Central Administrative Tribunal - Cuttack
Begum Bibi vs Steel Authority Of India on 3 March, 2025
1 T.A.260/00012 of 2014
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CUTTACK BENCH, CUTTACK
T.A.No. 260/00012 of 2014
Reserved on: 14.02.2025 Pronounced on :03.03.2025
Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Sudhi Ranjan Mishra, Member (J)
1. Smt. Begum Bibi, aged about 46 years, W/o late Asgar Ali.
2. Sk. Afjal Ali, aged about 28 years, S/o late Asgar Ali.
Both are residents of Qrs No.H/522, Sector-5, Rourkela,
District-Sundergarh.
..... Applicants
-Versus-
1. Union of India, represented through its Managing Director,
Steel Authority of India, Ltd. Rourkela Steel Plant, At/P.O.
Rourkela, District-Sundergarh.
2. Deputy General Manager, CRM(E), Steel Authority of India,
Rourkela Steel Plant, At/P.O. Rourkela, District-Sundergarh.
3. Assistant General Manager, CRM(E), Steel Authority of India,
Rourkela Steel Plant, At/P.O. Rourkela, District-Sundergarh.
......Respondents
For the applicant : Mr. S.B. Mohanty, Counsel
For the respondents : Mr. N.K. Sahu, Counsel
2 T.A.260/00012 of 2014
O R D E R
SUDHI RANJAN MISHRA, MEMBER (J):
The facts of the case is that, the applicants being the widow and the son of the deceased employee had preferred the Writ Application before the Hon'ble High Court which was subsequently transferred and registered as TA No.12/2014 with a prayer for Rehabilitation Assistance. The deceased Government employee was working as Senior Technician under the Rourkela Steel Plant since 1965 and continuing as such. While he was continuing in his service due to ill health, he was under medical treatment at IGH Hospital, Rourkela from 28/12/2002 to 25/01/2003. After being recovered and with due advice of the treating physician, he resumed his duty on 27/01/2003 and perform the duty on "B" shift. In course of employment while he was discharging his duty suddenly felt uneasy for which he intimated to the Authority and leave the working place for medical checkup. To his utter misfortune on the way he mates with an accident with a motor car on Bishra Square which resulted severe multiple injury on his person and immediately he was admitted in IGH Hospital, Rourkela and in the course of treatment he died on 05/02/2003. After the untimely death, the bereaved family was in distressed condition as he was the sole bread earner of the family. The widow Begum Bibi 3 T.A.260/00012 of 2014 who was the Applicant in the OA was also died in the meantime in poverty on 25/04/2018. The Applicant has submitted all relevant documents in support of the claim including the order of rejection under Annexure-4 and Annexure-6 to the OA dated 05/05/2003 and 30/07/2003 respectively. On perusal of the same it would be crystal clear that they have not disputed the accident in course of employment and also the entitlement and moreover the very order of rejection does not specify the details of the grounds of rejection rather it is a formal order which is non application of mind and shows the arbitrariness of the Authority even without considering the genuine and bonafideness of the Applicant. Besides that, the applicant has also submitted the relevant documents like the date of joining and the gate pass and the very doctor certificate along with the pay slip which has not been disputed by the Petitioner. The petitioner has falsely alleged that the accident was not in course of employment which is tale tell wrong and ignoring the factual aspect of the case and against the records. The very order of rejection is not in consonance with law and it cannot say to be a reasoned order which deserves to be quashed and the Applicant be given appointment in order to save the family and to maintain the livelihood.
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2. That the learned Tribunal while disposing the Original Application has considered all the aspects and finally remitted back the matter to the Petitioner/ SAIL to reconsider the case of the Opp. party for compassionate appointment in accordance with the scheme and pass appropriate order. The Hon'ble Tribunal while disposing the matter has very well considered the case of (SAIL Vrs. Smt. Jema) wherein it is well decided that the death was out of and in course of employment which is squarely covered the case. Hence, the applicants case of compassionate appointment deserves kind consideration.
3. The respondents filed counter inter alia stating that in order to get the benefit of compassionate employment the applicants have relied upon the Circular dated 22.09.1982, Memorandum of Agreement dated 23.07.2001 & 29.04.2010. It is submitted that the applicant is not governed under the Circular dated 22.09.1982 as at the time of death of employee and consideration of the application for compassionate employment, the Circular dated 01.01.1996 was in vogue. As per the Circular dated 01.01.1996, dependants of employees dying out of accidents in course of employment will not be extended the benefit of compassionate employment. Therefore, the 5 T.A.260/00012 of 2014 claim of the applicant No.2 is totally illegal and he is not entitled to appointment on compassionate ground. The relevant clause of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 29.04.2010 is quoted below:-
"Clause 3.5.6. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS
1. d) Workmen's Compensation benefit will continue to be extended to injury cases causing death or permanent/ temporary disablement arising during jurney from residence to place of work and back within one hour of the start or end of his duty hours provided that the accident takes place on the normal route of journey to the place of work".
4. It is submitted that by the learned counsel for the respondents that the applicant No.2 is not entitled to any benefit under the aforesaid clause of the agreement in as much as it is clearly borne out from records that the deceased employee was working in 'B' Shift on 27.01.2003. The duty hours for employees working in ' B' shift is from 2PM to 10 PM. However, in the present case th deceased employee left the duty at 7 PM and he was absent for the remaining shift which has been admitted by the applicant in her representation dated 19.06.2003(Annexure-A/6). It is further submitted that since the deceased employee has left the premises of company before 6 T.A.260/00012 of 2014 completion of duty hours, there is no scope to give compassionate employment to the applicant No.2 under Clause 3.5.6 1.(d) of the agreement dated 29.04.2010.
5. It is contended by the respondents that the claim of the applicant No.2 to get compassionate employment after more than 22 years of the death of deceased employee i.e. 05.02.2003 is not maintainable since the family has received benefits to the tune of Rs. 10,31,826/- at the time of death of the deceased employee. It is further submitted that, since the family is not in distress nor can be said to be entirely in penury and more than 22 years have elapsed in the mean time, the claim of compassionate employment is unsustainable. The position of law is well settled that for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the constitution. In view of aforesaid legal position, the claim for compassionate appointment cannot be entertained after lapse of 7 T.A.260/00012 of 2014 considerable period of time and the application being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for both sides, perused the records and citations relied upon by them.
7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and Another vrs. Francis De Costa and Another (1996) 6 SCC, the relevant portion is quoted below:-
"5. That the first respondent has suffered a personal injury is not in dispute. The only dispute is whether the injury will amount to "employment injury" within the meaning of Section 2(8), so as to enable the respondent to d claim benefit under the Act. The definition given to "employment injury"
in sub-section (8) of Section 2 envisages a personal injury to an employee caused by an accident or an occupational disease "arising out of and in the course of his employment". Therefore, the employee, in order to succeed in this case, will have to prove that the injury he had suffered arose out of and was in the course of his employment. Both the conditions will have to be fulfilled before he could claim any benefit under the Act. It does not appear that the injury suffered by the employee in the instant case arose in any way out of his employment. The injury was sustained while the employee was on his way to the factory where he was employed. The accident took place one 8 T.A.260/00012 of 2014 kilometre away from the place of employment. Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from his home, it f cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident "arising out of ... his employment". A road accident may happen anywhere at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something incidental to his employment.
7. Unless an employee can establish that the injury was caused or had its origin in the employment, he cannot succeed in a claim based on Section 2(8) of the Act. The words "accident arising out of ... his employment" indicate that any accident which occurred while going to the place of employment or for the purpose of employment, cannot be said to have arisen out of his employment. There is no causal connection between the accident and the employment.
12. This is precisely the case before us. Here also, we have a case of a person going from his home to his place of work. But he suffers injury in an accident on the way. It cannot be said that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. It was faintly suggested by Mr Chacko, appearing on behalf of the respondent, that the bicycle was bought by taking a loan from the employer.
That, however, is of no relevance. He might have borrowed money from his Company or from somewhere else for purchasing the bicycle. But the fact remains that the bicycle belonged to him 9 T.A.260/00012 of 2014 and not the employer. If he meets with an accident while riding his own bicycle on the way his place of work, it cannot be said that the accident was reasonably incidental to the employment and was in the course of his employment. The deeming provision of Section 51-C, which came into force by way of an amendment effected by the Employees' State Insurance (Amendment) Act of 1966 (Act No. 44 of 1966), enlarged the scope of the phrase "in the course of employment" to include travelling as a passenger by the employer's vehicle to or from the place of work. The legal fiction contained in Section 51-C. however, does not come into play in this case because the employee was not travelling as a passenger in any vehicle owned or operated by or on behalf of the employer or by some other person in pursuance of an arrangement made by the employer."
8. As per the relevant clause of the Memorandum of agreement dated 23.07.2001 (Annexure-A/11) is quoted below:-
"3.4.5 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS 3.4.5.1 The employees covered by this settlement shall continue to be entitled to the benefits admissible under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 as under:
a) The benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act will not be affected adversely on account of the revision of wages by this settlement.
10 T.A.260/00012 of 2014
b) The compensation during the period of disablement shall be paid on the basis of last wage drawn immediately before the employee met with the accident.
c) The erstwhile wages of an employee on rehabilitation will be protected respective of the place where he/she has been rehabilitated.
d) Workmen's Compensation benefit will continue to be extended to injury cases causing death or permanent/temporary disablement arising during journey from residence to place of work and back within one hour of the start or end of his duty hours provided that the accident takes place on the normal route of journey to the place of work.
e) If an employee is disabled due to accident arising out of and during the course of employment, he/she will get full wages and dearness allowance from the date of accident till the employee is declared fit by the Company's medical officer as per the existing practice.
f) In case of death or permanent total disablement due to accident arising out of and in course of employment, employment to one of his/her direct dependents will be provided, However, instead of employment, the dependent may opt for benefits under Employees' Family Benefit Scheme (EFBS).
11 T.A.260/00012 of 2014
9. In the instant case father of the applicant No.2 on 27.01.2003 left work place for medical checkup and met with an accident enroute and admitted in IGS Hospital, Routkela where he on 05.02.2003 breathed his last. Admittedly the accident took place on 05.02.2023 outside the office premises/place of employment and as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and Another Vrs. Francis De Costa and Another (Supra) read with the conditions stipulated in their rules, since the accident took place outside place of employment, we see no justification to interfere in the decision taken by the authority concerned; especially in the absence of any challenge to the conditions stipulated in the Memorandum of agreement. Accordingly, the OA is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Sudhi Ranjan Mishra) Member (Judl.) K.B/PS