Calcutta High Court
Ram Swarup Prosad vs State Of West Bengal on 22 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)3CALLT292(HC)
JUDGMENT D.B. Dutta, J.
1. The instant application under sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is for quashing the criminal preceding in G.R.Case No. 2263 of 1995 pending in the 12th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate. Calcutta.
2. How the aforesaid proceeding arose may be stated thus:
Ram Swarup Prasad, the petitioner of the present revisional application preferred in application being FMAT N. 955 of 1994 against the order dated 10th March, 1994 passed by P.K.Mukherjee, J. as His Lordship then was. In a civil order of 1994 in connection with Suryakesh Stngh and ors. v. State of West Bengal and ors. and moved the Division Bench of this court composed of Tarun Chatterjee and Mure Alam Chowdhury, JJ. during summer vacation of this court in the year 1994 on 27.5.94. The Division Bench passed certain order in FMAT No. 955 of 1994 on 27.5.94. Subsequently, two applications were fifed for recalling the order that was purported to have been passed by the said Division Bench in FMAT No. 955 of 1994. One of the applications was taken up for hearing by that Division Bench on 24.11.94 and the hearing continued till 8.12.94. In course of hearing of that application, it transpired that the purported signatures of the learned Judges composing that Division Bench appearing in the original order-sheet were not theirs. The contents of the purported order dated 27.5.94 that was appearing in the order-sheet also appeared to the Bench to be unusual. The Bench directed the Registered, Appellate Side, to ascertain from the relevant shorthand note-book as to what order was actually passed by the Bench on 27.5.94 in FMAT No. 955 of 1994. In pursuance of that direction, the Registrar located the relevant shorthand note-book and got the relevant transcript typed out. It was then detected that the order that was appearing in the record as the purported order of the Bench passed on 27.5.94 was not really the order that was actually passed by the Bench on that particular day in connection with that case.
The Bench found that the purported order appearing in the order-sheet was a forged and fabricated one. It also transpired in course of hearing, that on the basis of the forged order a sum of Rs. 2.500 was withdrawn from the bank and certain documents were taken away from the S.D.O.. Barrackpore with whom they were lying. The present petitioner claimed before the Division Bench to have taken the certified copy of the purported order dated 27.5.94 and on being directed by the Bench produced a xerox copy of the alleged cerlified copy of the impugned order before the Bench. The petitioner was the appellant opposite parly before the Bench, and it came to light in course of hearing that Mr. Samiran Mondal appearing on behalf of the appellant in the said appeal had written letters to various authorities on the basis of a xerox copy of the certified copy of the impugned order dated 27.5.94 and produced xerox copy of the said letter along with xerox copy of the alleged cerlified copy of the impugned order before the Bench. The present petitioner was appearing before the Bench through Mr. Bihanl. an advocate. During the hearing of the application for recalling the impugned ordr and claimed to have applied for the certified copy of the impugned order, pleading, however, his inability to disclose the name of the advocate's clerk through whom he made that application for obtaining the certified copy. The petitioner as the appellant further stated before the Bench that the original certified copy of the impugned order was handed over to him by the said clerk and that the said original certified copy was handed over to some persons whose names were not known to him and that the said certified copy was not lying with him. The Bench directed the Registrar, Appellate Side, also to inquire as to whether the present petitioner did really apply for a certified copy of the impugned order and was furnished with such copy by the court. The Registrar on inquiry found that the appellant petitioner did not really apply for the certified copy of the impugned order and that all his statements to the contrary made before the Bench were false. The Registrar also reported to the Bench that the xerox copy of the certified copy of the impugned order which was produced by the appellant petitioner was actually obtained by him through some dubious means. Upon consideration of all the materials collected during the hearing of the said application for recalling the Impugned order, the Bench by an order dated 21.12.94 concluded that serious offences of fraud, cheating and forgery had been committed and thought it fit that the. matter should be properly investigated and the offender brought to book, Accordingly, the Division Bench directed the DIG of Police. CBI, Calcutta Region to investigate and submit its report. The Bench also directed the Registrar, Appellate Side, to render all assistance to the investigating officer by making all relevant files, documents, papers etc. available to the investigating officer. The Registrar was also directed to serve a true copy of that order upon the DIG of Police. CBI. The matter was directed to be enlisted for further orders on 17.2.95 and the investigating officer was directed to submit the report on the date.
3. Pursuant to this order, the then Registrar by his letter dated 2.11.95 forwarded a xerox copy of the order to the DIG of Police, CBI for his perusal and necessary action.
4. On receipt of that letter from the Registrar, Appellate Side. CBI registered a case under sections 120B/420/467/468/471/477A of IPC against the present petitioner and other unknown persons treating the above order dated 21.12.94 passed by the Division Bench as the FIR since it disclosed commission of cognizable offences. The CBI investigated the matter and submitted its report before the Bench. By order dated 29 August. 1995, the concerned Division Bench upon perusal and careful consideration of the report recorded its opinion that a prima facie case of offences as specified in the report appears to have been made and on the basis of the materials collected during the investigation and accordingly, the Bench directed the DIG of Police. CBI to lake follow up action and to proceed in accordance with law.
5. Thereafter, the CBI submitted a charge-sheet before the Magistrate against the present petitioner as well as an advocate, namely. Vijay Bahadur Singh under sections 120B/192/193/420/467/463/468/471 of IPC.
6. According to the charge-sheet, investigation revealed the following facts and circumstances. Vijay Bahadur Singh who was acting as Secretary of Gouripur Hindi High School, entered into a criminal conspiracy with the present petitioner in order to cheat the Gouripur High School. District Inspector of Schools. North 24-Pgs, State Bank of India, Naihati Branch. North 24-Pgs. and other authorities and cheated those authorities by forging and fabricating the impugned order dated 27.5.94 including the signatures of the learned Judges who composed the Bench at the time of passing the order on 27.5.94. Vijay Bahadur Singh managed to get the forged order typed outside the High Court premises through one Arun Kumar Pal, a professional typist, and thereafter managed to remove the order that was actually passed by the Bench from the record and replace it with the forged order. No certified copy of the impugned order was at all applied for by the present petitioner nor was it actually supplied to him by the High Court. Vijay Bahadur Singh got the memo of appeal of the petitioner prepared by forging the signature of the advocate on record. Mr. Samiran Mondal on the said memo of appeal. On 27.5.94. Mr. Singh moved the said memo of appeal in absence of Samiran Mondal through one Ram Mitra. advocate, who was a fictitious person, and also managed to engage one B.M.Goswami. advocate, to appear on that day on behalf of the respondents No. 18-30 on the said appeal. The accused persons in connivance with one another committed the offences punishable under sections 120B/ 192/193/420/463/467. 468/471 of the 1PC.
7. The above charge-sheet was submitted on 28.9.95 and the learned Magistrate took cognizance on the basis of the said charge-sheet.
8. Mr.V.B.Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, made the following points in assailing the legality of the cognizance. The offences involved are specified in sub clause (i) and (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and are alleged to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a court and as such, for taking of cognizance of such offence, a court complaint would be necessary under sub-section (1) of section 195. and since no complaint as contemplated under sub-section (1) of section 195 Cr PC was lodged with the Magistrate, taking of cognizance was had in law, being in breach of the express prohibition contained in section 195(1) Cr PC. It was further contended by Mr. Kumar that the procedure prescribed, by section 340 of the Cr PC for lodging complaint has not at all been followed in the instant case and as such, the cognizance was bad. Mr. Kumar cited several decisions namely : Sugar Syndicate Bahadargarh v. Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab; : Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab; : Sheo Kumar Bhairo Prasad Sao v. N.P. Tripathi; : Dr. B.K.Pal Chaudhury v. State of Assam; 1985 Cr LJ 1956: Shrikrishna Khatry v. Gobardhan Nath Tandon: 1997 Cri LJ 999: Prasanna Kumar Roy Karmakar v. State of West Bengal and 1997 Cr LJ 4148: Amzad Ali v. Marfat Ali Biswas.
9. Mr. Ranjan Roy, the learned counsel appearing for the CB1 (Respondent No.2) contended that a complaint by the court is required only when the forged document is produced in court. What was produced before the court being a copy and not the original, the bar under section 195(1) Cr PC will not be attracted here. Reliance has been placed on one of the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner namely 1985 Cr LJ 1956: Srtrikrishna Khatry v. Gobardhan Nath Tandon and also a decision of the Supreme Court : Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh.
10. Section 199(5)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence specified in sub-clauses (i) and (ii). except on the complaint in writing of the court concerned. The offences specified in sub-clause (i) are punishable under sections 193 to 196, 199, 200. 205 to 211 and 228 of 1PC while sub-clause (li) specifies the offence described in section 463 and those punishable under sections 471, 475 and 476 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 195(i)(b)(i) and (ii) does not require a court complaint for taking cognizance of an offence specified in sub-clauses (if and (ii), unless it is committed under certain circumstances. So far as the offences specified in sub-clauses (i) are concerned, they must be alleged to have been committed in. or in relation to any proceeding in any court, while the offences specified in sub clause (ii) must be alleged to have been committed in respecl of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court. A plain reading of the provisions of section 195(i)(b)(i) and (ii) makes it clear that every court is prohibited from taking cognizance of the offences specified in sub-clauses (i) and (ii), except on a complaint in writing of the concerned court, whenever such offences are alleged to have been committed under the circumstances stated above. Now. the offences specified in the two sub-clauses are described wiih reference to the sections of the Indian Penal Code under which they are made punishable, except in one case, that is to say. the case of section 463 of the Indian Penat Code. In the case of section 463. the words used are "any offence described in section 463".
Section 463 of the Indian Penal Code simply defines the term 'forgery' or, in otherwords. specifies the circumstances under which a person con be said to have committed forgery. The offence of forgery is, however, punishable under section 465 of the IPC and sections 466, 467, 468 and 469 provide for punishment of different species of forgery. In this connection, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.L.Goswami v. Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court 467 may be referred to. In the said decision, it has been held that an offence under section 466 of the Penal Code is an offence which falls within the description of section .463 and is covered by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 195 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure which corresponds to sub-section (1)(b)(ii) of the present Code. Following this decision of the Supreme Court, it can be said that section 463 of the Indian Penal Code which defines forgery as a general term is referred to in sub-section (1)(b)(ii) in a comprehensive sense so as to embrace all species of forgery. In other words, even though sections 465. 466. 467. 468 and 469 of the Indian Penal Code are not explicitly specified in subsection (1) (b)[ii). the offences punishable under those sections can also be said to be the offences which are covered by the expression "any offence described in section 463".
11. Section 340(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the procedure to be followed by a court for making a court complaint as required under section 195(1)(b). The section reads that when, upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, any court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court, or, as the case may be, in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court, such court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record finding to that effect, make a complaint thereof in writing and send it to a magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. Such section (31(a) reads that a complaint made under this section shall be signed, where the court making the complaint is a High Court, by such officer of the court as the court may appoint. The section 340 thus speaks of two inquiries. One is an inquiry into the offence which is to be made by the court to which the complaint is to be lodged and the oilier is a preliminary inquiry which is to be made by the court by which the complaint is to be lodged. The expression "preliminary inquiry" is followed by the words "if any, as it thinks necessary". It clearly suggests that the preliminary inquiry is only optional and not obligatory and the nature, mode and extent of such an inquiry appears to be entirely within the discretion of the court concerned. The only purpose for this preliminary inquiry is to form an opinion as to whether the offence concerned does or does not appear to have been committed under the circumstances specified in sub-section 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and also for the purpose of determining the expediency of an inquiry into the offence concerned in the interest of justice.
12. Let us now endeavour to find out what offences if any. can be said to appear to have been committed prima facie in the facts and circumstances of this case.
The order dated 21.12.94 passed by the Division Bench comprising Justice T. Chatterjee and Justice N.A.Chowdhury in FMAT No.955 of 1994 clearly suggests that the said Division Bench was satisfied that the order purporting to have been passed by that Bench on 27.5.94 was not really the order that was actually passed by the Bench on that date in that case and that the purported order was a fabricated one and that the signatures appended to that order appearing in the order-sheet and purporting to be the signatures of the Judges of that Bench were not theirs and were forged. The said order further goes to show that it was a false document made dishonestly and fraudulently within the meaning of section 464 of the IPC with intent to commit fraud and also to support a claim. It would also appear from the order that there has been fabrication of false evidence for the purpose of being used in the subsequent stage of the judicial proceeding and also for the purpose of defrauding and cheating some persons and authorities. The order also suggests that there was forgery of a document purporting to be a record of proceeding of a court of Justice within the meaning of section 466 of IPC and that the said forgery was committed with the intention that the said document would be used for the purpose of cheating. It also discloses fraudulent and dishonest user of a document with the knowledge that it was a forged document. The order also reveals that the present petitioner falsely claimed before the Bench that he had applied for a certified copy of the impugned order and was furnished with such a copy by the court. It also reveals that the petitioner produced a document alleged to be the xerox copy of the original certified copy of the impugned order, even though no certified copy was applied for nor was it supplied to him by the court. It also appears from the order that the xerox copy of the so-called certified copy of the forged order of the court was used before authorities other than the court for gaining some advanlage which would not have been available but for that order. The investigation that was made by the CBI in pursuance of the direction given by the Division Bench contained in that order dated 21.12.94 revealed who the offenders are in relation to the offences of forgery of the court record, fabrication of false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding and also for the purpose of being used for making some other authorities to act in a manner they would not have acted but for that false evidence in support of the forged order of the court. Thus, upon a scrutiny of the facts and circumstances disclosed in the order dated 21.12.94 passed by the Division Bench (which is available from a copy of the FIR placed by the learned counsel for the CB1) as well as in the copy of the charge-sheet (placed by the learned counsel for the CBI) it can be said that they go to make out a prima facie case of commission of (i) an offence of fabricating false evidence punishable under section 193 of the IPC for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding and also elsewhere.(ii) the offence of cheating punishable under section 420 of IPC, (iii) the offence of forgery punishable under section 465 of the IPC. (iv) the offence of forgery of a court record punishable under section 446 of the IPC, (v) the offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating as punishable under section 468 IPC and (vi) the offence of dishonest and fraudulent user of a forged document as genuine punishable under section 471 of the IPC in pursuance of (vii) a criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120B of the IPC.
13. Amongst the aforesaid offences disclosed by the facts and circumstances of this case as revealed from the materials on record, the offences under sections 420 and 120B IPC are not specified in any of the two sub-clauses (1) and Hi) of clause (b) of sub-section (1} of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and are clearly outside the scope and purview of subsection (1)(b)(i) and (ii) and accordingly, the bar under this sub-section cannot get attracted in relation to the said two offences, necessiating a court complaint for taking cognizance thereof.
As regards the offences punishable under sections 465, 466 and 468 IPC. I have already observed that even though they are not explicitly mentioned in sub clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195. these offences also fall within the purview of this sub clause.
The offences under sections 193 and 471 IPC are, of course, expressly specified in sub-clauses (1) and (ii) respectively.
14, Now, we must not be oblivious of the fact that the offences essentially and primarily disclosed by the facts and circumstances of this case is the offence of forgery of a court re cord. Sub-section (1)(b) (ii) is attracted only when the offence of forgery is in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court . The forged order dated 27.5.94 of the Division Bench composed of T. Chatterjee and N.A.Chowdhury, JJ, appearing in the record of FMAT 955 of 1994 is a document, no doubt, but cannot be termed as a document "produced or given in evidence " in the concerned proceeding and the court within the meaning of sub clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1).
In Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana , the Supreme Court held that until the original document is produced in the court, the bar of section 195(1)(b)(ii) does not get attracted. Such a view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in : Surjit Singh v. Balbair Singh. Incidentally, it may be pointed out here that the decision of a Singie Bench of this court reported in 1985 Cr LJ 1956: Shrikrishna Khatry v. Gobardhan Nath Tandon, which was cited on behalf of the petitioner, also echoes the aforesaid proposition to the effect that unless it was prima facie established that the original forged document was in fact produced as evidence, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry under section 340 Cr PC nor does he have Jurisdiction to file a complaint. Mr, V.B.Singh did not, however, advance any argument to suggest that the original forged document was produced in evidence before the Division Bench. From the order dated 21.12.94, it would be evident that what was produced by the petitioner before the Division Bench in compliance with its direction was the xerox copy of the alleged certified copy of the impugned order dated 27.5.94 and not the original certified copy. Accordingly, it must be held that for the offences punishable under sections 466 and 468 involving the element of forgery as described in section 463 of the IPC, the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) is not at all attracted, necessiating a court complaint.
It cannot also be said that the offence under section 471, IPC has been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence before the court concerned. That being so, so far as the offence under section 471 IPC is concerned, the bar under section 195(1)(b)(ii) is also not attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case.
The offence under section 193 IPC can, however, be said to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding which was pending in connection with FMAT 955 of 1994, inasmuch as the charge-sheet discloses the fact that it was V.B.Singh, the co-accused of the petitioner, who removed the original order that was actually passed by the court on 27.5.94 and replaced it by the forged order. The facts and circumstances revealed from the materials on record, as I have already observed also suggest the commission of fabrication of a false evidence for the purpose of being used otherwise than in a judicial proceeding and for such offence as well, the mischief of sub-section (1)(b)(ii) is not attracted.
15. Normally, if an offence of forgery is committed, certain ancillary offences are also committed along with the offence of forgery. There may be cases where the offences covered by section 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and involved in a case can or cannot be spilt up from other offences not covered by that section.
In the instant case, all the offences except the one which has been committed under section 193 of IPC for the purpose of being used otherwise than in a Judicial proceeding do not fall within the purview of section 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and the said offence under section 193 IPC can be split up from the other offences involved in this case. Now, cognizance has been taken in the instant case in relation to the whole case in respect of some offences for which the Magistrate could take cognizance without any court complaint and some offence for which he could not except on a court complaint. If that be so, there is no point in characterising the entire cognizance to be an invalid one.
16. Assuming for the sake argument that the offences primarily and essentially disclosed by the facts and circumstances of this case are the offences covered by section 195(1)(b)(ii). I will now proceed to examine if the cognizance taken in this case is vitiated by any illegality so as to render the entire proceeding liable to be quashed. The underlying purpose of imposing an embargo created by section 195 upon the power of taking cognizance of offences specified in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 except on a complaint by the court concerned and the prescription of the procedure by section 340 for making such a complaint is well settled. To quote the language of the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai's case, , "The underlying purpose.... "seems to be to control the temptation on the part of the private parties considering themselves aggrieved by the offences mentioned in those sections to start criminal prosecutions on frivolous, vexatious or insufficient grounds inspired by a revengeful desire to harass or spite their opponents. These offences have been selected for the court's control because of their direct impact on the judicial process.
It is the judicial process, in other words, the administration of public justice, which is the direct and immediate object or victim of these offences and it is only by misleading the courts and thereby perverting the due course of law and justice that the ultimate object of harming the private party is designed to be realised. As the purity of the proceedings of the court is directly sullied by the crime the court is considered to be the only party entitled to consider the desirability of complaining against the guilty party. The private party designed ultimately to be injured through the offence against the administration of public justice is undoubtedly entitled to move the court for persuading it to file the complaint. But such party is deprived of the general right recognized by section 190, Cr PC of the aggrieved parties directly initiating the criminal proceedings. The offences about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can, without embarking upon a completely independent and fresh Inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party."
17. In the instant case, it was not at the instance of a private party that the present prosecution has been launched. The process of launching a prosecution was initiated by the court when certain facts and circumstances came to light in course of hearing of an application filed by some party to the proceeding for recalling of certain order of the court. The order dated 21.12.94 would at once reveal the fact that the court itself took pains to ascertain the commission of the offences. The court directed an inquiry to be held by the Registrar, Appellate Side for the purpose of ascertaining what order was actually passed by the court on 27.5.94 and whether the present petitioner, who was appearing before the court as the appellant opposite party, did at all apply for a certified copy or was furnished with such a copy by the court in pursuance of that direction, the Registrar held an inquiry and submitted a report before the court which was also taken into consideration by the court in coming to a prima facie finding as to the nature of the offences that were committed in this case. Since the offences are such that it could not be committed without there being a welt planned conspiracy involving a number of persons, the court was concerned not only with the offenders that might have been committed but also the offences who are responsible for the commission of those offences and for bringing the offenders to book, investigation by an expert investigating agency such as CBI was considered necessary by the court and accordingly, the court directed an investigation by the CBI. The court's order giving such direction for such investigation was forwarded by the Registrar by his letter and the CBI took cognizance upon that letter as its enclosure namely the order of the court disclosed commission of some cognizable offences. After investigation, the CBI submitted a report to the concerned court furnishing some additional particulars as to the offences involved as well as the offenders. From the copy of the order passed by the concerned Bench on 29.8.95, as produced by the petitioner as an annexure to a supplementary affidavit dated 21.11.97, it will appear that the concerted court applied iis mind to the report submitted by the CBI and by its order dated 29.8.95 directed the CBI to take follow-up action and proceed in accordance with law on the basis of the said report and as a measure of follow-up action in pursuance of that direction of the court, the CBI submitted the report containing the result of its investigation before the Magistrate who was pleased to take cognizance on the basis of that report. Unlike the provisions of sub-sections (i) and (ii) of section 479A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure which were meant for prosecution of a witness for giving false evidence and which have some what corresponding provisions in section 344 of the new Code providing for summary trial by the court itself instead of lodging any complaint, section 340 of the Code does not make it obligatory upon a court making the preliminary inquiry contemplated thereunder to give any opportunity of being heard to the person to be proceeded against. From the order dated 21.2.94 and the subsequent order dated 28.8.95 passed by the concerned Division Bench in FMAT 955 of 1994, it is clear that the provisions of section 340 Cr PC were substantially complied with in considering the expediency of launching a prosecution. It is not a case where the CBI lodged a suo motu FIR and took up investigation. If the investigation that was conducted by the CBI can be deemed to be a part of the preliminary inquiry within the meaning of section 340 because section 340 does not prescribe any specific procedure to be followed for holding such a preliminary inquiry nor does it debar the court from taking the assistance of police in ascertaining facts. Had the court directed lodging of a complaint through the Registrar. Appellate Side strictly in terms of section 340 of the Code and the cognizance taken by the Magistrate upon such a complaint, no exception could be taken on behalf of the petitioner against the cognizance, Nor could there by any scope for invoking the bar under section 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii). If the cognizance is to be quashed only because of the fact that the court did not lodge any complaint in writing strictly within the meaning of section 2(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code read with sub-section (3) of section 340 direct to the Magistrate for taking cognizance, the ends of justice would suffer irreparably and this court clothed with the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr PC cannot allow the interest of justice to suffer only on a hypertechnical ground. The underlying purpose and object of creating the embargo under section 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii) have after all been fully achieved in the facts and circumstances of this case. The word "complaint" appearing in section 195 should, in my view, be construed as a general sense and not in the strict sense of the term as defined in section 2(d). The fact remains that the inquiry which ultimately culminated in the charge-sheet before the Magistrate was started at the instance of the court concerned. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned congizance is not hit by the mischief of section 195(1)(b) of Cr PC.
18. Before I conclude, I should also deal with the decisions that were cited on behalf of the petitioner. In . a Single Bench of the Punjab High Court was considering the question of admissibility of a refund of sales tax paid, in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not clear how this decision could have any relevance to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In , section 476 of the old Code which corresponds to section 340(1) of the new Code was held to be exhaustive of all the power of a court as such to lay a complaint and a complaint filed by it otherwise than under that section should not be entertained. This ruling, in my view, is of no help to the petitioner, in the matter of quashing of the proceeding, in the facts and circumstances of this case. It is not understood why the decision of AIR I960 Madhya Pradesh was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In . the court was concerned with sub-sections (1) and (5) of section 479A of the old Code and as such, this decision has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The decision reported in 1985 Cri LJ 1956. I have already observed, helps the respondent CBI rather than the petitioner. In 1997 Cri LJ 999. a Division Bench of our High Court directed filing of crminal complaint for different offences specified in section 195. the question with which we are concerned here did not arise for consideration in that case and as such, the said decision is hardly of any assistance. The decision reported in 1997 Cri LJ 4148 also. In my view, docs not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
19. In view of what I have discussed above, it would necessarily follow that to interference would be justified in exercise of this court's revisional and inherent jurisdiction. In the result, the revisional application fails and is hereby accordingly dismissed.
20. Appeal dismissed