National Consumer Disputes Redressal
National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. vs Pv Krishna Reddy on 18 November, 2008
BEFORE THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, NEW DELHI NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 1029 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.114/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus PV Krishna Reddy Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1030 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.115/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus R.Sudhakar Reddy Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1031 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.116/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus R.Chandra Reddy Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1032 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.117/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus R.Dharma Reddy Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1033 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.118/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus G.Babu Reddy Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1034 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.119/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus K. Raja Reddy Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1035 OF 2004 (From the order dated 24.2.04 in Appeal No.120/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus M. Jagadevaiah Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1399 OF 2004 (From the order dated 30.4.04 in Appeal No.1215/03 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus G.Venkateswara Reddy & Ors. Respondents WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1400 OF 2004 (From the order dated 30.4.04 in Appeal No.1224/03 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus E.Pralhakar Reddy & Ors. Respondents WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1401 OF 2004 (From the order dated 30.4.04 in Appeal No.1225/03 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus Jalandhar Reddy & Ors. Respondents WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 1402 OF 2004 (From the order dated 30.4.04 in Appeal No.1226/03 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus G.Yugandhar Reddy & Ors. Respondents WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 3675 OF 2007 (From the common judgment and order dated 18.6.07 in Appeal No.1043/04 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus T.Srinivasa Rao Respondent WITH REVISION PETITION NO. 3676 OF 2007 (From the common judgment and order dated 18.6.07 in Appeal No.229/05 of the State Commission, A.P.) National Seeds Corpn. Ltd. Petitioner Versus T.Srinivasa Rao Respondent BEFORE: HONBLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHAN, PRESIDENT HONBLE MR. B.K. TAIMNI, MEMBER PRONOUNCED ON: 18.11.2008 O R D E R
ASHOK BHAN J., PRESIDENT This order shall dispose of the 13 sets of Revision Petitions filed by the National Seeds Corporation Limited-petitioner against different respondents. Although there is a variation in the land holdings of the various respondents and the varieties of seeds, which the respondents had obtained, but the question of law is the same.
The land holdings in all these cases vary from 2 acres to 10 acres. In Revision Petition No. 1400 of 2004, the holding is mentioned to be 27 acres but the same belongs to seven respondents and on an average, their holdings come to 2 to 4 acres of land. Except in Revision Petition Nos. 3675 of 2007 and 3676 of 2007, where the variety of seed taken by the farmer-respondent was of chilly, in all other cases, the farmers had taken seeds of bitter gourd and the quantity of the seeds vary from 3 to 6 kg.
We will be referring to the facts of Revision Petition Nos. 3675 of 2007 and 3676 of 2007, reference to which was made by the Counsel for the parties.
The complainant, Shri T.S. Rao, respondent herein, had on 24.06.1996, purchased 13.550 kg hybrid chilly seeds (X-235 Bhaskar variety) @ Rs. 225/- per kg. In addition to this, he paid Rs. 237/- as against registration fee, Rs.600/- as against inspection fee, Rs. 20/- as against seed testing charges and Rs. 55/- for other charges. According to the complainant, at the time of purchase of seeds, the complainant was assured of 80% germination by the petitioner-Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) and a yield of 30 quintals per acre.
As per the complainant, following the instructions of the petitioner, the complainant raised a nursery with the seeds in second week of July and transplanted the same in his land of 10 acre in the month of August. Being an experienced agriculturist, he took all the precautionary measures, but still he did not see the expected yield and so he immediately informed the opposite party officials about the disappointing state of the crops. But he received no response. The complainant also informed the concerned Agricultural Officer at Mandal and District level. It is only then, one Mr. T. Rama Rao inspected the crop on 30.10.1996 and, thereafter, Mr. K. Ramesh, A.S.C. inspected the crop on 21.11.1996. The Horticulturist who visited the filed, told the complainant at the time of inspection that the crop was defective and this could result into diseased yield. The petitioner rejected the yield on the ground that the same was diseased. Complainant suffered huge losses due to deficiency in service provided by petitioner. The complainant filed a consumer complaint claiming a compensation of Rs.3,75,000/- towards the loss suffered on account of failure of the crop, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards expenses, Rs. 20,000/- towards compensation and refund of cost of seeds of Rs. 3, 774.50. It was specifically stated in the complaint that the seeds were packed in 1993 but sold in the year 1996 and this delay has also contributed in poor/diseased yield despite taking all requisite precautions in sowing and growing the seeds.
The petitioner, in its reply to the complaint, raised the issue of jurisdiction of Consumer Forum on the ground that seeds were purchased by the complainant to grow more seeds to be sold back to the petitioner which means that the seeds were purchased for commercial purpose and, therefore, the complaint would not be maintainable; that the complainant failed to take proper precautions in sowing and growing the seeds; that he did not controlled and managed the crops properly despite instructions given at the time of inspection; that he failed to remove the contaminated crop immediately to avoid rejection. It was contended that the seed crop was raised on uneven low-lying area with high moisture content soil which resulted in stunted growth and it is only because the complainant failed to control and manage the crop properly, it resulted in poor field.
Both, the District Forum as well as the State Commission, decided the legal as well as factual issue in favour of the complainant. It was held by both the Forums below that the seeds were purchased by the complainant for agricultural purposes and not for commercial purpose and, therefore, the Consumer Forum has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the complainant. It was held that there was deficiency in service. With regard to the objection taken by the petitioner that the complainant should have sent the seeds to the appropriate laboratory by invoking provisions under Section 13(1) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986, both the Forums below have rejected the contention by observing that the petitioner itself could have applied for analysis of seeds, if they so desired and that the farmer is not expected to conserve certain portion of seeds for the future possibilities of any such analysis.
On merits, both the Forums below rejected the contention of the petitioner that the complainant had failed to take proper precautions in sowing and growing the seeds. Both District Forum as well as State Commission have heavily relied upon the fact that the seeds were packed in 1993 while the same had been sold to the complainant in June, 1996. That the petitioner had completely failed to give shelf life of the said seeds and the reason for the delayed marketing at the same time. Both the Forums below were of the opinion that this must have contributed in improper/defective yield. Both the Forums took note of the certificate issued by the Sarpanch of the village certifying that the complainant had proper irrigation and drainage facilities for his 10 acres of land. Reliance was also placed by them upon the report of Assistant Director of Horticulture, Guntoor, which clearly assessed the loss of about 70-75% of yield. Both the Forums also came to the conclusion that the petitioner did not bring on record any documentary evidence to support its claim that the complainant did not follow proper crop management practice and proceeded to grant compensation of Rs.50,000/- towards loss of crop with cost of seeds of Rs. 3,375/- plus Rs.10,000/- as compensation towards mental agony suffered by the complainant. The appeal by the complainant for enhancement was partly allowed inasmuch as it granted interest @ 9% on the amount of compensation of Rs.50,000/- from the date of filing of the complaint till its realization. And the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the District Forum was dismissed which resulted in the filing of two Revision Petitions, i.e., Revision Petition Nos. 3675 of 2007 and 3676 of 2007.
Shri Sudhir Kulshreshtha, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised two additional issues, viz., that whether provisions of Seeds Act, 1966 overrides the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and that whether the complaint is maintainable in view of the existence of the Arbitration Clause in the agreement. In support of the second issue, he placed reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleum reported in (2003) 6 SCC 503.
Shri Sudhir Kulshreshtha, learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the National Seeds Corporation-petitioner is the Corporation of Government of India and depends upon the procurement of the seeds of any vegetable produced by the farmers/growers. The growers are entering into a contract of seed production programme under an arbitration agreement between the National Seed Corporation-petitioner on the one hand and the grower/ farmer doing large-scale production on the other hand. That in the presence of Arbitration Clause, the farmer could not resort to the remedy made available under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In simple words, it means that in view of the Arbitration Clause, the petitioner could not approach District/State Commission for the redressal of its grievance in the present case. It was contended that the respondents were large-scale purchasers/sellers of seeds making it clear that the transaction in question was for a commercial purpose and, hence, the consumer complaint was not maintainable. He also reiterated the points which were argued before the State Commission on merits as well as that respondents were not consumers as the transaction was commercial.
There is no merit in either of the points raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner as these points stands settled by the authoritative pronouncements of either the Supreme Court of India or the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
Counsel for the parties have been heard at length.
As regards the question as to whether the provisions of Seeds Act, 1966 overrides the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, it may be stated that this particular point has already been concluded against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents by a 3-Member Bench of this Commission in the Revision Petition filed by the petitioner itself in National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. M. Madhusudan Reddy which is reported in 1986-2004 Consumer 8320 (NC). On the contentions raised by the petitioner in the said case that the Seeds Act, 1966 was a special Act must, therefore, would prevail over the general Act, it was held that the Seeds Act, 1966 is completely silent on the situation wherein a farmer has purchased seeds from an authorized dealer but it fails to give the desired yields. That the Seeds Act, 1966 did not deal with the pathos of the farmer who has invested his time, money and resources to get the fruits but fails to get it on account of poor quality/defective seeds. It was observed in the said case as under:-
7. The powers of the Seed Inspector are limited to draw samples of seed of the notified kind from the seller. The Act is completely silent on the situation wherein a farmer has purchased seed from an authorized dealer and of a released variety but it fails to give the desired yields even after following the agricultural practices provided for the purpose. Seeds Act does not deal with the pathos of the farmer and (loss of crop) who has invested his time, money and resources to get the fruits of green revolution but fails to get it on account of poor quality/defective seed.
8. In the absence of any clear provision in Seeds Act for compensating the farmer/consumer for his loss, we have no doubt whatsoever that his remedy lies under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In view of absence of any provisions in Seeds Act about compensating the farmer under tort first judgment of this Commission in M. Adai Kalams case (supra), has no relevance.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also argued that provisions of Section 13(1)(c) of the Act have not been followed and the onus of proof of any defect was on the complainant as per the provisions of Section 13(1)(c) of CP Act on the issue in Guruswamys case (supra) this Commission has held as follows:-
5.
There is no doubt in our mind that where complainant alleges a defect in goods which cannot be determined without proper analysis of test of the goods, there, the sample need to be taken and sent to a laboratory for analysis or test. But, the ground reality in the instant case is that reposing faith in the seller, in this case the leading Public Sector Company dealing in seed production and sale, the petitioner sowed whole of the seed purchased by him. Where was the question of any sample seed to be sent to any laboratory in the case? Whatever the respondent/complainant had, was sown. One could have appreciated the bona fides better, if sample from the crop was taken during the visit of Assistant Seed Officer of the petitioner-NSC and sent for analysis. Their failure is unexceptionable. In our view, it is the petitioner company which failed to comply with the provisions of Section 13(c) of the Act. By the time, complaint could be filed even this opportunity has passed. If the petitioner-company was little more sensitive or alert to the complaint of respondent/complainant, this situation might not have arisen. Petitioner has to pay for his insensitivity. The respondent/complainant led evidence of States Agricultural Authorities in support who made their statements after seeing the crop in the field. The onus passes on to the petitioner to prove that the crop, which grew in the field of the complainant, was of Arkajyothi of which the seed was sold and not of Sugar Baby, as alleged. He cannot take shelter under Section 13(c) of the C.P. Act. Learned Counsels plea that respondent/complainant should have kept portion of seeds purchased by him too because for sampling purposes, is not only unsustainable in law but to say the least, is very unbecoming of a leading Public Sector Seed Company to expect this arrangement."
The judgment of the Honble Supreme Court cited earlier also has no application as the main ground to Their Lordships observation was on account of the fact that National Commission disposed of the case in a summary manner. Honble Supreme Court observed as under:
The question of law raises, namely, whether respondents 1 and 2 were justified in moving the Consumer Forum for redressal on the facts of the case, is not free from doubt. However, we do not consider it necessary to decide that question of law in this case as the findings of the State Commission on the facts stare at the appellant, which cannot be lightly brushed aside.
In addition to what has already been stated in the aforesaid case, we may observe that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is a special Act having additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly, when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under the Act in addition to other remedies provided under other Acts unless there is a clear bar, as has been held by the Supreme Court in a number of judgments including Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. v. N.K. Modi reported in (1996) 6 SCC 385, State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharthi House Building Coop. Society and Others reported in (2003) 2 SCC 412, CCI Chambers Coop. Hsg. Society Ltd. v. Development Credit Bank Ltd. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 233 and Indochem Electronic and Another v. Additional Collector of Customs, A.P. reported in (2006) 3 SCC 721. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in all these cases that the Courts have to consider that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 confers additional jurisdiction upon Consumer Forums and not their exclusion.
Insofar as existence of Arbitration Clause is concerned, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a number of judgments of Supreme Court including the judgment reported in Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Shri Laxmi Knits & Wovens and Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 686, wherein the Supreme Court has taken the view that the existence of Arbitration Clause makes it mandatory for the Court to refer the parties to arbitration as Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is peremptory in nature. That the failure of the Court to refer the case of arbitration would amount to failure of justice as also causing irreparable injury to person requesting for arbitration.
None of these judgments would be applicable with reference to the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. No reliance can be placed upon either of these judgments because the Supreme Court, with reference to Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. case (supra), Skypak Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., etc. etc. reported in (2000) 5 SCC 294 and Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through Lrs. And Others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 305, has held that the existence of Arbitration Clause in agreement is no bar to the entertainment of the complaint by the Consumer Forum, which is an additional remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The remedy provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is in addition to the provisions of any other law.
In Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. case (supra), rejecting the contentions of the opposite party that the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 could not continue in view of the Arbitration Clause in the agreement entered into between the parties, Supreme Court observed as under:-
15. Accordingly, it must be held that the provisions of the Act are to be construed widely to give effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It is seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly contended by Shri Suri, that the words in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force would be given proper meaning and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the contention is not well founded. Parliament is aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act, 1872 and the consequential remedy available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., to avail of right of civil action in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act provides the additional remedy.
This judgment of the Supreme Court has been followed in a number of subsequent cases. Similarly, Supreme Court in Indochem Electronic and Another case (supra), Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society case (supra), CCI Chambers Coop. Hsg. Society Ltd. case (supra) and Vishwabharthi House Building Coop. Society and Others case (supra), has held that Consumer Protection Act, 1986 seeks to provide remedy in addition to the remedy provided under other Acts.
In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court in different cases, which have been referred to above, we find no merit in the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner.
Another contention raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the consumers-respondents failed to produce any expert opinion and analysis by invoking Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Similar contention has already been rejected by the Supreme Court of India and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Co. Ltd. v. Alavalapati Chandra Reddy & Others reported in (1998) 6 SCC 738 (see paragraphs 2 & 4 pl. g), H.N. Shankara Shastri v. Asstt. Director of Agriculture, Karnataka reported in (2004) 6 SCC 230 (see paragraph 5 pl. g-h), The Managing Director, A.P. Seeds Development Corporation Ltd. v. Seelam Rama Mohan & Anr. reported in III (1996) CPJ 435 (see paragraph
9) and M. Madhusudan Reddy case (supra).
Lastly, it was contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that petitioner was large-scale producer of seeds. Where a person purchases goods with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large-scale for earning profits, would not be a consumer within the meaning of the Act. He referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute reported in (1995) 3 SCC
583. We do not find any substance in this submission.
In the present case, the land holdings of the respondents vary from 2 to 4 acres generally and in one case, it is 10 acres of land. No doubt in paragraph 11, Their Lordships in Laxmi Engineering Works case (supra) have observed that a person who purchases goods with a view to using such goods for carrying on any activity on a large-scale basis for the purpose of earning profits would not be covered under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. If the case is read as a whole, the same is in favour of the respondents. The petitioner has extracted the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases out of context on a selective basis. The case read as a whole clearly goes to show that if the goods are purchased by the consumer for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such a person would be a consumer and such a purchase would not be treated as commercial purpose. Their Lordships in paragraph 11, itself have analyzed and observed as under:-
11. . Let us elaborate: a person who buys a typewriter or a car and uses them for his personal use is certainly a consumer but a person who buys a typewriter or a car for typing others work for consideration or for plying the car as a taxi can be said to be using the typewriter/car for a commercial purpose. The explanation however clarifies that in certain situations, purchase of goods for commercial purpose would not yet take the purchaser out of the definition of expression consumer. If the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such purchaser of goods is yet a consumer. In the illustration given above, if the purchaser himself works on typewriter or plies the car as a taxi himself, he does not cease to be a consumer. In other words, if the buyer of goods uses them himself, i.e., by self-employment, for earning his livelihood, it would not be treat as a commercial purpose and he does not cease to be a consumer for the purposes of the Act. The explanation reduces the question, what is a commercial purpose, to a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. It is not the value of the goods that matters but the purpose to which the goods bought are put to. The several words employed in the explanation, viz., uses them by himself, exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood and by means of self-employment make the intention of Parliament abundantly clear, that the goods bought must be used by the buyer himself, by employing himself for earning his livelihood. A few more illustrations would serve to emphasise what we say. A person who purchases an auto-rickshaw to ply it himself on hire for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. Similarly, a purchaser of a truck who purchases it for plying it as a public carrier by himself would be a consumer. A person who purchases a lathe machine or other machine to operate it himself for earning his livelihood would be a consumer. (In the above illustrations, if such buyer takes the assistance of one or two persons to assist/help him in operating the vehicle or machinery, he does not cease to be a consumer). As against this a person who purchases an auto-rickshaw, a car or a lathe machine or other machine to be plied or operated exclusively by another person would not be a consumer. This is the necessary limitation flowing from the expressions used by him, and by means of self-employment in the explanation. The ambiguity in the meaning of the words for the purpose of earning his livelihood is explained and clarified by the other two sets of words. (pl. b onwards, page 592 of the report) In Cheema Engineering Services v. Rajan Singh reported in (1997) 1 SCC 131 (see paragraphs 4-6 pl.
c), taking the same view, it was observed as under:-
4. If any goods are purchased for consideration, paid or promised or partly paid or under any system of deferred payment including any user of such goods other than the person who by such goods for the consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person the purchaser is the 'consumer' within the meaning of the Act.
But the Act provides for certain exceptions, namely, "does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or any commercial purpose; or...
5. The Explanation to the definition of 'consumer' has been added by way of an amendment in 1993 which reads as under:
Explanation--for the purposes of Sub-clause (i) "commercial purpose" does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment.
6. In other words, the Explanation excludes from the ambit of commercial purpose in Sub-clause (i) of Section 2(1)(d), any goods purchased by a consumer and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. Such purchase of goods is not a commercial purpose. The question, therefore, is: whether the respondent has been using the aforesaid machine for self-employment? The word 'self-employment' is not defined. Therefore, it is a matter of evidence. Unless there is evidence and on consideration thereof it is concluded that the machine was used only for self-employment to earn his livelihood without a sense of commercial purpose by employing on regular basis the employee or workmen for trade in the manufacture and sale of bricks, it would be for self-employment. Manufacture and sale of bricks in a commercial way may also be to earn livelihood, but "merely earning livelihood in commercial business", does not mean that it is not for commercial purpose. Self-employment connotes altogether a different concept, namely, he alone uses the machinery purchased for the purpose of manufacture by employing himself in working out or producing the goods for earning his livelihood. 'He' includes the members of his family. Whether the respondent is using the machine exclusively by himself and the members of his family for preparation, manufacture and sale of bricks or whether he employed any workmen and if so, how many, are matters of evidence. The burden is on the respondent to prove them. Therefore, the Tribunals were not right in concluding that the respondent is using the machine only for self-employment and that therefore, it is not a commercial purpose. The orders of all the Tribunals stand set aside. The matter is remitted to the District Forum. The District Forum is directed to record the evidence of the parties and dispose of it in accordance with law within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of this order.
The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Bhupinder Singh @ Tek Singh v. Omega Agro Private Ltd. & Ors. reported in II (1996) CPJ 86 (NC) (see paragraphs 3-5) and M/s Laxmi Agriculture Seed Store v. Dhoop Singh and Others reported in I (1995) CPJ 45 (NC) (see paragraph 7), has taken the view that the purchase of seeds for the purpose of agriculture is not a purchase of an article for commercial purpose.
Various State Commissions have also taken similar view in Mayur Seeds Corporation v. Krishna Kumar reported in IV (2005) CPJ 475 (see paragraph 7) and K. Anjaiah v. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. reported in IV (2004) CPJ 181 (see paragraph 9).
For the reasons stated above, we do not find merit in either of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and, accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs.5,000/- in each of the Revision Petitions.
Before parting with this Judgment, we must put on record our appreciation for the invaluable assistance given to us by Ms. Shobha, Advocate, who has appeared as Amicus Curie on behalf of the farmers-respondents at our request. She has worked very hard and has assisted us very well.
(ASHOK BHAN J.) PRESIDENT (B.K. TAIMNI) MEMBER