Gujarat High Court
Chief Officer, Bhavnagar Nagarpalika vs Meghjibhai Ugabhai And Ors. on 20 January, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1992)2GLR847, (1995)IIILLJ527GUJ
Author: J.M. Panchal
Bench: J.M. Panchal
JUDGMENT Divecha, J.
1. By means of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the correctness of the Judgment and order passed by the Authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (the Act for brief) on 30th October, 1979 in Minimum Wages Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 2 to 7 of 1978. Thereunder the Authority under the Act accepted the claim of each individual workman to the extent of the short payment made to him by the petitioner and also awarded compensation to the tune of four times the excess amount awarded to him thereunder. A copy of the Judgment and order passed by the Authority under the Act is annexed as Exh. 'A' to this petition. In the process of challenging the Judgment and order at Exh. 'A' to this petition, the petitioner has also sought declaration that provisions contained in Section 20(3)(i) of the Act are ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
2. The facts giving rise to this petition are not many. Respondents No. 1 to 6 were employed by the petitioner to work as watchmen. They were paid Rs.75/- per month as wages. They felt that the wages paid to them at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month were not what they were entitled to under the Act. According to them, they were required to perform duties for 11 hours a day as night watchmen. They therefore moved the Authority under the Act for payment of the difference between the amount payable to them under the Act and the actual payment made to them by the petitioner. Each of them made a separate application for the purpose. Their applications came to be registered as Minimum Wages Miscellaneous Applications No. 2 to 7 of 1978. Those applications were resisted by the petitioner on various grounds including the lack of jurisdiction and all other relevant technical pleas. It appears that the Authority under the Act thought it fit to dispose of all those applications by its common Judgment and order passed on 30th October, 1979. As aforesaid, its copy is at Exh. 'A' to this petition. This Judgment and order at Exh. A are challenged in this petition. The petitioner has also challenged the vires of Section 20(3)(i) of the Act conferring the powers on the Authority to pronounce such Judgment and order.
3. The challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 20(3)(i) of the Act is based on the ground that it is left to the Authority under the Act to determine the quantum of compensation as it thinks fit without providing any guidelines whatsoever for exercise of such discretionary power. In other words, what is contended by Shri D.U. Shah, tne learned Advocate for the petitioner, in support of this petition is that the power to award compensation conferred on the Authority under Section 20(3)(i) of the Act is absolutely arbitrary and is therefore offending the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Shri Shah for the petitioner has submitted that the guarantee of equality would connote absence of any kind of arbitrary power whatsoever. As against this, Shri Nayak for respondent No. 7 and Shri Zaveri for respondents Nos. 1 to 6 have contended that the guidelines are found in the Act as well as in the relevant provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act. According to Shri Nayak and Shri Zaveri for the respondents, it is difficult to hold that Section 20(3)(i) of the Act confers unguided arbitrary powers on the Authority to determine the quantum of compensation at his sweet-will. In that view of the matter, runs their submission, the constitutional validity of the said provisions will have to be upheld.
4. It would be quite proper to look at certain provisions of the Act in the light of its scheme. The Preamble says that it is meant to provide for fixing minimum rates of wages in certain employments. It is not necessary to trace the historical background for enactment of this beneficial legislation in favour of workmen. It appears that workmen were not paid wages sufficient to eke out even bare living. In other words, workmen were by and large subjected to exploitation by unscrupulous employers. The Act was made with a view to cutting this mischief on the part of the unscrupulous employers. Section 3 makes provision for fixation of the minimum rates of wages. Section 12 thereof fastens the liability on the employer to pay to every employee engaged in the scheduled employment under him wages at a rate not less than the minimum rate of wages fixed by the Government under the Act. Section 20 thereof provides the machinery for recovery of the short payment of wages made by the employer to his workmen or any of them.
5. In order to appreciate rival submissions urged before us, it would be quite proper to reproduce it. It reads:-
"(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment less than the minimum rates or wages or in respect of the payment of the remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under Section 14, to employees employed or paid in that area.
(2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorized in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under Sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under Sub-section (3):
Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable :
Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period (3) When any application under Sub-section (2), is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, may without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, direct-
(i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess;
(ii) in any other case, the payment of the amount due to the employee, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten rupees, and the authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases were the excess of the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application.
(4) If the authority hearing any application under this section is satisfied that it was either malicious or vexatious, it may direct that a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees be paid to the employer by the person presenting the application.
(5) Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered:
(a) if the authority is a Magistrate, the authority as if it were a fine imposed by the authority as a Magistrate, or
(b) if the authority is not a Magistrate, by any Magistrate to whom the authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate.
(6) Every direction of the authority under this section shall be final.
(7) Every authority appointed under Sub-section (1) shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the purpose of taking evidence and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents, and every such authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV (new Chapter XXVI) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)."
6. It thus becomes clear that the Authority under the Act entertaining any claim of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act is empowered to award compensation to the workman or workmen invoking his jurisdiction thereunder. So far as the first category of claims referred to in Clause (i) thereof is concerned, such compensation may be to the tune of ten times the excess amount awardable to the claimant. This provision for award of compensation which could be ten times the amount of such excess is challenged on the ground of conferment of arbitrary powers on the Authority named therein.
7. It would be necessary, in the first place, to examine the nature of the power conferred on the Authority under Section 20 of the Act. It is supposed to decide a lis between the employer and the employee or employees with respect to any dispute arising on account of non-compliance with the relevant provisions contained in the Act regarding fixation of the rate of minimum wages. This would mean that the power conferred on the Authority thereunder is judicial in nature. It partakes the character of judicial powers. It has to adjudicate upon the conflicting or rival claims raised before it. In fact the Authority has been invested with certain powers under the relevant provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. It is also made a Court for the purposes of the relevant provisions contained in Indian Penal Code, 1860. It thus becomes clear that the powers conferred upon the Authority under Section 20 of the Act are judicial in nature We need not be understood to mean that we hold the Authority under Section 20 of the Act to be a Court for any purposes other than what has been prescribed under Sub-section (7) thereof. We are not called upon to decide whether or not the Authority under Section 20 of the Act is a Court for any other purpose.
8. Once it is found that the nature of powers to be exercised under Section 20 of the Act is judicial, there is no escape from the conclusion that the discretion conferred upon the Authority invested with such judicial powers is not unbridled or unguided. By the very nature of its powers, such Authority is required carefully to look into the matter and to decide it in accordance with sound judicious principles. Even if such Authority has to exercise discretionary powers, the very nature of powers carries with them implicit guidelines to exercise such discretion in a judicial and judicious manner. Conferment of discretionary powers on the authorities performing judicial functions can never be considered arbitrary.
9. Again, performance of judicial functions requires application of mind after hearing both the sides. To decide a matter after hearing both the sides would carry with it implicit guidelines how to decide. It cannot be gain said that a Judicial decision is given after examining the pros and cons of the controversy involved therein. The concept of hearing involved in reaching a conclusion in exercise of judicial powers can by itself be considered a guideline. The concept of hearing is very much found embodied in Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act. The decision to award compensation, if any, and its quantum would be arrived at after hearing the concerned side. It would mean that the Authority is bound to consider what the other side has to say inter alia with respect to award of compensation, if any, thereunder.
10. Moreover a judicial decision is usually supported by reasons. Recording of reasons in support of a finding or conclusion is ordinarily a part of judicial process. What weighed with the authority invested with judicial powers in deciding a case or in giving a direction or directions is normally found reflected in its reasoned order what is popularly known in the legal parlance, speaking order. The requirement of recording reasons in support of its decision or direction based on exercise of discretionary powers is in itself a guideline for exercise of such discretionary powers. It rules, out conferment of unbridled and unguided arbitrary powers on the authority.
11. Besides, we cannot overlook one important aspect. The Authority constituted under Section 20 of the Act is empowered to make such further enquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary before passing any order under Section 20(3) of the Act. If such Authority makes any such further enquiry, it would also be useful for the purpose of deciding the award of compensation, if any, and its quantum. The very fact that the Authority is empowered to make further inquiry, whenever and wherever necessary, would indicate that it has been given sufficient guidelines.
12. Furthermore, the award of compensation under Section 20(3) of the Act is not compulsory or mandatory. Such award would depend upon various factors like the nature of employment, the status of the employer, the nature of defaults, the number of defaults, the frequency thereof, the amount involved, the delay in making payment of less than the minimum wages fixed and like matters. All these factors are bound to weigh with the Authority in its decision to award compensation, if any, and its quantum to the concerned workman with respect to the application under Section 20 of the Act. At this stage it may be noted that such compensation at the rate of ten times the excess amount is awardable only in cases where the complaint relates to payment of wages less than the minimum rates fixed under the Act. In no other case such compensation at the rate of ten times the excess amount is awardable. The case falling under Clause (ii) of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 requires the award of compensation not exceeding ten rupees. This provision by itself can be read as providing the necessary guidance for the Authority exercising its power under Section 20 of the Act.
13. At this stage we have also to bear in mind the relevant provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. Thereunder, the Authority is empowered to impose a penalty not exceeding Rs. 50 to be paid to the employer by the applicant in case the application under Section 20 of the Act is found to be either malicious or vexatious. It thus becomes clear that the Authority functioning under Section 20 of the Act has also to see whether or not the claim made before it by the applicant is false, frivolous, malicious or vexatious. If the Authority finds the claim of the applicant to be false or frivolous, malicious or vexatious, the workman has to pay a penalty, of course, not exceeding Rs. 50 as provided therein. The fact that the Authority is required to apply its mind to the question whether or not the claim of the applicant is false, frivolous, malicious or vexatious will in itself be a sufficient guideline for the purpose of exercise of the discretionary powers conferred on it under the relevant provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.
14. It may be noted that what is to be awarded is compensation under the relevant provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act. The word compensation is not defined therein. Its meaning will have therefore to be gathered by means of its usage in the common parlance. Its dictionary meaning inter alia connotes the act of compensating and something, especially money, given as a recompense (vide the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 8th Edition, 1990 published by Oxford University Press). In the same dictionary the word 'compensate', is defined inter alia to mean 'recompense' 'make amends', and 'counter balance . The dictionary meaning of the term 'recompense' inter alia is 'make amends to a person for a loss or requite, reward or punish a person or an action . The word 'requite' is referred to in the dictionary inter alia to connote 'reward' or avenge (a favour or injury)'. It thus become clear from the above referred meanings of various terms connected with the word 'compensation' that compensation is offered to a person to make amends for some injury or loss caused to him. The person responsible for causing such injury or loss is made liable to pay compensation. It cannot be forgotten that the minimum wages fixed under the Act are not in the nature of fair wages. It is our common knowledge that the minimum wages fixed under the Act would usually provide only a bare living or sustenance to the recipient of any such wages. They are not sufficient to enable him to make his both ends meet. A workman is usually poor. He is a human being. Man is a gregarious animal. He has to live in society and has to discharge his social obligations. He has often to incur expenses on several important occasions like a marriage or a death in the family or in the relations and often in the neighbourhood over customary ceremonies, formalities or rituals. Shortage of funds generates in him feelings of disappointment and often of frustration. His heart and mind are often filled with feelings of untold miseries and inexplicable sufferings on account of unlimited wants and limited, rather practically nil means. If the workman is not paid the minimum wages fixed under the Act or he is paid less than the minimum wages fixed thereunder, it would make it practically impossible for him to make provision for his bare sustenance as well as that of his dependents. That might lead him to his own starvation and also that of some dependents of his. Pangs of hunger can be understood better by experience than by description. Hunger and starvation cause much heart-burning. Hunger and starvation of "dependents would cause all the more heart-burning to a person who is responsible for making provision for sustenance of such dependents. Such heart-burning cannot be evaluated in monetary terms. The relevant provision contained in Section 20 of the Act is however designed to provide some compensation to the person for suffering such heart-burning on account of payment of less, than the minimum rates of wages fixed under the Act. The compensation to such workman has to be paid by the person responsible for making such short payment. Obviously, in the case of an applicant under Section 20 of the Act, the responsible person for making short payment to him would be his employer and none else. Even if the employer is not directly responsible for making any short payment to the concerned workman, the former would be held responsible for such short payment as the employer of the establishment in which the concerned workman might be working. The reason therefor is quite simple. The employer acts through its agents in causing payment of wages to his workman whose services are hired by him for his establishment. It thus becomes clear that the employer is required to recompense his workman for payment to the latter any short payment, that is payment of wages less than the minimum rates fixed under the Act. As indicated hereinabove the quantum of compensation would depend on various factors The maximum limit has been prescribed to be ten times the excess amount payable to the applicant making his application under Section 20 of the Act. The use of word 'compensation' would also in our opinion, indicate a sufficient guideline to the Authority for exercise of the discretionary power conferred on it under the relevant provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act.
15. It is true that the compensation referred to in the relevant provision contained in Section 20 of the Act is somewhat penal in nature. This also becomes clear from the relevant provisions contained in Section 22 of the Act. Payment of wages less than the minimum rates of wages fixed under the Act to the concerned workman is made an offence thereunder prescribing punishment inter alia with fine. Thereunder the Court has been directed to take into consideration the amount of any compensation already awarded against the accused in any proceeding taken under Section 20 while imposing any fine on the accused for an offence thereunder. It thus becomes clear that the award of comepnsation passed against the employer in favour of the workman under the relevant provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act would be in the nature of penalty. The object behind making such provision of awarding compensation is to induce the employer to make payment of wages to his workman in accordance with the minimum rates of wages fixed under the Act for such workman. It might also have some deterrent effect to the extent that the employer may not make payment of wages less than the minimum rates of wages fixed under the Act. The real deterrent effect is found made in the penal provision contained in Section 22 of the Act.
16. As aforesaid, the compensation awarded under Section 20(3)(i) of the Act has some penal element therein. It is however not a penalty stricto sensu. The legislature has advisedly used term 'compensation' in contra-distinction with the term penalty in Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. It is true that, under Section 20(4) of the Act, the workman is required to pay penalty to his employer for making a malicious or vexatious application under Section 20 of the Act. But it cannot be styled as compensation keeping in mind the meaning of the term as pointed out hereinabove There is no attempt to compensate the employer for any injury caused to him by the workman by means of his malicious or vexatious application. What the workman has to pay for such false or frivolous application would be a penalty. Any paise going out of his pocket would make him feel the pinch of it in view of his poverty and having practically no funds. It is unthinkable that he can provide any compensation to his employer for the heartburning, if any, caused to the latter by means of the former's malicious and vexatious application, if any.
17. It is true that the penalty that the workman has to pay under Section 20(4) of the Act is only upto Rs. 50 whereas the compensation containing some penal element payable by the employer to his workman under Section 20(3)(i) of the Act would be upto ten times the excess amount. But then the paying capacity of the two is quite different. The employer's financial capacity can be said to be of the elephant's size whereas that of the workman of the ant's Size. There cannot be any comparison between their respective paying capacity. The classification between the two can be said to be based on some intelligible differentia even if it is tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The objects sought to be achieved is to deter the employer from paying wages less than the minimum rates thereof fixed under the Act and to deter the workman from making any false or frivolous claim or malicious or vexatious application There thus exists a logical nexus between the classification made between the two and the object sought to be achieved. It cannot be said to be nit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
18. Even if it is assumed that the powers conferred upon the Authority under Section 20 of the Act are quasi-judicial in nature, the position would not be very much different. It is well settled that a quasi judicial power carries with it the duty to act judicially. It implies an opportunity of hearing to be given to the affected party. Any decision by a quasi-judicial authority without affording an opportunity of hearing to the affected party would be branded as contravening and violative of the audi alteram partem rule in view of the ruling of this Court in the case of East India Co. v. Official Liquidator of Rajratna Naranbhai Mills Pvt. Ltd. (In liquidation) and Anr. reported in (1970) XI GLR 457. Again, every quasi-judicial decision or order has to be supported by reasons. It should be a speaking decision or order. This principle or law has been well settled in view of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1302 and in the case of The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., reported in AIR 1976 SC 1785 It cannot be gainsaid that the requirement of hearing the affected party before deciding a matter and the requirement of recording reasons for ultimate decision or order can be said to be sufficient guidelines for exercise of even discretionary powers.
19. Again, the discretionary powers under the relevant provisions contained in Section 20 of the Act are conferred on certain officers named in Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act. They are any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendary Magistrate. It cannot be gainsaid that a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is invested with judicial powers under the relevant provisions contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. We should not be understood to have said that a Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is a Court for any purpose other than the purposes mentioned in the said enactment. Again, a Judge of a Civil Court is always a judicial officer. An officer exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner will be a very high ranking officer. He can be said to be conversant with the labour problems or matters pertaining to labour legislations. Similarly, an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner will also be a high ranking officer. Conferment of discretionary powers on a high ranking officer cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad and Ors. v. Ramanlal Govindram etc. reported in AIR 1975 SC 1187 = 1975 GLR 693 (SC). In that case Section 437-A(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (as inserted in Gujarat by Gujarat Act 19 of 1964) was challenged as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground of conferment of unbridled and unguided arbitrary powers. In that context it has been held:
"The conferment of power on the Municipal Commissioner as an Administrative Officer to take proceedings for eviction cannot be struck down as unreasonable on the ground that he is a Judge in his own cause. He is the highest officer of the Corporation. The Corporation acts through these officers. There is no personal interest of the Municipal Commissioner in evicting these persons. The Corporation represents public interest. The Municipal Commissioner acts in public duty in aid of public interest. The Municipal Commissioner therefore would apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of a given case as to whether there should be an order for eviction. If the Municipal Commissioner wrongly exercises his power the action can be corrected in appeal. The said section cannot be said to be bad in law for want of reasonableness."
In the instant case, the authority empowered to act as such under Section 20 of the Act is a judicial officer. Even if an officer of the Central Government performing functions as a Labour Commissioner or an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner was appointed as authority under Section 20 of the Act, the relevant provision contained therein could not have been struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in view of the aforesaid ruling in Ramanlal Govindram case (supra).
20. It may be mentioned at this stage that Section 14B of the, Employee's Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 requires the Authority named therein to levy damages for default in paying contributions thereunder. The damages could be the amount equal to the amount payable thereunder. The constitutional validity of that provisions was examined by the Supreme Court in the case of Organo Chemical Industries and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1979) II LLJ 416. While upholding the constitutional validity thereof, it has been held:
"It is not correct to say that there are no guidelines provided for fixing the quantum of damages. The power of the regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages under Section 14-B is a quasi-judicial function. It must be exercised after notice to the defaulter and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The discretion to award damages could be exercised within the limits fixed by the Statute. Having regard to the punitive nature of the power ex-ercisable under Section 14B and the consequences that ensue therefrom, an order under Section 14B must be a 'speaking order' containing the reasons in support of it. The guidelines are provided in the Act and its various provisions, particularly in the word 'damages' the liability for which in Section 14B arises on the making of default. While fixing the amount of damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration various factors, viz, the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. The word 'damages' in Section 14B lays down sufficient guidelines for him to levy damages."
21. It is true that the provisions of Section 14B of the Employee's Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 are not in pari materia with those contained in Section 20(3)(i) of the Act. However, the nature of discretion conferred on the Authority named thereunder can be said to be similar. The only difference is that in the former provision, the damages could not be assessed more than the amount equal to the amount claimed thereunder while in the latter provision ten times compensation of the excess amount can be awarded. However, by analogy, this ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Organo Chemical Industries (supra) would be applicable in the instant case. The guidelines found by the Supreme Court on the basis of certain factors mentioned therein in the said provisions in the Provident Funds legislation are very much present in Section 20(3)(i) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the constitutional validity of Section 20(3)(i) of the Act will have to be upheld.
22. Again, this ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Organo Chemical industries (supra) provides a complete answer to the contention raised before us based on absence of any provision for appeal against the decision of the Authority under the Act made under Section 20(3) thereof. Sub-section (6) of Section 20 thereof makes the direction of the Authority final. No provision for appeal is made thereunder. In view of the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Organo Chemical Industries (supra), mere absence of provisions for appeal does not imply that the Authority under the Act is invested with arbitrary and uncontrolled power without any guidelines.
23. We do not think that the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Gwalior Rayon Mills Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and Ors., reported in AIR 1974 SC 1660 is of any help to the petitioner in the present case. In that case, Section 8(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was challenged on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. It is not the case of the petitioner that Section 20(3)(i) of the Act suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power
24. Similarly, we do not think that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras v. V.G. Row, reported in IR 1952 SC 196 and in the case of Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 224 can come to the rescue of the petitioner in support of its challenge to the aforesaid provision of the Act. In the case of V.G. Row (supra) Section 15(2)(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 was challenged as violative of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. In the case of Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain (supra), what was challenged before the Court was Clauses 3(2)(b) and 4(3) of the U.P. Coal Control Order, 1953 as violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. No freedom guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India is pressed into service for challenging the constitutional validity of Section 20(3)(i) of the Act.
25. Besides, it would be desirable not to refer to precedents for Article 19 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of deciding the question pertaining to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this connection a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Deena alias Deen Dayal and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1983 SC 1155. It has been held therein:
"Any case, even a locus classius is an authority for what it decides. It is permissible to extend the ratio of a decision to cases involving identical situations, factual and legal, but care must be taken to see that this is not done mechanically, that is, without a close examination of the rationale of the decision which is cited as a precedent. Human mind, trained even in the strict discipline of law, is not averse to taking easy course of relying on decision which have become famous and applying their ratio to supposedly identical situations. The question of discrimination arises under Article 14 and not under Article 19 of Constitution. Where a case before the Court involved considerations limited and germane to the application of Article 14, the principles enunciated therein cannot be treated as of universal application and in that process to apply them to cases arising under other articles of the Constitution, particularly Articles 19 and 21 of Constitution."
By analogy, the proposition of law enunciated in this ruling of the Supreme Court will apply in the present case. If principles enunciated In regard to Article 14 cannot apply to cases arising under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, the reverse principle can also be enunciated to the effect that principles propounded in regard to Article 19 cannot apply to cases arising under Article 14. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to deal with and dilate upon extensively the aforesaid two rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of V.G. Row (supra) and Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain (supra).
26. In view of our aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 20(3)(i) of the Act has no merit in it and it cannot be upheld.
27. Shri Shah for the petitioner has then questioned the correctness of the decision at Exh. 'A' to this petition on the ground that the compensation ought not to have been awarded at four times the excess amount. According to Shri Shah, at the most the compensation equal to the excess amount ought to have been awarded by the Authority under the Act keeping in mind various factors involved in the litigation. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Authority under the Act in its decision in Exh. 'A' to this petition has thought it fit to exercise the discretion of awarding compensation to the tune of four times in excess amount. We find that the discretion exercised by the Authority under the Act is based on sound principles for exercise of such discretion. It may be noted that the objections raised by the petitioner-Municipality before the authority under the Act with respect to claims made by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 are also technical in nature. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction and the competence of the Authority appointed under the Act. The petitioner also contended before the Authority in answer to the claim applications that respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein were employed only as part-time Watchmen. The petitioner herein had the audacity to contend before the Authority that respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein were not required to be paid minimum wages as they were employed in the Education Department. Thereby the petitioner-Municipality wanted the liability to be fastened to the State Government with respect to the claims made by respondent Nos. 1 to 6 hereinbefore the Authority under the Act. We think that the objections raised by the petitioner-Municipality to the claim applications made by respondent Nos. 1 to 6 before the Authority under the Act are shocking to say the least. It may be pointed out at this stage that the petitioner at the relevant time was a Municipality deemed to have been constituted under the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. It would obviously partake the character of State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was not expected of it to have raised such objections against the just claims made by its employees. As a statutory body, it ought to have desisted from raising technical pleas to defeat the just claims of its employees in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of The Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1144. Besides, the petitioner as a statutory body ought to have proved itself an ideal employer. As a statutory body, it was its duty to have implemented the relevant provisions of this benevolent piece of legislation both in letter and spirit. If a statutory body like the petitioner-Municipality does not enforce or implement the benefits conferred by such benevolent piece of legislation on its employees, unscrupulous employers are likely to seek coverage and to cite such examples in their attempt to flout the provisions meant to cut the mischief on their part. Keeping in mind the nature of objections raised by and on behalf of the petitioner-Municipality in answer to the claim applications made by its workmen before the Authority under the Act, we think that the award of compensation to the tune of four times the excess amount can be said to be on the lower side. We find no reason to interfere with the award of compensation made in favour of its workmen by the Authority by means of its decision at Exh. 'A' to this petition.
28. Shri Shah for the petitioner has reiterated before us the contentions urged on behalf of the Municipality before the Authority for resisting the claim applications made by respondent Nos. 1 to 6 under Section 26 of the Act. The Authority in its decision at Exh. 'A' to the petition has found that respondents Nos. 1 to 6 were full time Watchmen and were therefore entitled to the minimum wages fixed for full-time Watchmen. This is a pure finding of fact and Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not meant for correcting such finding of fact even if it is found to be erroneous. It may be clarified that we have not found it to be erroneous. In fact, it is not shown how this finding can be said to be erroneous in any manner. We think that the Authority under the Act in its decision at Exh. 'A' to this petition has given cogent and convincing reasons for overruling all the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner-Municipality to the claim applications made by respondents Nos. 1 to 6 under Section 20 of the Act. We are in agreement with the findings recorded and the conclusions reached by it with respect to those objections. We find no reason to interfere with the just and proper order passed by the Authority at Exh 'A to this petition
29. No other point in support of this petition has been urged before us. We have found no merit or substance in any of the submissions urged before us in support of this petition. We find no reason to interfere with the decision of the Authority under the Act at Exh. 'A' to this petition.
30. Before parting with this Judgment, we should like to observe that, by the interim order passed by this Court on 22nd January, 1980 the petitioner was directed to deposit the amount payable under the order at Exh. 'A' to this petition on or before 31st January, 1980. By a subsequent order passed on 4th February, 1980, the deposited amount was ordered to be paid over to respondent Nos. 1 to 6 without imposing any condition whatsoever. It transpires from the order at Exh. 'A' to this petition that the amount awarded to each workman is quite small. It was not desirable on the part of the petitioner-Municipality to have challenged the decisions at Exh. 'A' to this petition keeping in view the smallness of the amount involved. In view of the fact that the amount was ordered to be paid over to the concerned workmen and in view of th6 statement made by Shri Zaveri for respondent Nos. 1 to 6 that the amount in question has already been paid over to them, we would have been disinclined to interfere with the decision at Exh. 'A' even if we might have been inclined to accept the submissions urged before us by Shri Shah for the petitioner-Municipality with respect to the merits of the controversy.
31. In the result, this petition fails. It is hereby rejected. Rule is accordingly discharged with costs.