Delhi High Court
Smt. Mohinder Jaspal Singh vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 12 August, 1991
Equivalent citations: [1992]194ITR186(DELHI)
Bench: B.N. Kirpal, D.K. Jain
JUDGMENT
B.N. Kirpal
1. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal the following two question to this court :
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of the section 144B of the Income tax Act, 1961, pertained to the branch of procedural law and the same applied to the all Income tax proceedings pending on January 1, 1976, irrespective of the assessment year to which those proceedings related ?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessment orders made by the Income tax Officer were beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the section 153 of the Act and so void in law ?"
2. In respect of the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76, the assessed did not return any capital gain in respect of the property known as "Narinder Place", parliament Street, New Delhi, which had been sold by her. According to her, there was no capital gain involved but the Income tax Officer did not accept her contention and levied capital gains tax. Appeal were filed before the Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals). Subsequently, relief was granted because the Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals) agreed with the assessed that the provisions of section 52(2) of the Act should not be invoked as had been done by the Income tax Officer. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals) did not accept the valuation of the property as on January 1, 1954, as put by the assessed.
3. Second appeals were filed to the Tribunal and it was, inter alia, urged that the proceedings for the years in the question under section 144B of the Act were illegal and void inasmuch as section 144B of the Act was substantive law and did not apply as the same was not procedural. The argument was that the said provision came in to effect from January 1, 1976, and, therefore, was not applicable to the earlier assessment years. It was also contented that the period of limitation for completing the assessment was two years under the provision of section 153(1)(a)(iii) and, therefore, the assessment was time-barred.
4. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the provision of section 144B were procedural in nature and because of the explanation contained in section 153, the assessment in question was barred by time. It is, thereafter, that the aforesaid reference was made to this court.
5. It is not disputed that it is now settled law that the provisions of the section 144B are procedural in nature. This being so, the said provision would apply even in relation to the assessment years prior to January 1, 1976, with regard to those assessments which were not complete. (See Sonia River Tea Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1990] 182 ITR 162 (Guahati); Banarsidas Bhanot and Sons v. CIT [1981] 129 ITR 488 (MP); K. U. Srinivasa Rao v. CWT ; Imam (H. S.) v. CIT and CIT v. Damoh Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. [1984] 145 ITR 572 (MP).
6. Question No. 1 has, therefore, to be answered in favor of Revenue and against the assessed.
7. As regards the question of limitation, Explanation 1 in section 153 is clearly applicable. Once it is held that the provision of section 144B could be invoked, then the period of limitation has to be computed by applying the said Explanation and, according to Explanation 1 (iv), he period of 180 days within which the assessment can be completed commences from the date on which the assessing Officer forwards the draft order.
8. It is admitted that, in the present case, the assessment was completed within the said period of 180 days and, therefore, question No. 2 as well has to be answered in favor of the Revenue.
9. There will be no order as to costs.
10. Reference answered accordingly.