Gujarat High Court
Hiralal K. Joshi vs State Of Gujarat And Anr. on 24 January, 1989
Equivalent citations: (1989)2GLR1183
JUDGMENT R.C. Mankad, J.
1. Petitioners, employees of the District Panchayat of Baroda, have filed these petitions challenging issuance of second charge-sheets against them and holding of fresh inquiry in pursuance of such charge-sheets by the District Development Officer of the District Panchayat of Baroda. Since common questions are involved in these petitions, they are disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Facts leading to these petitions briefly stated are as follows:
Petitioners of Special Civil Applications Nos. 3715 of 1983 and 3742 of 1985 were at the relevant time employed as Circle Inspectors while petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5022 of 1985 was employed as Clerk in the Waghodia Taluka of the Baroda District. Taluka Development Officer of Waghodia Taluka Panchayat granted permission for non-agricultural use of several parcels of land bearing different survey numbers and situated in different villages of Waghodia Taluka. It was alleged that the Taluka Development Officer had in collusion with the petitioners granted such permissions in violation of the guidelines and resolutions issued by the Government from time to time and the relevant Rules. It was alleged that petitioners of Special Civil Applications Nos 3715 of 1985 and 3742 of 1985, who were Circle Inspectors and petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5022 of 1985, who was Clerk had misused their authority and committed serveral irregularities in preparing the cases of various applicants seeking permission for non-agricultural use of the land in their occupation and it was on the basis of the cases prepared by the said petitioners that the Taluka Development Officer granted permission for non-agricultural use of several parcels of land as aforesaid. It was alleged that the Taluka Development Officer and the petitioners of the present petitions had colluded and it was as a result of such collusion that permission for non-agricultural use of the lands was granted in violation of the guidelines issued by the Government and the relevant Rules. It was. therefore, decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Taluka Development Officer and the petitioners. By an order dated September 9, 1981 the petitioners were suspended from service and on March 3, 1982 they were served with charge-sheets. The Taluka Development Officer was also suspended and served with charge-sheet. The petitioners submitted their replies to the charge-sheets denying the allegations made against them. Post of Taluka Development Officer is a Class II Gazetted post and, therefore, so far as Taluka Development Officer was concerned, the State Government was the Disciplinary authority. So far as he was concerned it was the Government which instituted disciplinary proceedings, suspended him from service and served him charge-sheet. So far as petitioners were concerned, they were Class III servants under the jurisdiction of the District Panchayat of Baroda and, therefore, disciplinary proceedings against them were instituted by the District Panchayat authorities who suspended them from services and served them with charge-sheets. Since, as pointed out above, the Taluka Development Officer, who was Class 11 Gazetted Officer, was involved the matter was referred to the State Government. The State Government it appears decided to hold a joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer as common questions were involved and it directed the Special Officer for Departmental Inquiry for Gazetted Officers to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. The Inquiry Officer was of the view that it was not necessary to record any oral evidence and the inquiry against each of the delinquents could be decided on the basis of the documentary evidence. He, therefore, referred the matter back to the State Government with a request to it to direct the appropriate authority to take action against each of the delinquents. The State Government, I am told, disagreed with the view taken by the Inquiry Officer and again remitted the matter to the Inquiry Officer for holding inquiry against all the four delinquents, namely, the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer.
3. In the meantime the petitioners, except the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5022 of 1985, approached this Court by way of Special Civil Applications and challenged the orders suspending them from services This Court by an order dated January 12, 1984 directed the State Government 10 complete the inquiry within three months. It was, thereafter, that the State Government remitted the matter back to the Inquiry Officer as staled above and directed him to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer.
4. The Inquiry Officer held inquiry and submitted his report to the State Government on August 31, 1984. The Inquiry Officer found the Taluka Development Officer guilty of the charges framed against him, but so far as petitioners were concerned he held that the charges levelled against them were not proved. The State Government, as it appears from the letter Annexure T dated February 26, 1985 addressed to the District Development Officer, agreed with the view taken by the Inquiry Officer. So far as petitioners were concerned the reason which was given for agreeing with the view of the Inquiry Officer that the charges were not proved was that the charges against the petitioners were not framed with care. The Government by the said letter informed the District Development Officer that it was decided to hold disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and directed him to hold fresh inquiry against the petitioners after framing charges giving all the necessary particulars and specifying the defaults committed by them. Thereafter, on June 18/20, 1985 each of the petitioners was served with second charge-sheets. Petitioners have filed these petitions challenging the legality and validity of these charge-sheets and the action of the District Panchayat authorities to hold fresh inquiry as directed by the State Government. By way of interim relief respondents were directed not to pass final order on the basis of the inquiry, which was to be completed within three months from the date of the order i.e. December 18, 1985. Petitioners were given liberty to move this Court to apply for the stay of the operation of the suspension orders after the inquiry was completed. 1 am told that inquiry against each of the petitioners was not completed within the specified time, but it has now been completed. It is stated that the Inquiry Officer has found petitioners of Special Civil Applications Nos. 3715 and 3742 of 1985 guilty of the charges framed against them while he has held the charges against the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5022 of 1985 not proved.
5. The question which arises for my consideration in these petitions is whether the State Government was justified in directing the District Development Officer to hold fresh inquiry against the petitioners after reframing the charges as directed in the latter dated February 26, 1985 addressed to the District Development Officer, which is referred to above. It is the contention of the petitioners mat the inquiry against them which was held jointly with the Taluka Development Officer was completed and they were found not guilty of the charges levelled against them by the Inquiry Officer. The State Government has agreed with the view taken by the Inquiry Officer and held that the charges against the petitioners were not proved. Under the circumstances it was not open to the State Govemment to direct the District Development Officer to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners on the same charges It was urged that the Inquiry Officer himself had not found the charges \ague or defective for want of particulars. Nor had the petitioners raised any contention that the charges were defective and for that reason there was any prejudice or that they did not have sufficient opportunity to defend themselves. It is the State Government which has found the charges to be defective and on that ground directed fresh inquiry against the petitioners This conclusion, it is submitted, the State Government could not have reached without hearing the petitioners. In any case once having agreed with the finding of the Inquiry Officer there was no question of holding fresh inquiry against the petitioners. It is further contended that the State Government as the Disciplinary Authority has not acted under Rule 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 1971 ('Rules' for short) which provides for action on the inquiry report. Under this Rules, it was submitted, the State Government could have remitted the case to the Inquiry Officer for further inquiry and report but it did not adopt that course and while agreeing with the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer directed fresh inquiry against the petitioners by an authority other than the Inquiry Officer, who had held joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. It was not open to the State Government to adopt such a course. It is, therefore, submitted that the order directing the District Development Officer to hold fresh inquiry against the petitioners after reframing the charges is not legal. On the other hand it is contended on behalf of the respondents that it was open to the State Government to direct fresh inquiry against the petitioners under Rule 10(1) of the Rules. It is further contended that the State Government had directed fresh inquiry against the petitioners as it found the charges to be defective. When the charges are found to be defective it is open to the State Government to hold fresh inquiry after reframing the charges. It was further contended that in view of the decision of this Court in AT.K. Shukla v. District Judge, Kutch [1984 (1)] XXV (1) GLR 117 it was doubtful whether joint inquiry could have been held against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. Therefore, on that ground also the Government could have directed fresh inquiry against the petitioners. It was submitted that objection regarding joint inquiry could have raised at any stage by the petitioners and, therefore, the course adopted by the State Government cannot be said to be illegal.
6. No objection regarding joint inquiry held by the Special Inquiry Officer under the directions given by the State Government is raised by any of the petitioners. Such an objection is not raised on behalf of petitioners at a later stage also. Even according to the respondents when disciplinary proceedings are initiated against Class II and Class III servants as a result of same transaction, it is open to the State Governmeni 10 direci joini inquiry against all the persons belonging to Class II or Class HI cadres who are involved in the said transaction. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the respondents that the decision of this Court in A' K. Shukla v. District Judge, Kutch, (supra) has raised doubt regarding joint inquiry and, therefore, whether or not objection is raised by the petitioners it is doubtful whether joint inquiry can be held against Class 11 and Class III servants. I do not see any substance in this contention. It is true that in that case joint departmental inquiry was directed against the petitioners in the petition before the Court and 11 was contended on behalf of the petitioners that they would be prejudiced by the joint inquiry. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in that case stated that in principle respondent had no objection in holding separate inquiry against each of the petitioners, but there was nothing to show that petitioners would be prejudiced by joint inquiry. In view of the facts in that case the learned single Judge of this Court felt that a separate inquiry should be held against each of the petitioners. The learned single Judge, therefore, accepted the convention raised on behalf of the petitioners in that case and directed the respondent to hold separate inquiry against each of the petitioners. The learned single Judge has not laid down any principle of law that in no case joint inquiry could be held. It was having regard to the peculiar facts of that case and the contention which was raised on behalf of the petitioners that they would be prejudiced if there was joint inquiry that the direction was given to the respondent to hold separate inquiry against each of the petitioners. The learned single Judge did not hold that joint inquiry was not permissible under the law. In my opinion, therefore, since no objection is raised on behalf of the petitioners the question whetehr or not joint inquiry is permissible under the law does not arise for consideration. But apart from that fresh inquiry against the petitioners was not ordered on the ground that the joint inquiry was not legal. It is not open to the authority, which directed joint inquiry, to contend at this stage that joint inquiry could not have been held against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. There is absolutely no reason or justification to challenge the legality or validity of joint inquiry held by the Special Inquiry Officer under the direction of the State Government. In other words, it must be presumed that the Joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer was not invalid.
7. It is also not disputed that the charges which were first franked against the petitioners and which were subsequently framed by the District Development Officer under the instructions of the State Government are substantially the same. In the subsequent charges which were framed against the petitioners involvement of the petitioners in certain specific instances to which reference in general alongwith other instances was made in the earlier charge-sheets, is brought out. Charges which are made in the subsequent charge-sheet were also made to the first charge-sheel but they were general and they related to more instances than those which arc mentioned in the subsequent charge-sheel. Some of the allegations made in the subsequent charge-sheet were more specific. It is however, conceded that charge-sheets which were served on the petitioners earlier and the charge-sheets which were served subsequently on them contained substantially the same charges. The petitioners did not raise any objection regarding the charges framed against them before the Special Inquiry Officer. It was not their contention that the charges against them did not contain the necessary particulars or specific instances and that as a result thereof they were prejudiced or were not in a position to properly defend themselves. The Inquiry Officer did not find the charges to be vague or defective for want of particulars. In this connection it is also pertinent to note that when the State Government look decision to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer charge-sheets and the replies or explanations given by the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer were placed before it and it was after considering the charge-sheets and the explanations given by the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer that the State Government decided to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer and directed the Special Inquiry Officer to hold such inquiry. The State Government did not find the charges framed against the petitioners defective at that stage. It is not disputed that so far as the State Government is concerned, it is the Disciplinary Authority for all servants irrespective of the Class to which they belong. It was in its capacity as the Disciplinary Authority that the State Government directed joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer, who as stated above, was Class II Gazetted Officer. Therefore, when the State Government directed to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer as Disciplinary Authority it must have scrutinized or examined charges framed against each of the petitioners. However, as pointed out above the State Government did not find any defect in the charge-sheets and directed the Special Inquiry Officer to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer.
8. The Special Inquiry Officer held the inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer and recorded evidence, which was led before him. On completion of the inquiry he appreciated the evidence which was led before him and reached the conclusion that:
(1) Taluka Development Officer was guilty of the charges framed against him, and (2) The petitioners were not guilty of the charges framed against them. The report of the Special Inquiry Officer was submitted to the State Government, which was the Disciplinary Authority.
9. The State Government was required to take action on the inquiry report as provided in Rule 10 of the Rules which in so far as is relevant, reads as follows:
(1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not self the Inquiry Authority may. for reasons 10 be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiry Authority for further inquiry and report and the Inquiry Auihoruy shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provision of Rule 9, as far as may be.
(2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.
Under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 the State Government could have for reasons to be recorded, remitted the case to the Special Inquiry Officer for further inquiry and report. However, it has not adopted such a course. If the State Government disagreed with the finding recorded by the Special Inquiry Officer it was required to record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidence on record was sufficient for the purpose. The State Government however, did not disagree with the finding recorded by the Special Inquiry Officer on any article of charge. On the contrary it is evident from the letter dated February 26, 1985 addressed to the District Development Officer of the District Panchayat of Baroda that the State Government agreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and held that the charges against the petitioners were not proved. Once the State Government agreed with the finding of the Special Inquiry Officer that the charges against the petitioners were not proved the only order which it could have passed was to hold the petitioners not guilty of charges framed against them and to fully exonerate them. Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 10 are not relevant for our purpose.
10. The State Government has however, adopted an entirely new procedure, which is not provided in the Rules. While agreeing with the findings recorded by the Special Inquiry Officer it directed the District Development Officer to hold fresh inquiry against the petitioners after reframing the charges against them. It may be mentioned here that the decision of the State Government was not communicated to the petitioners. The petitioners were not even heard before the decision was taken. The petitioners came to know about the decision of the State Government only when they were served with the second or subsequent charge-sheets. The decision of the State Government is contained in the letter dated February 26, 1985 addressed to the District Development Officer. Except this letter no material or evidence is produced to establish that such a decision was taken by the State Government. Now if we read the above letter an impression is created as if the Special Inquiry Officer had held the charges not proved because they were not properly framed or framed with care. It was however clarified on behalf of the respondents that it was the State Government which took the view that the charges were not framed properlv against the petitioners and it was. therefore. that they were not held proved against the petitioners. Assuming that it was the State Government's view That the charges were not properly framed, no reasons arc given as to why the State Government had come to that conclusion. No delects in the charge-sheet are pointed out by the State Government. The decision of the State Government in absence of the reasons must be held to be vague. The letter which is addressed to the District Development Officer does not indicate as to what defects the District Development Officer was required to remove and what he was required to state or specify in the fresh charges to be framed against the petitioners. The defects, if am. in the charges framed against the petitioners as already observed above, must have come to the notice of the State Government when it directed to hold joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. However, no attempt was made to remove these defects and to make the charges more specific by giving particulars and removing the vagueness, if any. In ordering joint inquiry the State Government was acting as the Disciplinary Authority and in that capacity it could have reframed the charges and called for further explanation of the petitioners. It however, did not do so and directed the Special Inquiry Officer to hold inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. It is only after the submission of the Special Inquiry Officer's report that the wisdom dawned on the State Government that the charges were not carefully framed and it was necessary to hold fresh inquiry after refraining of the charges. The State Government, however, did not adopt the course provided in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Rules. Instead of directing further inquiry by the Special Inquiry Officer, who had already held the inquiry against the petitioners, the State Government directed fresh inquiry by another Disciplinary Authority, namely, District Development Officer. Learned Counsel for the respondents were not able to point out any provision. Rule or law under which such a course could have been adopted by the State Government. Since joint inquiry was already held by Special Inquiry Officer, the State Government could have directed further inquiry as provided in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Rules. The Government, however, did not adopt such course but instead decided to institute fresh disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners and directed another Inquiry Officer, namely the District Development Officer to hold such fresh inquiry after reframing charges, which according to the State Government were not properly framed at the initial stage. There is no warrant for the course adopted by the State Government. In any case the State Government could not have adopted this course without giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. Admittedly no such opportunity was given to the petitioners. Had such opportunity been given to the petitioners they could have satisfied the State Government that the proposed action was not permissible under the law. The action taken by the State Government thus violates the principles of natural justice.
11. Question whether fresh inquiry by another officer could be ordered by the Disciplinary Authority under Rule 15 of the Central Civil Services (Classificauon. Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 ("Central Rules" for shon) was considered by the Supreme Court in K.R. Deb v. Collector, Central Excise . That was a case in which the Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Shillong ('Collector' for shon) framed a charge of misappropriation of Rs. 100/-against the appellant in that case and instituted disciplinary proceedings against him. The Collector appointed an Inquiry Officer to hold inquiry. The Inquiry Officer by his report dated July 3, 1961 held that the charge framed against the appellant was not proved. By an order dated August 23, 1961 the Collector appointed another officer as Inquiry Officer to conduct supplementary inquiry in the disciplinary proceedings instituted against the appellant. The second Inquiry Officer also by his report dated October 12, 1961 came to the conclusion that the whole episode in which the appellant was alleged to have misappropriated Government money was cooked up and fabricated to implicate the appellant for seizure he effected. The Collector was however not satisfied with this report and he directed the Inquiry Officer to examine two more witnesses named by him without further delay and submit the final report before January 10, 1962. The Inquiry Officer in his report dated January 20, 1962 came to the conclusion that there was no conclusive proof to establish the charge of acceptance of money by the appellant but his conduct might not be above board. The Collector in suppression of his previous order, by his order dated February 13, 1962 appointed yet another Inquiry Officer K.P. Patnaik to hold inquiry against the appellant. K.P. Patnaik, by his reported dated March 6, 1962 held that the charge of misappropriation of Rs. 100/- against the appellant was proved. Thereafter, the Collector gave notice to the appellant to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant submitted his explanation and asked for personal hearing. He was, however, dismissed from service on June 4, 1962. He challenged the order of dismissal in the Court of Judicial Commissioner for Tripura and Agartala by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Judicial Commissioner having dismissed the writ petition, the appellant went in appeal before the Supreme Court. After referring to Rule 15 of the Central Rules, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
It seems to us that Rule 15 on the face of it really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the enquiry or some important witnesses were not available fit the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiry Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9.
In our view the rules do not contemplate action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some Officer to report against the appellam The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules bat was harassing to the appellant.
The relevant provisions of the Central Rules are similar to the relevant provisions of the Rules with which we are concerned in these petitions. The view that there is no warrant for the course adopted by the State Government, which 1 am inclined to take, derives support from the above observation by the Supreme Court in the context of Rule 15 of the Central Rules. Like the Central Rules, there is no provision in the Rules for completely setting aside the previous inquiry. The inquiry could not have been set aside completely on the ground that the charges framed against the petitioners were not framed with care or that they did not contain particulars or were vague. The Rules do not contemplate the action such as was taken by the State Government. As pointed out above, the State Government itself was the Disciplinary Authority and it should have scrutinized the charges framed against the petitioners and removed any defect or omission which was found therein when it decided to hold a joint inquiry against the petitioners and the Taluka Development Officer. It was only at the stage subsequent to the submission of the report by the Special Inquiry Officer that the charges were found defective and decision was taken to hold fresh inquiry by another Inquiry Officer after refraining of charges. If the State Government felt that further inquiry was necessary it could have, for the reasons recorded, directed the Special Inquiry Officer to hold further inquiry and submit his report. However, the State Government took action which is not contemplated by the Rules and directed another Inquiry Officer to hold fresh departmental inquiry against the petitioners. In any case, as observed above, the action taken by the State Government could not have been taken without giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. Admittedly, no such opportunity was given to the petitioners and, therefore, the action is violative of principles of natural justice.
12. In the light of the above discussion, it must be held that the action of the State Government in directing fresh inquiry by the District Development Officer after refraining the charges is illegal being contrary to the Rules. The District Development Officer could not have reframed the charges against the petitioners for the purpose of holding fresh departmental inquiry against the petitioners. In my opinion, therefore, all the proceedings subsequent to the passing of the order dated February 26, 1985, must be held to be illegal. Consequently the reframing of the charges against the petitioners and the inquiry which followed must be held to be bad in law. It is clarified that it is having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that I have come to this conclusion and it should not be understood to mean that fresh inquiry can never be ordered by the Disciplinary Authority.
13. As pointed out above the Inquiry Officer has held fresh inquiry against each of the petitioner and has found the petitioners of Special Civil Applications Nos. 3715 of 1985 and 3742 of 1985 guilty of the charges levelled against them and petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5022 of 1985 not guilty However, in the view which J am taking this inquiry reports have no legal value. Therefore, no further action can be taken on the basis of such reports. So far as petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 5022 of 1985 is concerned, he has not been found guilty of the charges framed against him, but if subsequent inquiry is held to be legal it would be open to the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the view taken by the Inquiry Officer and hold him guilty of the charges framed against him. Since in my opinion the entire proceedings subsequent to the order passed on February 26, 1985 are illegal and the reports of the Inquiry Officer are also illegal, there is no question of taking any further action on the basis of these reports. Under the circumstances once the State Government, which was Disciplinary Authority, agreed with the finding recorded by the Special Inquiry Officer that the charges against the petitioners were not proved the only order which it could have passed was to hold the petitioners not guilty of the charges framed against them and to fully exonerate them, and to allow them to resume their duties. It is stated that petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 3715 of 1985 retired from service on March 31, 1984 on reaching the age of superannuation. Therefore, so far as he is concerned the question of allowing him to resume duties at this stage would not arise.
14. In the result it is declared that since the State Government had agreed with the finding recorded by Special Inquiry Officer that the charges against the petitioners were not proved, the petitioners are not guilty of the charges framed against them and that they stand fully exonerated. It is further declared that the order passed by the State Government directing the District Development Officer of the District Panchayat of Baroda to hold fresh inquiry against the petitioners after refraining the charges against them is illegal and ultra vires and consequently proceedings subsequent to such decision including the framing of the charges, holding of the inquiry and submission of the reports by the Inquiry Officer are illegal. Proceedings subsequent to the aforesaid decision of the State Government directing the District Development Officer to hold fresh inquiry including the framing of the second or subsequent charge-sheets, holding of the inquiry and submission of the reports by the Inquiry Officer are quashed and set aside. Since the petitioners stand exonerated of the charges framed against them the order of suspension from service passed against them shall stand revoked or cancelled and they shall be deemed to be on duty as if the suspension orders were not passed.
15. In other words, the period during which the petitioners were under suspension will be treated as duty for all purposes. Petitioners shall be entitled to full salary and other benefits admissible to them for the suspension period as if they have actually performed the duly during this period So far as petitioner of Special Civil Application No 3715 of 1985 is concerned, he shall be treated as on duly as aforesaid for the period from Sepiember 9, 1981 to March 31, 1984 the date on which he retired from service and he shall be entitled to all the monetary and other benefits treating the said period as on duty. The said petitioner shall be entitled to all the pensionary benefits available to him under the relevant rules treating the suspension period as duty period. So far as the other two petitioners of Special Civil Applications Nos. 3742 and 5022 of 1985 are concerned, they shall be allowed to resume duty and they shall be treated as on duty from the date of suspension from service to the date they are allowed to resume duty. The said petitioners shall be allowed to resume duties within two weeks and all the three petitioners shall be paid salary and all monetary and other benefits treating suspension period as on duty within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the writ of this Court. Petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 3715 of 1985 shall be given all pensionary benefits such as provident fund, gratuity and leave encashment etc. within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court and he shall further be paid pension payable to him regularly with effect from April 1, 1989. Arrears of pension shall be paid to the said petitioner within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of this Court as stated above. Rule made absolute accordingly in each of these petitions with costs.