Delhi District Court
Ram Kishan vs Rajinder Singh on 7 September, 2010
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IN THE COURT OF SHRI S. K. SARVARIA, DISTRICT JUDGE-VIII
& INCHARGE/ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, ROHINI COURTS
DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 08/10
Ram Kishan,
S/o Late Sh. Narain Singh,
R/o V & P.O. Qadirpur,
Delhi - 110036.
Through His Next Friend
Sh. Sudhir Rana,
S/o Sh. Ram Kishan,
R/o V & P.O. Qadirpur,
Delhi - 110036.
..... Petitioner
VERSUS
1. Rajinder Singh,
S/o Late Sh. Narain Singh,
R/o V & P.O. Qadirpur,
Delhi - 110036.
Also At:
18, Purana Rajpur,
Old Mussorrie Road,
Dehradoon.
2. Omdutt Bhardwaj,
2
S/o Sh. Sudan Singh,
R/o V & P.O. Tikri Khurd,
Delhi.
3. Satpal,
S/o Sh. Om Prakash,
R/o V & P.O. Alipur,
Delhi.
4. Mahesh Chand
5. Satish Chand
Both sons of
Sh. Kedar Nath,
Both Residents of
SU-108, Pitampura,
Delhi.
6. Narender Singh,
S/o Sh. Narain Singh,
R/o V & P.O. Siraspur,
Delhi - 42.
7. Virender Kumar Chauhan,
Tehsildar (Narela) At
BDO Office, Alipur,
Delhi.
..... Respondents
Date of Institution: 19.08.2010
Date of reserving order: 30.08.2010
Date of pronouncement: 07.09.2010
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ORDER
The present revision petition under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code is filed against the order dated 22/05/2010, passed by Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (in short Ld. M.M.) whereby the learned trial court refused to give directions for registration of FIR, thereby declining the request for investigation under S. 156 (3) CrPC.
The petitioner filed a complaint under Section 200 CrPC alleging the commission of the offences by the respondents under Sections 403/406/420/423/463/464/465/466/468/472/506 r/w 120- B/34 IPC. He has prayed for taking cognizance by the court and proceeding against accused persons for the said offences. Along with the complaint, the petitioner has filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC for direction to the police for registration of FIR and investigation of the case which was declined by the learned MM by impugned order. Aggrieved by the said order, the present revision petition is filed by the petitioner.
The contention of counsel for the revisionist was that the trial court did not properly appreciate the facts of the case. He 4 submitted that the Ld. Trial Court erred in not considering that the facts disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and thus calls for registration of FIR as mandated by the various decisions of the Apex Court and decisions of our Delhi High Court. He contended that thus, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
I have heard Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and have perused the trial court record.
The scheme of CrPC is such that an officer in charge of a police station has to initate investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 CrPC on the basis of entry of the first information report, on receiving the information of the commission of a cognizable offence. From the plain reading of Section 154 (1) CrPC, It is, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is made before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form to register a case on the basis of information. Pertaining to cognizable offence. But when the Police Officers do not register a case disclosing 5 commission of a cognizable offence and complaint in this regard is made to the Magistrate, then under Section 156 (3) CrPC, the Magistrate empowered under S. 190 CrPC 'may' order investigation. The expression used herein is 'may' and not 'shall' or 'must'. The expression 'shall' or 'must' implies that the provision is mandatory and expression 'may' implies that the provision is directory. The expression 'may' gives discretion to the Magistrate. In this regard, the following decision of the Apex Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy, A.I.R. 1976 SC 1672 is apposite to be referred to, the relevant para is as under:
"13. It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words "may take cognizance" which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with "must take cognizance." The word "may" gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was 6 primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself.
14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by "taking cognizance of an offence" by the Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a Court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190 (1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1) (a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he, has in th judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156 (3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence.7
15. This position of law has been explained in several cases by this Court, the latest being Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 753.
16. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction to send a complaint disclosing a cognizable offence - whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session - to the Police for investigation under Section 156 (3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. The distinction between a police investigation ordered under Section 156 (3) and the one directed under Section 202, has also been maintained under the new Code; but a rider has been clamped by the 1st Proviso to Sec. 202 (1) that if it appears to the Magistrate that an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session has been committed, he shall not make any direction for investigation.
17. Section 156 (3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: "Information to the Police and their powers to investigate"; while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrate". The power to order police investigation under Section 156 (3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Sec. 202 (1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable offence, the power under Sec. 156 (3) 8 can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1)
(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-
cognizance stage and avail of Section 156 (3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-
sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding." Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him."
Furthermore, in Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1541, it was observed as under:
"Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 9 contains the provision for cognizance of offences by Magistrates. It provides for three ways in which such cognizance can be taken. The first is on receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; the second is on a report in writing of such facts - that is, facts constituting the offence - made by any police officer; the third is upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrate's own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed.
In the case before us the Magistrate after receipt of Bhadai Shah's complaint proceeded to examine him under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That Section itself states that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath. This examination by the Magistrate under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure puts it beyond doubt that the Magistrate did take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. After completing such examination and recording the substance of it to writing as required by Section 200 the Magistrate could have issued process at once under Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or could have dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also open to him, before taking either of these courses, to take action under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That Section empowers the Magistrate to 'postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of persons complained against, and either enquire into the case himself or if he is a 10 Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class, direct an enquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by police officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint'. If and when such investigation or inquiry is ordered the result of the investigation or inquiry has to be taken into consideration before the Magistrate takes any action under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
It has to be noticed that the Magistrate was not bound to take cognizance of the offences on receipt of the complaint. He could have, without taking cognizance, directed an investigation of the case by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once however he took cognizance he could order investigation by the police only under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As it is clear here from the very fact that he took action under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that he had taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint, it was open to him to order investigation only under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under Section 156(3) of the Code."
In Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986 it has been observed as under:
"The provisions of S. 190 do not mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take 11 cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. The word `may' in the reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify the Magistrate in sending the complaint, under S. 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code."
When a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under S. 156(3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence."
The said judgments, only suggests that if a complaint discloses commission of a cognizable offence then investigation may be handed over to the police but does not direct that same should be the only course adopted by the Magistrate.
The position is thus clear. Any judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under S. 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he has not to examine the 12 complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. Thus, merely because the Magistrate chose one of the two courses while exercising his discretion would not mean that he has acted out of law.
This aspect has been properly explained by our Delhi High Court in Smt Meenakshi Anand Sootha Vs State 2007(4) JCC 3230 Delhi, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the application under Section 156(3) CrPC for giving direction to SHO to investigate the matter and instead took cognizance of the case and proceeded with the complaint case of the complainant. On these facts the following observations were made by our Hon'ble High Court :
"10. It is well settled that under Sec 156(3) CrPC, the Magistrate has not to pass the order mechanically and has to apply his judicial mind. On this point, decision of this court, M/s. Skipper Beverages Pvt Ltd V State 2001 IV AD( Delhi) 625, may be referred to in which it was held:
" It is true that Section 156(3) CrPC of the Code empowers to Magistrate to direct the 13 police to register a case and initiate investigation but this power has to be exercised judiciously on proper grounds and not in a mechanical manner. In those cases where the allegations are not very serious and the complainant himself is in possession of evidence to prove his allegations there should be no need to pass order under Section 156(3) of the Code. This discretion ought to be exercised after proper application of mind and only in those cases where the Magistrate is of the view that the nature of the allegations is such that the complainant himself may not be in a position to collect and produce evidence before the court and interest of justice demand that the police should step in to help the complainant"
11. Here in the present case, all the evidence which are in the form of oral testimony, is in the knowledge of the complainant and her witnesses. The only documentary evidence, ie MLC, prima facie appears to be not connected with the present case, is also with the complainant herself. Under these circumstances, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and it is still open for the petitioner to prove her case which is pending, in accordance with law"
In Pawan Verma v. SHO PS Model Town and others 2009 (2) JCC 1000 Delhi, our Hon'ble High Court has reiterated the legal position thus:14
" It is not that in every case merely on asking of the petitioner the Court must direct registration of an FIR unless the Court is satisfied with the preliminary evidence which is to be submitted by the complainant that an FIR must be registered.........".
Be that as it may, the very fact that the revisionist filed a complaint under S. 200 CrPC and also an application under S. 156 (3) CrPC clearly goes on to show that he himself had put forth two simultaneous parallel claims before the Ld. MM and out of which only one can be granted by Ld. M.M. now when the Ld. MM took cognizance under S. 200 CrPC and rejected the application under S. 156 (3) CrPC, the revisionist cannot turn turtle and claim that the order made by the Ld. MM was arbitrary and without application of mind.
Therefore, from the above discussion, it is manifest that the Ld. MM committed no illegality and exercised his discretion as bestowed under the provisions of the CrPC. In the light of the above discussion, there is no merit in the present revision petition. Hence, interference in order of learned Metropolitan Magistrate is not warranted.
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In view of the above discussion, the revision petition is dismissed. The impugned order dated 22/05/2010 does not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity or impropriety; therefore, same is not interfered with and is upheld. The order be sent to the server (www delhidistrictcourts.nic.in). Parties are directed to appear before the ld. trial court on 13.09.2010 at 10 a.m. The trial court record be returned along with the copy of this order. The file of the revision be consigned to the record room.
Announced in the open court on 7th day of September, 2010.
(S.K. SARVARIA) DISTRICTJUDGE-VIII & INCHARGE ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE ROHINI COURTS/ DELHI.