Kerala High Court
Abdul Kabeer vs The State Of Kerala on 25 August, 2020
Author: P.B.Suresh Kumar
Bench: P.B.Suresh Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR
TUESDAY, THE 25TH DAY OF AUGUST 2020 / 3RD BHADRA, 1942
CRL.A.No.537 OF 2019
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN SC 21/2011 DATED 04-04-2019 OF SPECIAL
COURT FOR TRIAL OF OFFENCES AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN,
THALASSERY
CRIME NO.367/2008 OF Irikkur Police Station
APPELLANT/ACCUSED:
ABDUL KABEER,
AGED 47 YEARS, S/O.MUHAMMED, MANAPATTIL HOUSE,
KOTTOOR VILLAGE, MALAPPURAM -676 503
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.M.FIROZ
SMT.M.SHAJNA
SRI.E.C.AHAMED FAZIL
SRI.P.C.MUHAMMED NOUSHIQ
SRI.DIPU JAMES
SRI.HUSSAIN K.
RESPONDENT/STATE:
THE STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER,
IRIKKUR POLICE STATION, THROUGH THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
ERNAKULAM-682018.
SMT. PUSHPALATHA .M.K SR. PP
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
25.08.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 2
C.R.
P.B.SURESH KUMAR, J.
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Criminal Appeal No.537 of 2019
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Dated this the 25th day of August, 2020
JUDGMENT
The sole accused in S.C. No.21 of 2011 on the files of the Special Court for the Trial of Offences Against Women and Children, Thalassery has come up in this appeal challenging his conviction and sentence in the said case.
2. The indictment against the accused is that on 04.12.2008, at about 16.15 hours, the accused who was driving a goods van through the wrong side of the State Highway leading to Iritty from Irikkur at a frightful speed has knocked down 21 school children from behind and thereby caused the death of 10 children and injured 11 children and thus committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 of the Indian Indian Penal Code Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 3 (the IPC).
3. On the accused pleading not guilty of the charge levelled against him, the prosecution examined 49 witnesses on its side as PWs.1 to 49 and proved through them as many as 49 documents as Exts.P1 to P49. Among the witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 4 are persons who have been examined to prove the occurrence, PW34 is the Joint Regional Transport Officer concerned and PW47 is the investigating officer in the case. Among the documents proved, Ext.P4 is the scene mahazar. The accused was, thereupon, questioned by the court under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) as regards the incriminating evidence brought out by the prosecution. The accused denied the same and maintained that he is innocent. Since the trial court did not find the case to be one fit for acquittal under Section 232 of the Code, the accused was called upon to enter on his defence. The accused did not, however, adduce any evidence.
4. On an appraisal of the materials on record, the Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 4 court below found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and convicted him for the said offence. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, for having caused the death of each of the ten children in the occurrence. Since the deaths occurred in the same incident, the court directed the substantive sentences imposed on the accused to run concurrently. As noted, the accused is aggrieved by his conviction and sentence.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the accused as also the learned Public Prosecutor.
6. The learned counsel for the accused has made elaborate submissions on the factual as also the legal aspects of the case. In the course of the submissions, the learned counsel has not disputed the occurrence or the death of the children in the occurrence. Similarly, the counsel did not dispute the fact that the accused was driving the vehicle Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 5 involved in the occurrence at the relevant time. The essence of the submissions made by the learned counsel was that the occurrence was only an accident and since the accused was driving the vehicle which is a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution, he is not liable to be punished under any of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel has elaborated the said submission pointing out that in order to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, in the absence of any case for the prosecution that the accused intended to cause the death of the children or cause such bodily injury to the children as is likely to cause their death, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the accused knew that he is likely by his act of driving the vehicle to cause the death of the children, and the prosecution has not established the said fact in the case. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that the evidence on record do not even make out a case of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused in driving the vehicle and that the accused cannot, therefore, be convicted Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 6 even for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.
7. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the knowledge on the part of the accused that he is likely by his act to cause death of the pedestrians on the road is explicit from the facts admitted by the accused itself. The learned Public Prosecutor has also submitted that even otherwise, the said knowledge can be inferred from the evidence tendered by PWs.1 to 4 who have witnessed the occurrence and the evidence tendered by the official witness, namely, PW47. The learned Public Prosecutor has elaborated the said submission pointing out that it has been established through the said evidence that the scene of occurrence is a school zone; that the vehicle did not have any mechanical defect and that the accused who was supposed to drive the vehicle through the northern side of the road has driven the vehicle through the southern side of the road and knocked down the children who were walking through the southern road margin of the road. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, had the vehicle been driven at a reasonable speed, the accused Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 7 could have certainly averted the occurrence, and the fact that the accused could not avert the occurrence even after hitting the vehicle on the first child is sufficient for the court to infer that the accused was driving the vehicle at a frightful speed and the knowledge that his act is likely to cause death of the pedestrians can be presumed in such a case. The learned Public Prosecutor has also relied on the tyre mark on the road at the scene of occurrence at a length of 7.5 meters recorded in Ext.P4 scene mahazar, in support of her contention that the vehicle was coming at a terrific speed.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties on either side and having perused the materials on record, the points to be adjudicated are (1) whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused under Section 304 Part II of the IPC and if not, whether the materials on record would disclose any other offence on the part of the accused, and (2) the relief, if any, to which the accused is entitled to.
9. Since the contention of the accused is that he Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 8 is not liable to be convicted either for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC or for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent act punishable under Section 304A of the IPC, it is necessary to understand the scope of the aforesaid provisions in the context of the case on hand for adjudicating the points formulated.
10. The offence of culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 of the IPC reads thus:
299. Culpable homicide.--Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide .
As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused, the prosecution has no case that the accused intended to cause the death of the children or cause such bodily injury to the children as is likely to cause their death. The case of the prosecution is only that the accused in a case of this nature shall be presumed to have the knowledge that he is likely by the act of driving to cause the death of pedestrians. In other Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 9 words, the case of the prosecution is that the case is one that falls under the third limb of Section 299 of the IPC and does not amount to murder as defined in Section 300 of the IPC. Two fundamental principles to be remembered before proceeding further with the case are that a man is presumed to know the natural and likely consequences of all his acts and that an act does not become involuntary merely because its consequences are unforeseen. No doubt that mere driving of a motor vehicle along a public road by a person who is licensed to drive the vehicle cannot be said to be an act done with the knowledge that by such act he is likely to cause death. Acts performed regardless of the consequences are understood in common parlance as rash acts, culpable rashness is understood in law as hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury, or knowledge that it will probably be caused and the culpability lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequence [See Empress v. Idu Beg, (1881) ILR 3 All 776 and Mahadev Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 10 Prasad Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 14 SCC 479]. The essential elements of the concept of rashness are conscious advertence to the risk, resolution to embark upon, or continue with the contemplated course of conduct notwithstanding the risk and the absence of justification or excuse for the risk the accused deliberately incurs. If death occurs on account of culpable rashness in performing an act, the person concerned is liable to be punished under Section 304A of the IPC. Culpable rashness in driving a vehicle which involves knowledge that it is likely to cause injury or death being an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC, it can certainly be held that mere knowledge on the part of a person in driving a vehicle that his act is likely to cause injury or death is not sufficient to make out the offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In other words, the extent and ambit of the knowledge to be established on the part of the person concerned is different from the knowledge which would bring an act within the scope of Section 304A of the IPC. Rashness being a matter concerning the state of mind of a person, it is Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 11 wholly subjective in nature and the criminal liability of a person for rashness therefore lies in the fact that he decides to embark or persist with the conduct which he knows or foresees to be likely to cause harm. What distinguishes the gravity of recklessness is the degree of risk of the anticipated harm. This involves an objective enquiry namely as to how an ordinary person in the situation of the accused would have regarded the chances of the harm occurring. The degree of risk under the third limb of Section 299 of the IPC would certainly therefore be higher than the degree of risk under Section 304A of the IPC, while both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death.
11. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648, the Apex Court, after surveying a large number of decisions dealing with the scope of Section 304 Part II and Section 304A of the IPC, held that the question whether the knowledge of the accused who is causing death of others while driving a motor vehicle would fall within the scope of Section 304 Part II or Section 304A of the IPC is to Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 12 be decided on the facts of each case. It was, however, laid down in the said case that where rash or negligent act is preceded with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC would be attracted. Alister Anthony Pareira was a case of drunken driving. The relevant paragraph of the said decision reads thus:
"Each case obviously has to be decided on its own facts. In a case where negligence or rashness is the cause of death and nothing more, Section 304-A may be attracted but where the rash or negligent act is preceded with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death, Section 304 Part II IPC may be attracted and if such a rash and negligent act is preceded by real intention on the part of the wrongdoer to cause death, offence may be punishable under Section 302 IPC." (Underline supplied) The proposition aforesaid has been quoted with approval by the Apex Court in State Tr. P.S. Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v. Sanjeev Nanda, (2012) 8 SCC 450. The aforesaid was a case of drunken driving without licence, and the Apex Court has held that it was a case of offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In other words, in such cases and similar, the knowledge that could be attributed to the person driving the Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 13 vehicle is certainly of a higher degree which would bring the act within the scope of Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In Anil Baran Dey v. The State, (1957) ILR 2 Calcutta 269, the High Court of Calcutta, while distinguishing the offences punishable under Section 304 Part II and Section 304A of the IPC observed that the conduct of a person in driving a vehicle without being there at the steering wheel along a crowded road may amount to an act of culpable homicide, if the death occurred to a pedestrian. Needless to say that the situations aforesaid are only illustrative, and not exhaustive and as held by the Apex Court in Alister Anthony Pareira, each case has to be decided on it own facts.
12. Having thus understood the scope of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, I shall first consider the question as to whether the case on hand is one that falls within the scope of Section 304 Part II of the IPC. But before adjudicating the said question, it is worth noticing a few observations made by the Apex Court in Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 165, Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 14 in the context of the evidence usually let in to prove an occurrence of the instant nature. The Apex Court has observed in the said case that when accidents take place on the road, people using the road or who may happen to be in close vicinity would normally be busy in their pre-occupation and in the normal course, their attention must be attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. It was also observed in the said case that it is seldom and it is only a matter of coincidence that a person actually watching the accident in a position to describe later the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. It was further observed in the said case that the evidence of witnesses examined to prove the accident, therefore, require close scrutiny.
13. As noted, there is no dispute to the fact that the vehicle involved in the occurrence was free from any mechanical defect. There is also no dispute to the fact that the accused was holding a valid licence to drive the vehicle at the relevant time. The prosecution has no case that the accused Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 15 was either drunk or under the influence of any intoxicating substance. The road was a State Highway having reasonable visibility. Since the road was lying in the east-west direction and the vehicle driven by the accused was moving from west to east, the accused was supposed to drive the vehicle through the northern side of the road.
14. PW1 who was examined by the prosecution to prove the occurrence has deposed that while he was proceeding to his house after purchasing some articles from a shop situated on the southern side of the road, he saw school children moving from west to east through the southern side of the road in a line and when he moved ten steps ahead, he heard a noise and scream and when he turned back hearing the noise and scream, he saw a vehicle knocking down the children and halting by hitting on a heap of firewood kept on the side of the road. He deposed that the vehicle was coming at a high speed. It has come out in evidence that the shop from which PW1 has purchased articles as referred to by him is one situated on the southern side of the road itself at a distance of Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 16 about 30 meters east from the scene of occurrence. From the evidence given by PW1 that he turned back hearing the noise and scream, it can be inferred that PW1 was moving towards east from the shop. If that be so, the statement made by PW1 that the vehicle was coming at a high speed would only be an inference made by him having regard to the nature of occurrence. At the same time, the evidence tendered by PW1 can certainly be accepted to hold that the vehicle which was supposed to move through the northern side of the road has come to the southern side and knocked down 21 children who were moving in a line and thereafter halted by hitting on a heap of firewood. PW2 examined by the prosecution to prove the occurrence is the person who was travelling with the accused in the van. The evidence given by him was to the effect that as he was sleeping, he did not see the occurrence and by the time he woke up, the vehicle had already knocked down the children. The evidence tendered by PW2 is therefore not of any use to the prosecution.
Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 17
15. PW3 is another witness examined by the prosecution to prove the occurrence. PW3 is the person who is running the shop on the side of the road from which PW1 has purchased articles. PW3 is the father of one of the children died in the occurrence also. He deposed that the van driven by the accused has run over the children who were walking in line through the southern side of the road from behind. He also deposed that he was waiting for his daughter in the shop. He too deposed that after knocking down the children, the vehicle halted by hitting on a heap of firewood. According to PW3, the speed of the vehicle and the negligence on the part of the driver are the causes for the occurrence. He also deposed that the driver did not make any attempt to stop the vehicle, even after hitting the first child. In cross-examination, he admitted that his shop is on the southern side of the road and that there were a few customers in his shop at the time of occurrence. He also admitted in cross-examination that his shop is situated 2 feet below the road and that the road is one through which buses are plying and further that there is reasonable traffic on Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 18 the road. To a leading question put to him by the counsel for the accused that by the time he reached the road, the children were lying in the road, he answered in the affirmative. Since the shop of the PW3 is situated on the southern side of the road itself and since it is lying at a lower level from the road and since there were customers in the shop at the time of the occurrence, it is doubtful as to whether PW3 has seen the occurrence. I take this view also in the light of the admission made by him in cross examination that by the time he reached the road, the children were lying on the road. PW4 is a person residing near the scene of occurrence on the northern side of the road. She deposed that she has seen the occurrence. What was testified by her was that while she was removing the calf from the cow after milking the cow, she saw the van hitting the children who were walking through the southern side of the road from behind and moving further and then halting by hitting on a heap of firewood kept on the side of the road. She also deposed that the occurrence happened on account of the carelessness of the accused. She deposed that had the accused Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 19 been careful, he could have prevented the casualty to a great extent. In cross examination, she admitted that her version before the police was that the occurrence took place while she was milking the cow. In the light of the aforesaid admission, it is doubtful as to whether she has seen the actual occurrence. If the evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case is evaluated in the light of the observation of the Apex Court in Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe, it is very difficult to make any inference as to what in all likelihood must have lead to the occurrence.
16. Among others, what a court needs to know in a case of this nature, where it has to decide the question as to whether the case would fall within the scope of Section 304 Part II or Section 304A of the IPC are, (i) through which side of the road the accused was driving the van, (ii) the speed at which the accused was driving the van, (iii) how the vehicle which was supposed to move through the northern side of the road has come to the southern side of the road and (iv) the reason why the vehicle could not be stopped by the accused even after Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 20 hitting the first child. There is no convincing evidence in the case on any of the aforesaid aspects. A feeble lead available to make an inference as to the speed at which the van was coming is the tyre mark of the vehicle as noted in Ext.P4 scene mahazar. Even for the same, scientific evidence which is possible has not been made available. At the most, what could be inferred from the evidence let in by the prosecution is that the vehicle was being driven at a considerably high speed. It has been held by the Apex Court in very many cases that the speed alone is not the criteria for deciding even rashness falling within the scope of Section 304A of the IPC, for motor vehicles are intended to be driven in speed as well and relationship between speed and rashness depends upon place and time [See Suleman Rahiman Mulani & Another v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829]. It was observed by the Apex Court in the said case that in a straight, wide road where there is no obstruction from other vehicles or pedestrians, it cannot be said that driving in speed, or for that matter, absence of Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 21 blowing horn by themselves will not amount to rashness or negligence.
17. True, from the definition of rash and negligent act contained in Section 304A of the IPC itself, it can be seen that rashness in driving a vehicle at times would amount to culpable homicide, if knowledge sufficient that such driving is likely to cause death could be attributed to the accused. But, merely for the reason that rashness in driving may at times would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, one cannot be charged with the said offence, having regard to the consequence of the occurrence. Similarly, it is true that careless drivers are a menace and curse to the public and they put the life not only of the passengers of the vehicles but also that of the pedestrian and other commuters to peril and they are, therefore, to be adequately punished. At the same time, merely for the reason that adequate punishment is not contemplated for rash and negligent driving, such drivers shall not be charged for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, if death results on account of rashness. When the provisions of Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 22 the IPC draw a clear distinction between the offences that would fall under Section 304 Part II and Section 304A, grave injustice would be caused to the accused in an occurrence involving a motor vehicle, if brought under Section 304 Part II unjustifiably. The onerous task of this court in the aforesaid background is to find out whether the accused was driving the vehicle at the relevant time in a rash manner sufficient to attribute on him knowledge of the consequences which would bring the act within the scope of Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In this context, it is worth referring to the explanation offered by the accused when questioned under Section 313 of the Code as to the cause of the occurrence. The said explanation reads thus:
"ഞഞൻ വഞഹനന മമതമഞയയ speed ൽ എനന side ൽ കടമ ഓടമകകയഞയമരന. ഉദ ശന 3-4 മ റർ അടതവചയ വലതവശതയ road ൽ കടമ കടമഞയമ കടമകൾ നടന ദ*ഞയമരന. അതമൽ ഒര കടമയനട bag എനന വണമയമൽ ഇടമച. ഞഞൻ ആ കടമനയ രകമകഞനള ശമതമൽ ന*നടനയ നവടമചതഞണയ. അതമൽ നമയനണന വമടതഞണയ അ*കടതമനന കഞരണന. അലഞനത ഞഞൻ മനപർവമഞയമ ഞഞൻ ഒനന ന=യമല. അതമനയ ഉദ ശവന ഉണഞയമല."
In the absence of satisfactory evidence as to the various facts referred to in the preceding paragraph which the Court in a Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 23 case of this nature expects from the prosecution, the Court is unable to rule out the explanation offered by the accused in a statement under Section 313 of the Code. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, from the mere inference that the accused must have been driving the vehicle at a considerably high speed, it cannot be said that he could be attributed with the knowledge of the consequences sufficient to bring the act of driving within the scope of Section 304 Part II of the IPC, especially when the road in question is a State Highway having a reasonable visibility even according to the prosecution. To sum up, on the facts established, the accused cannot be said to be guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
18. The next question is as to whether the evidence on record would disclose any other offence. As noted, the case of the accused is that the oral evidence let in by the prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused even under Section 304A of the IPC. But, merely for the reason that oral evidence is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 24 accused under Section 304A of the IPC, it cannot be said that the accused is not guilty under that provision. In a case of this nature, the court should certainly evaluate the circumstances brought out in evidence and the admitted facts to see whether the same, coupled with the oral evidence, would make out any offence. Of course, the law as regards circumstantial evidence is well settled that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, at the first instance, be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and not only that, the circumstances should exclude every hypothesis of innocence of the accused as well. As noted, the accused does not dispute the occurrence. He does not also dispute the fact that since the road was lying in the east-west direction and since he was moving from west to east, he was supposed to drive the vehicle through the northern side of the road. He does not also dispute the fact that the occurrence took place on the southern extreme portion of the road. He does not dispute the fact that the school children were moving in line and not in Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 25 clusters through the road at the time of the occurrence. He does not also dispute the fact that he could not stop the vehicle even after hitting the children and the vehicle was halted by hitting on a heap of firewood. In Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe, it was observed by the Apex Court that in a case of this nature, one would expect the driver of the vehicle to explain the circumstances which lead to the occurrence, for satisfactory nature of the explanation would absolve him from the criminal liability. Coming to the case on hand, the explanation of the accused in his statement under Section 313 of the Code does not give sufficient confidence for the court to hold that a mere turning of the vehicle to save the life of a person would result in such a huge casualty taking the life of ten innocent children. However, from the materials on record, it could be certainly inferred that had the vehicle been coming at a reasonable speed, even if the case was one in which the accused had to turn the vehicle to one side to save the life of a child, the casualty would not have been so terrible as in the case on hand. True, that the road is a State Highway and the Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 26 persons who are driving vehicles through Highway are entitled to drive vehicles at a reasonable speed. Though it was pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor that the scene of occurrence was a school zone, there is nothing on record to infer that the scene of occurrence was a school zone. But, insofar as it is established that there was a school on the side of the road and children coming from the school were moving through the side of the road, persons driving vehicles through such places shall necessarily be imputed with the knowledge that even the slightest element of carelessness or rashness on their part would endanger the life of the public. Insofar as it could be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case that the accused was driving the vehicle at a very high speed through the road abutting a school at a time when children coming out from the school were moving in line and not in clusters through the side of the road, he could certainly be attributed with the knowledge that his act of driving the vehicle at a high speed would certainly endanger the life of the pedestrians on the road. In that view of the matter, I am Crl.Appeal No.537 of 2019 27 inclined to hold that the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.
19. Coming to the sentence to be awarded to the accused, having regard to the nature of the occurrence, I am of the view that the accused is liable to be imposed the maximum sentence provided for the offence under Section 304A of the IPC which a Magistrate who is to try a case under Section 304A is empowered to impose.
In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the conviction of the accused is altered to one under Section 304A of the IPC and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. In all other respects, the impugned judgement will stand affirmed.
Sd/-
P.B.SURESH KUMAR, JUDGE.
YKB