40 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 3109 of 2001(o&m) 3 Article 226 does not admit of any limitation on the powers of the High Court for the exercise of its jurisdiction there under. Subba Rao, J. in Dwarkanath v. ITO [1965(3) SCR 536) said that Article 226 "is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised."
8. We have examined the provisions of Section 142. It does not provide any alternative remedy to an employee of the SGPC, who has been dismissed or whose services have been terminated. Section 142 does not cover any such type of case. In our view High Court in Ajaib Singh case rightly held that section 142 of the Act was inapplicable in the case and that petitioner therein could not seek remedy under Section 142, which does not provide any alternative remedy."
In view of the above, it is now apposite to decide all the related matters individually to see whether any cause of grievance personal to the petitioner survives, as it would have to be determined Kukreja Ritu 2013.11.27 16:40 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 3109 of 2001(o&m) 4 whether the principles of natural justice have been complied with and the procedure enshrined in the statute intended to ensure the observance of the principles of natural justice have been violated or not.
The petitioner's services were terminated on the ground that he had remained on unauthorised leave.
As per the facts which are evident from the record, the petitioner has submitted an application for going abroad to propagate religion. His application was recommended by the Member of the SGPC and duly accepted by the President who stated that leave be allowed to the petitioner as per Rules.
Subsequent thereto, no office order was passed by the respondents or at least none has been placed on record. The petitioner, however, was confronted with a letter dated 22.7.2000 intimating him that since he was a temporary employee he was not entitled to six months leave as per Rules. The petitioner who by now had been in England responded by pleading ill health. However, the respondents by virtue of the impugned order Annexure P-7 dated 9.01.2001 terminated the service arrangement of the petitioner which is now the cause of grievance to the petitioner and on whose behalf it has been contended that even if it is accepted that the petitioner was on unauthorised leave yet it was incumbent upon the respondents to at least hold an enquiry in this regard considering the fact that initially he was granted leave by President of the SGPC and also the fact that the petitioner had an explanation to offer. Learned Kukreja Ritu 2013.11.27 16:40 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 3109 of 2001(o&m) 5 counsel for the petitioner also contends that the mater is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment rendered in Kirpal Singh vs. SGPC, 2007 Vol. IV SCT 818.
The facts not having been controverted by the respondents, they sought to justify the order by stating that the petitioner being a temporary employee was not entitled to leave of six months and at best leave of 29 days could have been available to him and since he has violated this rule, he is not entitled to any relief in the instant proceedings.
On due consideration of the matter, I am of the view that the impugned order is arbitrary and unjust because no procedure was followed by the respondents. The petitioner once having been granted the leave which was curtailed subsequently was at least entitled to a hearing before any order adverse to him was passed. I am also of the opinion that the matter is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment in Kirpal Singh's case (Supra), to which the learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to offer any sustainable explanation. The writ petition is therefore accepted. The impugned order is set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to reinstatement in service with continuity but without any monetary consequences. The respondents would be at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law.
November 14, 2013 ( MAHESH GROVER )
ritu JUDGE
Kukreja Ritu
2013.11.27 16:40
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Chandigarh