Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of Himachal Pradesh vs Inder Jeet And Ors. on 6 October, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1996CRILJ1163
Author: S.N. Phukan
Bench: S.N. Phukan
JUDGMENT S.N. Phukan, J.
1. This appeal by the State is directed against the order of acquittal passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sundernagar, District Mandi dated 14-3-1989 in Police Challan case No. 280-I/87.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows. Five accused persons, namely, Inderjeet, Mini Lal, Shoan Lal, Des Raj and another Des Raj on 15-3-1987 at about 1.30 PM in furtherance of their common intention formed an unlawful assembly and voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant Rakesh Kumar, who was an agent of liquor vendor at Dehar. They committed house trespess and mischief by breaking bottles of Indian made foreign liquor and also given threats to Rakesh Kumar. The police, after investigation, submitted the charge sheet under Sections 147/323/451/427/506 of the Indian Penal Code and accordingly the learned trial Court also framed the charge. The prosecution examined six witnesses. All the accused persons pleaded not guilty. Their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were also recorded. The learned trial Court after fully considering the entire evidence on record and giving reasons, found the accused persons not guilty and hence the appeal by the State.
3. Heard Pt. Om Parkash Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr. R.P. Bisht, learned Assistant Advocate General. Heard Mr. Shrawan Dogra for the accused-respondents.
4. The learned counsel for the State has taken me through the entire record including the impugned judgment and has urged that this is a case for conviction in view of the statement of the complainant (PW- 1). On the other hand Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned counsel for the respondents has placed before this Court decisions of the apex Court to bring home his point that this is an appeal against the acquittal and the power of the Appellate Court is limited.
5. Mr. Dogra has placed reliance in Ramji Surjya Padvi v. State of Maharashtra, more particularly, paragraph 10 of the judgment, wherein the apex court held that there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of an appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court, in the case of an appeal against a judgment of acquittal it cannot totally brush aside the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court. It is also held that the reasons for reversing a judgment of acquittal should be cogent and if two views are reasonably possible, the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the judgment of the trial Court, even if it is possible for it to take a different view after a process of laborious reasoning.
6. Mr. Dogra has placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in Tota Singh v. State of Punjab more particularly, to paragraph 6 of the judgment, wherein the apex Court held that the Court has repeatedly pointed out that the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. It was also held that the jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach made by the lower court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse. According to the apex Court, two views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a view which is a plausible one, the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the court below on its consideration of the evidence is erroneous.
7. Mr. Dogra has also placed reliance in support of his contention on the decision of the apex Court in Awadhesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh . In this case, the apex Court took note of the decision of the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor (AIR 1934 P.C. 227) and G.B. Patel v. State of Maharashtra and held that although the power of the High Court to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusion, are as extensive as in an appeal against the order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, the High Court should always give proper weight and consideration to matters, for example, (i) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (ii) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (iii) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (iv) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
8. Within the above legal para-meters, let me consider the present appeal. Admittedly. PW-1. the complainant was the victim and the sole witness to support the case of the prosecution. Mr. Dogra has drawn attention of this Court to para 8 of the judgment of the apex Court in Ramji Surjya Padvi (supra), wherein it was held that there is no doubt that even where there is only a sole eye-witness of a crime a conviction may be recorded against the accused concerned provided the Court which hears such witness regards him as honest and truthful. But prudence requires that some corroboration should be sought from the other prosecution evidence in support of the testimony of a solitary witness particularly where such witness also happens to be closely related to the deceased and the accused are those against whom some motive or ill will is suggested. Coming to the case, in hand, definitely PW- 1 was an interesting witness, therefore, in view of the ratio laid down by the apex Court is risky to convict the accused persons on the sole testimony of PW-1.
9. PW-2 was examined as eye witness, but he was declared hostile. His evidence is of no use for the present appeal. PW-5 supported part of the occurrence and he did not fully support the prosecution story to prove the charge against the accused persons. All these facts were duly considered by the learned trial Court.
10. The occurrence took place on 15-3-1987 at 1.30 PM, but the first information report was lodged next day, though the Police Station was nearby. Mr. Dogra has drawn the attention of this Court to the observations of the apex Court in Ramji Surjya Padvi (supra). In that case, there was a delay of 24 hours in lodging the FIR though the Police Station was 3 Kms. away. The apex Court took this fact also into consideration while giving the benefit to the accused, In the case in hand also, the delay in filing the F.I.R. is also a factor against the prosecution.
11. I have perused the judgment and I find that the learned trial Court, which had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, has rightly come to the conclusion that the accused-respondents are not guilty. There is no question of taking another view on the evidence on record.
12. Thus, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly the same is dismissed.