Karnataka High Court
G.S. Sadashiva vs M.C. Srinivasan And Ors. on 23 July, 2001
Equivalent citations: AIR2001KANT453, ILR2001KAR4576, AIR 2001 KARNATAKA 453, 2001 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 2384, (2001) ILR (KANT) 4574, (2001) 6 KANT LJ 373, (2002) 1 HINDULR 237, (2003) 1 MARRILJ 301, (2002) 1 ICC 54
Author: K.L. Manjunath
Bench: K.L. Manjunath
JUDGMENT
The Court
1. R.F.A. No. 716 of 1997 is filed by the 1st defendant. R.F.A. No. 634 of 1997 is of the 2nd defendant. These two appeals are arising out of common judgment passed in O.S. No. 1058 of 1995. The respondent 1 filed a suit against the defendants to declare that he alone is entitled to succeed to the estate of late Smt. Bharathi and for a perpetual injunction to restrain the defendants 2 to 7 from making any payments to defendant 1.
2. As per the plaint averments, 1st defendant who is the appellant in the first appeal is the father-in-law and that the plaintiff married the daughter of Sadashiva, G.S. Bharathi on 4-4-1986 at Bangalore. At the time of marriage, the plaintiff was working as Assistant Manager in N.G.E.F., Bangalore and that Bharathi was working as a teacher in Government High School. On 21-11-1987, the plaintiffs wife committed suicide. After the death of his wife, at the instance of the 1st defendant, he was also charge-sheeted under Sections 308 and 498A of the IPC in S.C. No. 231 of 1991 and that he was honourably acquitted by the Sessions Court. Against the judgment of the Sessions Court, the Government had also filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court has confirmed the order of acquittal. The 1st defendant, the father-in-law also filed a suit against the order made in O.S. No. 2865 of 1998 for a declaration and for injunction claiming exclusive right over the properties of Bharathi and the said suit came to be dismissed on 28-7-1994 for non-prosecution. Therefore, he filed a suit for declaration and for injunction. The 1st defendant appeared before the Court and filed a detailed written statement. According to him, his daughter was murdered by the plaintiff on 21-11-1987, and therefore the plaintiff is disqualified under the law to claim the properties of his daughter. The 1st defendant has relied upon Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 ('the Act' for short) and he has requested the Court to dismiss the suit. The 2nd defendant contended that an amount of Rs. 28,101/- was paid to the 1st defendant by the 2nd defendant and according to the 2nd defendant, on the application of the 1st defendant, the 2nd defendant has honoured the claim of the 1st defendant as he was a nominee and therefore, the 2nd defendant requested the Court to dismiss the case.
3. Based on the above pleadings, the following issues were framed:
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he married G.S. Bharathi on 4-4-1986 at Andal Kalyana Mantapam at Bangalore, as per Hindu rites?
2. Whether plaintiff proves that he is entitled for the declaration prayed for?
3. Whether defendant 1 proves, defendant 1 and his daughter Gayathri alone are entitled to the suit amounts and the properties?
4. What decree or order? Additional issues:
1. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties?
2. Whether defendant 2 proves that there is no cause of action against it?
3-A. Plaintiff has been examined as P.W. 1 and the 1st defendant has been examined as D.W. 1. After appreciating the evidence of the parties, the Trial Court has decreed the suit as prayed for. In addition to that, the Trial Court has also directed the defendants 1 and 2 to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff in respect of the LIC amount disbursed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the 1st defendant.
4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the present appeals are filed.
5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants as well as the 1st respondent. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant in the first appeal, is that in view of Section 25 of the Act, the Trial Court should have dismissed the suit and according to her, the judgment of the Sessions Court as well as the High Court are not binding on the Civil Court to grant a decree in favour of the respondent 1. According to her, Section 25 of the Act has not been considered by the Trial Court.
6. The learned Advocate for the LIC of India contends that the LIC of India has honoured the claim of the 1st defendant and according to the Counsel, the 1st defendant was the nominee of the LIC policy holder Bharathi and after her death, the same was honoured and therefore, the Trial Court should not have passed a decree against the Insurance Company. She also contends that the plaintiff-1st respondent has not obtained an order of injunction to restrain the LIC of India to honour the claim of the 1st defendant. Therefore, she requested the Court to allow the appeal of the LIC of India. Learned Counsel for the 1st respondent has supported the judgment of the Trial Court and according to him, the 1st defendant has not placed any material to show that his client is disqualified to succeed to the estate of Bharathi as per Section 25 of the Act.
7. In the background of the grounds urged by both the Advocates, the points that arise in this appeal are:
(a) Whether the plaintiff is disqualified to succeed to the estate of Bharathi in view of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956?
(b) Whether the decree passed against the LIC of India is liable to be set aside?
8. The 1st defendant who has contended before the Trial Court that his daughter was murdered by the plaintiff and who has relied upon Section 25 of the Act has not placed sufficient material to show that plaintiff was involved in the murder of his daughter. To prove the allegations made in the written statement, D.W. 1 has stated in the examination-in-chief in two sentences as hereunder:
"I suspect the hand of the plaintiff in the death of my daughter. I am of the opinion that it is a murder for gain. The say of the plaintiff that my daughter was suffering from schizophrenia is absolutely false and unbelievable".
Except these two sentences, defendant 1 has not let in any evidence to show that his daughter was murdered by the plaintiff. It is no doubt true that on the complaint of the 1st defendant, a criminal case was registered under Sections 308 and 498A of the IPC and that the plaintiff was tried for the said offences. The plaintiff has taken a specific defence that his wife has committed suicide and that she was suffering from schizophrenia. To prove that his wife was suffering from schizophrenia, the medical evidence was also produced before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court, after appreciating the medical evidence, has held that Bharathi was suffering from schizophrenia and that it was a cause of suicide and not a murder. The judgment of the Sessions Court has also been upheld by this Court and the appeal of the State has been dismissed. Now, in this background, the learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the judgment of the Trial Court as well as the High Court in the criminal case should not have been considered or looked upon by the Trial Court as the judgment of the Criminal Court is not binding on the Civil Court.
9. I could have accepted the contentions of the learned Advocate for the appellant provided the appellant had placed sufficient material to show that the plaintiff was responsible for the murder of his wife or in other words that Bharathi did not commit suicide and that it was a case of murder. But the appellant had not placed any material before the Trial Court. No evidence had also been let in. The doctors who were treating Bharathi were also not summoned and based on the opinion of the defendant 1, any man of prudence cannot accept the contentions of the appellant.
10. Now, let me examine Section 25 of the Act and whether I can apply the said principle as contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant to the facts and circumstances of this case. Section 25 reads as hereunder:
"Murderer disqualified.--A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder".
From reading of Section 25 of the Act, it is clear that the person who commits a murder or abets the commission of murder is disqualified from inheriting the property of the murdered. Therefore, what is required to be proved by the 1st defendant is that his daughter was mur-
dered by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff had abetted commission of murder. Even if the plaintiff is acquitted by the Criminal Court, if the 1st defendant is able to satisfy that the plaintiff was acquitted either on any technical ground or by the benefit of doubt and can show that his daughter was actually murdered by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff was responsible for abetting the crime, in such circumstances, 1st defendant was right in canvassing that in view of Section 25 of the Act plaintiff is disqualified to inherit or succeed to the properties of his daughter. But in the instant case, 1st defendant is unable to prove that actually his daughter was murdered. When a competent Court has given a finding that the death of Bharathi was due to suicide considering the medical evidence and when the 1st defendant has not placed any evidence before the Civil Court to prove that Bharathi did not commit suicide, I cannot interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. No doubt, while dealing with Section 25 of the Act, one has to be liberal in defining the word "Murder" and one should not be too technical. In popular sense the word "Murder" means unlawful homicide or unlawful killing of human being. In popular parlance the word "Murder" is not used or understood in the technical sense as defined in Section 300 of the IPC. Therefore, to construe the said word in technical sense as defined in Section 300 of the IPC, will result in defeating the very object of the Legislature. It will also run counter to the well-established principles of equity, justice and good conscience. But considering the evidence adduced by the parties, I am not in a position to apply the principles of Section 25 of the Act to non-suit the plaintiff. Therefore, judgment and decree of the Trial Court is required to be confirmed and accordingly appeal of the 1st defendant in R.F.A. No. 716 of 1997 is hereby dismissed and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court passed against the 1st defendant is confirmed.
11. In regard to the appeal filed by the LIC of India is concerned, there was no basis for the Trial Court to pass a decree against the LIC of India. It is not the case of the plaintiff that in spite of there being an injunction or an order from a competent Court, the LIC of India has honoured the claim of the 1st defendant. The plaintiff has admitted that the 1st defendant was the nominee in respect of the LIC policy of Smt. Bharathi. Therefore, in the circumstances, I cannot find any fault in disbursing the amount by the LIC of India in favour of the 1st defendant, when the 1st defendant has claimed the amount pursuant to the nomination.
12. In the circumstances, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is modified and the appeal R.F.A. No, 634 of 1997 is hereby allowed by holding that the 1st defendant alone is liable to pay the amount of LIC Policy No. 48410016 and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the said amount from the 1st defendant alone and the claim against the 2nd defendant-LIC of India, is dismissed,
13. Parties to bear their own costs.