Bombay High Court
Divisional Controller, Maharashtra ... vs Dnyaneshwar S/O Kawaji Khokle And Anr. on 27 March, 1992
Equivalent citations: II(1993)ACC143, 1992(3)BOMCR220, (1992)94BOMLR916
JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J.
1. The first respondent in the Letters patent Appeal was a driver of the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (for short "the MSRTC"). The vehicle was involved in an accident on 17-7-1984. The respondent was charge-sheeted. He was found guilty of a major misconduct of a negligence in the discharge of his duties. Accordingly he was dismissed from service.
2. A dispute was raised in the matter. The authorities- the Labour Court and the Revisional authority-held that the charge had been established and that the punishment of dismissal was not unduly harsh.
3. These concurrent findings were challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge, by the judgement dated 5-12-1991 allowed the Writ Petition and directed the appellant-Driver to be reinstated in service with 50% of the back wages.
4. The MSRTC has come up in appeal.
5. In the enquiry evidence, including that of some of the passengers in the bus, had been adduced. The evidence established that bus driver by the driver dashed against a Stationary bus.
6. The learned Judge did not disturb the factual findings. In paragraph 4 of the judgment it is stated : "admittedly, the accident was of a vehicle dashing against another stationary vehicle". The learned Judge was not prepared to uphold the defence of the driver that there was a failure of the brakes. The learned Judge assumed that the accident was on account of the rash and negligent act of the driver. According to the learned Judge, a major penalty cannot be imposed even in such a situation. Observed the learned Judge:
"...He could be visited with lighter punishment on account of which he may feel the pinch of the wrong done by him and be more careful in future. Realistic and humanistic approach has to be taken in the matter like this. In such matters there should not be a reactionary approach so as to inflict punishment of economic death on a driver who commits an accident, pure and simple".
7. We regret our inability to endorse the view of the learned Judge that there was only an accident pure and simple. The facts not only speak for themselves but cry out vociferously about the involvement of the driver who, dashed against a stationary but on its rear side, causing injury to 24 passengers, and brought about extensive damages. A plea about the failure of brakes which was demonstrated to be false exposed his rash act and ugly conduct. It was in the above circumstances that the authorities below have come to the conclusion that the driver was guilty of a major misconduct. There would not be any misconduct if there was only an error of judgment or a mere accident. The learned Judge, with respect, contradicted himself when he declined to disturb the basic findings but abruptly rushed to hold that there was no misconduct at all, but only an accident pure and simple. On consideration of all the facts, evidence and materials, we are of the clear view that a case of a major misconduct consisting of rash and negligent driving of a public transport vehicle had been clearly established as against the driver.
8. Whether the punishment of dismissal was so disproportionate to the misconduct as to shock the conscience of the Court may now be considered. When the two authorities have concurred to hold that punishment was not so disproportionate, this Court will not ordinarily interfere with that finding unless a case of perversity or arbitrariness is made out.
9. The following circumstances are relevant in that context: The driver was engaged in a public transport vehicle. Large number of persons, particularly those belonging to lower strate of society, have necessarily to resort to such public transport system for moving from one place to another. Those who, therefore, drive a public transport vehicle - and in particular, of a public undertaking like the Transport Corporation, have a greater responsibility. Parliament has spoken about quality and quantum of the responsibility so reposed on the drivers. The Motor Vehicles Act, do indicate the will of the Supreme Legislature of the land. A licence of the driver can be cancelled if he is guilty of rash and negligent driving. The punishment is not confirmed to those provided under the provisions of the regulatory measure of Motor Vehicles Act. A person guilty of rash and negligent driving in answerable for damages to the victim of such rash and negligent driving. Apart from the above, the Criminal Law has also stepped in with the intent to provide a strong deterrent against rash and negligent driving. An offence, a serious one, is cast under law and make punishable under 304 A.I.P.C. We cannot be oblivious of all the concern and the care taken by the Parliament in relation to the safety of the travelling public and pedestrians. The heightened responsibility of the driver of the public vehicle needs no further reiteration of greater emphasis. The learned Judge, with great respect, did not give adequate emphasis and weight to these matters of primary importance closely related to the rights of the public at large.
10. The learned Judge referred to economic death, possibly of a person, who has lost his job. But then, imagine the picture of those who are otherwise exposed to instantaneous physical death, whereupon the economic death pales into insignificance in his case. The jurisprudence of his country, ever since the motor engine was discovered, has tried to point to a greater duty on those at the wheels, to prick their ears and preen their eyes so that roads become safe and the travels are not made travails. These principles which have guided the Courts for centuries cannot be easily jettisoned in a light hearted manner out of misplace sympathy for a drunken driver or a careless cleaner. We are of the view that the learned Judge misdirected himself in the enunciation of the principle in the manner done by him.
11. It is true, that the extreme penalty of dismissal from service will visit on the dismissed employee unberable consequences of economic deprivation and the like. That individual hardship has to be poised against the sufferings of the travelling public at large who use the vehicle or those who use the road and had been victims of such rash and negligent driving of the employee. Unlike a private employer in a smaller non-passenger vehicle, a driver of a stage carriage operated by the State undertaking has a greater responsibility. He is in the enjoyment of advantages and perquisites not ordinarily claimable and available for other employees. Security of service, decent wages, fair treatment and status and respectability attributable to the employment under a State authority- all give him a greater hold even among the generality of the class of employees. This adds to the more onerous nature of his duty and responsibility. In such a situation, if he misbehaves and misconducts himself and in such a manner as to generate an instantaneous revulsion towards his gross negligence, a soft approach cannot be taken by the Constitutional Court. We are clearly of the view that in such circumstances, the discretion exercised by the Labour Court and the revisional authority in upholding the finding of guilty and sustaining the order of dismissal cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be characterised as unreasonable or irrational. Consequently, the order of the learned Judge upsetting those sound orders on unsound reasoning and by way of interference under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, has to be reversed. We do so.
12. Counsel for the respondents in this case placed reliance on the decision in Jaswant Singh v. Pepsu Roadways Transport Corporation and another, 1984 S.C.C. 35. That, however, is not the only case where the relevant principles had been considered. The industrial jurisprudence of this country has grown and developed right from the year 1947 when Dr. Ambedkar, presented to this country a sheaf of social laws and offered comfortable area of formative and developmental industrial jurisprudence. The Labour Tribunals have examined various provisions and portions in these areas. This process which started with dynamism way back in the 1950s now presents a panoramic view of excellent employer-employee dispute resolution. The limited jurisdiction of an outside authority to interfere with the findings of a domestic forum had been emphasised in the early periods. In later times, greater powers have been conferred on the Tribunals. Even then, the manner in which the power has to be exercised and the cautious interference with the decision domestic forum, had been indicated by the Supreme Court in Firestone case, (1973)1 L.L.J. 278, Iron and Metal Traders case, and other decisions. The specialised Tribunals functioning under the Act, are entitled to have their analysis and assessment of the materials and the evidence in a given case. The mere fact that a different conclusion is possible is no good ground for the Constitutional Court for interfering with exercise of the discretion. The interference becomes all the more restricted when the decision of the first authority has been confirmed by the appellate authority. In the absence of patent perversity or discerniable capriciousness on the part of the authorities, this Court is denuded of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, to meddle with such findings of the statutory authorities.
13. The decision as referred to in Jaswant Singh v. Pepsu Roadways Transport Corporation and another (Cited supra), is the one wherein, in exercise of the discretion, the Tribunal directed reinstatement of the employee. The High Court interfered with that finding in exercise of its discretionary powers. What fell for consideration of the Supreme Court was the justifiability or otherwise of the interference on the part of the High Court in exercise of its attenuated writ jurisdiction. That is not the present position. In such a situation the observance or conclusion in Jaswant Singh v. Pepsu Roadways Transport Corporation and another (cited supra) has not direct bearing on the facts of this case.
14. The case Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, dealt with the proceedings under the Army Act. It only dealt with the general principles about the competence and power of the High Court to interfere with the exercise of the jurisdiction of subordinate authorities if there is perversity or capriciousness in their findings.
15. The third case relied on by counsel for the employee is Rama Kant Misra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, . The facts there are so tellingly different. Misconduct, as alleged in that case, was one of the use of language only. A bad language, repulsive to a referred mind, has no irretrievable consequences as arising from a rash and reckless driving.
16. In light of the above discussion, we allow the appeal. The Writ Petition will stand dismissed. The finding of the authorities, upholding the misconduct alleged against the respondents and the action of the management in ordering dismissal of the employee would, therefore, stand. The appeal is allowed as the above; we do not, however, make any order as to costs.