Allahabad High Court
Siya Ram vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 15 September, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2004(2)AWC1029, [2004(102)FLR31], (2004)IILLJ844ALL
JUDGMENT N.K. Mehrotra, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned standing counsel for the opposite party No. 1 and Shri Mahesh Chandra, advocate for the opposite parties No. 2 and 3.
2. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India for issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to issue the appointment letter to the petitioner for the post of conductor and also to provide all consequential benefits in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1995) 1 UPLBEC 320.
3. The case of the petitioner is that he completed the training for the post of the conductor from 15.6.1980 to 29.6.1980. After completion of his apprenticeship as conductor, the petitioner was not provided any job although, the Apprentices Act provided for the regulation and control of training of apprentices and the amendment in the Act aimed to provide 'on the job training' to the products of vocational streams. In compliance of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and Ors., (1995) 1 UPLBEC 320, the opposite party No. 2, U. P. State Road Transport Corporation issued an advertisement on 31.5.1995 (Annexure-2) for appointment of apprentice conductors and last date was 19.6.1995. In pursuance of the advertisement, the petitioner applied for appointment on the post of conductor on the basis of his training during the period from 15.6.1980 to 29.6.1980. On 12.6.1995, 7.8.1995 and 21.9.1995, he sent representations to the opposite party No. 2 but no action has been taken. It is further alleged that the department has appointed the junior persons who have completed the training of the post of conductors. He has referred the various guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. The petitioner has also referred a judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4532 of 1992 (S/S), Mohd. Waseem v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. (Annexure-6). It is further alleged that the last reminder was given on 10.7.2002 but to no effect.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that the case of the petitioner is that he is an apprentice having obtained training for the post of conductor during the period from 15.6.1980 to 29.6.1980 and therefore; he should be given appointment on the post of conductor on the basis of the judgment and order referred to above. Before this writ petition should be entertained, the petitioner has to establish that he is an apprentice. Section 2(aa) of the Apprentices Act, 1961 defines 'apprentice'. "Apprentice" means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship. Section 4 of the aforesaid Act provides that no person shall be engaged as an apprentice to undergo apprenticeship training in a designated trade unless such person or, if he is a minor, his guardian, has entered into a contract of apprenticeship with the employer. Designated trade is defined under Section 2(e) of the Act. "Designated trade" means any trade or occupation in any subject field in engineering or technology or any vocational course, which the Central Government, after consultation with the Central Apprenticeship Council, may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify as a designated trade for the purposes of this Act. I am of the view that firstly, the petitioner has to prove that there was a contract of apprenticeship as provided under Section 4 of the Act and the job of the conductor in U.P.S.R.T.C. is notified as designated trade after consultation with the Central Apprenticeship Council. There is no such averment about these facts in the writ petition.
5. The petitioner has averred that the department has appointed junior persons who have completed the training of conductor. The petitioner has neither disclosed any name of such person nor the period when the appointment was given. Therefore, the allegation is vague.
6. The petitioner claims advantage of the judgment of the Supreme Court in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and Ors. (supra), I find that the Supreme Court has given four guidelines in the matter of appointment to the apprentices in any designated trade. These guidelines are as follows :
"(1) Other thing being equal, a trained apprentice should be given preference over direct recruits.
(2) For this, 'a trainee' would not be required to get his name sponsored by any employment exchange. The decision of this Court in Union of India v. Hargopal, AIR 1987 SC 1227. would permit this.
(3) If, age bar would come in the way of the trainee, the same would be relaxed in accordance with what is stated in this regard, if any, in the concerned service rule. If, the service rule be silent on this aspect, relaxation to the extent of the period for which the apprentice had undergone training would be given.
(4) The concerned training institute would maintain a list of the persons trained year wise. The persons trained earlier would be treated as senior to the persons trained later. In between the trained apprentices, preference shall be given to those who are senior."
7. A perusal of the aforesaid guidelines makes it clear that the petitioner has no right to claim direct appointment on the basis of those guidelines.
8. The petitioner has further referred Annexure-6 which is a judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4532 of 1992 (S/S), Mohd. Waseem v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors.. In this case, the petitioner was apprentice draftsman. No advantage can be given of this judgment to the petitioner in granting the relief of mandamus for appointment.
9. In the last, I find that the petitioner alleges that he completed the training in the trade of conductor during the period from 15.6.1980 to 29.6.1980. After that he sent certain representations in the year 1995. From 1995 to 10.7.2003, he remained sitting idle. No action has been taken on his part. There is nothing in the writ petition that this representation dated 10.7.2003 has been actually served on the opposite party No. 2. I am of the view that the conduct of the petitioner is such that he does not deserve the discretionary remedy by way of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that he is guilty of laches.
10. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed at admission stage.