Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief ... vs Lakhi Bauri @ Lakhi Devi on 8 January, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:354
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 16 of 2025
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Chief Secretary,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue,
Registration and Land Reforms, Government of
Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The District Land Acquisition Officer, Bokaro
4. The Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro
5. The Circle Officer, Chas, District- Bokaro
... ... Review Petitioners
Versus
1. Lakhi Bauri @ Lakhi Devi, wife of Amulya Bauri, resident
of Dulalpur, P.O.- Radhanagar, P.S.- Balidih, District-
Bokaro
2. Duryodhan Bauri, son of Amulya Bauri, resident of
Dulalpur, P.O.- Radhanagar, P.S.- Balidih, District- Bokaro
3. M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, through its
Chairman, having registered office at Bharat Bhawan, 4
& 6, Currimbhoy Road, Ballard Estate, P.O. & P.S.-
Mumbai, District- Mumbai (Maharashtra)
4. The Area Manager-cum-Side-In-Charge, Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited Depot at Radhanagar,
Village & P.O.- Radhanagar, P.S.- Baridih, District- Bokaro
.... ... Respondents
---
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR For the Review Petitioners: Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, Sr.S.C.-I Mr. Anish Kumar Mishra, AC to Sr.S.C.-I For the Resp. Nos. 1 & 2 : Mr. Baibhaw Gahlaut, Advocate For the Resp.- BPCL : Mr. Ajit Kumar, Sr. Advocate Order No. 19 Dated: 08.01.2026 The present Civil Review has been filed seeking review of the order dated 03.08.2023 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 4278 of 2020.
2. The writ petitioners (the respondent nos. 1 & 2 herein) filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 4278 of 2020 for issuance of direction upon the respondents to make payment of compensation for the land appertaining to Khata No. 136, Plot No. 432, measuring an area of 2 acres of Mauza Radhanagar, Thana 1 2026:JHHC:354 No.36/201, Halka No. 13, Circle-Chas, District-Bokaro (hereinafter referred to as "the said land") which was transferred to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) for construction of Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) depot along with railway siding by illegally dispossessing them. Further prayer was made for issuance of direction upon the respondents to make payment of interest @ 15% from the date of dispossession and other consequential benefits accruing therefrom. The writ petitioners also prayed for issuance of direction upon the respondents to pay damages to them for illegal possession and use of the said land.
3. The claim of the writ petitioners before the writ court was that the said land was settled in favour of the writ petitioner no. 1 under the scheme of allotment of land to SC/ST and Backward Class, vide Settlement Case No. 18(XIII) of 1988-89 and jamabandi of the said land was opened in her name.
4. A proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short, the Act, 1950) was initiated for cancellation of jamabandi of the said land and a notice was issued to the writ petitioner no. 1.
5. It was further stated in the said writ petition that the BPCL had started construction on the said land without payment of compensation to the writ petitioners.
6. The BPCL took stand in the said writ proceeding that the compensation for acquisition of the said land was already deposited with the State Government and considering the said stand, the writ petition was allowed by this Court vide order 2 2026:JHHC:354 dated 03.08.2023 directing the State Government to determine appropriate compensation of the said land under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short "the Act, 2013") and to pay the same to the writ petitioner no.1 within eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of the said order.
7. The review petitioners have sought review of the order dated 03.08.2023 passed in the said writ petition on the ground that the nature of the said land was 'Gair Mazarua' and in that view of the matter, no proceeding for acquisition of the said land was initiated, rather the same was permanently transferred to the BPCL vide order as contained in memo no. 3333 dated 04.09.2019.
8. It is also contended that in lieu of the transfer of 3.04 acres of land, the BPCL had paid a sum of Rs.91,13,954/- as "Salami, Lagan and cess" to the State-Government and the BPCL had incorrectly submitted in the writ proceeding that it had made payment of compensation for acquisition of the said land.
9. It is further contended that one Niwaran Marandi along with others had claimed title over 10 acres out of 69.65 acres of land and had approached this court by filing a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3648 of 2019 (Niwaran Marandi & Ors. Vs.The State of Jharkhand & Ors.) for quashing of proceeding initiated under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 and for payment of compensation. The said writ petition was disposed of vide 3 2026:JHHC:354 order dated 03.09.2021 [reported in 2022 (1) JLJR 11] directing the State Government to determine appropriate compensation of the said 10 acres of land forthwith and to deliver possession of the same to the BPCL on payment of proportionate compensation to the petitioners of that case. In compliance of the said order, the BPCL was informed by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Bokaro that the estimated compensation for 10 acres of land was Rs. 2,26,11,028/- and the same was to be deposited in the government account so as to make payment of compensation to the claimants/writ petitioners of the said case and accordingly, the compensation amount was paid by the BPCL.
10. Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Sr.S.C.-I appearing on behalf of the review petitioners, submits that a similar situation has arisen in the present case also as the entire 'Gair Mazarua' land measuring an area of 3.04 acres was transferred to the BPCL for which "Salami along with Lagal and cess" was assessed to the tune of Rs.91,13,954/- and the said amount was deposited by the BPCL under the government head. The BPCL has however not paid any amount of compensation to the State as was done in the case of Niwaran Marandi (supra).
11. It is further argued that out of the total 'Gair Mazarua' land of 3.04 acres, the writ petitioners have claimed title over 2 acres of the land, the compensation for which has been assessed by the authority under the Act, 2013 which comes to Rs.53,45,219.00 and the same is required to be paid by the BPCL as proportionate amount to the writ petitioners. 4
2026:JHHC:354
12. It is also submitted that no special ground has been made out by the BPCL for exemption from payment of compensation amount as the government has already given concession by reducing the Salami substantially from 20.91 crores to 7.85 crores for transferring 'Gair Mazarua' land of 69.65 acres. Even otherwise, the amount of Salami determined and paid by the BPCL has already been deposited in the government treasury under 'Budget Head' and the said amount cannot be utilized for the payment of compensation to the raiyat(s) in compliance of the order of this Court.
13. On the contrary, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-BPCL submits that the BPCL had made a requisition to the State Government for acquisition of lands and on such requisition, the BPCL was directed to deposit 80% of Rs.91,13,954/- so that 3.04 acres of land could be transferred in favour of the BPCL. Thereafter, the BPCL deposited a sum of Rs.72,91,163/- (being 80% of the total amount as demanded) on 22.1.2019 in the account of Additional Collector, Bokaro and due information to that effect was given to the Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro vide letter dated 24.01.2019 along with copy of online challan. The remaining amount of Rs.18,22,791/- was subsequently deposited on 09.10.2019 vide e-Pay Order No. CHD9956532 in the same account. Thereafter, the said land was permanently allotted to the BPCL.
14. It is further submitted that since the BPCL has already paid the amount as demanded by the State Government vide 5 2026:JHHC:354 memo no. 3333 dated 04.09.2019, it is not fair on the part of the State Government to raise any further demand from the BPCL.
15. It is also argued that at no point of time, the BPCL was intimated by the State Government regarding any proceeding pending u/s 4(h) of the Act, 1950 and hence, it was not within the knowledge of the BPCL that there was any encumbrance on the said land. If the BPCL had knowledge that it would have to incur further liability, it could have examined the feasibility of such requisition.
16. It is further contended that as regards the claim of the review petitioners that the amount of Rs.91,13,954/- has been paid by way of "Salami, Lagan & cess" and not by way of compensation, the State Government had never disclosed to the BPCL that a proceeding under the Act, 1950 was pending with regard to the said land, rather the State Government had claimed that the same was owned and possessed by it.
17. Learned senior counsel further submits that either the State Government be directed to pay the compensation in terms of the Act, 2013 out of the amount deposited by the BPCL or in case BPCL is made to pay compensation in terms of the Act, 2013, the State be directed to refund the said amount to it. It would be unfair and improper to direct the BPCL to pay compensation twice: firstly, to State Government and secondly to the writ petitioners for the same piece of land.
18. According to learned senior counsel, the direction in the 6 2026:JHHC:354 case of Niwaran Marandi (supra.) was issued looking to the peculiar facts and circumstance of the said case with an observation that the same would not be taken as a precedence by any other person claiming to be similarly situated and as such the review petitioners cannot claim the same direction in the present case. Moreover, the facts and circumstance of the present case is different from the case of Niwaran Marandi (supra.) as in the said case, there was a lease of 69.65 acres of land in favour of the BPCL for a period of 30 years whereas in the present case, there is permanent transfer of the land in question by the State Government to the BPCL.
19. Further, it is wrong to say that the amount of Salami was reduced as a measure of concession. In fact, an amount of Rs.20.91 crores was initially calculated on the basis of the fact that the land was proposed to be permanently transferred, however subsequently it was decided to lease the same in favour of BPCL for a period of 30 years and accordingly the amount was reduced to Rs.7.85 crores.
20. It is also submitted that the BPCL had decided to deposit additional sum of Rs.2,26,11,208/- for 10 acres of land due to the reason that this Court had initially passed an order of status-quo over 10 acres of land claimed by said Niwaran Marandi and others and the BPCL was not in a position to go ahead with the construction of the depot. The said construction was in advance stage and the BPCL had invested huge amount by that time. In such a situation, if the BPCL had not agreed to deposit 7 2026:JHHC:354 Rs.2,26,11,028/-, the entire investment would have been in dire straits. In such peculiar circumstance, the BPCL had decided to make the payment and complete the project, however the same cannot be taken as a precedence.
21. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
22. According to learned counsel for the review petitioners, the BPCL during the writ proceeding, had wrongly submitted before this Court that the compensation for the said land was already paid to the State. In fact, the amount paid to the State by the BPCL in lieu of transfer of the said land was for "Salami, Lagan & cess" and not the compensation. By putting reliance on the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Niwaran Marandi (supra.), the review petitioners have claimed that in the present case also, similar direction may be issued and the BPCL may be directed to pay the amount of compensation for the said land so as to disburse it to the writ petitioners.
23. The relevant part of the judgment rendered in W.P.(C) No. 4278 of 2020 is quoted hereinbelow: -
"12. In the present case also, on the one hand, the proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 for cancellation of jamabandi was pending before the Commissioner, North Chotanagpur Division, Hazaribagh (though such proceeding was itself not maintainable) and on the other hand, the said land was transferred to BPCL, which clearly reflects that the proceeding under Section 4(h) of the Act, 1950 was merely an eye wash to somehow 8 2026:JHHC:354 evict the petitioners from the said land without payment of due compensation to them for acquisition of the same.
13. The stand of the BPCL is that the compensation for the said land has already been deposited with the State Government and as such, the State Government is directed to determine appropriate compensation of the said land under the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and pay the same to the petitioner no. 1 within eight weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order."
24. The writ petitioners filed Contempt Case (Civil) No. 943 of 2023 on 02.11.2023 alleging willful non-compliance of the order dated 03.08.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4278 of 2020 and during the pendency of the said contempt case, the review petitioners filed the present review petition after delay of 455 days.
25. On bare perusal of the letter issued by the Additional Collector, Bokaro to the Member INFRA (T/F) ER, BPCL, Kolkata vide memo No. 2096 dated 18.09.2018, it would be evident that vide said letter, the Additional Collector had informed the BPCL that total 3.04 acres land of village Radhanagar was demarcated to be transferred to BPCL which in turn was directed to deposit 80% of the total calculated amount of "Salami, Lagan & cess" i.e. Rs.91,13,954.00. The said amount included 'Salami' of Rs.22,43,429/- which was equivalent to the market rate of the said 3.04 acres of land (i.e. Rs.7,37,970.00 per acre).
26. The claim of the BPCL is that the entire calculated amount was deposited with the State Government and only thereafter the 9 2026:JHHC:354 said land was transferred in its favour. The said claim of the BPCL has not been denied by the review petitioners.
27. On perusal of the record, it appears that despite the fact that the said land was settled in the name of the writ petitioner no. 1, the State Government transferred the same to the BPCL and also received the amount of compensation from it in the name of "Salami, Lagan & cess" claiming that the said land was 'Gair Mazarua'.
28. While passing the order dated 03.08.2023 in W.P.(C) No. 4278 of 2020, this Court specifically held that the proceeding under section 4(h) for cancellation of jamabandi was merely an eye wash to somehow evict the writ petitioners from the concerned land without payment of compensation and as such, the review petitioners were duty bound to pay the compensation to the writ petitioners. However, instead of complying the said order, the review petitioners have filed the present civil review by taking an absurd plea that the amount paid by the BPCL was in the name of "Salami, Lagan & cess" and not compensation.
29. In the case of Niwaran Marandi (supra) which has been relied upon by the review petitioners, this Court had directed the BPCL to pay the compensation to the writ petitioners of that case looking to the peculiar facts and circumstances and in the said order itself, it was observed that the same would not be taken as a precedence by any other person claiming to be similarly situated.
30. So far as the present case is concerned, the clear stand of 10 2026:JHHC:354 the BPCL is that the compensation of the said land was already paid and during the writ proceeding, the review petitioners did not controvert the said claim. Only when, the writ petitioners filed contempt case, in order to save themselves from any action of this court, the State and its authorities have filed the present civil review by taking a complete new stand that the amount paid by the BPCL was "Salami, Lagan & cess" and not the compensation for the said land.
31. Moreover, as per the direction of this Court, the compensation with respect to the said land belonging to the writ petitioners has been assessed by the authority under the Act, 2013 which comes to Rs.53,45,219.00 and the BPCL has already deposited an amount of Rs.91,13,954/- to the review petitioners which is much more than the amount of compensation to be paid to them. Thus, the review petitioners cannot deny payment of compensation to the writ petitioners merely on the ground that the amount paid to them was in the name of "Salami, Lagan & cess". The stand taken by the review petitioners that the amount of "Salami, Lagan & cess" paid by the BPCL has already been deposited in the government treasury under Budget Head as a result of which there is no fund available for payment of compensation to the writ petitioners, is also not acceptable to this Court in view of the fact that once the compensation has already been deposited by the BPCL with the State Government, it is the duty of the State to release the compensation amount to the rightful claimant.
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32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again laid down the law with respect to the scope of entertaining a review petition by the High Courts. It is appropriate to refer few of those judgments which are as under:-
33. In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aibam Pishak Sharma & Ors., reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"3. ......... It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
(emphasis supplied)
34. In the case of Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri 12 2026:JHHC:354 Devi and others reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case of Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Mawasi and others, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200, has held as under:
"27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed:
"19. Review literally and even judicially means reexamination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory 13 2026:JHHC:354 provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216) '... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. ... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.' Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under: 'It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.' Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for 14 2026:JHHC:354 disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:
"32. ... It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction 15 2026:JHHC:354 circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words 'any other sufficient reason' must mean 'a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule'. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of 'mistake or error apparent on the face of the record' or some ground analogous thereto."
29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed:
"11. ... A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made 16 2026:JHHC:354 out."
30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe:
"3. ... But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed:
"9. ... An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC ... A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words:
"56. ... Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of 17 2026:JHHC:354 power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised."
34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed:
"13. ... The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason'. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."
35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex 18 2026:JHHC:354 debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.
22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not selfevident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision."
36. Thus, it is no more res-integra that a review petition cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, even after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was made. It may only be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found or on any analogous ground.
37. In the present case, the review petitioners have failed to make out any of the above grounds so as to review the order 19 2026:JHHC:354 dated 03.08.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4278 of 2020, rather from the facts of the case, it is evident that the present frivolous review petition has been filed by the review petitioners only with an intent to save their skin in the contempt proceeding.
38. The said conduct of the review petitioners is quite detrimental to the interest of the writ petitioners who are still deprived of due compensation for the said land in spite of the specific order dated 03.08.2023 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4278 of 2020.
39. This Court takes serious note of the conduct of the State authorities particularly of the District Land Acquisition Officer, Bokaro in filing this frivolous review petition. Such an attitude is bound to be strongly deprecated and the said officer deserves to be saddled with an exemplary cost.
40. Accordingly, the District Land Acquisition Officer, Bokaro, who has sworn the affidavit of the present review petition, shall pay a cost of Rs.1,00,000/- to the writ petitioner no. 1 (the respondent no.1 herein) from his own resources within two weeks from today and file proof of the same, failing which the registry shall report the non-compliance to the Bench.
41. The review petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Rajesh Shankar, J.) January 08, 2026 Ritesh/A.F.R. Uploaded on 08.01.2026 20