Jharkhand High Court
Managing Committee Of Delhi Public ... vs Manoranjan Prasad Sinha on 7 April, 2003
Equivalent citations: [2003(4)JCR300(JHR)]
JUDGMENT
Gurusharan Sharma J.
1. The defendants are appellants. Plaintiffs suit for declaration that termination of his services as a teacher of Delhi Public School, Ranchi, was illegal, was dismissed. However, appeal filed by him was allowed in part and his removal from service was held to be arbitrary and in violation of natural Justice.
2. Delhi Public School Society (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. 1860. Its object is to establish progressive schools and other educational institutions in Delhi or outside Delhi and impart sound and liberal education.
3. An agreement dated 6.1.1989 was entered into between the Research and Development Center for Iron and Steel, Ranchi (in short the 'RDCIS', an unit of Steel Authority of India Limited (in short 'the SAIL) a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and the society regarding setting up of an English medium School in the township of the RDCIS at Ranchi in the name of Delhi Public School (in short 'the School') for the benefit of children of employees working in the units of SAIL at Ranchi and Metallurgical and Engineering Consultants (India) Limited (in short 'MECON') under the control of the Society.
4. It was agreed that the Society shall select and appoint good and qualified teachers and other staff to run the school and representative of the SAIL - RDCIS shall also be associated in the selection of qualified teachers. The RDCIS will construct school building and provide furniture, audio-visuals, play materials and other teaching aids required for keeping up the standard of the school. Keeping in view the high initial cost of establishing, running and maintaining the school, as the classes were to be gradually built up, the RDCIS was to provide suitable grants to make the shortfall in expenditure of the school for the first five years only. It was the responsibility of the society to make all efforts to get recognition of the, school by the Central Board of Secondary Education (in short 'the CBSE') with cooperation of RDCIS.
5. According to the Memorandum of Association of the society a working committee in the school was constituted to function and perform its duties. The said working committee constituted a selection committee for selection of staff. The School was duly affiliated by the CBSE.
6. The Managing Committee of the School selected the plaintiff for appointment as a teacher in Grade IV with effect from 17.8.1992 for a period of six months, extendable subject to approval by the selection Committee. The Principal of the school by letter dated 10.9.1992 communicated the terms and conditions of his appointment. At that time the plaintiff was possessing Master of Science degree in Chemistry (Organic) and had not obtained Bachelor of Education degree. As the meeting of the selection Committee could not commence. The respondent was granted three months' extension of service with effect from 17.2.1993. It was made clea'r that any further extension of his service will be subject to his appearance in the interview board and approval of his appointment by the selection Committee.
7. On 31.5.1993 the plaintiff was informed that his services expired on 16.5.1993 and, therefore, he has been relieved and was asked to return library books, Chemistry Laboratory key and Gas Book key, which were in his possession.
8. In the meantime, an advertisement was made for appointment of Grade III and IV teachers in Chemistry in the school, which was published in "Employment News" dated 20-26.2.1993. The plaintiff claimed to have obtained senior teacher's Training Diploma certificate from sister Nivedita College, Calcutta and applied against the aforesaid advertisement for appointment as Grade III teacher, but he was not called for interview.
9. The plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 76 of 1993 in the Court of Munsif, Ranchi, against the Managing Committee of the school and its Principal for declaration that letter dated 31.5.1993 terminating his services as well as proceedings of the selection Committee dated 14.6.1993 were illegal and for permanent Injunction restraining the defendants from taking charge from him or appointing and allowing any one to join as Chemistry teacher of the school.
10. According to him, no doubt the school was being run by the Society and was affiliated with the CBSE, but it was under the financial and administrative control of the SAIL. It was a non- proprietary school and was bound to follow/abide by the Rules as enumerated in the Education Code of the State or Union Territory or under the bye-laws/rules made by the CBSE. The relieving letter issued by the Principal was illegal as he was not the appointing authority and neither one month's notice was given from either side nor payment of salary in lieu of notice period was made to him.
11. The defendants in their written stated, inter alia, that the suit was not only hit under the provisions of Section 34 but was also not maintainable under Sections 16 and 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiff was appointed by the Managing Committee of the school on purely temporary basis for six months and his service period was extendable subject to approval of the selection committee. However, the said period was extended by three months, pending approval of his appointment, by the Pro-Vice Chairman of the society as meeting of the selection committee did not commence in the meantime. The said extension was subject to his appearance before the Interview Board and approval of his appointment by the selection committee. The extended period of service of the plaintiff automatically expired on 15.5.1993 (afternoon), during the Summer Vacation. His service was never terminated by the Principal of the school. The Principal simply informed him by letter dated 31.5.1992.
12. The suit was dismissed as not maintainable and it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief claimed.
13. The plaintiff filed Title Appeal No. 67 of 1997 against the said decree, which was allowed in part on 19.2.2000 and the suit was decreed to the extent that removal of plaintiff from service was arbitrary in nature and it was in violation of natural justice and equity as well. It was also declared that the School was affiliated with CBSE and was bound to follow the rules framed and the bye-laws of CBSE, Plaintiff's removal was also against the rules of CBSE. However, no relief under Sections 14 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act was granted.
14. The Managing Committee of the school has, therefore, filed the present second appeal, which was admitted on 30.8.2000 on the following substantial questions of law :
"(i) Whether the lower appellate Court has erred, in law, in declaring the status of the plaintiff/respondent under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act without adjudicating whether he had the right to the post of the teacher in the institution ?
(ii) Whether the impugned judgment of the lower appellate Court is bad in law due to non-consideration of the documents, which have been considered by the trial Court, while reversing its judgment in part."
15. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff - respondent was appointed for a fixed period on the terms and conditions mentioned in the appointment letter dated 10.9.1992 (Exhibit 1), By Exhibit 2, letter dated 15.2.1993 he was further granted three months' extension of service with effect from 17.2.1993 and by letter dated 31.5.1993 (Exhibit 3) he was informed that his services expired on 16th May, 1993, and accordingly, he was relieved. He was also directed to return the library books. Chemistry Laboratory Key and Gas Bank key, which were in his possession. He was duly paid his salary up to 16th May, 1993.
16. It is, therefore, clear that appointment of respondent No. 1 as Grade IV teacher in the school was purely on temporary basis and for a fixed term subject to other conditions mentioned in Exhibit 1. It was also clarified in Exhibit 1 that his appointment was governed by the rules of the DPS and during the fixed period of six months his services could have been terminated without assigning any reason.
17. It appears that at the time of plaintiff's appointment in September, 1992, the proposal for regular appointment after making necessary advertisement and complying with the other processes of both Grades III and IV teachers was In process, which was likely to take some time and as such keeping in view the urgent requirement of Grade IV teacher in Chemistry, he was given purely temporary appointment for six months and ad-hoc basis.
18. Admittedly, in September, 1992, the plaintiff did not possess B.Ed. degree or Diploma certificate and he claimed to have appeared in the Diploma in Education Examination held on 21.9.1992 from Sister Nivedita College, Calcutta (now Kolkata) which was affiliated to All India Educational Services and is said to be equivalent to B.Ed. degree. However, it appears that for the purposes of temporary appointment of the plaintiff - the Managing Committee relaxed the required qualification of B.Ed. for Grade IV teacher as admitted by the Principal of the School, who examined himself as DW 1.
19. On the ground of having obtained training degree from Nivedita College, Calcutta, the plaintiff applied for his regular appointment on the post of Grade III teacher in the school for which advertisement was made on 20/26.2.1993, but he was not called for Interview as on scrutiny of his Diploma certificate it was found that he did not possess B.Ed. degree. The trial Court considered this aspect of the matter and found that the respondent herein had not obtained any permission from the school to appear in such examination. On 21.9.1992 he was present in the school and performed his duty and on the same day he claimed to have appeared in the Diploma Examination organized by Sister Nivedita College, Calcutta, at Ranchi, but unfortunately be failed to produce any paper in support of his contention. Further the Diploma certificate was found not to be genuine one by the trial Court.
20. It is also not in dispute that for regular appointment as either Class III or IV Grade teacher, B.Ed. qualification was a must and, therefore, the plaintiff was not qualified to be appointed even as Grade IV teacher in the school. Hence, there was nothing wrong if he was not asked to appear before the Selection Committee under term No. 1 of his appointment letter (Exhibit 1) and he was rightly removed from service after expiry of the extended period of his temporary service on 16.5.1993. In my view, the plaintiff was appointed on certain terms and pursuant to such appointment he worked within the scope of such employment. Hence, the reliefs claimed by him in the plaint were to be determined on the basis of ostensible pleadings made therein.
21. On reading the pleadings, the evidence and the judgments passed by the two Courts below, it appears that respondent was appointed by the Managing Committee of the school as Grade IV teacher purely on temporary basis only for six months, which was subject to approval of the selection Committee and by the Chairman of the DPS Society and he could have been put on probation for one year only if his appointment was approved. However, within six months thereafter neither any advertisement for regular appointment of Grade IV teacher was made -nor any meeting of the selection committee commenced and as such his temporary services was extended for further three months from 17.2.1993. Thereafter on 20/26.2.1993 an advertisement for regular appointment of Grades III and IV teachers in the school was made. The plaintiff also applied for his appointment as Grade III teacher. On scrutiny of his certificate, he was found not to have obtained B.Ed. degree, which was required for appointment of both Grades III and IV teachers. Hence, he was not called for interview. Since the plaintiff did not possess the required B.Ed. degree for being appointed even as Grade IV teacher, he was also not required to be called to appear before the Selection Committee for approval of his service and on the expiry of the extended period his temporary appointment stood terminated automatically.
22. In the present suit, in my view, there was no occasion to go into the question and decide whether the service conditions of the teachers of the school were governed by the DPS Society Rules or the Bihar Education Code or the CBSE Rules and bye-laws as it was specifically mentioned in his contractual temporary appointment letter (Exhibit 1) that he was to be governed by the DPS rules. Further, whether the school was established and managed by the CBSE or was under he financial control of SAIL was also not required to be gone, into and decided in the suit.
23. The plaintiff was not a teacher of the school appointed on regular basis and admittedly his appointment as Grade IV teacher was made by the Managing Committee temporarily for a fixed period on ad-hoc basis which stood terminated automatically on the expiry of the said period. If the plaintiffs services would have been terminated during the period of temporary appointment, service of one month's notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice was necessary, but since his services stood terminated automatically on expiry of the fixed period, there was no necessity for either notice or payment of salary to him. In my view, therefore, only question which was involved in the suit was whether plaintiff was entitled to declaration that he continued to be in the employment of the school. The trial Court held that he was not, because the contract of employment did not entitle him to continue. The terms and conditions of employment of the plaintiff Were incorporated in the letter of appointment. Exhibit 1. Inter alia, it contained the following :
i. He was selected in Grade IV for a period of six months, extendable subject to approval by the selection committee with effect from 17.8.1992.
ii. After the final approval of selection committee by the Chairman of the DPS society, he was to be put on probation for a period of one year.
iii. During the said period, his appointment could have been terminated without assigning any reason by serving one month's notice on other side or on payment of salary in lieu of notice period.
iv. He was to be governed by the rules of the Delhi Public School, Ranchi as enforced by its Managing Committee.
24. The plaintiff had no case that the school issued any letter of appointment after approval of selection committee and the Chairman of the Society before the expiry of the extended period of his temporary ad-hoc appointment as Grade IV teacher, nor he had a case that the period of his appointment was further extended after 15.5.1993.
25. In my opinion, the above being the admitted position the plaintiff was not entitled to get declaration that he continued to be in service. Hence, the conclusion of the trial Court that his suit was liable to be dismissed, in my view, did not warrant any interference. In this regard, reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in Ashok Kumar Srivastava v. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2046. I, therefore, hold that even if the suit for declaratory relief at the instance of the plaintiff was maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, he was not entitled to get the declaration that, termination of his service was illegal and proceedings of the selection committee dated 14.6.1993 wherein the candidates were interviewed for regular appointment as Grades III and IV teachers, pursuant to the advertisement made in February, 1993, but the plaintiff was not called for therein, was also illegal.
26. The Court of appeal below, therefore, erred in holding that as per the terms of appointment letter by not putting the plaintiff before the selection committee and relieving him from service was arbitrary in nature and in violation of natural justice and equity as well.
27. I, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court of appeal below and confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The plaintiff was not; entitled to the declaration aforesaid sought for under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act in the suit, which was rightly dismissed.
28. In the result, the appeal is allowed, but without costs.