Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Bansiya And Anr. vs State Of Rajasthan on 17 February, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996CRILJ1393, 1995(3)WLC553, 1995(1)WLN215
JUDGMENT Rajendra Saxena, J.
1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 19-6-92 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra, whereby he convicted appellants Bansiya and his father Chela Ram for the offence under Section 306, I.P.C. and sentenced appellant Bansiya to rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs. two thousand and in default to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and appellant Chela Ram to rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. five hundred and in default to further undergo six month's imprisonment.
2. Briefly the facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that Smt. Rani Meghwal, deceased, was married to appellant Bansiya some time in July, 1990. After marriage, she remained at her in-laws' house situated in village Jasol for about a week. Thereafter, she went to her parents house (Peehar) situated in village Asotra, where she stayed for about two months. Again, she went to her in-laws house, stayed for one and a half months and came back to her 'Peehar'. Lastly about one and a half months prior to the date of occurrence i.e. 14-5-1991, she was living with the appellants. On 13-5-91 i.e. one day earlier to 'aakhateej', P.W. 7 Chhagana Ram, the brother of the deceased Smt. Rani, went to fetch her but appellant Chela Ram and his wife co-accused Smt. Mangi neither talked to him nor sent Smt. Rani with him. Thereupon, Chhagana Ram came back to his house and asked his wife P.W. 5 Smt. Anchi, who is also the niece of appellant Chela Ram, to bring Smt. Rani. Smt. Anchi did not return till 6 p.m. Thereupon, P.W. 7 Chhagana Ram again went to the house of appellants and asked his wife Smt. Anchi to come back, but the appellants did not send Smt. Rani. It is the case of the prosecution that thereupon, the appellant did not send Smt. Rani and told Chhagana Ram that now, he would see the dreams of taking his sister ¼jk.kh ds feyus ds lius vk;saxs ½ It is the case of the prosecution that thereafter, P.W. 7 Chhagana Ram and P.W. 5 Smt. Anchi came back to village Asotra. On the next day i.e. 14-5-91, the S.D.M.. Balotra called Chhagana Ram to appellants' house, where he found that Smt. Rani was lying dead after receiving extensive burn injuries in her house. It may be mentioned here that on 14-5-91 at 4.20 p.m. appellant Chela Ram submitted a written report Ex. P. 9 to the S.H.O., Police Station, Siwana, wherein he submitted that on the same day at about: 12 noon, his wife (co-accused Smt. Mangi) informed him, while he was coming from the 'Bera' to the village, that appellant Bansiya's wife Smt. Rani had burnt herself after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body inside the closed room. She also informed that at that time, she had gone to the flour-mill for grinding the wheat and that other members of the family had gone to Poonamji's Bera. Chela Ram also mentioned in his report that his son Bansiya had gone to Balotra; that he rushed to his house, where he found Bansiya's wife lying dead. He further mentioned that his daughter-in-law Smt. Rani had committed suicide after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body. On further interrogation made by Shri Jalam Singh, SHO, appellant Chela Ram also informed him that Smt. Rani was aged about 18 years; that she was married to his son Bansiya about eleven months back and that on 13-5-91, Chhagana Ram and his wife Smt. Anchi had come to his house for taking Smt. Rani to village Jasol but he did not send her and that for that reason, the deceased Smt. Rani became infuriated and after getting the opportunity, committed suicide. Thereupon, an inquest report No. 5/91 under Section 174, Cr. P. C. was drawn and the same was sent to the S.D.M., Balotra, who rushed to the place of occurrence and got the site plan Ex. P. 19 and memo thereof Ex. P. 5 prepared. He also got the post-mortem examination of the dead body of Smt. Rani conducted by a Board of doctors consisting of P.W. 6 Dr. O.P. Vyas and P.W. 10 Dr. B.P. Lohiya. The doctors found extensive deep burns on the entire body. The skin was peeled off. The pleurae, larynax & trachea, right and left lungs, pericardium, spleen and kidney were congested. The heart and large vessels were empty. The abdomen walls were blackened with peeled off skin. The mouth was swollen and protruded. The doctors did not notice any injury like bruises, abrasions and other wounds because of the extensive burns all over the body. The doctors vide the postmortem examination report Ex. P. 3 opined that the cause of death was extensive deep hundred per cent burns. They however preserved the visceras and sent for chemical examination but it appears that no chemical examination report was received. The S.D.M. also examined Chhagana Ram; the brother of the deceased, Smt. Anchi and Smt. Nathi besides the appellants and other witnesses. The S.D.M. concluded that from his enquiry, it was fairly established that the deceased prior to her death was mentally and physically fit; that the room in which the incident took place was not bolted from inside; that Smt. Mangi, the m6ther-in-law of the deceased even after knowing about the incident did not immediately inform the villagers and that one day prior to the ill fated incident day, the appellant Chela Ram and Smt. Mangi did not send the deceased to her parents house along with Chhagana Ram and Smt. Anchi, who had come to fetch her and that the appellants were harassing and maltreating the deceased and were also suspecting about her character and, thus, they abetted/compelled her to commit suicide. He, therefore, sent a detailed report of his enquiry dt. 28-5-91 Ex. P. 8 along with the record of the enquiry including the statements of Chhagana Ram, Smt. Anchi and Smt. Nathi to the S.H.O., P.S., Siwana for registering a case under Section 306 and 498A, I.P.C. Thereupon, formal FIR Ex. P. 10 was drawn and the case was registered against the appellants and co-accused Smt. Mangi, who has been acquitted by the learned trial Judge. After usual investigation, a challan was filed against the appellants and co-accused Smt. Mangi before the M.J.M., Balotra, who in his turn committed the case to the learned trial Judge. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing the parties and considering the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer by his order dated 29-1-92 discharged the accused persons for the offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. and framed charge for the offence under Section 306, I.P.C. only to which they pleaded not guilty. The prosecution examined as many as thirteen witnesses. Appellants in their plea recorded under Section 313, Cr. P. C. admitted that deceased Smt. Rani was married to appellant Bansiya in July, 1990 but denied that they harassed or mal-treated or subjected her to cruelty. On the other hand, they asserted that Smt. Rani often used to go to her parents house. They also denied that on 13-5-91, Chhagana Ram and Smt. Anchi had come to fetch her. Appellant Bansiya pleaded that on the day of the alleged incident, he was not present in village Asotra, and had gone to Balotra, where he was working in a factory. Appellant Chela Ram denied that he had told Chhagana Ram that now, he would dream for taking the deceased. The appellants asserted that there was no chain 'sankal' inside the door of the room, where Smt. Rani had committed suicide.
3. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge felt thatit was a lit case, wherein presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act be drawn against the appellants, who have failed to discharge the burden. He further held that it was not at all a case of dowry death or a case for demanding the dowry but from the evidence, it was established that the appellants subjected her to cruelty and, thus, abetted her to commit suicide. He, however, by giving benefit of reasonable doubt, acquitted co-accused Smt. Mangi but by his impugned judgment dt. 19-6-92 convicted and sentenced the appellants under Section 306, I.P.C. in the manner indicated above. Hence this appeal.
4. I have heard Shri P. N. Mohanani, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri S. M. Singhvi, learned Public Prosecutor at length and carefully perused the record of the trial Court in extenso.
5. It has been vehemently canvased by Mr. Mohanani that admittedly, the learned trial Judge had discharged the appellants of the offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. and as the State did not challenge that order, the same became final; that there was no eye-witness of the incident; that the neighbours P.W. 1 Mangla Ram, P.W. 13 Deva Ram and P.W. 8 Ganga Ram have not supported the prosecution case at all; that even P.W. 4 Smt. Nathi, P.W. 5 Smt. Anchi and P.W. 7 Chhagana Ram, who are the mother, sister-in-law (Bhabhi) and brother of the deceased, were initially examined by the S.D.M. during enquiry under Section 171, Cr. P. C. and their statements were also sent by him along with his report Ex. P. 8, whereupon the FIR Ex. P. 10 was drawn and the case was registered, but the Investigating Officer has deliberately withheld those material statements and did not submit them along with the challan. According to Mr. Mohanani, even the aforementioned witnesses, who are close relatives and interested witnesses, in their initial version did not state that the appellants maltreated and harassed the deceased. According to him, the testimony of these witnesses is inconsistent, replete with embellishment and is untrustworthy and, the learned trial Judge has committed an illegality in relying on their evidence. His another limb of argument is that there is not a fringe of evidence to convict the appellants for the offences under Section 306, I.P.C, specially when on the same evidence, the learned trial Judge has acquitted co-accused Smt. Mangi by giving her benefit of doubt. Another limb of argument of Mr. Mohanani is that the learned trial Judge has further committed an illegality in discussing and evaluating the defence evidence first of all and then scanning the prosecution evidence. He has contended that the learned trial Judge has convicted the appellants merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Singhvi, learned Public Prosecutor, has simply reiterated the reasonings given by the learned trial Judge in the impugned judgment.
7. I have given my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made before me. There is no dispute that the learned trial Judge discharged the appellants and co-accused Smt. Mangi for the offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. vide his order dated 29-1 -92, which has not been challenged by the State and the same has, thus, become final. The appellants had been charged for the offence under Section 306, I.P.C. for abetment of suicide alleged to have been committed by the deceased.
8. Now let us find out as to whether the Provisions of Section 113A, Evidence Act can be pressed into service in this case ? Section 113A, Evidence Act runs as under:-
"Presumption as to the abatement of suicide by a married woman. Section 113A when the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband."
9. The explanation appended to Section 498A, I.P.C. proclaims that for the purposes of Section 498A, 'cruelty' means-(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Since the appellants have already been discharged for the offence under Section 498A, I.P.C, the 'cruelty' for the purpose of raising the presumption as to abatement of suicide by the deceased under Section 113, I.P.C. can only be raised, if the prosecution by adducing clear, cogent and convincing evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt any wilful conduct of the appellants which is of such a nature as was likely to drive the deceased Smt. Rani to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical. Therefore, to sustain a conviction under Section 306, I.P.C, the 'cruelty' must have been committed soon before the death of a married woman. If the cruelty of the husband or the relative is not proved then no presumption of abetting the deceased in committing the suicide is available.
10. In E. Balakrishnama Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1992 Cri LJ 2328), the accused husband was acquitted of the offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. but convicted under Section 306, I.P.C. by the learned trial Judge. There was no appeal against his acquittal under Section 498A, I.P.C. The accused filed appeal against his conviction under Section 306, I.P.C. However, the High Court found the accused guilty under Section 498A, I.P.C. but set aside his conviction under Section 306, I.P.C. The prosecution case was that the deceased was harassed for not begetting children. The Apex Court held that the prosecution evidence that the accused harassed the deceased for not begetting the children and caused her mental agony and abetted her to commit suicide was not satisfactory and acceptable and, as such, the finding of the High Court acquitting the accused under Section 306, I.P.C. was affirmed. However, the conviction of the accused under Section 498A, I.P.C. was set aside because no appeal against the acquittal was filed by the State.
11. In State of Punjab v. Kirpal Singh (1992 Cri LJ 2472), a married woman committed suicide within few months of her marriage. It was alleged that her husband and in-laws started maltreating her for bringing inadequate dowry and coercing her to bring more dowry from her parents. Her relatives were not permitted to see her on the pretext that she was sleeping. She also complained that she had been harassed by her husband and in-laws to bring more dowry and that on that count, she consumed poison. There was no reliable evidence of torture or cruelty by her in-laws for bringing insufficient dowry. The learned trial Judge acquitted the accused persons of the offence under Section 306, I.P.C. The Apex Court dismissing State's appeal against acquittal held that by the mere fact that deceased committed suicide within few months of her marriage, no inference of abetment can be drawn against the husband and in-laws specially when there was no reliable evidence of torture or cruelty for bringing insufficient dowry.
12. In Jagdish Chander v. State of Haryana (1988 Cri LJ 1048), the Punjab and Haryana High Court), the accused was alleged to have burnt his wife by pouring kerosene oil. There was no reliable or trustworthy evidence on record. He was tried for committing the murder of his wife. His conviction recorded by the trial Judge was quashed. It was the prosecution case that the husband used to take liquor daily despite constant protest from the wife and that he was also in the habit of coming late in the night. Interpreting the provisions of Section 113A, Evidence Act and 498A, I.P.C., it was held that the first requisite for raising the presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act is that it must be proved that wife was subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498A, I.P.C. and that the fact of wilful conduct of the accused in taking the liquor almost daily despite constant protest by his wife and his habit of coming home late in the night did not fulfil the essential ingredients of the cruelty as given in Section 498A, I.P.C. In that case, the trial Court had rejected the application of the Public Prosecutor for framing charge against the accused under Section 498A, I.P.C. holding that no sufficient ground for framing such a charge was made out. That order was not challenged by the prosecution. It was held that the same matter could not be re-agitated and the alleged cruelty having been excluded by the said order, the same could not be taken into consideration for raising a presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act and the accused was acquitted.
13. In Tapan Pal v. State of West Bengal (1992 Cri LJ 1017), Namita committed suicide by hanging within three years of the marriage with the accused appellant. It was alleged that she was subjected to physical and mental torture by the appellants. The evidence adduced by the prosecution consisted mainly of the alleged statements made by the deceased regarding the torture made by the appellants, when she stayed at her father's house on some occasions. Her statements were vague and did not disclose overt acts of the appellants. It was alleged that the deceased was asked to part with her jewellery and valuable for marriage of her sister-in-law. There was evidence that quarrels were usually picked up by the deceased. It was held that the isolated statements of the deceased made more than six months before her date of suicide did not amount to dying declaration and were not admissible in evidence under Section 32(1), Evidence Act. It was held that such statements of the deceased were not directly connected to her death nor logically culminated in her death and that such statements of the deceased were not admissible in evidence.
14. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984 Cri LJ 1738), the Apex Court has laid down the following proposition :
"(i) Section 32, Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is homicide, or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(ii) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait jacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible, because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.
(iii) The second part of Clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person, who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by promoting or tutoring.
(iv) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.
(v) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statements irrelevant.".
15. In Samir Samanta and anr. v. The State (1992 (3) Crimes 850), it has been held that where the woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband subjected her to cruelty as the term has been defined in Section 498A, the Court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide had been abetted by such person and that legislature was extremely careful in drafting the provisions of Section 113A, Evidence Act. Had it been the intention of the legislature that the Court should in all cases jump upon a conclusion as a rule that there has been abetment of suicide simply because suicide has been committed by the woman within seven years of marriage and she was subjected to cruelty, the legislature would not have used such flexible expression as "the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband ...." The expression used is 'may presume' and not that rigid as 'shall presume' as used in Section 113A Evidence Act. Therefore, for raising a presumption under Section 113A Evidence Act, all other circumstances of the case have to be taken into consideration. The cruelty or harassment must have been committed soon before the death of such married woman. This reflects the insignia of proximity text. The question as to what length of time will answer the requirement of the words, "soon before", may of course depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. It was further held that there was no reason to suppose that Section 113A Evidence Act, the language of which is rather all embracing excludes proximity test even when such text is projected by the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, in order to attract presumption of abetment of suicide under Section 113A, Evidence Act, the facts and circumstances of the case should be such as can reasonably sustain a presumption about the existence of a nexus of cause and effect between the alleged cruelty and suicide.
16. Now, keeping in view the aforementioned principles of law, let us find out whether in the case on hand, the presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act can be raised against the appellants ?
17. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence in this case. PW 4 Smt. Nathi, who is the mother of deceased, has deposed that immediately after her marriage, Rani stayed with her in-laws for about five days and when she came back, she informed her that her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law had quarrelled with her " ^^esjsls VaVk fd;k** and that she told her that she had to remain there for her entire life; that for two-three months, she did not send Rani to her in-laws house; that thereafter, her mother-in-law came to fetch her and she was sent with her. Nathi has stated that at that time, Rani had told her that she was in grief ^^esjs nq%[k gS**. However, she has not given any details about the alleged grief of the deceased. She further stated that thereafter she had gone to appellants' house to fetch the deceased. She stated that Rani was sent to appellants' house along with appellant Bansiya, who had come along with Kumbha and Deva about one and a half months prior to the alleged incident. She told that one day prior to 'aakhateej', her son Chhagana had gone to fetch Smt. Rani but the appellants did not send her and that on the next day, the alleged incident took place. She has admitted that appellants are masons and engaged in construction of the houses and that her daughter Rani also used to go to kiln for preparing the bricks along with her son Chhagan and Smt. Anchi. She also stated that Rani had told her that her in-laws used to tell her that she was black and fat. Thus, this witness has not given any details of alleged maltreatment or harassment. Even if it is taken to be correct that in-laws of the deceased used to tell her that she was black and fat lady, still then this cannot be termed as a cruelty within the meaning of explanation appended to Section 498A IPC.
18. PW 5 Smt. Anchi on the other hand deposed that she had accompanied Smt. Rani at the time of latter's marriage to appellants' house and stayed there for about four days and came back togather. She has specifically stated that during that period, nobody quarrelled with her nor inflicted any injuries to her. Thus, she has categorically contradicted the testimony of PW 4 Nathi on this count. Smt. Anchi has further stated that Rani was sent to appellants' house after few months and when she returned, she had complained that she was beaten. However, she has not given any details as to who had beaten the deceased. Therefore, this allegation is very vague. Smt. Anchi has further stated that for the third time, Rani was sent to her in-laws house about one and a half months prior to the alleged incident alongwith Bansiya and Kumbha. She has deposed that one day prior to 'aakhateej', her husband Chhagana had gone to appellants' house to fetch Smt. Rani but the appellants did not send her; that thereupon she went to appellants' house at about 3 PM. The appellants refused to send the deceased and asked her to go back ^^ikgh tk ijh esyksu gh**. She also stated that at that time, her in-laws also told her that the deceased would see dreams of going to her parents house and that in the meanwhile, her husband Chhagna also came there and thereafter they came back. She deposed that on the next day, the appellants killed the deceased. Thus, from her statement, no specific overt act of Cruelty of any of the appellants has been disclosed. At the most it appears that one day prior to alleged incident i.e. 13-5-91, PW 5 Smt. Anchi and PW 7 Chhagana had gone to appellants' house to fetch Smt. Rani but her in-laws did not send her. PW 7 Chhagana Ram has stated that after marriage of Rani, his wife had also gone to appellants' house and that after five days, he brought them from there and that at that time, Rani had told him that she had been married in such a poor house that her in-laws will kill her some day hut neither Smt. Nathi nor Anchi has deposed like vise. Apparently, Chhagana has unsuccessfully tried to invent a new story and exaggerate the matter. Chhagana has further stated that after about one and a half months of her marriage, Rani was again sent to her in-laws house and after remaining there for about one and a half months, she came back to her parents' house and at that time she told him that her in-laws had beaten her severely and that her neighbours Devla and Mangaliya rescued her. Again, Nathi and Anchi have not deposed likewise. Moreover, PW 1 Mangla and PW 12 Deva Ram, who are the next door neighbours of appellants have specifically stated that they had never seen any quarrel in between the deceased and her in-laws or that her in-laws had never beaten her. These witnesses have, thus, not supported the prosecution case and have been declared hostile. These witnesses have specifically stated that the appellants never harassed or maltreated the deceased. They have also denied that in their presence, the appellant Chela Ram had told to Chhagana that he will now see the deceased in his dreams. They have also stated that the relations between Rani and her husband appellant Bansilal were cordial. PW 8 Ganga Ram has also not supported the prosecution story. He has deposed that he does not know about the behaviour of appellants with deceased. On the other hand, he has stated that Rani used to go to her in-laws house and come to her parents house frequently. PW 2 Sanwla Ram, who is the cousin of the deceased, has stated that when Rani used to come to her parents house, she used to tell that she would not go to her in-laws house and alleged that her in-laws used to harass and beat her. Again, his statement is very vague and incomplete. He has not given any details of the alleged beating. There is no other evidence regarding the alleged cruelty. A careful scanning of the statements of the aforementioned witnesses makes it amply clear that these witnesses have given inconsistent and contradictory versions and their testimony is replete with contradictions. Apart from it, the testimony of Smt. Nathi, Smt. Anchi and Chhagana is based on the alleged statement of deceased Rani, uttered many months prior to her death. Apparently, such statement does not fall within the provisions of Section 32(1), Evidence Act and the same is not admissible in evidence. In my considered opinion, the learned trial Judge has misread the evidence recorded in this case and based his findings merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures. From the prosection evidence, no wilful conduct of the appellants, which was of such a narture as was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, has been proved at all. There is no positive evidence to prove that at the time of the alleged occurrence, appellants Bansiya and Chela Ram were present at their house. From the perusal of the memo of site plan Ex. P. 19 and site plan Ex.P.5, which has been proved by PW 13 Bajranglal, S.D.M., it stands well established that there was no chain inside the door of the room, where the alleged incident took place. Thus, there was no question of bolting that room from inside. Simply because the room was not bolted from inside, it cannot be inferred that the appellants by their any wilful conduct had abetted Smt. Rani to commit suicide. The learned trial Judge, has, thus committed an illegality in raising a presumption against appellants under Section 113A, Evidence Act, the provisions of which do not come into play keeping in view the evidence recorded in this case as also the facts and circumstances of the case. It appears that when Smt. Rani was not permitted by her in-laws to go along with Chhagana and Anchi on 13-5-1991, she became perturbed and got infuriated and lost balance of her mind and when on the next day, when the appellants and co-accused Smt. Mangi were out, she committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil and setting her to fire and for that act, the appellants cannot be held responsible.
19. It is also curious to note that the evidence against appellants and co-accused Smt. Mangi, who has been acquitted by the learned trial Judge, was the same but without any plausible reason, the learned trial Judge has convicted the appellants. In my considered opinion, the findings of the learned trial Judge are perverse and against the evidence recorded in this case. The prosecution has miserably failed to successfully bring home the offence under Section 306, IPC against the appellants and, as such, their conviction deserves to be set aside.
20. The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment qua the appellants as well as their conviction and sentence are hereby set aside and they are acquitted of the offence under Section 306 IPC. Appellant Bansiya is in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Appellant Chela Ram, whose sentence was suspended, need not surrender