Delhi High Court
A. K. Jaison vs State on 27 March, 2009
Author: Badar Durrez Ahmed
Bench: Badar Durrez Ahmed, P. K. Bhasin
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 27.03.2009
+ CRL APPEAL No. 6/1994
A. K. JAISON ... Appellant
- versus -
STATE ... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellants : Mr M. T. George
For the Respondent/State : Mr M. N. Dudeja, APP
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE P. K. BHASIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? YES
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13.08.1993 delivered by the Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 103/1990, emanating from FIR No. 354/1989 registered at Police Station Vikas Puri. The appellant has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'the IPC'). By a separate order dated 16.10.1993, the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.1 of 11
2. The learned counsel for the appellant, at the outset, pointed out that this was a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence. According to him the Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of three circumstances:-
(i) Motive;
(ii) Keys of the flat where the deceased R. R. Anyara used to
reside and where his dead body was recovered in a
putrefied state, were allegedly recovered at the instance of the appellant; and
(iii) The circumstance that the appellant was absent from his native village Karakachal in Kerala between the dates 20.10.1989 and 31.10.1989.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court had committed a gross error in concluding that the appellant had any motive to kill his uncle R. R. Anyara, who was a bachelor. According to the learned counsel for the appellant when the appellant was a child, his mother had passed away and his father re-married and it is his uncle, late R. R. Anyara, who took care of him. The learned counsel submitted that the only circumstance that has been construed to be a motive for killing R. R. Anyara is the fact that late R. R. Anyara had given the name of the appellant as a nominee in his service record so that in the event of his death all benefits accruing as a part of his service would be handed over to the appellant. He submitted that the Trial Court took the view that because R. R. Anyara was allegedly thinking of entering into matrimony, this was motive enough for the CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.2 of 11 appellant to kill his uncle because he felt that if his uncle entered into matrimony, then he would no longer continue to be a nominee in respect of these service benefits, which had earlier been indicated to be in favour of the appellant. According to the learned counsel for the appellant this is hardly any motive and certainly not one for murdering the uncle, who looked after him and took care of him since his childhood.
4. Insofar as the recovery of the keys at the instance of the appellant is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, first of all, the recovery of the keys themselves do not link the appellant with the commission of the crime. Secondly, he submitted that the appellant allegedly gave his disclosure statement in Malayalam, which was translated by one Babu Joseph (PW16), who was a constable at that point of time posted at Police Station Vikas Puri. He submits that that statement cannot be regarded as a statement made by the appellant. As regards the third circumstance, that is, absence from the native village between 20.10.1989 and 31.10.1989, the learned counsel submitted that this has not been established and in any event, according to him, absence from the native village does not mean that the appellant was in Delhi. He submitted that there is no evidence brought forward by the prosecution to show the presence of the appellant in Delhi during those dates. It was, therefore, the case of the CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.3 of 11 learned counsel for the appellant that the chain of circumstances has not been completed and there is sufficient doubt for which benefit must be given to the appellant.
5. On the part of the prosecution, the case against the appellant is that on receipt of copy of DD No. 13-A on 04.11.1989, Sub- Inspector Madan Lal along with Constable Narender proceeded to the spot, that is, House No. 275, DG-II, Vikas Puri, New Delhi. Apparently, the house was found locked and a foul smell was emanating from the said flat. The lock was broken open and in the bedroom of the said flat, a highly decomposed dead body was found which was later on identified to be that of R. R. Anyara, son of K. R. Anyara. Apparently, to the police officers, it appeared to be a case of murder and accordingly a case was registered and investigation was taken up by the Station House Officer. The said flat was inspected and blood stained earth, red chilli powder and a broken lock was taken into possession. Apart from this, a sweater, lungi and bed sheet were seized. Thereafter, post mortem was got conducted on the dead body. The investigation proceeded and ultimately the charge-sheet was filed.
6. It appears that the deceased R. R. Anyara was aged about 62 years and was a bachelor and had a property at Kerala as well as at Delhi and that he had nominated the appellant as his beneficiary in his CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.4 of 11 service record. It may be pointed out at this stage itself that, though the post mortem report (Exhibit PW20/D) is on record, the doctor, who conducted the same, was not examined. The post mortem report indicates that the time of death could be around seven days from the date on which the post mortem was conducted and the post mortem was conducted on 04.11.1989 at the spot itself.
7. Mr Dudeja, who appeared on behalf of the State, submitted that apart from the three circumstances already brought to the notice of the Court by the learned counsel for the appellant, there was another circumstance which would lead to the guilt of the appellant and that is the fact that blood stained clothes, as per memo Exhibit PW10/K, which were a shirt and pant belonging to the appellant, were produced by him itself in Delhi on 22.11.1989. Mr Dudeja also submitted that the police party had gone to the appellant's native village in Kerala on 15.11.1989 where they met the appellant and made some preliminary inquiries. Thereafter, the appellant accompanied the police party of his own volition to Delhi. And, it is only on 22.11.1989 at Delhi that he produced the said clothes, which were seized. The said clothes, according to Mr Dudeja, were sent to Central Forensic Science Laboratory as Exhibit 12a and 12b. No blood was visible on the said clothes at the time they were seized as, according to them, the appellant had stated that they had been washed several times. However, at the CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.5 of 11 Central Forensic Science Laboratory, when the seized articles were examined, it was found that Exhibit 12a was one very dirty blue full sleeved bush-shirt having a small speck of brown stain on the upper back left region and exhibit 12b was found to be one dirty brown pant. As per the chemical analysis done at the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, the quantity of blood was too small insofar as Exhibit 12b was concerned for the purposes of serological analysis. However, blood was detected in Exhibit 12a, namely, the bush-shirt. The report indicates that though the blood was of human origin, insofar as the blood group test is concerned it did not give any reaction. Therefore, the blood group could not be ascertained. According to Mr Dudeja, the fact that the blood was found in the clothes of the appellant which had been produced by him is a very important circumstance which goes towards the guilt of the appellant. Mr Dudeja supported the Trial Court judgment in its entirety and stated that the circumstances noted by the Trial Court completed the chain of circumstances necessary for returning a finding of guilt against the appellant.
8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on both sides and have also gone through the evidence on record in detail. As regards the motive, we find that there is reference to certain letters, translations of which have been exhibited as PW16/B, PW16/C and PW16/D dated CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.6 of 11 03.12.1988, 25.05.1989 and 15.12.1988 respectively. These letters were allegedly written by the deceased to the appellant and were apparently produced by the appellant when the police party met him in his native village on 15.11.1989. However, there is nothing to prove or establish that these letters were written in the hand of the deceased and, therefore, we need not deal with this aspect of the matter any further. The other aspect with regard to motive was the issue of nomination by the deceased in his service record. This, to our minds, is too flimsy a reason for constituting a motive for murder. There is nothing to indicate that there was any animosity between the appellant and the deceased. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that the deceased was a bachelor and he had taken care of the appellant since he was a child and ever since the appellant's mother had passed away. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no motive can be said to have been established so as to fuel the mind of the appellant to commit the murder of his uncle.
9. With regard to the circumstance of the appellant being absent from his native village during the dates 20.10.1989 to 31.10.1989, we find that the prosecution has produced two witnesses, namely, C. P. Thangappan (PW7) and M. N. Thangachan (PW8). Insofar as PW7 C. P. Thangappan is concerned, he has stated in his examination-in- chief that from 20th to 31st October, 1989, the accused was not at his CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.7 of 11 house in Kerala. He also stated that he did not know where he had gone. However, in his examination-in-chief itself the same witness has stated that he came to know this fact through his mother-in-law, who had been informed by the mother of the accused that the accused was not in the village from 20.10.1989 to 31.10.1989. He has also stated that he did not enquire from the father of the accused about his whereabouts but the father of the accused had told him that he had no knowledge about the whereabouts of the accused. From this, the Trial Court has inferred that the appellant was absent from his village in Kerala and also that he was present in Delhi. Although the second inference cannot be made even if the appellant was absent from his village during that period, even the conclusion with regard to the first inference is not correct. This is so because the said witness, namely, PW7 C. P. Thangappan has not given any direct testimony with regard to the absence of the appellant from his village. He only stated that he came to know through his mother-in-law, who in turn had been informed by the mother of the appellant. It may also be noted here that the appellant's mother had died when he was only 2-1/2 years old and the reference to the mother of the appellant is probably to his step- mother. This statement is, therefore, merely hearsay and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, since the appellant was residing with his father, the said witness could have made enquiries from the appellant's father. But he admittedly did not do so.
CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.8 of 11
10. The next witness that has been relied upon by the prosecution is PW8 M. N. Thangachan, who stated that in the month of October, 1989 he had gone to the house of the accused and he was told that he was not there for the last one week. He further stated that the appellant had come to his house in the beginning of November, 1989, that is, on 6th or 7th of November, 1989 and that he had told him that he (the accused) had gone to the house of Emini and Sunny at Ettamanur and Tripunitura. First of all, the testimony of this witness does not disclose the exact period of the month when the appellant was absent from his house. It could have been the beginning of the month of October, middle of the month of October or any other week of the month of October. Furthermore, the said witness has also stated that the accused told him that while he was away from the native village, he had gone to other places in Kerala itself. From these statements made by PW7 and PW8, it cannot be inferred by any stretch of imagination that the appellant was present in Delhi in those dates during which the death of R. R. Anyara took place.
11. With regard to the circumstance of recovery of keys, we are of the view that this is by itself cannot be a circumstance to implicate the appellant unless it forms part of the chain of circumstances. In any event, it does appear to us to be a little strange that the appellant would have hidden the keys under the tank on the roof of the flat and taken the CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.9 of 11 murder weapon with him and thrown it from a running train. Did he expect to return some day and open the flat with those keys when he knew very well that the body would be discovered at some point of time and the lock would be broken open? We think not.
12. The last circumstance is of the recovery of the blood stained clothes. With regard to this also, we find that there is insufficient material to link the blood on the said shirt and pant with the deceased. First of all, the blood that has been discovered in the shirt is just a small speck on the top left of the back region of the shirt. Secondly, although it has been identified as human blood, the blood group could not be ascertained. Furthermore, we find that no question was put to the accused with regard to these blood stained clothes in his Section 313 statement. There is, therefore, no link between the blood stained clothes and the deceased. Apart from this, we also find it to be quite unnatural that the appellant would bring his blood stained clothes with him on 15.11.1989 after about 20 days of the death of the deceased and hand them over to the police.
13. For all these reasons, we feel that the evidence on record, as brought forward by the prosecution, is insufficient to form a complete chain so as to convict the appellant on the basis of circumstantial evidence only. There is enough doubt in the case and the benefit goes CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.10 of 11 to the accused. Consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment and order on sentence and acquit the appellant. The appeal stands allowed. The bail bond stands cancelled and the sureties are discharged.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J P. K. BHASIN, J March 27, 2009 SR CRL. A. 6/94 Page No.11 of 11