Allahabad High Court
Dr. Hidiyat Hussain Khan vs State Of Uttar Pradesh And Ors. on 14 May, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1992CRILJ3534
JUDGMENT S.K. Mookerji, J.
1. This petition has been filed by Hidayat Hussain Khan a student of Ist year M.D. (Skin) in S.N. Hospital, Agra in Hailing Wards at Agra praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the first information report dated 3-4-92 lodged by Km. Shashi Lata Mukherji, a staff nurse of the aforesaid Medical College under Section 376/420, IPC. Crime No. 44 of 1992, police station M. M. Gate, Agra, a Copy whereof is Annexure 3 to the writ petition.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and also the learned Standing Counsel. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and also examining the materials on record, we are not inclined to interfere with the first information report or the investigation, at this stage. On reading the first information report, it cannot be held that no case is made out against the petitioner. At present investigation is in progress as such also we are not inclined to interfere. The Investigating Officer, on completion of investigation, may file the necessary charge-sheet or final report, as deemed fit, expeditiously, in accordance with law. It may not be proper to discuss, at this stage about the merits of the first information report.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, thereafter urged to issue a direction to the courts below for considering the bail application of the petitioner on the same day. It is averred that the petitioner filed surrender application before the Sessions Judge, Agra on 17-4-92 and the court was pleased to release him on personal bond of Rs. 5,000/-and fixed for hearing the bail application on 21-4-92. This order of the Sessions Judge dated 17-4-92 is Annexure-4 to the writ petition. On 21-4-92 the Sessions Judge transferred the bail application of the petitioner to the court of Additional District Judge XIIth and the date of hearing of the bail application was fixed on 1-5-92. A copy of the order dated 21-4-1992 has also been annexed as Annexure-5 to the writ petition. Mr. S.A. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner made a statement before us that the above bail application shall now be heard on 18-4-92.
4. From the narration of the above facts, it is clear that the petitioner was granted temporary bail by the Sessions Judge and bail application shall now be considered on 18-5-92. The learned counsel for the petitioner, as mentioned above, orally prayed that a direction be issued for consideration of bail application on the same day. This prayer was made in view of the observations made in cases reported in 1989 (26) ACC (Sic) 57 Rajendra v. State of U.P. and 1991 (28) ACC 178. It appears that on the basis of the observations made in the cases reported above, the Sessions Judge, Agra released the petitioner on personal bond whom the petitioner surrendered himself and presented a bail application which was posted for disposal on a subsequent date. Both the above reported cases arise from an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. The judgment in 1989 (26) ACC 57 is as under :
The only prayer to which this petition has been confined during the arguments is relating to the fact mentioned in paragraph 16 of the affidavit of Rajendra Prasad which says that in courts at Saharanpur bail applications are not decided the day the accused surrenders but the bail applications are decided after a week without any fault on the part of the applicant. It is consequently prayed that a direction be issued that the bail application of the applicant may be considered on the same day. However, the allegation in paragraph 16 of the affidavit cannot be accepted as it is not believable that bail applications are not decided forthwith when they are presented in the courts below got without adverting to the correctness or otherwise of this allegation all that need be said is the fact that is always expected that as and when a particular person surrenders and makes an application for bail in the court below, the bail application should be considered by the Courts concerned on the same day. If the court below has to adjourn the decision on the bail application to enable the public prosecutor to obtain instructions then in that case the Court below should direct the applicant to appear again on a date fixed by the said Court for disposal of the bail application with a further direction to the police not to arrest such an applicant till his bail application has been disposed of by the court below. This practice should be universally adopted both by the courts of Sessions as also by the Courts of Magistrates.
(Above emphasis has been provided by us)
5. While going through the above judgment we have noticed that the single Judge has stated, "this practice should be universally adopted both by Courts of Sessions and also by the courts of Magistrates." The above order was passed in respect of a particular case where such orders might have been required according to the circumstances of that case but it cannot be universally adopted by the Courts below. Normally subordinate courts hearing a bail application cannot issue an order in the form of an injunction restraining any police officer from arresting an accused in discharge of his legal duty. It may amount to an embargo on statutory or legal power. This rule, however, may not apply if High Court issues a direction clothing the subordinate court with such power in a particular case. We are of the opinion that bail applications should be decided expeditiously by the courts below. It should be left to the discretion of the courts below to decide the bail application expeditiously consuming minimum time. However, in a particular case this Court is not debarred from issuing a direction for deciding a bail application expeditiously or within a specific period. We only want to emphasise that seriousness of the offence and other circumstances involved in a bail application differs from case to case and, therefore, the court below may exercise its own jurisdiction without adopting any universal practice as laid down in the above case. Similar view has been taken by another single Judge in the case of Sipti v. State of U.P. reported in 1991 (28) ACC 178 relying upon the cases reported in 1988 ACC 318 (Sic) Babu Ram v. State of U.P. and 1989 ACC 57 (supra).
6. We, therefore, disagree with the guidelines issued by the Single Judge in above cases to the effect that the practice mentioned therein should be universally adopted both by the Courts of Sessions and also by the courts of Magistrates.
7. We do not subscribe to the view that in each and every case, without any direction from High Court, the courts below should consider the bail application on the same day it is moved and in case the accused surrenders and the bail application is not considered on the same day, then it should also be disposed of on a subsequent date to be fixed by the courts below and for this interim period, either the accused should be released on personal bond or the police should be restrained from arresting him during the aforesaid period. The courts below have, no doubt, powers under law in absence of any direction by the High Court to pass orders on bail application according to their own discretion on merits and in accordance with law. The discretion should be exercised in a reasonable manner and not arbitrarily. It has to be based on sound principle of law.
8. In the present case at hand, we have already narrated the facts above and, it appears, that the date has been fixed for disposal of the bail application of the petitioner on 18-5-92. The question arises whether after coming to the conclusion that we are not inclined to interfere either with the first information report or the investigation, is it open for us to issue directions to the courts below for considering the bail application on the date of surrender or thereafter while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution? It is necessary to point out that in large number of cases such directions have been issued by different Benches for considering the bail on the same day. In fact, the direction to consider the bail application on the same day is not the universal practice or a part of the rule of law but is an exception depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Even when such directions are issued by this Court, it has to be based on sound principle of law. It is not possible to catalogue all the circumstances in which such directions can be issued. Suffice it to say that it is the discretion of the High Court to issue such directions in appropriate cases. The directions to this effect cannot be issued arbitrarily but with a view to promote the cause of justice, we are of opinion that it is expected that the investigation, bail application and trial should be disposed of speedily. Speedily certainly will not mean hurriedly in any manner because hurriedness in such case may cause injustice. We are conscious that the courts below have no power to abridge, deface or defile or short circuit the mandatory provisions of law, namely, constitutional provisions and provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure. The discretion therefore, has to be exercised reasonably. While issuing direction in a writ petition to consider a bail application on the same day. We are not functioning as a filteration plant' to issue direction in such cases where bail is likely to be granted. The discretion is exercised on a variety of considerations. The power exercised under Article 226 are not devine powers but defined powers. It is based on sound principles of law only.
9. Even without interfering with the first information report or with the investigation, High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, has power, subject to limitations created by Constitution, to enforce fundamental or legal rights and also to administer law with a view to give effect to law. Right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 of the Constitution encompassing all the stages, namely, stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, revision and retrial. The principle of speedy trial even includes the period of remand, pre-conviction detention. It should be as short as possible. Accused are not to be subjected to unnecessary and unduly long harassment prior to his conviction. Thus, a direction of the High Court in appropriate cases under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of the consideration of the bail application speedily are implicit in its power to administer law. We also make it clear that while passing order for consideration of the bail application on the same day in excercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court, subordinate courts cannot take a cue for exercising similar power indiscriminately or universally. It is also necessary to clarify when the High Court directs to consider a bail on the same day, subject to such terms incorporated in that order, it does not mean that the bail application should be allowed invariably. Such powers can be exercised by courts below for dismissing the bail applications also. It is also clarified that even if an accused is released on personal bond by the courts below for a period of three or seven days under direction of this Court, then also the courts below should decide the bail application finally on merits alone. Even during the period of short term release for 3 or 7 days if the accused keeps good conduct that itself shall not be the sole ground for enlarging him on bail finally.
10. We have already noticed above that 18-5-92 has been fixed by the court below for consideration of the bail application of the petitioner. Court below shall be free to pass appropriate orders on the bail application as he deems fit on that date.
11. With the above observations/directions this writ petition is finally disposed of.
12. A certified copy of the order be issued to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within 24 hours.