Kerala High Court
Hashir vs Shermily on 3 March, 2014
Bench: A.M.Shaffique, K.Ramakrishnan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.RAMAKRISHNAN
THURSDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE 2017/11TH JYAISHTA, 1939
OP (FC).No. 194 of 2014 (R)
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(AGAINST ORDER IN IA NO.1871/13 IN OP 523/2012 OF FAMILY COURT,
KOTTAYAM AT ETTUMANOOR DATED 03/3/2014
PETITIONER(S):
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1. HASHIR
S/O.ABDUL HAMEED, NOW RESIDING AT
KUNNUMPURATHU HOUSE, KOTTUKAPPILLY ROAD,
NADAKKAL P.O., ERATTUPETTA-686 121.
2. ABDUL HAMEED
NOW RESIDING AT KUNNUMPURATHU HOUSE,
KOTTUKAPPILLY ROAD, NADAKKAL P.O., ERATTUPETTA-686 121.
BY ADV. SRI.K.K.MOHAMED RAVUF
RESPONDENT(S):
--------------
SHERMILY
D/O.RAFEEQUE, NOW RESIDING AT
PUTHUPARAMBIL HOUSE, POOZHIKOL P.O.,
KADUTHURUTHY, KOTTAYAM 686 127.
R1 BY ADV. SRI.S.PRASANTH
R1 BY ADV. SRI.SOORAJ T.ELENJICKAL
THIS OP (FAMILY COURT) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
28/2/2017, THE COURT ON 1/6/2017 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
OP (FC).No. 194 of 2014 (R)
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APPENDIX
PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS
-----------------------
EXT.P1.TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 24/8/2013 IN MC NO.121/2012 OF
JFCMC-I, VAIKOM.
EXT.P2.TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 3/3/2014 IN IA NO.1871/2013 IN OP
523/2012 OF FAMILY COURT, KOTTAYAM AT ETTUMANOOR.
EXT.P3. TRUE COPY OF OP NO.523/2012 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT BEFORE
THE FAMILY COURT, ETTUMANOOR.
EXT.P4. TRUE COPY OF THE MC NO.121/2012 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT
BEFORE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT I, VAIKOM.
EXT.P5. TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT DATED 29.8.2009 ISSUED BY THE
RESPONDENT.
EXT.P6. TRUE COPY OF THE AMENDMENT PETITION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT
IN OP NO.523/2012 BEFORE THE FAMILY COURT, ETTUMANNUR.
EXT.P7. TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 9/7/2015 IN CRL.R.P.
NO.38/2013 OF SESSIONS COURT, KOTTAYAM.
RESPONDENT(S)' EXHIBITS NIL
-----------------------
Rp
//TRUE COPY//
PS TO JUDGE
A.M. SHAFFIQUE & K.RAMAKRISHNAN, JJ.
===========================
OP(FC) No. 194 of 2014
==================
Dated this, the 1st day of June, 2017
J U D G M E N T
Shaffique, J.
The original petition is filed seeking to set aside Ext.P2 order dated 3/3/2014 in IA No.1871/2013 in OP No.523/12 pending before the Family Court, Kottayam at Ettumanoor.
2. The short facts involved would show that OP No.523/2012 was filed by the respondent herein seeking for return of gold and cash. The claim was for 81 sovereigns of gold ornaments given at the time of marriage valued at `20 lakhs. Though initially a claim was made for a further amount of `10 lakhs, it was thereafter deleted by amendment of pleadings.
3. Respondent herein filed MC No.121/12 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Vaikom under Section 3(1) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1986 Act') claiming `75,000/- as maintenance during iddat period, `10 lakhs as lumpsum OP(FC) No.194/14 -:2:- maintenance towards reasonable and fair provision and also for return of 81 sovereigns of gold ornaments or its equivalent value of `20 lakhs. The learned Magistrate after enquiry directed payment of maintenance during the iddat period at `5,000/- for 3 months and also `3,00,000/- towards reasonable and fair provision. In the absence of any evidence, the claim for return of 81 sovereigns of gold was rejected. Respondent filed Criminal Revision Petition No.38/2013 before the Additional Sessions Court, Kottayam challenging the rejection of claim for 81 sovereigns of gold ornaments. The said criminal revision petition is pending consideration.
4. It is submitted that OP No.523/2012 is filed at that stage making a claim for the very same relief that has been sought for in the MC filed under Section 3 of the 1986 Act. Petitioners therefore filed IA No. No.1871/13 challenging the maintainability of the original petition. The respondent filed objection inter alia contending that the petition was maintainable. The Family Court by the impugned order dismissed IA No.1871/13 on the ground that the learned Magistrate had rejected the claim for return of gold ornaments, in the absence of evidence and the OP(FC) No.194/14 -:3:- fact that the original petition was filed even before filing of the MC, the original petition was maintainable.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners however would submit that though the original petition was filed simultaneously, when the learned Magistrate has jurisdiction to entertain a claim for return of gold ornaments and a finding had been entered into stating that there is no evidence to support the contentions urged, the very same contention cannot be urged in a civil proceeding. It is therefore contended that when Ext.P1 order had been passed by the learned Magistrate, the said order will operate as res judicata in the present proceedings. Even otherwise, once the petitioner has chosen a forum to agitate a claim and when that forum has jurisdiction to entertain the same, a finding by the said forum cannot be reagitated in a different forum exercising similar jurisdiction.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supported the view taken by the Family Court and contended that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a Magistrate does not stand in the way of a person claiming right under the civil law. Both the jurisdictions are separate and OP(FC) No.194/14 -:4:- distinct and merely for the reason that a finding is entered into by the Magistrate observing that there is no evidence, that by itself will not preclude the respondent herein from agitating the claim before the Family Court.
7. During the pendency of the original petition, the petitioners had produced additional documents including Ext.P7 which is the order passed by the Sessions Court, Kottayam in Criminal RP No.38/13, by which the claim for gold ornaments had been rejected, however interfered with the amount for reasonable and fair provision for future maintenance enhancing it to `6 lakhs. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in respect of a matter arising under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where a criminal complaint is filed alleging offence under Section 138 of the said Act and simultaneously a suit is filed for recovery of money, the Apex Court in Sh.Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Smt.Daya Sapra [(2009) 13 SCC 729] held that a creditor can maintain civil and criminal proceedings at the same time and both the proceedings can run parallel. It was also held that a claim cannot be rejected on the ground that a criminal complaint based on the same cause of action is dismissed. While OP(FC) No.194/14 -:5:- considering the above matter, the Apex Court observed that any person may as of right have access to the Courts of justice. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables him to file a suit of civil nature excepting those the cognizance whereof is expressly or by necessary implication barred. Order VII Rule 11
(d) is one such provision which provides for rejection of claim if it is barred by any law. In order to reject a plaint, it has to be understood as to whether the suit was not maintainable at the time of filing the same. It was further held that a suit cannot be held to be barred only because the principle of estoppel, subject to requisite pleading and proof may be applied. The said principle may be applicable only at a later stage of the suit. Therefore, the Apex Court considered the question whether the previous judgment of the criminal proceeding would be relevant in a suit. After placing reference to Section 40 of the Evidence Act, it is held that the principle underlying Section 40 would be applicable if the suit is found to be barred by the principle of res judicata or by the reason of the provisions of any other statute. Proceeding further, it was held at paragraphs 38 and 39 as under:-
"38. If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, OP(FC) No.194/14 -:6:- indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the evidence which has been brought on record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding.
39. The question came up for consideration in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87], wherein this Court inter alia held:
"30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
- (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the Court has to decide to what extent it is binding OP(FC) No.194/14 -:7:- or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and the Court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of B over the property. In such case, A may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first question which would require consideration is -
whether judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant- its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case.' It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad and Anr.
etc. vs. Union of India and Ors. [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the Civil Court will be binding on the Criminal Courts but the converse is not true, was overruled therein, stating :
33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V. M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the Civil Court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand case are in OP(FC) No.194/14 -:8:- context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M. S. Sheriff case as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act."
The Apex Court also made reference to a Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah and another [(2005) 4 SCC 370] wherein it was held that the standard of proof required in civil and criminal courts are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of probability while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. Yet another judgment relied upon is Kishan Singh (D) through LRS v.Gurpal Singh and Others [(2010) 8 SCC 775]. This judgment is cited only to emphasise the point that findings of facts recorded by the Civil Court do not have any bearing in a criminal case and vice versa. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgment of Bombay High Court in Amirshah and Others v. Salimabi (2007 KHC 3447) wherein it is held that jurisdiction of the civil court is not ousted by provisions of Section 3. The remedy provided under Section 3 of OP(FC) No.194/14 -:9:- the 1986 Act is before the Magistrate and the proceedings are of criminal nature. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for enforcement of common law rights cannot be said to be either expressly or impliedly barred. It was held that provisions of Section 3 neither expressly nor impliedly oust the jurisdiction of Civil Court and the said remedy is in addition to other remedies available to the muslim divorced women for recovery of the articles or mahr.
8. Before proceeding further,it will be useful to refer to some more judgments on the point. In State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2016 KHC 6772), in a matter relating to levy of service tax, when it was found that the assessee had already availed of the statutory remedy by filing an appeal against an order of assessment, it was found that a suit filed by him challenging the levy of service tax which is founded on the same cause of action is not maintainable taking into account the principle of doctrine of election and hence the suit was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. In Sheeba Pulikkal v. Shoukath Ali (2011 (4) KLT
746), a Division Bench of this Court had occassion to consider OP(FC) No.194/14 -:10:- whether the jurisdiction of the Family Court is ousted by enactment of the 1986 Act and whether the stipulations of Section 3 overrides the provisions of general law. It was held that there is no express provision in the 1986 Act ousting the Civil Courts of their jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While considering the question whether there is an implied bar of jurisdiction, it was held that the non obstante clause in Section 3 of the 1986 Act does not amount to an implied bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The Division Bench further considered another judgment in Avaran Koya v. Mariyam (1993 (1) KLT 65) wherein it was held that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to deal with a claim for return of gold ornaments. In Avaran Koya (supra), a claim was made specifically under Section 3 of the 1986 Act before the Magistrate. A contention was raised that the Family Court alone have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. The Division Bench held that a claim under Section 3 of the 1986 Act can be entertained only by a Magistrate and not by the Family Court and that claim does not fall under Section 7(2) of the Family Courts Act. Division Bench observed that Avaran Koya (supra) does not hold any contra OP(FC) No.194/14 -:11:- position since the Division Bench in that case did not have occasion to consider whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction is available or not when a claim for return of gold ornaments is made under Section 7(1) of the Family Court' Act. It is therefore held that under the Family Courts Act, the jurisdiction of the Family Court is to exercise the jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 7(1) and the jurisdiction of criminal court under Section 7 (2). Finally it is held that Civil Courts jurisdiction in respect of matters enumerated in Explanation to Section 7(1) is to be entertained by the Family Court and the jurisdiction of criminal court can also be entertained by the Family Court in so far as it relates to jurisdiction under Chapter 9 of the Cr.PC.
10. In Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar [(2005) 1 SCC 787], a 3 judge Bench of the Apex Court had occasion to consider the concepts of res judicata under Section 11 and what is "issue estoppel" and "cause of action estoppel", it was held that there is a distinction between "issue estoppel" and "res judicata". Res judicata debars a court from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties, whereas the doctrine of issue estoppel is invoked against a party. OP(FC) No.194/14 -:12:- If an issue is decided against a party, that party would be estopped from raising the same in the latter proceedings. The doctrine of res judicata creates a different kind of estoppel namely estoppel by accord. However, the doctrine of issue estoppel, as also cause of action estoppel may both be attracted. A cause of action estoppel arises when in two different proceedings, identical issues are raised, in which event, the latter proceedings between the same parties shall be dealt with similarly as was done in the previous proceedings. In such an event, the bar is absolute in relation to all points decided except allegations of fraud and collusion. This principle came to be evolved in a case where the Apex Court was considering the remedy available to a defendant in the event an ex parte decree was passed against him in terms of Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the extent and limitation thereof. On facts, it is seen that an application was filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an appeal was also filed against the ex parte judgment. It was contended that two proceedings on the same subject matter is against public policy as one cannot have two parallel proceedings to continue simultaneously and at OP(FC) No.194/14 -:13:- any rate, the claim would be hit by doctrine of issue estoppel. It was held that when an application under Order IX Rule 13 is dismissed, the defendant can only avail one remedy, namely to prefer an appeal in terms of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once such an appeal is dismissed, the appellant cannot raise the same contention in the first appeal. However, in an appeal against judgment, it will be possible for the appellant to raise their contentions as regards the merits of the plaintiff's case in the said appeal confining their contentions to the materials which are on record alone.
11. Having regard to the principles enunciated above, the first question to be considered is whether the original petition filed by the respondent was maintainable. It is apparent from the facts of the case that the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act was taken up before the Magistrate only after filing of the above original petition. Therefore, the original petition as on the date of filing of the same was indeed maintainable as held by this Court in Sheeba Pulikkal (supra). Now the question is the respondent having approached the Magistrate under Section 3 of the Act wherein the same relief was claimed, whether the present original OP(FC) No.194/14 -:14:- petition can be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
12. As far as the general principle regarding acceptability of the judgment of a Criminal Court before a Civil Court is rather well settled. A criminal case is generally filed for taking penal action against an offender whereas civil case is filed for establishing the civil rights of the parties. Both can go parallelly. But in the facts of the present case, especially matrimonial matters when different forum had been provided for making different claims, or even same claim can be raised before different forums, the question is whether one of the parties to the lis can have an option or is their right concurrent.
13. Section 3 of the 1986 Act reads as under:-
"3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce -(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to-
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband.
(b) where she herself maintains the children born to her before or after her divorce, a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid by her former husband for a OP(FC) No.194/14 -:15:- period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children.
(c) an amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law; and
(d) all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after the marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends.
(2) Where a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance or the amount of mahr or dower due has not been made or paid or the properties referred to in Clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly authorised by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, mahr or dower or the delivery of properties, as the case may be.
(3) Where an application has been made under
sub-section (2) by a divorced woman, the
Magistrate may, if he is satisfied that-
(a) her husband having sufficient means, has failed or neglected to make or pay her within the iddat period a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for her and the children; or
(b) the amount equal to the sum of mahr or dower has not been paid or that the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not been delivered to her, OP(FC) No.194/14 -:16:- make an order, within one month of the date of the filing of the application, directing her former husband to pay such reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to the divorced woman as he may determine as fit and proper having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband or, as the case may be, for the payment of such mahr or dower or the delivery of such properties referred to in clause(d) of sub-
section (1) to the divorced woman:
Provided that if the Magistrate finds it impracticable to dispose of the application within the said period, he may, for reasons to be recorded by him dispose of the application after the said period (4) If any person against whom an order has been made under sub- section (3) fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount of maintenance of mahr or dower due in the manner provided for levying fines under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and may sentence such person, for the whole or part of any amount remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or until payment if sooner made, subject to such person being heard in defence and the said sentence being imposed according to the provisions of the said Code."
14. Explanation appended to Section 7 of the Family OP(FC) No.194/14 -:17:- Courts Act, 1984 takes care of a proceeding in respect of a proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or either of them. Therefore, a claim for return of gold ornaments can also be agitated before the Family Court in terms of Explanation (c) to Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act.
15. But in the present set of facts, the respondent herein filed a case under Section 3 of the 1986 Act before the Magistrate and claimed return of gold ornaments or its value which was rejected by the Magistrate. A revision petition filed against the said order was also dismissed. Under such circumstances, the question is whether such an issue can be reagitated in the pending original petition filed under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
16. Going by Section 3 of the Act, the Magistrate has absolute powers to direct return of gold ornaments or its value thereof. The said direction is in consonance with the powers vested with the Family Court to adjudicate on a dispute under Explanation (c) to Section 7(1). Though the exercise of power is by the Magistrate under Section 3 and the procedure adopted is OP(FC) No.194/14 -:18:- under the Criminal Procedure Code, substantially the issue is the same. In other words, the subject matter in issue is the same. Of course, the Magistrate decides the case based on absolute proof as there is no provision akin to Section 14 of the Family Courts Act whereas Civil Court decides the matter based on preponderance of probabilities. Rules have been framed under Section 6 of the 1986 Act known as the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Rules 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1986 Rules'). The Rules clearly provide for a procedure to be followed by the Magistrate. Rule 3 indicates that a summons has to be issued by a Magistrate on an application made under the Act with a true copy of the application, date of first hearing etc., the summons has to be personally served on the respondent. Rule 4 further indicates that all evidence of the proceedings under the Act shall be taken in the presence of the respondent against whom a payment for provision and maintenance, mahr or dower, or the delivery of property is proposed to be made or when his personal attendance is dispensed with. Therefore the statute and the Rule only gives an option to the divorced woman to submit an application to the Magistrate and thereafter on service of summons, without any OP(FC) No.194/14 -:19:- further pleading, the Magistrate shall proceed with the evidence and pass appropriate orders. In other words, it is not a case where there is an adjudication of the case on the basis of pleadings of the parties, which is the backbone of a civil litigation. In that view of the matter, it cannot be stated that a decision by the Magistrate under Section 3 operates as res judicata with reference to the civil suit.
17. But still the question is when a person opts for a particular enquiry to be conducted with reference to her claim, can a different method be adopted taking into account the principle of estoppel or the doctrine of election. Apparently, such matters have not been considered by the Family Court in this proceedings. The Family Court found that the learned Magistrate could not have given relief due to lack of evidence and that apart the original petition was filed prior to the filing of the case before the Magistrate and therefore, the petition is maintainable.
18. Though the principle of res judicata may not apply in the present facts of the case, still, it is worthwhile to consider whether parallel proceedings can be initiated by a person with respect to the same subject matter. This aspect of the matter OP(FC) No.194/14 -:20:- requires consideration. The question would be when a person had elected to approach a forum having jurisdiction knowing fully well the nature of consideration of matter before the said forum and suffers an order, can the very same person make a claim in a different forum following a different procedure. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the Family Court, since this original petition is filed only on the ground that the principle of res judicata applies to the fact situation and since we have decided that it does not apply, as far as other legal arguments are concerned, it is open for the petitioners to agitate the same at the appropriate stage. We are not expressing any opinion regarding the same.
In the result, this original petition is dismissed, however, reserving liberty to the petitioners to agitate all other contentions before the Family Court at the appropriate time.
Sd/-
A.M. SHAFFIQUE, JUDGE Sd/-
K.RAMAKRISHNAN, JUDGE Rp