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[Cites 18, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

3 vs State Of Uttarakhand on 16 May, 2020

 IN THE COURT OF SH. M. P. SINGH, ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE­
       03, EAST DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
CS No. 2850/16
Pushpa Yadav,
W/o Col Gajendra Pal Singh
R/o 29­30 Krishna Kunj, Laxmi Nagar
Delhi.                                                          ................Plaintiff

                                                   Versus

1. State of Uttarakhand
(Through it Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Govt. of
Uttarakhand,Dehradun)
2. The H.N.B. Garhwal University, Srinagar, Garhwal
Uttarakhand, (Through its Registrar)
3. Sh. Vedpal Singh s/o Sh. Jaswant Singh, Manager
Rashtriya Inter College, Ismailpur, R/o Village Ismailpur, P.S Sikandrabad,
Distt. Bulandshahar (UP)
                                                               .................Defendants
                                  Suit filed on ­ 29.09.2011
                             Arguments concluded on ­20.02.2020
                              Order pronounced on - 16.05.2020
                                                  ORDER

1. An application of defendant no.3 Vedpal Singh, filed on 07.09.2017, under Order VII Rule 11 read with section 151 of CPC is pending disposal. Arguments were heard on 20.02.2020. Record perused.

2. This is a civil suit instituted, in September 2011, with the following title:

"SUIT FOR DEFAMTION AND DAMAGES Rs. 30,00,000/­ (Rs.Thirty lakh only) ALONG WITH INTEREST"
CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 1 of 14

3. Facts as culled from the amended plaint (amendment allowed vide order dt. 23.04.2012) are as follows: ­ I) Plaintiff was a candidate for the post of Manager, Rashtriya Inter College, Ismailpur, Sikandrabad, Bulandshahar, Uttar Pradesh. Elections were to be held on 14.09.2003. Defendant no.3 Vedpal Singh was the only rival candidate. Being a graduate was an eligibility criteria for this post.

II) Defendant no.3 Vedpal Singh and his supporters wrote a letter dt. 07.09.2003 to the Election Officer that plaintiff had presented a BA 1 st Division degree of year 1981 with roll no. 87871 from Meerut University. Plaintiff had in fact not presented any such degree. She had no concern with the same. Plaintiff had in fact done her BA course from Garhwal University and had presented the same before the Election Officer on demand.

III) Defendant no.3 Vedpal and his supporters got a false and defamatory publication made in Hindi daily Amar Ujala (published from Meerut) dt. 09.09.2003 in its Bulandshahar page. The newspaper is well circulated in villages and in remote areas of Bulandshahar district and is widely read by the public at large in Hindi belt in North India. Copies of this edition were sent to all relations and friend in Delhi. Plaintiff, her husband and her near relatives, on being apprised of this publication, met the Bulandshahar sub­editor of Amar Ujala the very same day. They apprised him of the true facts, showed him plaintiff's BA degree and handed over to him its photocopy. The sub­editor got published a denial in the same newspaper. But, this was too late. Plaintiff had already suffered damage to her reputation in the eyes of the people of Delhi and entire Bulandshahar district, particularly voters of the RI College, CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 2 of 14 Ismailpur. Defendant no.3 Vedpal also circulated the false report in the newspaper by showing the same to all and sundry knowing fully well it was false and humiliating.

IV) Plaintiff authorised one Permanand to go to the University and collect her certificate. However, the University inadvertently issued degree of some other lady having similar name. Defendant no.3 Vedpal, taking advantage of this, got lodged an FIR at police station Bulandshahar. Plaintiff then approached the University and plaintiff's degree was traced out. University then wrote to SSP of Bulandshahar that under a bonafide mistake degree of some other lady with similar name as that of the plaintiff had been issued. Police filed a final closing report.

V) Defendant no.3 Vedpal got another FIR registered at police station Srinagar, Pauri Garhwal. Plaintiff's husband was made to make 20­22 visits by the police of police station Srinagar under the garb of investigation, but when there was no progress in the case, plaintiff approached High Court of Uttarakhand. Hon'ble the Chief Justice was pleased to issue notice and direct that plaintiff be not arrested in connection with the case. On 04.04.2008 police reached plaintiff's house to arrest her. Police was informed of the order not to arrest her. Despite this, police entered plaintiff's house and searched every room in the presence of maid servants and physically and mentally challenged daughter. This action of the police injured plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of all friends, relations and public at large.

VI) On 04.04.2008 the aforesaid incident was brought to the notice of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Uttarakhand High Court. A contempt petition was filed. On 07.05.2008 Registrar of University filed a counter affidavit. On 16.06.2008 criminal proceedings against the plaintiff was CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 3 of 14 quashed. Defendant no.3 Vedpal challenged the Order dt. 16.06.2008 of Uttarakhand High Court before the Supreme Court. Plaintiff filed her reply. Supreme Court dismissed the petition vide Order dt. 04.05.2009.

VII) On 26.05.2009 plaintiff received an order dt. 01.07.2008 holding that her BA 3rd year result had been declared null and void. She was asked to deposit her graduation degree in the University. Plaintiff challenged it before the High Court. High Court issued a show cause to the University and also granted protection to the plaintiff from any mischief that could jeopardise her honour. On 06.07.2009 University filed a short affidavit withdrawing its order whereby plaintiff's degree was withdrawn.

VIII) All the three defendants were involved in tarnishing plaintiff's image and reputation. Everybody started to look down upon the plaintiff. Plaintiff finally decided to leave the country.

IX) Plaintiff's husband had to make 22­22 visits to Pauri Garhwal and he spent about Rs. 2 lakhs for the visits. Plaintiff's husband paid Rs. 11,000/­ to advocate at Srinagar and Rs. 2 lakhs to advocate at High Court in Nainital and suffered a loss of Rs. 2 lacs in his business. In the Supreme Court, plaintiff paid Rs. 1,50,000/­ to the advocate. She further paid Rs. 2,00,000/­ as lawyer fee when her degree was set aside. Plaintiff spent Rs. 11,61,000/­ as actual expenses.

X) Plaintiff issued legal notice to the defendants, but the latter did not respond to it.

XI) Plaintiff states that she claims Rs. 25 lacs against loss of business and defamation, besides actual loss of Rs. 11,61,000/­. Plaintiff, however, filed the present suit for Rs. 30 lacs only for the sake of court fee.

CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 4 of 14

XII) The paragraph relating to cause of action (paragraph 23 of the plaint) is as follows: ­ "That the cause of action arose firstly on 03.9.2003 when the defendant university issued degree to plaintiff of some other student having same first name, secondly on 7.9.2003 when the plaintiff was asked by the election officer about her education qualification on the basis of complaint by defendant no.3, thirdly on 1.4.2008 when the court of Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, District Pauri Garhwal issued order under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case Crime No. 886/2007, fourthly on 4.4.2008 when police of respondent State reached residences of plaintiff despite direction of Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand not to arrest the plaintiff, fifthly on 01.07.2008 when the defendant university cancelled degree on plaintiff without any notice to her, sixthly on 06.07.2009 when the Hon'ble High Court of Uttarakhand directed the defendant university to show cause why exemplary cost be not imposed for the wrong action and same is still subsisting."

XIII) Paragraph pertaining to territorial jurisdiction of this court reads as follows, "24. That the plaintiff had been living in Delhi and she suffered humiliation and defamation in Delhi and hence this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to try and decided this suit."

XIV) Plaintiff seeks the following reliefs: ­ (a) Pass a decree of Rs.

30,00,000/­ towards defamation, damages and expenses against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff, and (b) Pass any other order or direction which this court may deem fit and proper.

4. Since averments in the written statement are not germane for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC the same are not being taken note of herein.

CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 5 of 14

5. Now to the averments in the application under consideration. It is stated that the suit, filed eight years after publication on 09.09.2013 of alleged defamatory news article in Amar Ujala, is time barred; that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction as the alleged defamatory news had been published in the city section ('Bulandshar News') of Amar Ujala; that suit fails to disclose any cause of action and that it is an abuse of process of law.

6. Before proceeding further, in order to get better clarity of the facts, Order dt. 16.06.2008 of Uttarakhand High Court whereby criminal proceedings against the plaintiff stood quashed is being reproduced as under: ­ "At the centre of controversy in the criminal proceedings (under challenge in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.) launched by respondents no.1 to 3 against the petitioner at the instance of respondent no.4 was the allegation that for contesting the election to the post of a member of Management Committee in an Inter College, the petitioner had falsely declared herself to be a graduate (a candidate being a graduate was an eligibility criteria for contesting this election).

2. Since the objection was raised that the petitioner was not a graduate, she took steps and accordingly got from Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University, Sri Nagar, Pauri Garhwal a Degree Certificate. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the Decree (sic. Degree) issued by the University in the year 2003, even though was in the name of one Km. Pushpa, in fact, this Km. Pushpa turned out to be a person other than the petitioner. In view of this interesting coincidence, when this mistake was discovered, the petitioner took steps and in the year 2007 was issued a Degree Certificate, which, as per the affidavit of Registrar of H.N.B. Garhwal University, Sri Nagar, Pauri Garhwal filed in this Court, actually and factually, was in the name of the petitioner.

3. There is no dispute that the petitioner passed her B.A. from H.N.B. Garhwal University, Pauri Garhwal. Only the difficulty is that the Degree was not issued in her favour till as late as 2007, because she had not completed some formalities, such as submission of Marks Certificate of her B.A. I examination which she had passed from Delhi University in the year 1967.

CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 6 of 14

4. The aforesaid facts clearly point out that he petitioner, in fact, graduate having passed her B.A. examination and having been given Degree in the year 2007. It is nobody's contention that the petitioner had obtained any undue benefit or has caused any harm to anybody.

5. Based on the aforesaid, I have no hesitation in quashing the proceedings under challenge in this petition. The proceedings are accordingly quashed with all consequences.

6. The petition stands quashed."

7. Having heard the submission and perused the record of the case, this Court is of the view that the plaint liable to be rejected for multiple reasons.

8. PUBLICATION OF THE SO­CALLED DEFAMATORY NEWS ITEM IN AMAR UJALA (PUBLISHED FROM MEERUT) IN ITS BULANDSHAHAR PAGE ON 09.09.2003 - As per the plaintiff, a news item defamatory to her had been published in Hindi daily Amar Ujala (published from Meerut) dt. 09.09.2003 in its Bulandshahar page. Limitation for compensation for libel is one year in terms of Article 75 of Schedule to Limitation Act and the time begins to run when the libel is published. The news item was published on 09.09.2003. Plaintiff in her plaint states that she, her husband and her near relatives, on being apprised of this publication, had met the Bulandshahar sub­editor of Amar Ujala the very same day. The suit filed in September 2011 is thus hopelessly time barred. Besides this, defendant(s) were not authors of the so­called defamatory matter in Amar Ujala. Consequently, for this there can be no cause of action against the defendant(s). Next, the person who actually published the so­called defamatory news item in Amar Ujala has not been joined in the present suit. As such the suit is bad in terms of proviso to Order I Rule 9 of CPC. That apart, how can the defendant(s) be said to have made publication of an already published matter in a newspaper. Counsel for defendant no.3 had vehemently argued that qua this aspect this CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 7 of 14 court lacks territorial jurisdiction. This court does not intend to go into the question of territorial jurisdiction on this aspect for the reason that plaintiff in her plaint states that she 'had been living in Delhi and she suffered humiliation and defamation in Delhi.'

9. LODGING OF FIR AT BULANDSHAHAR AND FILING OF CLOSURE REPORT - Plaintiff states that defendant no.3 Vedpal had got FIR registered against her at police station Bulandshahar and that police had filed a final closing report. On record there is copy of an FIR no. 46/07 dt. 15.02.2007 PS Sikandarabad, District Bulandshahar and also copy of the police final report stating therein that Pushpa Yadav (plaintiff herein) committed no offence. For the following multiple reasons, plaintiff's case on this count is not on proper basis.

(a) Lodging of FIR is no defamation. Lodging of police complaint and/or registration of FIR, even though false or defamatory, has the protection of absolute privilege and the same affords no basis to sue for defamation. In Indu Dalmia & Ors. v. Rajasekhar Naidu Galla & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 204 it was observed, "13. I have in Mahadev I. Todale v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9135, SLP(C) No. 28925/2017 preferred whereagainst was dismissed on 10th November, 2017, held as not maintainable, a suit for damages for defamation by publication of complaints made to the Police. It was inter alia held that the contents of a FIR are in public domain, with the Police itself being required to publish it; that a complainant pursuing due process of law, even if his/her complaint is defamatory, is entitled to protection from a suit for defamation and this protection is the absolute privilege accorded in the public interest to those who make statements to the Court in the course and in relation to judicial proceedings. A Nine CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 8 of 14 Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkarv. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 held that what takes place in the Court is public and the publication of the proceedings merely enlarges the area of the Court and gives to the trial that added publicity which is favoured by the rule that the trial should be open and public; it is only when the public is excluded from audience that the privilege of publication also goes because the public outside then has no right to obtain at second­ hand what they cannot obtain in the Court itself. It was yet further held that if the matter is already published in open Court, it cannot be prevented from being published outside the Court room. Reference may also be made to Primero Skill & Training v. Selima Publications (2017) 239 DLT (CN15) 15, Exide Life Insurance Company v. Mitun Garg, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8325, Nau Nihal Singh Rana v. Sunil Kumar 202 (2013) DLT 465, The Punjabi Bagh Co­operative Housing Society v. K.L. Kishwar 95 (2002) DLT 573 and Kamalini Mannade v. Union of India 1965 SCC OnLine Bom 149."

(b) Although the plaintiff does not say that she is suing for the tort of malicious prosecution, yet such claim for damages for malicious prosecution would be highly time barred. As per Article 74 of the Schedule of Limitation Act limitation for malicious prosecution is one year and the time period begins to run from the date when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. Plaintiff's documents show that police closure report / final report is dated 10.05.2007. The present suit filed in September 2011 is hopelessly time barred.

(d) It is also difficult to comprehend as to whether the plaintiff had been maliciously 'prosecuted'. Mere lodging of FIR is no 'prosecution'.

CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 9 of 14

Bulandshahar police had not arrested her or detained her for even a brief moment. Plaint does not show that police had ever summoned her under section 160 CrPC in connection with the FIR at Bulandshahar. The plaint does not show that she had ever applied for bail before any court. The plaint neither shows that police had visited her house for any search or seizure. The FIR ultimately resulted in the police filing closure report. In S.T. Sahib v. N. Hasan Ghani Sahib & Ors., AIR 1957 Mad 646 it has been held that action for malicious prosecution is not favoured in law and should be properly guarded and its true principles strictly adhered to, since public policy favours the exposure of a crime and it is highly desirable that those reasonably suspected of crime be subjected to the process of criminal law for the protection of society and the citizen be accorded immunity for bonafide efforts to bring anti­social members to the society to the bar of justice. This Court has not come across any decided case where the mere factum of registration of FIR, sans anything more, was held to be 'prosecution' under the Tort of Malicious Prosecution. Privy Council in Gaya Prasad Tewari v. Bhagat Singh, (1908) 36 IA 189 observed that mere setting of the law in motion would not be sufficient.

(e) That apart, lodging of FIR at Bulandshahar was not 'malicious'. This is clear from plaintiff's document. Closure report of the police states that the university had in fact issued degree of the some other lady having similar name as the plaintiff and the true degree of the plaintiff was later on collected from the university. Given this, at the time when the FIR was lodged, there was at least some basis to allege that the degree, which the plaintiff had with her, did not in fact pertain to her. Given this, it certainly cannot be said that it had been lodged 'maliciously'. In Indu Dalmia CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 10 of 14 (supra) it was observed, "16. Though as aforesaid, the plaintiffs in the prayer paragraph of the plaint have not claimed the recovery of damages of Rs. 10,00,00,000/­ or any part thereof on account of malicious prosecution and in the body of the plaint also no plea of the prosecution by the defendant no. 1 of the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 malicious is found, but as held in Deepak Rathour v. Shashi Bhushan Lal Dass 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5319, Radhey Mohan Singh v. Kaushalya Devi 105 (2003) DLT 678 (DB), Gangadhar Pandhy v. Prem Singh 2011 (2014) DLT 104, Akbar Ali v. State 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1547, Sannam Bharti v. DTC 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3104, Bhupinder Chaudhary v. Chander Prakash 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1126, on the basis of every unsuccessful prosecution, a claim for malicious prosecution does not lie."

(f) It is difficult to comprehend as to how this court can have territorial jurisdiction over the tort based on registration of FIR at Bulandshahar. The plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted, if at all, in Bulandshahar and not in Delhi. None of the defendants are based in Delhi.

10. LODGING OF FIR AT SRINAGAR, PAURI GARHWAL AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS - As per the plaintiff, defendant no.3 Vedpal had got FIR lodged against her at Srinagar, Pauri Garhwal; that on 01.04.2008 Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, Pauri Garhwal issued order under section 82 of CrPC; that despite order of no arrest by the High Court, on 04.04.2008 police reached her house to arrest her; that police despite being informed of the order of no arrest entered her house and searched every room in the presence of maid servants and physically and mentally challenged daughter; that a contempt petition was then filed; that on 16.06.2008 criminal proceedings against her was quashed; that SLP of defendant no.3 Vedpal before the Supreme Court was CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 11 of 14 dismissed on 04.05.2009. The action of the plaintiff on this count too is not on proper basis for the following multiple reasons: ­

(a) Lodging of FIR is no defamation. Lodging of police complaint and/or registration of FIR, even though false or defamatory, has the protection of absolute privilege and the same affords no basis to sue for defamation. Similarly, judicial proceedings are also absolutely privileged and the same can afford no basis for the tort of defamation.

(b) Although the plaintiff does not say that she is suing for the tort of malicious prosecution, yet such claim for damages for malicious prosecution would be highly time barred. As per Article 74 of the Schedule of Limitation Act limitation for malicious prosecution is one year and the time period begins to run from the date when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. The proceedings finally came to a end when on 04.05.2009 Supreme Court dismissed the SLP of defendant no.3 Vedpla. The present suit filed in September 2011 is thus time barred.

(c) The police action in entering her house on 04.04.2008 is again hopelessly time barred. On this count, the suit has been filed more than three years later in September 2011.

(d) It is difficult to comprehend as to how this court can have territorial jurisdiction over the tort based on registration of FIR at Srinagar. The plaintiff was maliciously prosecuted, if at all, in Srinagar and not in Delhi. She was not 'prosecuted' in the Supreme Court of India. None of the defendants are based in Delhi.

11. UNIVERSITY ORDER DT. 01.07.2008 HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF'S BA 3RD YEAR IS NULL AND VOID - Plaintiff's averment is CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 12 of 14 that on 26.05.2009 she received an order dt. 01.07.2008 holding that her BA 3 rd year result had been declared null and void; that she was asked to deposit her graduation degree in the University; that she challenged it before the High Court which issued a show cause to University and also granted protection to her from any mischief that could jeopardise her honour; that on 06.07.2009 University filed a short affidavit withdrawing its order whereby her degree was withdrawn. Plaintiff's action based on this is again not on proper basis for following multiple reasons: ­

(a) This is no defamation. There is no defamatory matter in such an order of the university. There is neither any publication of the same to anyone else. Even if it be defamatory, the suit filed in September 2011 is hopelessly time barred.

(b) This is also no tort of malicious prosecution. Plaintiff was certainly not prosecuted by this act of the university.

12. PLAINTIFF PAYING FEES TO ADVOCATES IN SRINAGAR COURT, HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT AND OTHER EXPENSES INVOLVED IN LITIGATIONS AND LOSS OF BUSINESS TO HER - Plaintiff had no contractual relations under any agreement with any of the defendants. Thus she cannot seek damages on this count from any of the defendants. Besides this, under the Law of Torts, either for defamation or for malicious prosecution, for the aforesaid multiple reasons, her action is unfounded. Independent of either a contract or a tort, plaintiff cannot seek to recover damages on this count. Given this, it is difficult to comprehend as to what under what law can she seek to recover the fess paid to advocates for the previous cases or business loss that she may have suffered. To my mind, such an action for recovery of fees paid to advocates or loss of business could possibly have been only under the tort of CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 13 of 14 malicious prosecution. But for reasons stated hereinabove, the tort of malicious prosecution is not on proper basis. Thus, no recovery on this count can lie.

13. PLAINTIFF'S HUSBAND SUFFERING BUSINESS LOSS OF Rs. 2 LACS ON ACCOUNT OF LITIGATIONS - As per the plaintiff, because of the previous litigations, her husband suffered business loss of Rs. 2 lacs. At the very outset, plaintiff has no locus standi to sue for this. Locus would actually lie with plaintiff's husband, so long as he is alive, subject to law of the law of the land, to sue.

14. For the aforesaid reasons, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11, CPC. It is ordered accordingly.

15. Before parting with this order, there is one observation that is required to be made. In the original suit, the signatures of the plaintiff as appearing in the plaint do not at all match with her signatures as appearing in her affidavit supporting the plaint. Further, the amended plaint bears an altogether different signature of the plaintiff. Besides this, the amended plaint does not have any supporting affidavit. It is pertinent to mention here plaintiff in the plaint itself states that she had sifted abroad. Vide Order dt. 04.09.2019 Court notice had been issued to plaintiff as she had not been appearing before this Court. Court notice to her returned with report that the process server met brother of plaintiff's husband who informed that plaintiff and her family had shifted abroad (New Zealand) in 2009­10 and that they do not come back.

16. This file be consigned to record room.

(M. P. Singh) ADJ­03 (East), Delhi 16.05.2020 CS NO. 2850/16 Pushpa Yadav Vs State of Uttarakhand & Ors. Page 14 of 14