Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gopal Gupta vs Central Narcotics Bureau on 29 November, 2018
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
1
M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017
(Gopal Gupta Vs. Central Narcotics Bureau, Morar, Gwalior)
Gwalior Bench: Dated: 29.11.2018
Shri Raj Kumar Singh Kushwah, learned counsel for the
petitioner.
Shri Vivek Khedkar, learned Assistant Solicitor General for
the respondent/State.
With consent, heard finally.
The present petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the petitioner for quashment of FIR No.2/2017 dated 19.01.2017, registered under Section 8/29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act 1985 (hereinafter referred as "NDPS Act"), by the Central Bureau of Narcotics, Morar, Gwalior and all consequential proceedings. Later on, although the petitioner placed the charge-sheet filed by the respondent by way of private complaint, but pleadings remained the same, without any amendment.
2. Precisely stated facts of the case are that on the basis of secret information, Officer of Central Bureau of Narcotics (hereinafter referred as "CBN") seized about 76,200 bottles of Phensedyl Syrup (Cough Syrup) 100 ml. each on 20.01.2017 from the garage of the residence of petitioner situate at Ravi Nagar Gwalior. It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioner was unable to show any license/document to validate possession of pharmaceutical preparation containing Codeine phosphate which is a narcotic drug. Later on, private complaint was filed by the respondent/CBN under Sections 8, 21, 28 and 29 of the NDPS Act and it was referred in the complaint that with the name of M/s Pharma Traders, Hujrat Kotwali, Gwalior illicit trafficking and transportation of Phensedyl Syrup to North East States were conducted. On the tip off of secret information, inquiry conducted HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 2 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 and found that only with the name of Pharma Agency, a shop was operated.
3. Thereafter, it was found that the person at the helm was Rajendra Bandil, who represented himself as Manager and on search, 150 cartoons of Phensedyl Syrup was found and he could not able to give the details of sale and purchase of the goods. On inquiry, he admitted that he is the Manager and Proprietor is Smt. Anita Gupta. Thereafter, computers of Pharma Agencies were seized and on analysis, it was found that a large quantity of Phensedyl Syrup was sold on 01.04.2016 to 05.08.2016 to the different agencies at Delhi, Kolkata and Gwalior and when those agencies at Delhi, Kolkata and Gwalior were inquired then they categorically denied the purchase of said Phensedyl Syrup. Out of six firms, Abhay Traders Delhi, Tara Medical Agency Kolkata and Galav Pharmaceutical Gwalior were the firms who denied the purchase of said Phensedyl Syrup and K.D.M. Enterprises Gwalior was found to be run by Rajendra Bandil and Global Marketing Gwalior was run in the name of petitioner's son and company Pharma Sales was run in the name of father of petitioner.
4. Thereafter, on a tip off, on 19.01.2017, Inspector, Central Bureau of Narcotics, Gwalior raided the house of petitioner. Initially the petitioner did not come out from his house, then police protection was taken and he was apprised by the consequences orally from outside then he opened the door and in his presence, search was conducted in the basement of his residence where about 76,200 bottles of Phensedyl Syrup have been seized. Thereafter, FIR was registered under the provisions of NDPS Act. The seven distributors of the said product gave the statement under Section 67 of NDPS Act and admitted the fact that said batch of Phensrdyl Syrup was not sold to Pharma Agencies and HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 3 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 some of the distributors, as referred in the complaint, despite issuing summons did not appear and submit the information as sought by the department. Remaining distributor Pharma Traders Morena is owned by proprietor Gopal Gupta petitioner himself, he did not file any document in support of his submission regarding purchase of the Phensedyl Syrup. The search conducted on 19.01.2017 and at that time Gopal Gupta denied that any license is possessed by him, but later on he produced a license dated 15.02.2016 in which proprietor of the firm Global Marketing is his son Ritik Gupta and the competent person to take care of the drugs was Rajesh Gupta who happens to be the co-brother of Gopal Gupta and he denied regarding existence of any license or declaration of competent person.
5. Private complaint further reveals that notified competent person Rajesh Gupta did not have any experience for distribution of drugs and so was the case of Ritik Gupta S/o Gopal Gupta who also did not have any experience to run the Pharma business. Therefore, firm Global Marketing was established as a cover to conduct illicit trafficking of Phensedyl Syrup. Through the various international conventions and covenants as referred in the private complaint as well as in the reply, department asserted that drugs menace is a serious social and political menace disturbing the relationship of countries and therefore, need to be curved at an urgent note.
6. Since the Phensedyl Syrup has been used for other than pharmaceutical use, therefore, petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 8(c) of NDPS Act and the quantity is much higher than prescribed guideline. Therefore, complaint for violation of Sections 8, 21, 28, and 29 was preferred and sought conviction.
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 4 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017
7. After registration of FIR, the instant petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been preferred. Later on, charge-sheet by way of private complaint has been filed by the department. Therefore, petitioner without causing any amendment and incorporation of the challenge to the said charge-sheet, continued with the submission that the case is not made out and respondent erred in registering the FIR against the petitioner.
8. It is the submission of the petitioner as echoed in the petition and through the submissions that Phensedyl Syrup does contain codeine but the said drug does not fall within the definition of provisions of NDPS Act, because vide notification dated 14.11.1985 of Government of India, it has been stated that if the concentration of codeine in 100 mg. of drugs dose unit is not more than 2.5% as undivided preparation, the same shall be exempted from the category of narcotic drug. Therefore, Phensedyl Syrup does not fall in the category of narcotic drug and the petitioner cannot be fastened with the liability. Through the circular issued by the Drug Controller General in 2005, petitioner asserts that the drug would not fall under the purview of NDPS Act if the percentage as provided under the notification is not breached. Petitioner has been made an accused whereas he is an authorized wholesale dealer having drug license authorizing him to transact in the business of drugs which have been seized by the authority in question. Petitioner and sellers both have relevant documentation and bills for the drug in question at all relevant point of time.
9. Violation of Sections 42 and 50 of NDPS were also alleged. Violation of Sections 41 and 42 is apparent on record. Phensedyl Syrup has been prepared by Abbott Health Care Private Limited and from there, petitioner purchased the Phensedyl Syrup and HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 5 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 being license holder, entire search and seizure operation have been done without any legal justification.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner while referring many provisions of the NDPS Act argued that in the FIR, only allegation against the petitioner is that he was not found in possession of the documentation and transportation of the said drug from one place to another place and that can be ascertained by the documents submitted by the petitioner. The particular percentage of quantity of a drugs cannot be the basis for implication under the NDPS Act. He relied upon many judgments passed by the Court in respect of controversy in question and seeks parity.
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the prayer made by the petitioner and submits that initially FIR has been challenged by the petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and during the pendency of this petition, charge- sheet has been filed as private complaint. The petitioner has filed copy of private complaint but has not amended the petition wherein quashment of private complaint could have been sought, therefore, petition suffers from the inadequate pleadings.
12. It is further submitted that the scope of petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is limited and case involves disputed question of facts. Different provisions of NDPS Act and The Drugs and Cosmetics, Act 1940 are to be seen and the same cannot be considered and discussed under the scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Excerpts of international Narcotics Control Bureau report from 2009 to 2015 were referred in which growing menace of illegal trafficking pharmaceutical preparation was shown.
13. Beside that learned counsel for the respondent further submits that license has not been produced at the time of seizure despite of repeated demands. While referring the provisions HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 6 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 contained in Section 2 (viiiB) of NDPS Act , respondent submits that petitioner was involved in illicit trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and violated conditions of license. Therefore, he is rightly being chargesheeted through private complaint. Respondent relied upon the provisions contained in Sections 8 and 9 of the Act also and submits that requisite safeguard and procedural compliance were taken into consideration as contained in Sections 42, 50, 57 and 76 of the NDPS Act.
14. Respondent further submitted that statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act of those persons who were alleged to be purchaser of the goods allegedly sold by the petitioner to them, denied such transaction and categorically denied about the receipt of any such bottles of Phensedyl Syrup. M/s Abbott Pharmaceutical (Manufacturer of Phensrdyl Syrup) supplied only 5000 bottles of Phensedyl Syrup to one distributor in a week and 20000 bottles in a month. The perusal of stock of drug recovered from the petitioner's premises shows that it has been stocked for selling without following the terms and conditions of the license which has been granted under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and that's why at the time of seizure, petitioner did not produce any documentary proof and subsequently by way of application, certain documents have been produced, but the same are within the purview of trial and cannot be decided under the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. While relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another Vs. Sanjeev V. Deshpande reported in (2014) 13 SCC 1 and Mohd. Sahabuddin and another Vs. State of Assam reported in (2012) 13 SCC 491. Respondent asserts that HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 7 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 the contents of Phensedyl Syrup is yet to be ascertained as well as the probable use because it was not meant for therapeutic used as tried to submit by the petitioner.
15. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgment rendered by the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Baljeet Singh Vs. Union of India (NCB) reported in 2015 (5) R.C.R. (Criminal) 47 and Vicky @ Baba and another Vs. Union of India reported in 2015 (14) R.C.R. (Criminal) 854 and judgment rendered by High Court of Kolkata in the case of Pankaj Shukla Vs. UOI and others reported in 2016 (4) Cal. H.C.N. 233. It is further submitted that at the time of raid, no sign of existence of any pharmacy as required under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and rules made thereunder, was found. Therefore, allegation is that for illicit trafficking of Phensedyl Syrup the godown and premises have been used and to cover up the transaction a license under the Drugs and Cosmetics, Act 1940 has been taken in the name of Global Marketing. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of this petition.
16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended thereto.
17. The scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is well defined. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kurukshetra University Vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1977 SC 2229 laid down the exact nature and scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C.. In the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 Apex Court culled out the principles for interference in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.. The said principles had been reiterated time and again by the Apex Court including in the case of S. Krishnamoorthy Vs. Chellammal reported in (2015) 14 SCC 559 and in the case of HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 8 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 Taramani Parakh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2015 Cr.L.J. SC 2031. Therefore, from the guidance given by the Apex Court in the catena of judgments some of which are referred above, it is well settled in law that the scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. although vast in nature needs to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in a case, where any of the principles culled out by the Apex Court are attracted. The case, in hand, needs to be seen on the anvil of such preposition propounded by the Apex Court.
18. The main allegation against the petitioner is illicit trafficking of Phensedyl Syrup without using the license conditions because as per submissions of respondent in the return, 76,200 bottles of Phensedyl Syrup have been seized which were alleged to be used by the petitioner for commercial gains. Section 67 of NDPS Act deals in respect of powers of an officer referred in Section 42 of NDPS Act to call for information and the said section has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Kanhaiyalal Vs. Union of India reported in (2008) 4 SCC 668 has held as under :-
"42. Of course, this Court has also held in Pon Adithans case (supra) that even if a person is placed under arrest and thereafter makes a statement which seeks to incriminate him, the bar under Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not operate against him if such statement was given voluntarily and without any threat or compulsion and if supported by corroborating evidence.
43. The law involved in deciding this appeal has been considered by this Court from as far back as in 1963 in Pyare Lal Bhargava case (supra). The consistent view which has been taken with regard to confessions made under provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act and other criminal enactments, such as the Customs Act, 1962, has been that such statements may be treated as confessions for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, but with HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 9 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 the caution that the Court should satisfy itself that such statements had been made voluntarily and at a time when the person making such statement had not been made an accused in connection with the alleged offence.
44. In addition to the above, in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India and others (1990) 2 SCC 409, this Court held that officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence who have been vested with powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a police station under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, 1985, are not "police officers" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, a confessional statement recorded by such officer in the course of investigation of a person accused of an offence under the Act is admissible in evidence against him. It was also held that power conferred on officers under the NDPS Act in relation to arrest, search and seizure were similar to powers vested on officers under the Customs Act. Nothing new has been submitted which can persuade us to take a different view.
45. Considering the provisions of Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the views expressed by this Court in Raj Kumar Karwals case (supra), with which we agree, that an officer vested with the powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station under Section 53 of the above Act is not a "Police Officer" within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, it is clear that a statement made under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act is not the same as a statement made under Section 161 of the Code, unless made under threat or coercion. It is this vital difference, which allows a statement made under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act to be used as a confession against the person making it and excludes it from the operation of Sections 24 to 27 of the Evidence Act.
47. It may also be recalled that though an application was made for retracting the confession made by the appellant, neither was any order passed on the said application nor was the same proved during the trial so as to water down the evidentiary value of the said statement. On the other hand, in the absence of such evidence on record, the High Court had no option but to proceed on the basis of the confession as made by the appellant under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 10 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 Since it has been held by this Court that an officer for the purposes of Section 67 of the NDPS Act read with Section 42 thereof, is not a police officer, the bar under Sections 24 and 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be attracted and the statement made by a person directed to appear before the officer concerned may be relied upon as a confessional statement against such person. Since a conviction can be maintained solely on the basis of a confession made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, we see no reason to interfere with the conclusion of the High Court convicting the appellant."
19. Therefore, validity of Section 67 of NDPS Act assumes importance in the case, in hand, when the persons to whom the drugs was alleged to have been sold, have denied such transaction and have denied receipt of drug as sale proceed from petitioner to them. Abhay Traders Delhi, Tara Medical Agency Kolkata and Galav Pharmaceutical Gwalior (Total 22,400 bottles) denied such transaction. Therefore, these bottles under the garb of transaction might have been used for illicit trafficking as defined in Section 2(viiiB) of NDPS Act. Beside that Sections 8 and 9 of NDPS Act is of vast amplitude where all exigencies in respect of manufacture, possession, transportation, sale, purchase, consumption or use have been taken into its ambit.
20. Similarly, Section 80 of the NDPS Act contemplates the application of the NDPS act in addition to The Drugs and Cosmetics, Act 1940 or the rules made thereunder. The said application is in addition and not in derogation of Act 1940. (See Sanjeev P.Deshpande). Therefore, the case in hand is to be seen in light of those provisions. The submissions of the petitioner are that the drug was used for medicinal or therapeutic purposes. The same arguments stand repelled by Apex court in the case of Mohd. Sahabuddin (Supra) when the Apex Court has clarified the position in following words:-
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 11 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 "11. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants was that the content of the codeine phosphate in each 100 ml. bottle if related to the permissible dosage, namely, 5 ml. would only result in less than 10 mg. of codeine phosphate thereby would fall within the permissible limit as stipulated in the Notifications dated 14.11.1985 and 29.1.1993. As rightly held by the High Court, the said contention should have satisfied the twin conditions, namely, that the contents of the narcotic substance should not be more than 100 mg. of codeine, per dose unit and with a concentration of not more than 2.5% in undivided preparation apart from the other condition, namely, that it should be only for therapeutic practice.
Therapeutic practice as per dictionary meaning means ''contributing to cure of disease''. In other words, the assessment of codeine content on dosage basis can only be made only when the cough syrup is definitely kept or transported which is exclusively meant for its usage for curing a disease and as an action of remedial agent.
12. As pointed out by us earlier, since the appellants had no documents in their possession to disclose as to for what purpose such a huge quantity of Schedule 'H' drug containing narcotic substance was being transported and that too stealthily, it cannot be simply presumed that such transportation was for therapeutic practice as mentioned in the Notifications dated 14.11.1985 and 29.1.1993. Therefore, if the said requirement meant for therapeutic practice is not satisfied then in the event of the entire 100 ml. content of the cough syrup containing the prohibited quantity of codeine phosphate is meant for human consumption, the same would certainly fall within the penal provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act calling for appropriate punishment to be inflicted upon the appellants. Therefore, the appellants' failure to establish the specific conditions required to be satisfied under the above referred to notifications, the application of the exemption provided under the said notifications in order to consider the appellants' application for bail by the Courts below does not arise.
13. As far as the grievance raised on the ground that the appellants were illegally detained beyond 24 hours by the police is concerned, the conclusion HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 12 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 of the High Court having been based on the satisfaction reached by it, we do not find any scope to interfere with the same."
21. Similarly, in the case of Sanjeev P. Deshpande (Supra) the Apex Court while dealing with the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Rules 1985 vis a vis Section 8 of NDPS Act has held that dealing in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances is permissible only when dealing is for medical and scientific purposes and that too when any Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances are permitted in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of NDPS Act or Rules or Order made thereunder. While clarifying the legal position vis a vis the earlier judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal Vs. Rajesh Kumar Gupta reported in 2006 AIR SCW 5666, Apex court held in the case of Sanjeev P.Deshpande (Supra) as under:-
26.The Act does not contemplate framing of rules for prohibiting the various activities of DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Such prohibition is already contained in Section 8(c). It only contemplates of the framing of Rules for permitting and regulating any activity of DEALING IN narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
27. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the conclusion reached by the various High Courts that prohibition contained under Section 8 is not attracted in respect to all those psychotropic substances which find a mention in the Schedule to the Act but not in Schedule-I to the Rules framed under the Act is untenable.
28. However, it is brought to our notice that conclusion such as the one reached by the various High Courts as noted above is supported by a judgment of this Court in Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra). At para 19, it was held;
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 13 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 "19. It has not been brought to our notice that the 1985 Act provides for the manner and extent of possession of the contraband. The Rules framed under Section 9 of the 1985 Act read with Section 76 thereof, however, provide for both the manner and the extent, inter alia, of production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transport, etc. of the contraband. Chapter VI of the 1985 Rules provides for import, export and transhipment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Rule 53 contains general prohibition in terms whereof the import and export out of India of the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances specified in Schedule I appended thereto is prohibited. Such prohibition, however, is subject to the other provisions of the said Chapter. Rule 63 to which our attention has been drawn specifically prohibits import and export of consignments through a post office box but keeping in view the general prohibition contained in Rule 53 the same must be held to apply only to those drugs and psychotropic substances which are mentioned in Schedule I of the Rules and not under the 1985 Act.
Similarly, Chapter VII provides for psychotropic substances. Rule 64 provides for general prohibition. Rules 53 and 64, thus, contain a genus and other provisions following the same under the said Chapter are species thereof. This we say in view of the fact that whereas Rule 64 provides for general prohibition in respect of sale, purchase, consumption or use of the psychotropic substances specified in Schedule I, Rule 65 prohibits manufacture of psychotropic substances, whereas Rule 66 prohibits possession, etc. of psychotropic substances and Rule 67 prohibits transport thereof. Rule 67-A provides for special provisions for medical and scientific purposes." (emphasis supplied)
29. We are unable to agree with the conclusion (reached in Rajesh Kumar Gupta's case) that the prohibition contained in Rule 63 of the 1985 Rules is applicable only to those narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which are mentioned in Schedule-I to the Rules and not to the psychotropic HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 14 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 substances enumerated in the Schedule to the Act. Such a conclusion was reached in Rajesh Kumar Gupta's case on the understanding that Rule 53 (prohibiting the import into and export out of India of the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances specified in Schedule-I to the Rules) is the source of the authority for such prohibition. Such a conclusion was drawn from the fact that the other Rules contained in the Chapter permit import into and export out of India of certain narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances other than those specified in Schedule-I to the Rules. Unfortunately, the learned Judges in reaching such a conclusion ignored the mandate of Section 8(c) which inter alia prohibits in absolute terms import into and export out of India of any narcotic drug and psychotropic substance. Rules framed under the Act cannot be understood to create rights and obligations contrary to those contained in the parent Act.
22. Therefore, when this aspect is dealt with from this angle and taking guidance from the judgment rendered by Apex Court then it is clear that judgments relied upon by the petitioner passed by this Coordinate Bench of this Court in MCRC No.19922/2015 (Arvind Chandwani Vs. State of M.P.) reported in 2015 (3) MPWN 30 and order dated 08.03.2016 passed in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. State of M.P. in Cr.A No.3126/2015 and in the case of Laxmi Medical Agency Vs. State of Madhay Pradesh reported in 2017 (2) MPWN 67 and in the case of Tribhuwan Singh Vs. Union of India passed by Allahabad High Court reported in (2016) 95 A.Cr.C. 659 are not applicable in the case in hand.
23. All those cases have not taken into consideration, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sanjeev P. Deshpande and Md. Shahabuddin (Supra). Beside that scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. stares over the facts of this case.
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24. Here, the petitioner could not establish through his pleadings, documents and submissions that he has acted in any manner and extent provided by NDPS Act to use or sale the drugs for medical or scientific purposes. In absence of explanation of manner and extent and requirement of license conditions, it would be too early to infer about the innocence of petitioner. Merely holding a license under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act does not provide an immunity to the petitioner from the rigours of the applicability of the NDPS Act and the rules made thereunder. Legislative intent is apparently clear when the Section 80 of the Act has been inserted in the NDPS Act which gives NDPS the status of special Act vis a vis general enactment i.e. Drugs And Cosmetics, Act 1940, therefore, prevalence of Special Act over General Act also pales the case of petitioner into oblivion. The very nature of godown, working of petitioner and statements recorded during investigation reveal that when the premises was raided, no sign of exigencies of any pharmacy found as required under the Act of 1940 and rules made thereunder. No other medicine except Phensedyl Syrup found in the garage of the petitioner. This further strengthened the apprehension of C.B.N. and reflected in the reply of the respondent as well as in the private complaint. Who was the license holder and owner at the relevant point of time are the questions which can be resolved in the trial only.
25. In the considered opinion of this Court petitioner does not succeed in bringing home the argument about the interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR and/or quashment of private complaint. Petitioner has to plead and prove his innocence or truth by way of leading evidence and pleadings. The mixed question of facts and law cannot be decided on the HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH 16 M.Cr.C.No.2155/2017 basis of mere pleadings. Therefore, no case is made out for interference.
26. Resultantly, petition preferred by the petitioner, being bereft of merits stands dismissed.
(Anand Pathak) Judge Rashid RASHID KHAN 2018.12.07 13:12:45 +05'30'