Allahabad High Court
Sharda Prasad Tiwari And Another vs Board Of Revenue And Others on 20 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(2)AWC1547
JUDGMENT Sudhir Narain, J.
1. The petitioners have sought to quash the order passed by the Additional Commissioner dated 26.3.1990 in appeal and the order of the Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1, dated 29.7.1997, affirming the said order in revision.
2. The facts in brief are that Late Paramhans, husband of respondent No. 6 was recorded as tenure-holder over the land in dispute. The petitioners filed suit under Section 229B of U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act on 17.3.1988 against Paramhans for declaration of their rights on the allegations that Paramhans was bhumidhar of the disputed land. He was issueless and surrendered his possession in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiff-petitioners remained in possession and they acquired bhumidhari rights. On 15.6.1988 Paramhans executed sale deed in favour of respondent Noa. 7 to 10. The petitioners alleged that Paramhans filed Iabaldawa (Admission) in the suit on 19.8.1988 admitting the claim of the plaintiffs. The District Authorities organised a Lok Adalat. The file of the case was sent to be decided in Lok Adalat on 11.12.1988. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Khajni, district Gorakhpur, respondent No. 3 decreed the suit of the plaintiff-petitioners on the basis of the said Iqbaldawa. Respondent Nos. 7 to 10 filed appeal against the said order of respondent No. 3 before the Additional Commissioner, respondent No. 2. During the pendency of the appeal, Paramhans filed an affidavit stating that he had not filed any Iqbaldawa as alleged by the petitioners. Respondent Nos. 7 to 10 also moved an application before the trial court on 11.10.1989 to set aside the order dated 11.12.1988, and also filed an application for their impleadment on the allegation that before the order was passed, they had purchased the disputed properly from Paramhans. Respondent No. 2 allowed the appeal remanding the matter to the trial court to decide the matter regarding the compromise afresh. The Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1, has affirmed the said order in revision flled by the petitioners.
3. Shri Triveni Shanker, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that respondent Nos. 7 to 10 were not parties to the suit and they had no right to challenge the order by filing appeal against the order of the trial court. The contention of the contesting respondents was that they had purchased the property on 15th June, 1988 from Paramhans. The alleged Iqbaldawa dated 19.8.1988 was flled subsequent to the execution of the sale deed by Paramhans. The rights of the purchasers could not be affected by making admission by the vendor in a suit flled against him. The decree passed in a suit is binding upon the purchaser under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act but it is always open to the purchaser of the property to show that the order has been obtained either by practising fraud or by collusion between the parties to the suit affecting the rights of the purchaser.
4. In Nathu Dhoju v. Ramchand Balchand, AIR 1946 Bom 462, it was held that the rule of lis pendens applies to consent on compromise decree but the consent or compromise must be honest and not fraudulent or collusive. If a person purchases the property which is the subject-matter of suit, he takes the risk of losing it if the result of the suit goes against the party from whom he has purchased but he takes such risk of an adverse decision obtained in a fair and legal manner. If the final decision in the pending litigation is brought about by fraud or collusion, it cannot be said that lis pendens was fairly decided and that decision cannot affect the rights of the transferee pendente life.
5. In Annammal v. Chillakutti, AIR 1963 Mad 300, the Court emphasised that unless the termination of a suit is honestly brought about in one of the usual modes, the doctrine of Us pendens will have no application and abandonment of suit cannot be said to be the normal way of its termination or one honestly brought about, even though it may not be the result of collusion.
6. The suit was flled on 17.3.1988 by the petitioners on the allegation that Paramhans, the recorded tenure-holder had surrendered the possession in their favour and they continued in possession over the land in dispute and acquired rights over the land in dispute. Paramhans is alleged to have executed sale deed in favour of respondent Nos. 7 to 10 on 15.6.1988. He is alleged to have submitted Iqbaldawa (Admission) in the suit on 19.8.1988 and on that basis, the Lok Adalat is alleged to have passed a decree taking the said Iqbaldawa as a compromise. This vitally affected the interest of respondent Nos. 7 to 10. They had a right to file an appeal against the decision of the trial court. Respondent No. 2 has further directed that these respondents shall be impleaded as a party in the application filed by them for their impleadment.
7. The next submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the award was given by the Court in exercise of the powers under Section 20 of Legal Service Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), cannot be challenged as under sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act, the award made by a Lok Adalat is treated as final and binding and no appeal lies against such an award.
8. Section 20 of the Act provides the procedure for taking cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats and dispose of the suit, proceedings, dispute or matter on a compromise or settlement between the parties. Section 21(2) provides that every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award. Sections 20 and 21 of the Act read as under :
"20. Cognizance of cases by Lok Adalats.---(1) Where, in any suit or other proceeding which is capable of being taken cognizance of by a Lok Adalat under the provisions of this Act and pending before any Court or Tribunal, if the parties thereof make a joint application to the Court or Tribunal indicating their intention to compromise the matter or to arrive at a settlement, the presiding officer of the Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, may, Instead of proceeding to effect a compromise between the parties or to arrive at a settlement himself, and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, pass an order that the suit or proceeding shall stand transferred to the Lok Adalat for arriving at a compromise or settlement.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the District Authority may, on receipt of an application from any person that any dispute or matter pending for a compromise or settlement needs to be determined by Lok Adalat, refer such dispute or matter to the Lok Adalat for determination.
(3) Where any suit or proceeding is transferred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the suit, proceeding, dispute or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adatat shall, while determining any proceeding before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by legal principles and the principles of Justice, equity and fair play, (5) Where go award is made by the Lok Adalat on the ground that no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between the parties. It shall be open to the parties to a suit or proceeding transferred from a Court or Tribunal under sub-section (1) to continue such suit or proceeding before such Court or Tribunal, or if it is a dispute or matter referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section (1), any of the persons may institute a proceeding in an appropriate Court.
(6) Where, under sub-section (5), the parties to a suit or proceeding Intend to continue the proceeding in such suit or proceeding before the Court or Tribunal from which it was transferred, such Court or Tribunal shall proceed to deal with such suit or proceeding from the stage at which it was before the suit or proceeding was transferred to the Lok Adalat.
21. Award of Lok Adalat.--(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or order of any other Court or Tribunal and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a suit or proceeding transferred to it under sub-section (1) of Section 20, the court-fee paid in such suit or proceeding shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act. 1870 (7 of 1870).
(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any Court against the award."
9. The prohibition regarding the filing of appeal against an award of Lok Adalat is only when it is passed on a compromise or settlement arrived at between the parties in the manner prescribed under Section 20 of the Act. It contemplates that there must be an application to the Court indicating their intention to compromise the matter or to arrive at a settlement or there is an application under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act by a party concerned. Secondly, the parties must have entered into compromise or arrived at settlement before the Lok Adalat.
10. Sub-section (3) of Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure is in part materia with sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 which provides that no appeal shall he from a decree passed by the Court with the consent _of the parties. A Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Naratn v. Rasool Ahmad and others, AIR 1952 All 29, held that if a party challenges the consent having been given on the basis of which the decree was passed, the party has a right to file appeal against such consent decree under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed :
"When the consent upon the basis of which a decree has been passed by the Court is Itself challenged in the Court of appeal, it cannot be taken for granted the decree was a consent decree. A consent decree must mean a decree valldly consented to either by the party himself or by his duly authorised agent. If the question raised is that the agent who had consented to the decree was not duly authorised the question has to be decided and it cannot be pre-judged by holding that because on the face of it there was a consent decree, no appeal lies to the appellate court."
11. A Lok Adalat under sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act is to dispose of the suit, proceeding, dispute or matter only on a settlement or compromise arrived at between the parties. Sub-section (4) lays down that the Lok Adalat shall be guided by the legal principles and the principles of justice, equity and fair play. If a party alleged that there was no settlement or compromise arrived at between the parties. It can file an appeal before the appropriate forum against the award made by a Lok Adalat. Sub-section (2) of Section 21 will bar an appeal against an award made by a Lok Adalat when it is based on a compromise or settlement arrived at between the parties.
12. The order of the Lok Adalat indicates that there was already an Iqbaldawa (Admission) dated 19.8.1988 filed by defendant Paramhans in the suit and on that basis, the award was made. There is nothing to show that on the date the Lok Adalat was organised, the defendant was present before the Lok Adalat and verified the Iqbaldawa or compromise. Paramhans had filed an affidavit dated 15.9.1989 that he had not filed any Iqbaldawa (Admission) admitting the claim of the plaintiff. The suit was filed on 17.3.1988. The defendant had not filed any written statement. The Court had not framed any Issue nor the parties led evidence.
13. Respondent No. 2, considering the entire facts and circumstances, directed the trial court to consider as to whether the compromise was arrived at between the parties to the suit in accordance with law.
14. The third contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that if a party challenged an order passed on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties and if such order/decree is challenged on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently or colluslvely, it is a fraud on the party and not upon the Court and the aggrieved party should be directed to challenge such decree/order by filing a suit in a competent Court of law. This legal aspect was considered in Smt. Vishwanathi v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Mirzapur and others. 1983 RD 267, wherein the Court found that there is a very thin distinction between the fraud on the party and fraud on the Court. If fraud on a party is accepted by the Court without realising the correct state of affairs and it is demonstrated that the Court had acted on fraudulent representation of aggrieved party. It would tantamount to fraud on Court also. The Court relied upon the decision of the Division Bench in Mst. Kalpa v. Sitaram and others, AIR 1955 All 187, quoting the following observation :
".....It was evidently the duty of the Court below to have come to a conclusion on the allegations made by the defendant with regard to the making of the compromise. If a party to a compromise denies having entered Into the compromise, the Court will have to come to a finding as to whether there had or had not been a compromise effected between the parties and then also to decide if the agreement or the adjustment was lawful. It is only after the Court is satisfied that there had in fact been a compromise and further that the compromise was a lawful compromise, that there would be no option left to the Court but to record it and to pass a decree in terms of the compromise."
15. In Rama Shankar v. 3rd Additional District Judge, Basti and others, AIR 1983 All 152, the Court repelled the contention that the Court had no Jurisdiction to enter into the controversy whether the compromise was or was not obtained by fraud. The Court made the following observation :
"One of the other submissions raised by the learned counsel was that as soon the application was filed on behalf of the petitioner repudiating the compromise, the parties should have been relegated to a civil suit. The Courts below Itself should not have entered into the controversy whether the compromise was or was not obtained by fraud. In support learned counsel placed reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1962 Ori 110. The submission is completely devoid of any merit. I do not agree that the Court before which an application is made for recording a compromise under Order XXIII, Rule 3, C.P.C. must stay its hands and relegate the parties to the compromise chooses to repudiate the same."
16. The last submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the contesting respondents had filed appeal on 22.8-1989 which was barred by limitation. Respondent No. 2 without passing any order for condoning the delay in filing the appeal decided it on merits. I have perused the memo of revision filed by the petitioners annexed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition but no such objection was taken therein. The petitioners had advanced the arguments on merits and the case has now been decided. It is not necessary to go into this controversy.
17. There is no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.