Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Mr. Vallabhneni Vamsi Mohan, vs The State Of A.P on 8 May, 2025
APHC010185232025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY
THURSDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY
TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T
T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3909/2025
Between:
Mr. Vallabhneni Vamsi Mohan, ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
The State Of A P ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. V.Devi Satya Sri Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The court made the following ORDER:
1. The petitioner/A.1 has filed this Criminal Petition by invoking the provisions of Sections 482 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 [for short, "BNSS'), seeking pre-arrest pre bail in connection with Crime No.75 No. of 2025 of Gannavaram Police Station, Krishna District, involving the offences punishable under Section 384, 420, 406, 379, 120(B) r/w. 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (referred to as the 'I.P.C.') ' and Section 4 r/w. 21(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Developmen (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (referred to as 'MMDAR Act') and Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (referred to as 'PDPP PDPP Act') against the petitioner herein and other accused.2
2. The prosecution's case, as detailed in the report dated 25.02.2025, is summarized as follows:
(i) One Jasthi Murali Krishna, the de-facto complainant, is a resident of Marlapalem, a hamlet of Gannavaram village in Krishna district. He resides and works in the Panakal Cheruvu Ayacut area of his village.
Panakal Cheruvu, located in R.S. No. 86, spans approximately 18 acres. For the past 30 to 40 years, around 15 villagers, including the complainant, have been cultivating portions of this land, and they hold B-form pattas for the same. In 2023, the then MLA of Gannavaram, Vallabhaneni Vamsi Mohan, the petitioner herein, visited the village and allegedly demanded, aggressively, that the farmers vacate the land they were cultivating. When the farmers resisted, asserting their longstanding rights over the land, he reportedly responded with threats and intimidation. It is alleged that he told them, "I know how to remove the blockage", thereby instilling fear of physical harm among the farmers. The complainant contends that the MLA forcibly evicted him and others without due process. Subsequently, the then MLA publicly claimed falsely, according to the complainant, that he was undertaking the development of the Panakal Lake for public benefit.
(ii) One day, the petitioner herein suddenly asked all the farmers to come to the lake and stated, "Now, I have blocked the village, if you do not do it, the village will turn against you". He blackmailed all the MLAs and kept the farmers of Panakala Lake in fear. The then MLA, Vamsi and his followers, namely Ravi, Seshu, Ranga and Mechineni Babu, formed an illegal association with the farmers and took possession of the land and developed the lake for the people, misleading everyone with false words and removing the soil from the Panakala Lake in May 2023. For about 40 days, day and night, 10 excavators were used to dig illegally and illegally, to a depth of about 12 to 15 feet, and Vamsi, namely Ravi, Seshu, Ranga, and Mechineni Babu, sold it for their 3 gain. While this was happening, the farmers were thinking about what to do or how to expose this injustice through the media when Vamsi asked the farmers to come to his office. If the farmers called, he would go with them when their relative Kambhampati Krishna Kishore (Bobby) also went to Vamsi's office, there Ranga, Seshu, Ravi, and Mechinani Babu, who had put on a crazy show and had not given up hope for that land, threatened Vamsi that this land would be sold to him out of fear for their lives. Then why would they risk their lives for something that is not there? After the pond excavation is completed, they will buy land equivalent to his land somewhere, and Vamsi told them to keep quiet with false words and alcohol. There was nothing else to do, so they all left from there. After Vamsi and his men had dug up the entire pond, the farmers went to Vamsi again and asked about the land. When Vamsi threw them out of the office, he threatened them with death and said, "I will see to it that you are in the right place". It is known that government officials were involved in the fact that the MLA Vamsi had dug up the soil in the vicinity of the pond without getting permission from the government and used it for his benefit under the guise of pond development. At that time, no one cared when they complained to the police. Therefore, under the pretext of pond development, he frightened the farmers and forcibly vacated their land, and instead of giving their own land, he deceived them as part of a scheme and as part of a conspiracy, dug up the pond soil worth crores and sold it for their benefit.
3. The case of the petitioner/A.1, in brief, is that:
(i) The petitioner, a former MLA from Gannavaram, Krishna District, has been falsely implicated in this crime nearly two years after the alleged incident. The complainant, Murali Krishna Jaasthi, claims to have been advised by village elders to lodge the FIR only in February 2025, indicating an inordinate and unexplained delay.4
(ii) It is further averred that the FIR lacks specific details, including the date the complainant allegedly approached the police and was rebuffed. The complainant has not provided credible evidence or documentation, such as mining permits or environmental clearances, to support the allegations.
(iii) The petitioner further asserts that Section 173(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, mandates that in cases where the alleged offences are punishable with imprisonment for less than seven years, the police must conduct a preliminary investigation before proceeding with formal registration of an FIR. The respondent police bypassed this mandatory requirement and directly registered the FIR without any preliminary investigation, vitiating the entire initiation of the criminal process against the petitioner.
(iv) The petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani, wherein it is held that an accused is entitled to seek anticipatory bail in connection with an offence even while in custody in a different offence. He further asserts that the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that there is no express or implied restriction in the Criminal Procedure Code or in any other statute that prohibits the Court of Session or the High Court from entertaining and deciding an anticipatory bail application concerning an offence, while the applicant is in custody concerning a different offence.
4. I have heard Sri S. Sriram, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor, representing the Respondent-State. Both sides reiterated their submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition.
5. According to the prosecution, the petitioner and four other accused allegedly excavated soil illegally from Panakala Cheruvu (tank) in Gannavaram village and sold it for personal gain. It is further alleged that, 5 during his tenure as an MLA, the petitioner threatened farmers and forcibly took possession of their lands under the pretext of developing the lake.
6. The petitioner/A.1 is a former Legislative Assembly (MLA) member from the Gannavaram constituency, Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner's counsel contends that as an MLA, the petitioner's role is to represent the interests of his constituency, including its villages, and to facilitate communication with the relevant authorities. However, the petitioner does not hold executive authority over development projects or activities concerning the pond in question, and the pond is under the control of the Village Panchayat, a self-governing body responsible for its maintenance and management. The petitioner's counsel further contended that the complaint was lodged with mala fide intent rather than out of genuine concern over illegal activities.
7. It is submitted that the FIR vaguely alleges that the petitioner/Accused No.1 excavated approximately 10 to 15 feet of the pond. However, it is contended that the pond is an existing water body with a depth of 5 to 10 feet. So, the allegation of an additional excavation of 10 to 15 feet is baseless and unsupported by any scientific or factual evidence.
8. The learned Public Prosecutor representing the Respondent-State contends that the investigation is at its nascent stage and granting bail to the petitioner would seriously prejudice the ongoing investigation and the petitioner may tamper with the evidence and in support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Dhruvesh Dipakbhai Trivedi V. State of Punjab1 and also the decision of the High Court of Kerala in Anil Kumar and others V. State of Kerala2.
9. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that, under Section 173(3) of the BNSS, in cases where the alleged offences are 1 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 11501 2 Bail Appln.No.2285 of 2024 6 punishable with imprisonment of less than seven years, the police are mandated to conduct a preliminary investigation before the formal registration of an FIR.
10. To appreciate the petitioner's contention, it is relevant to refer to section 173 of BNSS, which reads as follows:
"173. Information in cognizable cases.--(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station, and if given--
xxxxxxx (3) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in Section 175, on receipt of information relating to the commission of any cognizable offence, which is made punishable for three years or more but less than seven years, the officer in charge of the police station may with the prior permission from an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, considering the nature and gravity of the offence,--
(i) Proceed to conduct a preliminary enquiry to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within fourteen days or
(ii) Proceed with the investigation when a prima facie case exists.
11. As per Section 173(3) of the BNSS, the investigating agency is within its rights to proceed further when a prima facie case exists. During the investigation, confessional statements of co-accused were recorded, which prima facie established the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the offence. The records clearly show that the case was not initially registered against the petitioner; however, based on the investigation findings, he was subsequently arrayed as an accused. In this context, the absence of a preliminary investigation, as contemplated under Section 173(3), does not, by any stretch, constitute a valid ground for seeking anticipatory bail.
12. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that the FIR invokes the MMDR Act and the PDPP Act, both of which are special laws 7 specifically designed to address mining offences and damage to public property, respectively. Special laws take precedence over general ones, like the IPC, when both address the same matter; section 21(1) of the MMDR Act outlines a self-contained process for penalizing illegal mining, including investigation and penalties; the PDPP Act has its own provisions; offences under these laws, particularly Sections 21 and 23 of the MMDR Act, can only be initiated upon a complaint before a Magistrate by an authorized government representative; this procedure, akin to Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C., must be followed; failure to adhere to it invalidates the prosecution; the inclusion of IPC offences alongside these special laws is legally untenable, as it duplicates charges; consequently, the IPC charges should be struck down, leaving only the special laws for consideration.
13. The petitioner's counsel argued that it is settled law that when both general offences and offences under a special statute are alleged in an FIR, the investigation cannot be bifurcated. If the special procedure prescribed for offences under the special law is not followed, the entire prosecution must fail. He relied on Ayyapan v. Krishnapillai3, wherein the Madras High Court held that:
7. Even in the citation quoted by the trial Court, the very same proposition has been laid down i.e. 1992 (1) M.W.N. 283.
"The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in catena of cases show, that where an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from that contained under Section 195, Cr.P.C. the said section will affect only the offences mentioned therein, unless such offences form an integral part, so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case, the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This legal position has been made clear by the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Suresh Charar Srivastava, 1985 Law Weekly (Crl) 5 : (1985 Cri LJ 926)".
8. Therefore, in the light of the above guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court and in view of the earlier observation made by a Division Bench of this Court, in the Writ Petitions, offences under Sections 199 and 200, I.P.C. as mentioned in the private complaint related to separate transaction which are 3 1991 (1) MWN (Cr.) 305 8 separable from the main offences alleged to have been committed by the respondent/accused in some other transaction and as such, I am of the view, that the embargo under Section 195, Cr.P.C. would not be applicable for other offences except 199 and 200, I.P.C. In these circumstances, the order passed by the lower Court discharging accused/respondent in respect of all the offences suffers from infirmity and therefore, it is liable to be set aside and remitted back to the trial Court to go on with trial in respect of other offences. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the case is remitted back to the trial Court to proceed with the trial against the respondent/accused and others in accordance with law in respect of the remaining offences as referred to above.
14. He further relied on the decision in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni4, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which Section 195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible to split them up, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State of Karnataka v.
Hemareddy [(1981) 2 SCC 185], this Court referred to a judgment of the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236] ) and approved its ratio as follows : [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185] , SCC pp. 190-91, paras 7-8) "7. ... In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236], SCC OnLine Mad) 'The main point on which Mr Jayarama Ayyar appearing for the petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193 reads as follows:
"193. Punishment for false evidence.--Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
"Fabrication of false evidence" is defined in Section 192. The relevant portion of it is:4
(2020) 20 SCC 1 (para 48) 9 "Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said "to fabricate false evidence"."
The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC. It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e. fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceeding in any court.
Mr Jayarama Ayyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.'
8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld."
15. He further submitted that non-compliance with the procedural requirements under Section 21 of the MMDR Act renders the prosecution invalid, as the investigation cannot be selectively conducted, and the illegality strikes at the root of the matter.
1016. The record indicates that the crime is registered for the offences under Sections 384, 420, 406, 379, 120B r/w. 149 of the IPC, Section 4 r/w. 21(1) of the MMDR Act, and Section 3 of the PDPP Act. According to the prosecution, the petitioner extorted the de facto complainant by threatening Panakala Lanka farmers with death. Under the guise of tank development, he took possession of their land for about forty days, during which ten excavators operated continuously to illegally dig 10-12 feet deep. The excavated soil was sold for personal gain. He assured the farmers that equivalent land would be allotted to them later. However, after the excavation was completed, he threatened them again when they demanded the promised land. It was also revealed that the petitioner (MLA Vamsi) excavated the pond without government approval, using threats and deception as a part of the larger scheme.
17. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that given the allegations against the petitioner, it may be difficult to accept the petitioner's contention that the offences under Sections 384, 420, 406, 379, and 120B r/w 149 of the IPC do not apply, particularly in light of the crime registration under Sections 4 r/w 21(1) of the MMDR Act and Section 3 of the PDPP Act. However, this Court views that it is a matter to be considered at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. This Court has not expressed any opinion on the contentions raised, leaving it open to both parties to make their respective submissions before the Court concerned.
18. Another argument put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the present case was registered after an unexplained and excessive delay of two years from the date of the alleged offence.
19. Notably, the FIR was registered on 25.02.2025, nearly 19 months after the alleged incident, which is said to have occurred before 23.05.2023. Nothing on record suggests that the complainant approached the relevant authorities or departments during this intervening period.
1120. The record reveals an ongoing animosity towards the petitioner (A.1), stemming from political differences. The case registration after a significant delay suggests that political interests may be influencing the complaint.
21. As the investigation is pending, this court is not inclined to express any opinion on the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner that the case is foisted against him due to political vendetta. Even if it is assumed so, such a ground alone cannot warrant anticipatory bail.
22. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner contends that the addition of Section 386 IPC to the case was made with mala fide intent to bypass the procedural safeguards established in Arnesh Kumar's case. This provision was inserted on 13.03.2025, following Writ Petition No. 6515 of 2025, which sought a notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, as the initial offences carried a maximum sentence of seven years and a fine. The inclusion of Section 386, which carries a higher punishment of up to ten years, appears to be a calculated response to that petition, based on selectively worded allegations aimed at fitting the provision's requirements. However, as correctly argued by the petitioner, Section 386 IPC necessitates proof that the victim was put in fear of death or grievous hurt, an essential element not reflected in the facts alleged. The anticipatory bail application was filed on 08.042025, while the offence was originally registered on 25.02.2025, and the addition of Section 386 IPC was made only later, raising further doubts about the prosecution's intent.
23. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the photographs relied upon by the prosecution show the presence of the de facto complainant, the petitioner, and others. These photographs were taken in connection with the work undertaken related to the pond. It contradicts the de facto complainant's claim that the petitioner forcibly took possession of the land under the threat of death or grievous bodily harm.
1224. Section 386 of the IPC relates to extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. Section 386 of the IPC runs as follows:
"Section 386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. --Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
"Extortion" has been defined in Section 383 of the IPC as follows:--
"Section 383. Extortion.--Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits 'extortion.
Illustrations
(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.
(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z sings and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.
(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.
(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z sings and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion."
384. Punishment for extortion.--
Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
25. The learned senior counsel for petitioner/A.1 submits that the recitals in the report clearly show that certain words used by the accused, such as "ni anthu chustanani Panakala cheruvu raithulanu pranabhayam tho dowrjanyam chesi bedirinchinadu," were part of the record when the offence was initially registered under Section 384 of the IPC; however, the subsequent inclusion of 13 the offence was made with the ulterior motive of facilitating the petitioner's arrest, bypassing the protections outlined in Arnesh Kumar's decision.
26. There is no prima facie material to suggest that the language employed was intended to threaten or instil fear of death or grievous bodily harm in any individual. This court finds merit in the petitioner's submission that the essential ingredients of Section 386 of the IPC prima facie do not appear to be attracted. Moreover, the applicability of Section 386 of IPC cannot be determined solely based on an isolated sentence in the report. More particularly, when considered in conjunction with the statements of the witnesses that when the petitioner promised that he would provide alternative lands to them, the farmers accepted his statement readily. As the petitioner failed to give the land as promised, they lodged the report with a delay of nearly 19 months. Their grievance appears to be that he is not providing alternative land. At best, the facts of the case may invoke the provisions of Section 384 IPC, as initially registered against the petitioner.
27. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others V. State of Punjab 5, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that "The question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answers upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict".
28. However, the prosecution has placed a letter dated 03.03.2025, issued by the Tahsildar, which states that no relevant records were found concerning permission for stilt removal in Panakala Cheruvu, Gannavaram. The Tahsildar's statement is significant as the competent authority on matters related to stilt removal in the tank. Additionally, the Sub Inspector of Police addressed a letter to the Assistant Executive Engineer of the Water Resources Department and the Additional Director of the Mines and Geology Department, requesting information on whether any orders or permissions were issued for the development, stilt removal, or excavation at Panakala Cheruvu between the years 2019 and 2024.
5(1980) 2 SCC 565 14
29. It is surprising to contend that, despite the petitioner and others allegedly engaging in unauthorized digging of the pond, no action was taken by the authorities at the relevant point of time. The investigation reveals a failure to question relevant officials about whether any action was taken to remove the stilt without proper authorization and to verify if the stilt was indeed removed, as claimed by the de facto complainant and other farmers. Aside from witness statements, no substantial material was gathered to substantiate the claim of illegal excavation. Furthermore, the investigating officer failed to investigate the lack of response from the relevant departments in the face of alleged unlawful excavation. It can be seen that the complainant and others were aware of the unauthorized nature of the digging but refrained from initiating action due to a purported promise of alternative land; it remains difficult to conclude that they acted in good faith under these circumstances.
30. The investigation fails to clarify whether the farmers of Panakala Cheruvu Tank notified the relevant authorities about the illegal excavation. Additionally, it does not identify the officials responsible for allowing the unauthorized activity. The investigation fails to explain why the authorities did not take timely or appropriate action despite the large-scale nature of the excavation. Furthermore, the investigation does not reveal whether disciplinary measures were implemented against the officials who neglected to prevent the illegal activity. It also remains unclear whether the investigating officer examined the involved officials to assess the reasons behind their inaction.
31. The record reflects that the petitioner has a permanent residence. Given the nature of the dispute between the parties, there is no reasonable apprehension that they would influence or intimidate witnesses. The ex-MLA petitioner has strong societal roots, making it highly unlikely that he would attempt to flee from justice. The facts do not warrant custodial interrogation of the petitioner like the accusations. The petitioner expressed willingness to cooperate with the investigation agency. The likelihood of levying accusations 15 of harm or embarrassment through potential arrest is not improbable. The delay in considering the report plays a significant role in evaluating the petitioner's request. All the offences are punishable with imprisonment of up to seven years, except 386 of IPC. Furthermore, this court finds reason to doubt the applicability of Section 386 of the IPC; instead, Section 384 IPC, which was invoked initially and carries a lesser punishment of up to three years, maybe more appropriately applicable. At least the petitioner has made a case for issuance of notice under section 35(3) of BNSS (section 41A of IPC).
32. As a result, the Criminal Petition is disposed of, directing the investigating officer to strictly follow the procedure laid down under Section 41A of the Cr.P.C., / Section 35(3) of the BNSS, and also the guidelines set forth by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar and another. The petitioner / A.1 shall cooperate with the investigation by appearing before the concerned Investigating officer as and when his presence is required, in compliance with the procedure contemplated under section 35(3) of the BNSS by furnishing information and documents sought by him in completing the investigation.
33. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present petitions without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is affirmed to have the freedom to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this Order.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 08.05.2025 MS/SAK 16 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION No.3909 OF 2025 Date: 08.05.2025 SAK